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Foreword 
 
It is my pleasure to introduce this new edition to the third e-book in the European Audiovisual 
Observatory’s IRIS Themes series, prepared in collaboration with our partner organisation, the 
Institute for Information Law (IViR) of the University of Amsterdam.  
 
The success of the first three editions has proved that a structured insight into the European 
Court of Human Rights’ case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms 
has been a widely appreciated vade mecum on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Our target group included lawyers, judges, law- and policy-makers, civil society actors, 
journalists and other media actors, academics, students, and indeed everyone with an interest 
in its subject matter. The high download figures (over 30,000 downloads in four years) as well 
as requests of translations have encouraged us to pursue on this path. The collection has 
therefore been widened so as to include the judgments or decisions that have been taken in the 
meantime. 
 
This revised edition contains summaries of over 270 judgments or decisions by the Court and 
provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via 
HUDOC, the Court’s online case-law database). It can be read in various ways: for initial 
orientation in the steadily growing Article 10 case-law; for refreshing one’s knowledge of that 
case-law; for quick reference and checking, as well as for substantive research. 
 
The summaries included in the e-book have been reported in IRIS – Legal Observations of the 
European Audiovisual Observatory between 1994 and 2017 and can be retrieved from our legal 
database, IRIS Merlin. The summaries have not been re-edited for present purposes, although 
hyperlinks to other judgments or reference texts have been introduced, as relevant; subsequent 
developments (eg. referrals of Chamber judgments to the Grand Chamber) have been indicated, 
again as relevant, and the citational style has been standardised to conform with the Court’s 
official reporting guidelines. Please see the technical tips on page 3 in order to make optimal 
use of the navigational tools in this e-book.   
 
The structure of the e-book is as follows: 
 
1. Table of cases: an overview of all the cases summarised, including bibliographic data, 
keywords, hyperlinks to the individual summaries and hyperlinks to the full texts of the 
judgments or decisions. 
 
2. Introduction by Dirk Voorhoof to trends and developments in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ case-law on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
the period 1994-2017.  
 
3. Compilation of case-law summaries.  
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4. Appendices: 
I: Cases reported in IRIS, but not included in the main selection (i.e., cases that were 
struck off the list/in which friendly settlements were reached). 
II: Overview of cases in alphabetical order. 
III: Overview of cases by country. 
IV: The European Convention on Human Rights – full text (as amended by protocols). 
 
Again, my warmest thanks go to Tarlach McGonagle (IViR), who not only conceived the idea of 
this e-book, but also designed and formatted it. I would like to thank him for his initiative and 
commitment. I am also very grateful to Dirk Voorhoof (Human Rights Centre/Ghent University, 
Legal Human Academy and ECPMF), who took care of the summaries of the judgments and the 
decisions of the Court. He has been a steadfast IRIS correspondent since the very early days of 
the publication and this e-book demonstrates the vast extent of his coverage of Article 10 case-
law in IRIS over the years.  
 
Thanks are also due to Rosanne Deen and Nanette Schumacher, former research interns at IViR, 
for their research assistance and for providing keywords and for standardising citations, 
respectively, and to Ronan Fahy, IViR, for providing keywords for new cases added to the third 
and present editions. 
 
I would also like to remind readers of the focuses of the first two volumes in the IRIS Themes 
series: standard-setting on freedom of expression and the media by the Council of Europe’s (I) 
Committee of Ministers and (II) Parliamentary Assembly.  
 
Strasbourg, March 2018 
 
Maja Cappello 
IRIS Coordinator 
Head of the Department for Legal Information 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 3 
 
 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
CASE-LAW ON ARTICLE 10, ECHR 
 
(arranged in chronological order) 
 
Please note: 
  
- Links in the first column lead directly to articles summarising the judgments or decisions in question. 
- To navigate back to the page you were on before clicking on a link, either use the “backward” button in your toolbar (if you have 
one), or else click simultaneously on <Alt> + [arrow pointing left on the right-hand-side of your keyboard]. 
- Click on the link at the bottom of each summary to access the full text of the judgment or decision via the European Court of 
Human Rights’ HUDOC database. 
- Blue hyperlinks are to texts within this e-book; red hyperlinks are to external sources. 
- In the ‘Outcome’ column: V = Violation; NV = Non-Violation; I = Inadmissible. > GC indicates that the case was subsequently 
referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court in accordance with Article 43, ECHR. Whenever mentioned, numbers refer to ECHR 
articles other than Article 10.  
 
 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
1 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. 
Austria  
13470/87 20/09
/1994 
NV Cinema, blasphemous film, religion, 
artistic expression, margin of appreciation, 
art house cinema 
Full text 39 
2 Jersild v. Denmark  15890/89 23/09
/1994 
V News reporting, interviews, anti-racism, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 40 
3 Vereiniging Weekblad 
Bluf! v. the Netherlands  
16616/90 09/02
/1995 
V National security, sensitive information, 
State secrets, impart information 
Full text 41 
4 Vereinigung 
Demokratischer Soldaten 
Österreichs & Gubi v. 
15153/89 19/12
/1994 
V Political expression, critical reporting, 
criticism, rights of others, reputation 
Full text 42 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
Austria 
5 Prager & Oberschlick v. 
Austria  
15974/90 26/04
/1995 
NV Critical reporting, offensive information, 
defamation, criticism, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 43 
6 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the 
United Kingdom  
18139/91 13/07
/1995 
V Defamation, libel, crime reporting, 
disproportionate damages 
Full text 44 
7 Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom 
17488/90 27/03
/1996 
V Protection of sources, public interest, 
responsible journalism, chilling effect, 
whistle-blowing  
Full text 45 
8 Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom 
17419/90 25/11
/1996 
NV Blasphemous film, artistic expression, 
rights of others, general verification 
system for videos, political speech, public 
interest, margin of appreciation, morals or 
religion 
Full text 47 
9 De Haes & Gijsels v. 
Belgium 
19983/92 24/02
/1997 
V Defamation, criticism, duties and 
responsibilities, mode of expression, 
exaggeration, provocation, authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, protection of 
journalistic sources, alternative evidence 
Full text 49 
10 Oberschlick (No. 2) v. 
Austria 
20834/92 01/07
/1997 
V Political expression, defamation, insult, 
offensive information, limits of acceptable 
criticism 
Full text 50 
11 Worm v. Austria 22714/93 29/08
/1997 
NV Authority and impartiality of the judiciary, 
journalism, prejudice, crime reporting, fair 
trial 
Full text 51 
12 Radio ABC v. Austria 19736/92 20/10
/1997 
V Private broadcasting, monopoly position 
of the media, positive obligations 
Full text 52 
13 Zana v. Turkey 18954/91 25/11
/1997 
NV Political expression, incitement to 
violence, terrorism 
Full text 53 
14 Grigoriades v. Greece 24348/94 25/11 V Military discipline, limits of acceptable Full text 53 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
/1997 criticism, insult 
15 Guerra v. Italy 14967/89 19/02
/1998 
NV10; 
V8 
Right to receive information, positive 
obligations, effective protection, privacy 
Full text 53 
16 Bowman v. the United 
Kingdom  
24839/94 19/02
/1998 
V Political expression, monopoly position of 
the media, critical reporting 
Full text 54 
17 Schöpfer v. Switzerland 25405/94 20/05
/1998 
NV Limits of acceptable criticism, receive 
information, critical reporting, public 
interest  
Full text 55 
18 Incal v. Turkey   09/06
/1998 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, limits of acceptable criticism, 
public interest, hate speech 
Full text 56 
19 Ahmed & others v. the 
United Kingdom 
22954/93 02/09
/1998 
NV Impart information, political expression, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 57 
20 Hertel v. Switzerland 25181/94 25/08
/1998 
V Research paper, rights of others, necessity, 
commercial speech, academic freedom 
Full text 58 
21 Lehideux & Isorni v. 
France 
24662/94 23/09
/1998 
V Advertisement, reputation, rights of 
others, abuse of rights, historical research, 
second world war 
Full text 58 
22 Steel & others v. the 
United Kingdom  
24838/94 23/09
/1998 
V Necessity, public order, rule of law, 
authority of the judiciary, breach of peace, 
preventing disorder, rights of others 
Full text 59 
23 Fressoz & Roire v. France  29183/95 21/01
/1999 
V Confidential information, public interest, 
well-known information, privacy, 
journalistic ethics, tax reports, journalists 
committing offence and public interest
  
Full text 61 
24 Janowski v. Poland  25716/94 21/01
/1999 
NV Journalism, insult, necessity, offensive and 
abusive verbal attacks 
Full text 61 
25 Bladet Tromso & 
Stensaas v. Norway 
21980/93 20/05
/1999 
V Secret information, presumption of 
innocence, critical reporting, defamation, 
Full text 63 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
honour and reputation, good faith, public 
watchdog 
26 Rekvényi v. Hungary 25390/94 20/05
/1999 
NV Politically neutral police force, national 
security, prevention of disorder 
Full text 64 
27 Arslan v. Turkey 23462/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 65 
28 Polat v. Turkey 23500/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
29 Başkaya & Okçuoğlu v. 
Turkey 
23536/94 
and 
24408/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
30 Karataş v. Turkey 23168/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
31 Erdoğdu and İnce v. 
Turkey 
25067/94 
and 
25068/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
32 Ceylan v. Turkey 23556/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
33 Okçuoğlu v. Turkey 24246/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
34 Gerger v. Turkey 24919/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
35 Sürek & Özdemir v. 
Turkey 
23927/94 
and 
24277/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
36 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) 26682/95 08/07 NV Idem. Full text 65 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
/1999  
37 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 2) 24122/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
38 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3) 24735/94 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
39 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4)  24762/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
40 Dalban v. Romania 28114/95 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, exaggeration, 
criminal libel, duty of care for journalists, 
public function, privacy, public watchdog 
Full text 67 
41 Öztürk v. Turkey  22479/93 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, incitement to crime, 
hatred or hostility, public interest, 
prevention of disorder or crime 
Full text 67 
42 Wille v. Liechtenstein 28396/95 28/10
/1999 
V Political expression, insult, critical 
reporting, public debate, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 69 
43 Nilsen & Johnsen v. 
Norway 
23118/93 25/11
/1999 
V Police brutality, defamation, receive and 
impart information, exaggeration, public 
debate, limits of acceptable criticism 
Full text 69 
44 Hashman & Harrup v. the 
United Kingdom 
25594/94 25/11
/1999 
V Unlawful action, concept of behaviour 
contra bonos mores, foreseeability 
Full text 69 
45 T. v. the United Kingdom 24724/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest Full text 70 
46 V. v. the United Kingdom  24888/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest 
 
Full text 70 
47 News Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria 
31457/96 11/01
/2000 
V Defamation, reputation, rights of others, 
public concern, publication of photos, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 71 
48 Fuentes Bobo v. Spain 39293/98 29/02
/2000 
V Offensive information, criticism, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
Full text 72 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
obligations, reputation, rights of others, 
employment relations, dismissal 
49 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey  23144/93 16/03
/2000 
V Critical media reporting, separatist 
propaganda, racism, political expression, 
positive obligations, horizontal effect of 
human rights 
Full text 72 
50 Andreas Wabl v. Austria  24773/94 21/03
/2000 
NV Political expression, defamation, Nazism, 
offensive information 
Full text 73 
51 Bergens Tidende v. 
Norway 
26132/95 02/05
/2000 
V Defamation, publication of photos, 
reputation, rights of others, good faith, 
public watchdog 
Full text 74 
52 Erdogdu v. Turkey 25723/94 15/06
/2000 
V Propaganda against the territorial integrity 
of the State, terrorism, access, receive 
information, prevention of disorder or 
crime 
Full text 75 
53 Constantinescu v. 
Romania  
28871/95 27/06
/2000 
NV Criminal defamation, criticism, public 
debate, interview, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 75 
54 Sener v. Turkey 26680/95 18/07
/2000 
V Vital role of press, positive obligations,  
political expression, public interest, 
receive information 
Full text 77 
55 Tele 1 
Privatfernsehgesellschaft 
MBH v. Austria 
32240/96 21/09
/2000 
V & 
NV 
Allocation of broadcasting licence, impart 
information, monopoly position of the 
media 
Full text 78 
56 Lopes Gomes da Silva v. 
Portugal 
37698/97 28/09
/2000 
V Vital role of press, political expression, 
limits of acceptable criticism, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 78 
57 Du Roy & Malaurie v. 
France  
34000/96 03/10
/2000 
V Public interest, secrecy during 
investigation and enquiry procedures, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 80 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
58 Akkoç v. Turkey 22947/93 
and 
22948/93 
10/10
/2000 
NV Interview, disciplinary sanction, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence, armed 
resistance or an uprising 
Full text 81 
59 Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey  28635/95, 
30171/96 
and 
34535/97 
10/10
/2000 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence 
Full text 81 
60 Tammer v. Estonia 41205/98 06/02
/2001 
NV Privacy, private information, politician, 
public interest, defamation 
Full text 82 
61 Jerusalem v. Austria 26958/95 27/02
/2001 
V Political expression, public debate, facts 
or value judgments 
Full text 83 
62 B. & P. v. the United 
Kingdom 
36337/97 
and 
35974/97 
24/04
/2001 
NV Privacy, protection of vulnerable persons, 
necessity 
Full text 84 
63 Cyprus v. Turkey 25781/94 10/05
/2001 
V Conflict between State Parties, censorship 
of school-books, restricted distribution 
and importation media 
Full text 85 
64 VgT Vereinigung Tegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland 
24699/94 28/06
/2001 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 86 
65 Ekin Association v. France 39288/98 17/07
/2001 
V Insult of foreigners, discrimination based 
on foreign origin 
Full text 88 
66 Feldek v. Slovakia 29032/95 12/07
/2001 
V Facts or value judgments, political speech, 
public interest, common knowledge, limits 
of acceptable criticism 
Full text 89 
67 Perna v. Italy 48898/99 25/07
/2001 
V, >GC Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest  
Full text 90 
68 Thoma v. Luxembourg 38432/97 29/03
/2001 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, quoting other media sources, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 92 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
69 Marônek v. Slovakia 32686/96 19/04
/2001 
V Well-known information, public interest, 
rule of law, good faith, reputation, rights 
of others 
Full text 93 
70 Bankovic & others v. 
Belgium & others 
52207/99 12/12
/2001 
I NATO-bombing of TV station, 
inadmissible, jurisdiction, treaty 
obligations of State Parties 
Full text 94 
71 E.K. v. Turkey 28496/95 07/02
/2002 
V Book, political expression, vital role of 
press, receive information 
Full text 95 
72 Unabhängige Initiative 
Informationsvielfalt v. 
Austria 
28525/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, political debate, 
public interest, value judgment 
Full text 96 
73 Dichand & others v. 
Austria 
29271/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, offensive 
information, public interest, value 
judgments 
Full text 96 
74 Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Austria  
34315/96 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, publication of photos, 
vital role of press, public interest, privacy 
Full text 96 
75 De Diego Nafría v. Spain 46833/99 14/03
/2002 
NV Defamation, criticism, limits of 
acceptable criticism, public interest, 
employment relation 
Full text 98 
76 Gaweda v. Poland 26229/95 14/03
/2002 
V Lack of clarity, accessible and foreseeable, 
printed media 
Full text 99 
77 Nikula v. Finland 31611/96 21/03
/2002 
V Defamation, criticism, fair trial, potential 
chilling effect of criminal sanctions, 
lawyer 
Full text 100 
78 McVicar v. the United 
Kingdom 
46311/99 02/05
/2002 
NV Defamation, public interest, well-known 
sports figures, factual evidence 
Full text 101 
79 Colombani & others v. 
France 
51279/99 25/06
/2002 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public watchdog, public 
function of press 
Full text 102 
80 Wilson & NUJ v. the 30668/96, 02/07 V 11 Journalism, freedom of assembly and Full text 103 
 11 
 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
United Kingdom 30671/96 
and 
30678/96 
/2002 association, necessity  
81 Yagmuredereli v. Turkey 29590/96 04/06
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
separatist propaganda, violence, national 
security 
Full text 104 
82 Seher Karatas v. Turkey  33179/96 09/07
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
incitement to hatred or hostility, national 
security 
Full text 104 
83 Stambuk v. Germany 37928/97 17/10
/2002 
V Medical advertising, rights of others, 
protect health, commercial speech, public 
interest 
Full text 105 
84 Ayse Öztürk v. Turkey 24914/94 15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, terrorism, incitement 
to violence, public debate, positive 
obligation 
Full text 107 
85 Karakoç & others v. 
Turkey  
27692/95, 
28138/95 
and 
28498/95 
15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, public watchdog, 
separatist propaganda, positive obligation 
Full text 107 
86 Demuth v. Switzerland 38743/97 05/11
/2002 
NV Allocation of broadcasting licence, media 
pluralism, margin of appreciation 
Full text 109 
87  Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 28493/95 05/12
/2002 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, receive information, positive 
obligation 
Full text 111 
88 Dicle on behalf of DEP 
(Democratic Party) v. 
Turkey  
25141/94 10/12
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, positive 
obligation 
Full text 111 
89 A. v. the United Kingdom 35373/97 17/12
/2002 
NV 6, 
8, 13, 
14 
Political expression, right of access, 
defamation, discrimination, privacy 
 
Full text 112 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
90 Roemen & Schmit v. 
Luxembourg 
51772/99 25/02
/2003 
V Protection of sources, search of homes, 
privacy, responsible journalism 
Full text 114 
91 Peck v. the United 
Kingdom 
44647/98 28/01
/2003 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, reasonable 
expectation of privacy, CCTV, media 
reporting 
Full text 116 
92 Cordova v. Italy (Nos. 1 & 
2) 
40877/98 
and 
45649/99 
30/01
/2003 
V 6 Defamation, insult, duties and 
responsibilities, public interest, reputation 
Full text: 
No. 1 
No. 2 
118 
93 Perna v. Italy [Grand 
Chamber] 
48898/99 06/05
/2003 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation 
Full text 119 
94 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark 
49017/99 19/06
/2003 
NV 10, 
6, >GC 
Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 121 
95 Murphy v. Ireland 44179/98 10/07
/2003 
NV Broadcasting prohibition, religious 
advertising, margin of appreciation 
Full text 122 
96 Ernst & others v. Belgium 33400/96 15/07
/2003 
V 10, 
8 
Protection of sources, journalism, 
overriding public interest 
Full text 123 
97 Karkin v. Turkey 43928/98 23/09
/2003 
V Political expression, hate speech, 
discrimination, racism 
Full text 124 
98 Kizilyaprak v. Turkey 27528/95 02/10
/2003 
V Receive information, separatist 
propaganda, hate speech based on ethnic 
and regional differences 
Full text 125 
99 Gündüz v. Turkey 35071/97 04/12
/2003 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, religious intolerance, positive 
obligations, shocking or offensive 
information, live studio debate, hatred or 
hostility, pluralism 
Full text 126 
100 Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey 42435/98 09/03
/2004 
V Political expression, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, social, ethnic and regional 
differences 
Full text 127 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
101 Radio France v. France 53984/00 30/03
/2004 
NV Privacy, good name and reputation, 
responsible journalism, exaggeration, 
provocation 
Full text 128 
102 Von Hannover v. Germany 59320/00 24/06
/2004 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, continual 
harassment, public interest, conflicting 
human rights   
Full text 129 
103 Österreichischer 
Rundfunk v. Austria (dec.) 
57597/00 25/05
/2004 
I Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 130 
104 Editions Plon v. France 56148/00 18/05
/2004 
V Privacy, public interest, medical 
confidentiality, journalistic ethics, rights of 
others 
Full text 131 
105 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark [Grand 
Chamber] 
49017/99 17/12
/2004 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 132 
106 Cumpana & Mazare v. 
Romania [Grand Chamber] 
33348/96 17/12
/2004 
V Defamation, insult, limits of acceptable 
criticism, factual basis or value judgments, 
reputation, privacy, chilling effect, public 
watchdog 
Full text 133 
107 Steel & Morris v. the 
United Kingdom 
68416/01 15/02
/2005 
V 10, 
6 
Defamation, libel, potential chilling effect, 
reputation, public debate 
Full text 135 
108 Independent News and 
Media v. Ireland 
55120/00 16/06
/2005 
NV Political expression, defamation, libel, 
chilling effect, margin of appreciation 
Full text 136 
109 Grinberg v. Russia 23472/03 21/07
/2005 
V Defamation, political expression, facts and 
value judgments, public function of press, 
public watchdog, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public function, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 138 
110 IA v. Turkey 42571/98 13/09
/2005 
NV Religious insult, rights of others, 
provocative opinions, abusive and  
Full text 140 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
offensive information 
111 Wirtschafts-Trend 
Zeitschriften-Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria 
58547/00 27/10
/2005 
V Limits of acceptable criticism, political 
expression, defamation, high degree of 
tolerance, public interest  
Full text 141 
112 Tourancheau & July v. 
France 
53886/00 24/11
/2005 
NV Crime reporting, necessity, reputation, 
rights of others, presumption of innocence 
Full text 143 
113 Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. 
Denmark 
40485/02 08/12
/2005 
NV Protection of sources, vulnerable persons, 
positive obligations, major crime 
Full text 145 
114 Giniewski v. France 64016/00 31/01
/2006 
V Religion, defamation, religious insult, 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 147 
115 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 64178/00, 
64179/00, 
64181/00, 
64183/00, 
64184/00 
30/03
/2006 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 148 
116 Stoll v. Switzerland 69698/01 25/04
/2006 
V, >GC Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 150 
117 Dammann v. Switzerland 77551/01 25/04
/2006 
V Confidential information, public 
discussion, vital role of press, public 
watchdog, newsgathering 
Full text 152 
118 Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey  50692/99 02/02
/2006 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, positive obligations, religion 
Full text 153 
119 Erbakan v. Turkey 59405/00 06/07
/2006 
V Political debate, political expression, hate 
speech, intolerance, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, religion 
Full text 154 
120 Matky v. Czech Republic 19101/03 10/07
/2006 
I Receive information, access to public or 
administrative documents, positive 
obligations, rights of others, national 
security, public health, public interest 
Full text 156 
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come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
121 Monnat v. Switzerland 73604/01 21/09
/2006 
V Broadcasting, critical reporting, public 
interest, positive obligations, anti-
Semitism, politically engaged journalism, 
journalistic ethics, public watchdog 
Full text 158 
122 White v. Sweden 42435/02 19/09
/2006 
NV 8 Privacy, good name and reputation, 
defamation, exaggeration, provocation, 
journalistic ethics, positive obligation, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 160 
123 Klein v. Slovakia 72208/01 31/10
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, religion, critically comment 
Full text 161 
124 Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Cine 
Revue v. Belgium 
64772/01 09/11
/2006 
NV Censorship, privacy, strictly confidential 
correspondence, public interest  
Full text 162 
125 Radio Twist v. Slovakia 62202/00 19/12
/2006 
V Privacy, political information, public 
interest, use of illegally recorded 
telephone conversation 
Full text 164 
126 Mamère v. France 12697/03 07/11
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation, libel, public 
interest, political expression, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 166 
127 Österreichischer 
Rundfunk v. Austria 
35841/02 07/12
/2006 
V Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 168 
128 Nikowitz & 
Verlagsgruppe News 
GmbH v. Austria 
5266/03 22/02
/2007 
V Defamation, value judgments, well-known 
information, humorous commentary, 
acceptable satire, public interest 
Full text 169 
129 Tønsberg Blad AS & Marit 
Haukom v. Norway 
510/04 01/03
/2007 
V Criticism, defamation, reputation, right to 
receive information, public interest, good 
faith, journalistic ethics, duty to verify 
factual allegations 
Full text 170 
130 Colaço Mestre & SIC v. 11182/03 26/04 V Interview, public interest, defamation, Full text 172 
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come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
Portugal and 
11319/03 
/2007 journalistic ethics 
131 Dupuis & others v. France 1914/02 07/06
/2007 
V Confidential but well-known information, 
public interest, public watchdog, chilling 
effect, newsgathering 
Full text 173 
132 Hachette Filipacchi 
Associés v. France 
71111/01 14/06
/2007 
NV Rights of others, privacy, human dignity, 
very high circulation of information, 
accessibility and foreseeability 
Full text 174 
133 Lionarakis v. Greece 1131/05 05/07
/2007 
V 10, 
6 
Political expression, radio broadcast, 
defamation, facts or value judgments, 
value judgments with factual basis 
Full text 176 
134 Glas Nadezhda EOOD & 
Elenkov v. Bulgaria 
14134/02 11/10
/2007 
V 10, 
13 
Allocation of radio licence, religion, lack of 
motivation of the judgment, transparency, 
licensing procedure 
Full text 177 
135 Filatenko v. Russia 73219/01 06/12
/2007 
V Defamation, public interest, reputation, 
good faith, journalistic ethics 
Full text 179 
136 Stoll v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
69698/01 10/12
/2007 
NV Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 180 
137 Nur Radyo v. Turkey 6587/03 27/11
/2007 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, shocking or 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 182 
138 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey  11369/03 04/12
/2007 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 182 
139 Voskuil v. The 
Netherlands 
64752/01 22/11
/2007 
V Confidential information, protection of 
sources, integrity of the police and judicial 
authorities, right to remain silent, public 
watchdog 
Full text 184 
140 Tillack v. Belgium 20477/05 27/11 V Protection of sources, searches of homes Full text 184 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
/2007 and workplaces, public watchdog 
141 Guja v. Moldova 14277/04 12/02
/2008 
V Whistleblowing, public interest, 
journalistic ethics, duties and 
responsibilities, good faith, chilling effect, 
employment relation 
Full text 186 
142 Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 
(No. 3) 
71353/01 22/04
/2008 
V Incitement to hatred or hostility, 
separatism, necessity 
Full text 188 
143 Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop 
Movsesyan v. Armenia 
32283/04 17/06
/2008 
V Non-discriminatory allocation of 
frequencies or broadcasting licences, 
licencing procedure 
Full text 189 
144 Flux (No. 6) v. Moldova 22824/04 29/07
/2008 
NV Criticism, sensationalism, defamation, 
journalistic ethics, unprofessional 
behaviour, chilling effect, lack of factual 
basis for allegations 
Full text 191 
145 Petrina v. Romania 78060/01 14/10
/2008 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, defamation, 
libel, reputation 
Full text 193 
146 Leroy v. France 36109/03 02/10
/2008 
NV Public interest, artistic expression, 
glorifying terrorism, political expression, 
activism, cartoon 
Full text 194 
147 TV Vest SA Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v. Norway 
21132/05 11/12
/2008 
V Television, political advertising, positive 
obligation, margin of appreciation, 
pluralism 
Full text 196 
148 Khurshid Mustafa & 
Tarzibachi v. Sweden 
23883/06 16/12
/2008 
V Language of television, freedom to receive 
information, positive obligation, horizontal 
effect, disproportionality of the 
interference      
Full text 198 
149 Times Newspapers Ltd. 
(Nos. 1 & 2) v. the United 
Kingdom 
3002/03 
and 
23676/03 
10/03
/2009 
NV Internet, internet publication rule, 
defamation, libel, education, historical 
research, responsible journalism, news 
archives 
Full text 200 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
150 Faccio v. Italy 33/04 31/03
/2009 
I Disproportionate measure, right to receive 
information, privacy, licence fee. 
Full text 202 
151 A. v. Norway 28070/06 09/04
/2009 
V 8 Crime reporting, defamation, presumption 
of innocence, privacy, margin of 
appreciation, moral and psychological 
integrity, protection of minors 
Full text 203 
152 TASZ v. Hungary 37374/05 14/04
/2009 
V Access to information, public or official 
documents, open government, indirect 
censorship, personal information of a 
politician, social watchdog 
Full text 205 
153 Kenedi v. Hungary 31475/05 26/05
/2009 
V 10, 
6, 13 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, public watchdog 
Full text 207 
154 Féret v. Belgium 15615/07 16/07
/2009 
NV Hate speech, insult of foreigners, political 
expression, election campaign, public 
debate 
Full text 209 
155 Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland 20436/02 16/07
/2009 
V Public interest, pluralism, facts or value 
judgments, duties and responsibilities, 
good faith, employment relation 
Full text 211 
156 Manole & others v. 
Moldova 
13936/02 17/09
/2009 
V Broadcasting licences, political 
independence political independence of 
media, pluralism, censorship, public 
service broadcasting 
Full text 213 
157 VgT Vereinigung gegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland (No. 2) [Grand 
Chamber] 
32772/02 30/06
/2009 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 215 
158 Pasko v. Russia 69519/01 22/10
/2009 
NV Confidential information, state secrets, 
national security, military information 
Full text 217 
159 Ürper & others v. Turkey 14526/07, 
14747/07, 
20/10
/2009 
V Terrorism, suspension of publication and 
distribution of newspaper, public 
Full text 219 
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come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
15022/07, 
15737/07, 
36137/07, 
47245/07, 
50371/07, 
50372/07 
and 
54637/07 
watchdog 
160 Financial Times & others 
v. the United Kingdom 
821/03 15/12
/2009 
V Protection of journalistic sources, a source 
acting in bad faith, public interest 
Full text 220 
161 Laranjeira Marques da 
Silva v. Portugal 
16983/06 19/01
/2010 
V Political expression, defamation, facts or 
value judgments, reputation, public 
interest 
Full text 222 
162 Alfantakis v. Greece 49330/0 11/02
/2010 
V Television interview, defamation, insult, 
reputation, live broadcasting, facts or 
value judgments 
Full text 224 
163 Flinkkilä & others v. 
Finland 
25576/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest 
Full text 225 
164 Jokitaipale & others v. 
Finland 
43349/05 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
165 Iltalehti & Karhuvaara v. 
Finland 
6372/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
166 Soila v. Finland 6806/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
167 Tuomela & others v. 
Finland  
25711/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
168 Renaud v. France 13290/07 25/02
/2010 
V Internet, political speech, criticism, 
emotional political debate, tolerance, facts 
or value judgments, chilling effect 
Full text 227 
169 Jean-Marie Le Pen v. 18788/09 20/04 I Offensive information, hate speech,  Full text 228 
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come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
France /2010 political debate, reputation, rights of 
others, exaggeration, provocation 
170 Akdas v. Turkey 41056/04 16/02
/2010 
V Artistic expression, obscene or immoral 
information, fiction, 
exaggeration, humorous, duties and 
responsibilities, protection of morals  
Full text 230 
171 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 40984/07 22/04
/2010 
V Sensitive and offensive information, 
defamation, terrorism, historical truth, 
public watchdog, disproportionate 
sanction, order of immediate release from 
prison 
Full text 231 
172 Andreescu v. Romania 19452/02 08/06
/2010 
V 10, 
6 
Access, defamation, insult, reputation, 
facts or value judgments, public debate, 
good faith 
Full text 234 
173 Aksu v. Turkey 4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
27/07
/2010 
NV 14, 
8, >GC 
Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation, racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy 
Full text 236 
174 Sanoma v. The 
Netherlands 
38224/03 14/09
/2010 
V Protection of journalistic sources, public 
interest, public watchdog 
Full text 238 
175 Gillberg v. Sweden 41723/06 02/11
/2010 
NV 10, 
8, >GC 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 240 
176 Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon 
Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
(No. 2) 
42284/05 12/10
/2010 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, rule of law, 
positive obligations  
Full text 243 
177 MGN Ltd. v. United 
Kingdom 
39401/04 18/01
/2011 
V Public interest, privacy, chilling effect, 
disproportionality of interference 
Full text 244 
178 Yleisradio Oy & others v. 30881/09 08/02 NV Defamation, confidential and sensitive Full text 245 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
Finland /2011 information, privacy, private persons,  
179 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 2034/07 15/03
/2011 
V Political expression, insult, value 
judgments, honour, privacy, dignity, public 
debate, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 246 
180 RTBF v. Belgium 50084/06 29/03
/2011 
V Broadcasting, patients’ rights, impart 
information, prior restraint, censorship, 
foreseeability of law 
Full text 247 
181 Mosley v. the United 
Kingdom 
48009/08 10/05
/2011 
NV 8 Privacy, positive obligation, 
prenotification, public interest, margin of 
appreciation, chilling effect 
Full text 248 
182 Sigma Radio Television 
Ltd. V. Cyprus 
32181/04 
and 
35122/05 
21/07
/2011 
NV 10, 
14 
Rights of others, decisions by independent 
media regulators, budget neutrality, 
margin of appreciation, discrimination 
Full text 250 
183 Sipoş v. Romania 26125/04 03/05
/2011 
V 8 Journalism, defamation, insult, privacy, 
horizontal effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, chilling effect of criminal 
sanctions 
Full text 252 
184 Karttunen v. Finland 1685/10 10/05
/2011 
I Internet, possession and reproduction of 
child pornography, illegal content, artistic 
expression 
Full text 254 
185 Avram & others v. 
Moldova 
41588/05 05/07
/2011 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, undercover 
video, journalism 
Full text 256 
186 Standard News Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria (No. 3) 
34702/07 10/01
/2012 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, public figure, 
defamation, libel  
Full text 258 
187 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany 
39954/08 07/02
/2012 
V Privacy, reputation, receive information, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 260 
188 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 2)  
40660/08 
and 
60614/08 
07/02
/2012 
NV 8 Privacy in public areas, public interest, 
entertainment press, conflicting human 
rights 
Full text 260 
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come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
189 Tusalp v. Turkey 32131/08 
and 
41617/08 
21/02
/2012 
V Defamation, journalistic freedom of 
expression, value judgments, Prime 
Minister’s personality rights, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 262 
190 Aksu v. Turkey [Grand 
Chamber] 
4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
15/03
/2012 
NV 8 Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation, racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy  
Full text 264 
191 Vejdeland & others v. 
Sweden 
1813/07 09/02
/2012 
NV Hate speech, homophobia, insult 
homosexuals, pamphlets, school  
Full text 266 
192 Gillberg v. Sweden [Grand 
Chamber] 
41723/06 03/04
/2012 
NV Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 268 
193 Frasilă and Ciocirlan v. 
Romania 
25329/03 10/05
/2012 
V Positive obligations, access, rights of 
others, public debate, public watchdog, 
pluralism 
Full text 269 
194 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and 
Di Stefano v. Italy 
38433/09 07/06
/2012 
V 10, 
AP-
1(1) 
Dominant position over the audiovisual 
media, allocation of frequencies, media 
pluralism, right to receive information 
Full text 270 
195 Mouvement raëlien suisse 
v. Switzerland 
16354/06 13/07
/2012 
NV Internet, illegal content, poster campaign, 
aliens, proselytising speech, the protection 
of morals, health, rights of others and 
prevention of crime 
Full text 272 
196 Schweizerische Radio- 
und Fernseh gesellschaft 
SRG v. Switzerland  
34124/06 21/06
/2012 
V Television interview, political and 
economic expression, rights of others, 
public interest, privacy, security, margin of 
appreciation, public interest 
Full text 274 
197 Ressiot & others v. France 15054/07 
and 
28/06
/2012 
V Protection of sources, disproportionality of 
interference, searches of offices of 
Full text 276 
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Keywords HUDOC Page 
15066/07 newspapers, searches of homes 
198 Szima v. Hungary 29723/11 09/10
/2012 
NV Internet, criticism, labour union, 
disciplinary sanction 
Full text 277 
199 Telegraaf Media 
Nederland Landelijke 
Media B.V. & Others v. the 
Netherlands 
39315/06 22/11
/2012 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
intelligence and security services, 
surveillance, coercive measures, ex ante 
review 
Full text 279 
200 Nenkova-Lalova v. 
Bulgaria 
35745/05 11/12
/2012 
NV Dismissal of journalist, disciplinary 
sanction 
Full text 281 
201 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey 3111/10 18/12
/2012 
V Internet, defamation, blocking of Google 
Sites, disproportionate measure, 
prescribed by law 
Full text 283 
202 Ashby Donald & Others v. 
France 
36769/08 10/01
/2013 
NV Intellectual property, unauthorised 
reproduction of fashion photos, Internet, 
margin of appreciation, news reporting 
exception, commercial speech 
Full text 285 
203 Frederik Neij & Peter 
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The 
Pirate Bay) v. Sweden 
(dec.) 
40397/12 19/02
/2013 
I Copyright, The Pirate Bay, Internet file-
sharing service, illegal use of copyright-
protected music, conviction, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 287 
204 Eon v. France 26118/10 14/03
/2013 
V Insult of President, discussion of matters 
of public interest, private life or honour, 
satire, chilling effect 
Full text 289 
205 Saint-Paul Luxembourg 
S.A. v. Luxembourg 
26419/10 18/04
/2013 
V 10, 
8 
Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, identification of author, 
proportionality 
Full text 291 
206 Animal Defenders 
International v. the 
United Kingdom [Grand 
Chamber] 
48876/08 22/04
/2013 
NV Public debate, ban on political advertising, 
NGO, powerful financial groups, access, 
influential media, alternative media, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 293 
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Keywords HUDOC Page 
207 Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia 
(dec.) 
45199/09 21/05
/2013 
I Broadcasting licence, licensing body, 
arbitrary interference, procedural 
safeguards, domestic enforcement of 
Court’s judgment, fresh violation of 
freedom of expression 
Full text 295 
208 Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights v. Serbia 
48135/06 25/06
/2013 
V Access to documents held by public 
authorities, NGO, electronic surveillance 
measures, freedom of information 
legislation, public debate, public interest, 
public watchdog 
Full text 296 
209 Nagla v. Latvia 73469/10 16/07
/2013 
V Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, chilling effect, safeguards 
against abuse, pressing social need 
Full text 297 
210 Węgrzynowski and 
Smolczewski v. Poland 
33846/07 16/07
/2013 
NV 10, 
8 
Personality rights, online news media, 
digital archives, public watchdog, privacy, 
libel, rectification 
Full text 298 
211 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 3) 
8772/10 19/09
/2013 
NV 8 Photograph, injunction prohibiting further 
publication, debate of general interest, 
public figure, privacy, freedom of the 
press, positive obligations 
Full text 300 
212 Belpietro v. Italy 43612/10 24/09
/2013 
V Freedom of parliamentary speech, 
parliamentary immunity, defamation, 
public officials, conviction, editorial 
control, chilling effect 
Full text 301 
213 Ricci v. Italy 30210/06 08/10
/2013 
V Satirical television programme, disclosure 
of confidential images, suspended prison 
sentence, ethics of journalism, chilling 
effect 
Full text 303 
214 Delfi AS v. Estonia 64569/09 10/10
/2013 
NV, 
>GC 
Internet news portal, grossly insulting 
remarks, readers’ comments, ISP liability 
Full text 305 
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come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
(exemption), filter, notice-and-takedown, 
editorial control, economic interest 
215 Ristamäki and Korvola v. 
Finland 
66456/09 29/10
/2013 
V Defamation, conviction, protection of 
reputation, public interest, tax inspection 
Full text 307 
216 Österreichische 
Vereinigung zur 
Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines 
wirtschaftlich gesunden 
land- und 
forstwirtschaftlichen 
Grundbesitzes v. Austria 
39534/07 28/11
/2013 
V NGO, gathering of information in public 
interest, public debate, right of access to 
information, positive State obligations, 
information monopoly, social watchdog 
Full text 309 
217 Perinçek v. Switzerland 27510/08 17/12
/2013 
V, >GC Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 311 
218 Lillo-Stenberg and 
Sæther v. Norway 
13258/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 8 Public figures, respect for private life, 
wedding, accessibility to public, image, 
personality, reputation, fair balance 
Full text 313 
219 Tierbefreier E.V. v. 
Germany 
45192/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 10, 
14 
Association, animal rights, film, website, 
injunction, personality rights of company, 
debate on matters of public interest, 
unfair means 
Full text 315 
220 Pentikäinen v. Finland 11882/10 04/02
/2014 
NV, 
>GC 
Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 317 
221 Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey 39690/06, 
40559/06,
48815/06, 
25/03
/2014 
V 10, 
6 
Criminal conviction, publication of 
declarations by illegal armed organisation, 
right to fair trial, fight against terrorism, 
Full text 319 
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Keywords HUDOC Page 
2512/07, 
55197/07, 
55199/07, 
55201/07 
and 
55202/07 
no encouragement of violence, no hate 
speech 
222 Brosa v. Germany 5709/09 17/04
/2014 
V Freedom of political expression, pre-
election, neo-Nazi organisation, private 
individual, public discussion, mayoral 
election, acceptable criticism, honour and 
social reputation, sufficient factual basis 
Full text 320 
223 Salumäki v. Finland 23605/09 29/04
/2014 
NV Newspaper article, insinuation, criminal 
conviction, private life, reputation, fair 
balance, public interest, presumption of 
innocence, margin of appreciation 
Full text 322 
224 Taranenko v. Russia 19554/05 15/05
/2014 
V 10, 
11 
Freedom of assembly and association, 
leaflets, occupation of administrative 
premises, conviction, prison sentence, pre-
trial detention, chilling effect 
Full text 324 
225 Roşiianu v. Romania 27329/06 24/06
/2014 
V Right of access to public documents, 
public interest, journalism, efficient 
enforcement mechanisms, arbitrary 
restrictions, indirect censorship 
Full text 325 
226 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany (No. 2) 
48311/10 10/07
/2014 
V Protection of reputation, private life, value 
judgment, former Chancellor, public 
figure, degree of tolerance, public 
watchdog 
Full text 327 
227 Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria 8429/05 30/10
/2014 
V 8 Private life, confiscation of computers, 
illegal software, illegal distribution and 
reproduction, search-and-seizure, arbitrary 
Full text 329 
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interference, sufficient guarantees 
228 Matúz v. Hungary 73571/10 21/10
/2014 
V Whistleblower, journalist, confidential 
information, censorship, public 
broadcasting organisation, public interest, 
severity of sanction 
Full text 331 
229 Urechean and Pavlicenco 
v. Moldova  
27756/05 
and 
41219/07 
02/12
/2014 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, President, 
blanket immunity, right of access to courts 
Full text 333 
230 Uzeyir Jafarov v. 
Azerbaijan 
54204/08 29/01
/2015 
V 3 Violent attack, journalist, favourable 
environment, participation in public 
debate, effective investigation, prohibition 
of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment 
Full text 335 
231 Bohlen v. Germany 53495/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 337 
232 Ernst August von 
Hannover v. Germany  
53649/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 337 
234 Haldimann and Others v. 
Switzerland  
21830/09 24/02
/2015 
V Hidden cameras, private life, public 
interest, personal reputation, ethics of 
journalism, good faith, accurate factual 
basis 
Full text 339 
235 Morice v. France [Grand 
Chamber] 
29369/10 23/04
/2015 
V Defamation, investigative judges, lawyers, 
sufficient factual basis, public interest, 
value judgments, judicial proceedings, 
authority of judiciary, chilling effect 
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Introduction  
Prof. em. dr. Dirk Voorhoof 
(Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Legal Human Academy and European Centre for Press 
and Media Freedom/ECPMF) 
 
Since its inception in 1995, IRIS – Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory has 
given a prominent place to the European Court of Human Rights’ (‘ECtHR’, or ‘the Court’) 
jurisprudence on the right to freedom of expression and information, in particular as regards 
audiovisual media, film and journalism. Its very first issue of January 1995 included focuses on 
two judgments with specific relevance for audiovisual media and film. The judgment in the 
case Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994) concerned the seizure and forfeiture of 
a film (Das Liebeskonzil) considered blasphemous (at that time) by the Austrian authorities. The 
Court found no violation of Article 10 of the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’, or ‘the European Convention’), accepting the reasoning 
that the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans would be offended in their religious feelings by the 
mere fact of announcing and showing the film in a special featured programme in a cinema. In 
Jersild v. Denmark (23 September 1994), the ECtHR came to the conclusion that it was not 
necessary in a democratic society to convict a journalist for aiding and abetting in the 
dissemination of racist remarks made by extremist youths in a television programme. The Court 
was of the opinion that the punishment of a television news journalist for assisting in the 
dissemination of racist statements made by another person in an interview would seriously 
hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest. It also stated that 
it was not for the courts or judges “to substitute their own views for those of the press as to what 
technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists” and that “news reporting based on 
interviews, whether edited or not, constitutes one of the most important means whereby the press 
is able to play its vital role as public watchdog”. In this case, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 
10, ECHR, by the Danish authorities. 
 
These were certainly not the first judgments of the ECtHR related to freedom of expression and 
information with special relevance for audiovisual media, film and journalism. Before 1995 
when IRIS was launched, other landmark judgments on freedom of expression and media had 
already been delivered by the ECtHR, interpreting and applying the European Convention as a 
binding instrument of human rights protection in Europe. The ECtHR found violations of the 
right to freedom of expression and information in a series of interesting cases, such as: Sunday 
Times no. 1 v. the United Kingdom (26 April 1979; pre-trial reporting in the media); Lingens v. 
Austria (8 July 1986; right to criticise a politician and the distinction between allegations of 
facts and value-judgments, the latter not being susceptible of proof), and Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. 
Iceland (25 June 1992; the right to comment critically on alleged police brutalities).  
 
The very first judgments with specific relevance for the audiovisual media were Groppera Radio 
AG a.o. v. Switzerland (28 March 1990) and Autronic AG v. Switzerland (22 May 1990). In Groppera, 
a ban on the retransmission by cable networks of the programmes of a Swiss radio station, 
having evaded the Swiss broadcasting law by establishing its transmitters in Italy, was not 
considered to be a violation of Article 10, ECHR. In Autronic AG, the refusal by the Swiss 
authorities to grant an authorisation to install a satellite dish for receiving television 
programmes broadcast by a telecommunications satellite was considered a violation of Article 
10, ECHR, thereby explicitly recognising the right to receive broadcast television programmes. 
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Many years later, in Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden (16 December 2008), the Court 
emphasised the importance of the right to receive television programmes in one’s own language 
in a case where Swedish nationals of Iraqi origin had been forced to move from their rented flat 
as they had refused to remove a satellite dish in their flat after the landlord had initiated 
proceedings against them. The landlord considered the installation of a satellite antenna as a 
breach of the tenancy agreement that stipulated that ‘outdoor antennae’ were not allowed to 
be set up on the house. The ECtHR, however, considered the eviction of the family as a 
disproportionate measure amounting to a violation of Article 10, ECHR. 
 
One of the first ECtHR judgments to be brought to the attention of the IRIS-readership (IRIS 
1996/4) was the judgment in the case of Goodwin v. the United Kingdom. A few months earlier, 
the editorial in IRIS 1996/1 had already announced this forthcoming ‘landmark judgment’ on 
the protection of journalistic sources. In its judgment of 27 March 1996, the ECtHR came to the 
conclusion that a disclosure order requiring a British journalist to reveal the identity of his 
source and the fine imposed upon him for having refused to do so, constituted a violation of 
the right to freedom of expression and information as protected by Article 10 of the European 
Convention.  
 
Another judgment reported in IRIS in 1996 was the case of Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 
November 1996): the decision by the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) to reject 
classification of a blasphemous film (Visions of Ecstasy) and hence the prohibition to distribute the 
film in the United Kingdom was not considered to be a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
It was certainly a controversial judgment at the time. In January 2012, the BBFC gave the film 
an 18-certificate, with no cuts or alterations to the original film's content, after the United 
Kingdom had repealed its blasphemy laws in 2008. 
 
Over the years, IRIS has highlighted a long series of ECtHR judgments relating to freedom of 
expression, illuminating important developments and their consequences for media regulation 
and policy in the Council of Europe and its member states. In the first period, 1995-2000, a 
substantial sample of the judgments dealing with freedom of expression, media and journalism 
could be reported on, selecting those cases with a general, important or innovative impact on 
the interpretation of Article 10, ECHR. Gradually, and especially since 2001, IRIS was confronted 
with an increasing amount of judgments being delivered by the European Court dealing with 
freedom of expression and information. As a strict selection had to be made every month, not 
all important judgments could be reported. Therefore, priority was given to those judgments 
with specific importance for the sector of film, broadcasting, audiovisual media services and 
later also internet. The selection of summaries of judgments dealing with Article 10, ECHR, 
gives a valuable overview of the case-law in these fields, without excluding those judgments 
which are of general importance for the functioning of all media and journalism in a democratic 
society. The latter category of judgments includes the Court’s case-law dealing with: protection 
of journalistic sources (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, Ernst 
a.o. v. Belgium, Voskuil v. the Netherlands, Tillack v. Belgium, Financial Times a.o. v. the United 
Kingdom, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands, Ressiot a.o. v. France, Telegraaf Media 
Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands, Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. 
Luxembourg, and more recently, Nagla v. Latvia, Görmüş a.o. v. Turkey and Becker v. Norway); 
access to public or official documents (TASZ v. Hungary, Kenedi v. Hungary, Gillberg v. Sweden, 
Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines wirtschaftlich gesunden land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. Austria, 
Roşiianu v. Romania and particularly the Grand Chamber judgment in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. 
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Hungary) and whistleblowing (Guja v. Moldova, Matúz v. Hungary and Görmüş a.o. v. Turkey). It also 
includes the case-law balancing the right to freedom of expression with the right to privacy 
(Peck v. the United Kingdom, Radio France v. France, Von Hannover no. 1, no. 2 and no. 3 v. 
Germany, Plon v. France, Tammer v. Estonia, Radio Twist v. Slovakia, Petrina v. Romania, White v. 
Sweden, Mosley v. the United Kingdom, Avram a.o. v. Moldova, Axel Springer AG no. 1 v. Germany, 
Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway, Bohlen v. Germany, Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany, 
Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, Sousa Goucha v. Portugal and Rubio 
Dosamantes v. Spain). Many other cases dealt with responsible journalism in relation to 
allegations of facts tarnishing the good name and reputation of others (Perna v. Italy, Pedersen 
and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, Thoma v. Luxembourg, Colombani v. France, Klein v. Slovakia, Mamère 
v. France, Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria, Belpietro v. Italy, Ristamäki and Korvola v. Finland, 
Brosa v. Germany, Salumäki v. Finland, Axel Springer AG No. 2 v. Germany, Erla Hlynsdóttir v. 
Iceland (no. 3), Morice v. France, Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v. Finland, De Carolis and France 
Télévisions v. France and Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. Ukraine, Terentyev v. Russia, Pihl 
v. Sweden, Ólafsson v. Iceland, Milisavljević v. Serbia, Halldórsson v. Iceland, Ghiulfer Predescu v. 
Romania and Herbert Haupt v. Austria) or disclosing confidential information (Fressoz and Roire v. 
France, Radio Twist v. Slovakia, Stoll v. Switzerland, Ricci v. Italy, Pinto Coelho v. Portugal (no. 2) 
and Bédat v. Switzerland). The Court also dealt with the (ab)use of hidden cameras (Tierbefreier 
E.V. v. Germany and Haldimann v. Switzerland) and with the making or publishing of pictures of 
suspects in crime or court reporting (Axel Springer AG no. 1 v. Germany and Axel Springer SE and 
RTL Television GmbH v. Germany). In other cases the Court determined the scope of the right of 
newsgathering by journalists and media workers, such as in Dammann v. Switzerland, Dupuis and 
others v. France, Pentikaïnen v. Finland and Selmani and others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. The Court’s findings in recent cases show that journalists who commit (minor) 
offences during newsgathering activities, cannot invoke robust protection based on their rights 
to freedom of expression and information as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR (Diamant Salihu a.o. 
v. Sweden and Brambilla a.o. v. Italy). 
 
In a case related to a violent attack on a journalist, the European Court reiterated that States, 
under their positive obligations of the Convention, are required to create a favourable 
environment for participation in public debate by all the persons concerned, enabling them to 
express their opinions and ideas without fear. Because of failures to carry out an effective 
investigation, the Court found that the criminal investigation of the journalist’s claim of ill-
treatment was ineffective and that accordingly there had been a violation of Article 3 
(prohibition of torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention under its 
procedural limb (Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan). In other cases the Court found a violation of Article 
2 ECHR (right to life). In Huseynova v. Azerbaijan it concluded that the domestic authorities had 
failed to carry out an adequate and effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding 
the killing of a prominent independent journalist, and it held that there has been a violation of 
Article 2 ECHR under its procedural limb. 
 
It also became obvious that the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights was 
increasing as a result of the growing number State Parties to the Convention in the 1990s, after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Consequently, the first judgments in which the ECtHR 
decided on alleged violations of Article 10 in the new member states were soon reported on in 
IRIS. In the new member states’ transition towards democracy, transparency, pluralism and 
diversity, the Court’s case-law demonstrated that the authorities in those states did not always 
adequately respect the right to freedom of expression and information (e.g., Dalban v. Romania, 
Feldek v. Slovakia, Gaweda v. Poland, Grinberg v. Russia, Klein v. Slovakia, Glas Nadezhda EOO & 
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Elenkov v. Bulgaria, Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia, Filatenko v. Russia, Manole a.o. v. 
Moldova, Taranenko v. Russia, Roşiianu v. Romania and Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. 
Ukraine, Terentyev v. Russia, Selmani and others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Milisavljević v. Serbia, Ghiulfer Predescu v. Romania, Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia and Huseynova v. 
Azerbaijan). Reflecting the Court’s case-law output, very often cases were reported in which the 
Court had found violations by the Turkish authorities regarding freedom of the media, the right 
of critical media reporting and freedom of (political) expression, such as in Özgür Gündem v. 
Turkey, Müslum Gündüz v. Turkey, Nur Radio and Ozgür Radio v. Turkey, Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, Nur 
Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayinciligi AS v. Turkey and in Bayar (Nos. 1-8) v. Turkey. In Tuşalp v. Turkey, a 
case about a defamatory article criticising the Turkish Prime Minister, the Court came to the 
conclusion that the domestic courts had failed to establish convincingly any pressing social 
need for putting the Prime Minister’s personality rights above the journalist’s rights and the 
general interest in promoting the freedom of the press where issues of public interest are 
concerned. In KAOS GL v. Turkey the Court found that the aim of protecting public morals relied 
upon by the Turkish authorities had been insufficient to justify the prior censorship of an LGBT-
magazine for more than five years. The judgment emphasises the need for proportionate 
interferences with the right to freedom of expression in the light of the protection of minors 
against sexually explicit content. 
 
In other judgments, the Court has made clear that hate speech is intolerable in a democratic 
society, whether it is directed against foreigners (Féret v. Belgium) or homosexuals (Vejdeland 
a.o. v. Sweden), or whether it concerns religious insult (I.A. v. Turkey and Fouad Belkacem v. 
Belgium). Some judgments found that too far-reaching restrictions had been imposed on 
political advertising on television, such as in Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland and in TV 
Vest SA and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, while the Court accepted a general ban in 
Ireland on the broadcasting of religious advertising (Murphy v. Ireland) and a ban in the United 
Kingdom on political advertising on television (Animal Defenders International v. the United 
Kingdom). In Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, the Court dealt with an application of the Russian 
Electoral Rights Act aimed at transparency of elections, including campaign finances, as well as 
at enforcing the voters’ right to impartial, truthful and balanced information via mass media 
outlets. The Court found, however, that the application of the Electoral Rights Act interfered 
with a newspaper’s editorial choice to publish a text taking a critical stance and to impart 
information and ideas on matters of public interest. The Court found that this interference with 
the newspaper’s freedom to impart information and ideas during the election period was not 
shown to achieve, in a proportionate manner, the aim of running fair elections. 
 
In Perinçek v. Switzerland the Court ruled that Switzerland had violated Article 10 by convicting 
a Turkish politician of publicly denying the genocide against the Armenian people, 
distinguishing the genocide against the Armenian people from the negation of crimes of the 
Holocaust, committed by the Nazi regime. After referral, the Grand Chamber came to the 
conclusion that the statements at issue could not be regarded as affecting the dignity of the 
members of the Armenian community to the point of requiring a criminal law response in 
Switzerland. It confirmed the finding of a violation of Article 10 ECHR, while also emphasising 
that Article 17 of the Convention (abuse clause) can only be applied on an exceptional basis 
and in extreme cases, where it is “immediately clear” that freedom of expression is employed 
for ends manifestly contrary to the values of the Convention (Perinçek v. Switzerland). In some 
recent decisions, however, the Court has applied Article 17 ECHR. In Fouad Belkacem v. Belgium, 
the ECtHR considered that Belkacem had attempted to deflect Article 10 of the Convention 
from its real purpose by using his right to freedom of expression for ends that were manifestly 
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contrary to the spirit of the Convention. As the leader and spokesperson of the organisation 
“Sharia4Belgium”, Belkacem had published a series of YouTube videos that incited to 
discrimination, hatred and violence against non-Muslim groups and also promoted Sharia. 
 
Other issues reflected in the ECtHR’s case-law that have been regularly reported in IRIS 
concern: media pluralism, non-discriminatory allocation of frequencies or broadcasting licences, 
decisions by independent media regulators and procedural safeguards against arbitrary 
applications of media law provisions (e.g. Demuth v. Switzerland, Glas Nadezhda EOOD and 
Elenkov v. Bulgaria, Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia, Nur Radyo v. Turkey, Özgür Radyo 
v. Turkey, Manole a.o. v. Moldova, Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayinciliği A.Ş. v. Turkey, RTBF v. 
Belgium and Sigma Radio Television Ltd. v. Cyprus). In Centro Europe 7 S.r.l. and  Di Stefano v. Italy, 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights clarified that a situation whereby a 
powerful economic or political group in society is permitted to obtain a position of dominance 
over the audiovisual media and thereby exercise pressure on broadcasters and eventually 
curtail their editorial freedom, undermines the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a 
democratic society, as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention. In this case, Centro Europa 7 
especially referred to the dominant and influential position of the private broadcaster, Mediaset 
– owned by the family of (former) Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi – being treated 
preferentially and being the reason for the postponement for years of making frequencies 
available for other broadcasting companies. A recent decision of the European Court confirms 
the competence of a media regulatory body to interfere, in a proportionate way, with a 
journalist’s or a radio station’s freedom of expression. In the case at issue Ofcom, the 
independent regulator and competition authority for the United Kingdom communications 
industries, had launched an investigation into a radio interview about which it had received a 
series of complaints. Ofcom concluded that the broadcast had breached the Broadcasting Code, 
as it had amounted to gratuitous and offensive insult without contextual content or 
justification. No sanction or penalty was imposed either on the radio station or the journalist 
other than the publication of the decision by Ofcom (Jon Gaunt v. the United Kingdom). In 
another judgment the Court found Sweden to be in breach of the European Convention because 
it had denied access to court for a person who wanted to bring defamation proceedings in 
Sweden arising out of the content of a trans-border television programme service (TV3) 
resorting under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. The European Court is of the opinion 
that requiring a Swedish national to bring defamation proceedings in the UK courts following 
an alleged defamatory TV programme broadcast by the London-based company Viasat 
Broadcasting UK, but targeting mostly, if not exclusively, a Swedish audience, was not 
reasonable and violated Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, guaranteeing access to court (Arlewin v. 
Sweden). 
 
In recent years, the cases reported in IRIS have also reflected the growing impact of the 
Internet and some of the specific legal issues related to it, such as in Times Newspapers Ltd., 
nos. 1 & 2 v. the United Kingdom, in which the Court accepted the application of the so-called 
“Internet publication rule”, a British common-law rule according to which each publication of a 
defamatory statement can give rise to a separate cause of action, with the implication that a 
new cause of action accrues every time the defamatory material is accessed on the Internet. 
The Court recognised the importance of the media’s internet archives for education and 
historical research, emphasising the duty of the media to act in accordance with the principles 
of responsible journalism, including by ensuring the accuracy of historical information. Another 
relevant case, also reported on in IRIS, was Karttunen v. Finland, on the criminalisation of the 
possession and reproduction of child pornography, freely downloaded from the Internet, and its 
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compatibility with freedom of (artistic) expression. In Mouvement raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland, 
the Court found that the (illegal) content on a website referred to on a poster distributed by an 
organisation could help to justify the Swiss authorities’ decision to ban a poster campaign by 
that organisation. In this judgment, the Court also reiterated that the authorities are required, 
when they decide to restrict fundamental rights, to choose the means that cause the least 
possible prejudice to the rights in question. In Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria the Court found a 
violation of the right of private life (Article 8 of the Convention) as it considered the 
confiscation of computers containing illegal software was not in accordance with the law and 
deprived the applicants of sufficient safeguards against abuse. The Court has also delivered 
judgments with an important impact on Internet regulation and freedom of expression on the 
Internet, such as in Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, Ashby Donald a.o. v. France, Neij and Sunde 
Kolmissopi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, Kalda v. Estonia 
and Terentyev v. Russia.1 Delfi AS v. Estonia concerns the liability of an Internet news portal for 
offensive comments that were posted by readers below one of its online news articles. The 
news portal was found liable for violating the personality rights of a plaintiff, although it had 
expeditiously removed the grossly offending comments posted on its website as soon as it had 
been informed of their insulting character. The Grand Chamber of the Court found that the 
news portal was not exempt from liability for grossly insulting remarks in its readers’ online 
comments. As Delfi’s involvement in making public readers’ comments on its news portal went 
beyond that of a passive, purely technical service provider, the provisions on the limited 
liability of ISPs did not apply. Delfi’s activities reflected those of a media publisher, running a 
commercially organised internet news portal and it was therefore held liable for the manifest 
expressions of hatred and threats to other persons’ physical integrity as expressed in its 
readers’ online comments (Delfi AS v. Estonia). More recently, in Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary the Court decided that a self-regulatory body and an 
Internet news portal were not liable for the offensive comments posted by their readers on 
their respective websites. The European Court found that by holding MTE and Index.hu liable 
for the comments, the Hungarian courts had violated the right to freedom of expression. It is 
true that, in cases where third-party user comments take the form of hate speech and direct 
threats to the physical integrity of individuals, the rights and interests of others and of the 
society as a whole might entitle Contracting States to impose liability on Internet news portals 
if they failed to take measures to remove clearly unlawful comments without delay, even 
without notice from the alleged victim or from third parties. The present case however did not 
involve such utterances and the Court came to the conclusion that the rigid stance of the 
Hungarian courts reflected a notion of liability which effectively precluded the balancing 
between the competing rights according to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case law. In Pihl 
v. Sweden, the Court also applied a crucial distinction between illegal hate speech and 
defamation, limiting the liability of the operator of a blog when it (only) concerns defamation, 
and not incitement to violence. 
 
In Cengiz a.o. v. Turkey the Court found that the blocking of access to You Tube in Turkey for a 
period of more than two years amounted to a violation of the right to receive and impart 
information under Article 10 ECHR. The Court observed that YouTube as an Internet platform 
enabled information on political and social matters to be broadcast and citizen journalism to 
                                                          
1 More information on the case-law of the ECtHR dealing with online media and ICT can be found in the Fact Sheet, “New technologies”, 
European Court of Human Rights Press Unit.  Other interesting fact sheets focus on the Court’s case law regarding the protection of 
personal data, the right to the protection of one’s image, hate speech and the protection of journalistic sources. 
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emerge. It found that there was no provision in the Turkish law allowing the domestic courts to 
impose the blanket blocking order of You Tube at issue. 
 
Another interesting case is Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, on data 
protection and data journalism. A decision issued by the Finnish Data Protection Board that 
prohibited two media companies from publishing personal taxation data in the manner and to 
the extent the media companies had published these data before, was considered as a 
legitimate interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and information. The 
European Court agreed with the Finnish authorities that the applicants could not rely on the 
exception of journalistic activities (compare with CJEU 16 December 2008, Case C-73/07), as 
the publication of a too large amount of taxation data was not justified by a public interest. The 
Grand Chamber in its judgment of 27 June 2017 clarified that the journalistic purposes 
derogation “is intended to allow journalists to access, collect and process data in order to 
ensure that they are able to perform their journalistic activities”, while the right of access to 
public documents does not by itself justify the dissemination en masse of such “raw data in 
unaltered form without any analytical input”. It considers that the dissemination of the data at 
issue rather might have enabled curious members of the public to categorise named 
individuals, who are not public figures, and that this could be regarded “as a manifestation of 
the public’s thirst for information about the private life of others and, as such, a form of 
sensationalism, even voyeurism”. 
 
The last references to the Court’s case law regarding audiovisual media, media pluralism and 
freedom of expression in the online environment confirm the importance of the application of 
Article 10 of the European Convention for the economic, technical and regulatory 
developments in the European media landscape. The central issue remains that there should 
not be any restrictive interferences with the right to freedom of expression and information, 
unless it can be pertinently justified that the inference at issue is “necessary in a democratic 
society”. It is to be hoped that the European Court of Human Rights will keep up its high 
standards of protection and promotion of the right to freedom of expression and information, 
also in the new media environment. Article 10 of the Convention is a living and dynamic 
instrument for the protection of the right to freedom of expression and information in Europe’s 
democracies. IRIS and the European Audiovisual Observatory will therefore continue reporting 
on the Court’s case-law related to media, journalism and the Internet in the future. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Seizure of "blasphemous" film does not violate Article 10 
ECHR 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
In its judgment of 20 September 1994, the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
seizure and forfeiture of the film Das Liebeskonzil in May 1985 by the Austrian authorities, was 
not a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In this case, the applicant - the Otto-Preminger-Institut für audiovisuelle Mediengestaltung 
(OPI) - had planned to show the film, in which God the Father is presented as old, infirm and 
ineffective, Jesus Christ as a 'mummy's boy' of low intelligence and the Virgin Mary as an 
unprincipled wanton. They conspire with the Devil to punish mankind for its immorality. 
 
At the request of the Innsbruck diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, the Public Prosecutor 
instituted criminal proceedings against OPI's manager on charge of "disparaging religious 
doctrines" and seized the film under section 36 of the Austrian Media Act. On 10 October 1986 
the Austrian Regional Court ruled that, since artistic freedom cannot be unlimited, in view of 
"the particular gravity in the instant case - which concerned a film primarily intended to be 
provocative and aimed at the Church - of the multiple and sustained violation of legally 
protected interests, the basic right of artistic freedom will in the instant case have to come 
second." The European Court of Human Rights accepted that the impugned measures pursued a 
legitimate aim under Article 10 par. 2, namely "the protection of the rights of others", i.e., the 
protection of the right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public 
expression of views of others. The Court ruled that the Austrian courts, when ordering the 
seizure and subsequent forfeiture of the film, justfiably held it to be an abusive attack on the 
Roman Catholic religion according to the conception of the Tyrolean public. Since their 
judgments show that the Austrian courts had due regard to the freedom of artistic expression 
and the content of the film can support the conclusions arrived at by the national courts, the 
Court ruled that the seizure does not constitute a violation of Article 10. In view of all the 
circumstances in this case, the Court considered that the Austrian authorities had not 
overstepped their margin of appreciation. This reasoning was also applied to the forfeiture of 
the film, which is said to be the normal sequel to the seizure. 
 
• Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295-A. 
 
IRIS 1995-1/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Journalistic coverage of racist statements protected by Article 
10 ECHR 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
On 23 September 1994 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the conviction and 
sentence of a fine to a Danish television journalist for aiding and abetting the dissemination of 
racist statements, constituted a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention for the 
protection on Human Rights. The journalist, Mr Jersild, had interviewed a group of young racists 
("the Greenjackets") for the Sunday News Magazine, which interview was broadcast on 21 July 
1985 on Danish television. The three youths interviewed by the applicant were charged with 
violating the Danish Penal Code for making racist statements and the journalist was 
subsequently charged with aiding them. On 24 April 1987 the Danish City Court sentenced the 
applicant to a fine of 1.000 Danish Krone because he had encouraged "the Greenjackets" to 
express their racist views and he had been well aware in advance that discriminatory 
statements of a racist nature were likely to be made during the interview. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights focussed on the question whether the measures against 
the applicant were "necessary in a democratic society". The Court said that news reporting 
based on interviews constitutes one of the most important means whereby the press is able to 
play its vital role of "public watchdog". The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the 
dissimination of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper 
the contribution of the press to the discussion of matters of public interest. Taking the 
circumstances of the case into consideration, the Court held that the reasons for the applicant's 
conviction and sentence were not sufficient to establish convincingly that the interference with 
Mr Jersild's right to freedom of expression was "necessary in a democratic society". In particular, 
the means employed were considered disproportionate to the aim of protecting "the reputation 
or rights of others". 
 
• Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298. 
 
IRIS 1995-1/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Bluf! v. the Netherlands 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
On 9 February 1995, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the seizure by the Dutch 
authorities of the cirulation of an issue of a left-wing weekly, containing a report of the Dutch 
internal security service, constituted a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. In the Spring of 1987 
the weekly, called Bluf!, got access to a quarterly report of the Dutch internal security service, 
which Bluf! decided to publish as a supplement to the issue of 29 April 1987. However, the 
Amsterdam Regional Court (Rechtbank) ordered the seizure of the circulation of the issue 
concerned before it was sent out to subscribers. Because the police had failed to take away the 
offset plates from the printing press, the staff of Bluf! managed to reprint the issue. The 
reprinted issues were sold on the streets of Amsterdam the next day, which was the Queen's 
birthday, a national holiday. The authorities decided not to put a stop to this circulation so as to 
avoid any public disorder. The request for the return of the confiscated copies was dismissed; 
the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) held that the seizure of printed matter to be distributed 
was, in this case, justified under the Dutch Criminal Code. The European Court of Human Rights 
noted that the seizure amounted to an interference in Bluf!'s freedom to impart information 
and ideas. The Court ruled that, although the interference was "prescibed by law" and pursued a 
legitimate aim (the protection of national security), the seizure and withdrawal was not 
"necessary in a democratic society'" and therefore constituted a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
The Court based this ruling on its doubt whether the information in the report was sufficiently 
sensitive to justify preventing its distribution, and furthermore on the fact that, since the issue 
was reprinted and distributed, the information in question was made accessible to a large 
number of people; as a result, protecting the information as a State secret was no longer 
justified and the withdrawal of the issue no longer necessary to achieve the legitimate aim 
pursued. 
 
• Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands, 9 February 1995, Series A no. 306-A. 
 
IRIS 1995-3/6 
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European Court of Human Rights: Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. 
Austria 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the refusal of Austria to distribute a special 
interest magazine among Austrian soldiers, constituted a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The monthly magazine, called der Igel (the hedgehog) was aimed 
at the soldiers serving in the Austrian army; it contained information and articles - often of a 
critical nature - on military life. In 1987, the organisation that published der Igel requested the 
Austrian Federal Defence Minister to have der Igel distributed in the barracks in the same way 
as the other two military magazines. The minister decided that he would not authorise such a 
distribution. In his opinion, only publications adhering to the constitutional duties of the army, 
which did not damage its reputation and which did not lend column space to political parties, 
should be supplied on military premises. The second applicant in this case, Mr Gubi - at that 
time fulfilling his national service - had been ordered to stop the distribution of issue No. 3/87 
of der Igel in his barracks. A disciplinary penalty for distributing the magazine was imposed on 
Mr Gubi, because of certain guidelines prohibiting the distribution of any publication in the 
barracks without prior authorisation of the commanding officer. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights held that the refusal by the Minister of Defence to allow 
the distribution of der Igel in the same way as other magazines distributed by the army was 
disproportionate of the legitimate aim pursued. Prohibiting Mr Gubi to distribute the magazine 
also constituted a breach of Article 10 of the Convention, since the interference was not 
"necessary in a democratic society". 
 
• Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria, 19 December 1994, 
Series A no. 302.  
 
IRIS 1995-3/7 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Prager and Oberschlick vs Austria 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
On 26 April 1995, the European Court of Human Rights held - by five votes to four - that Austria 
did not violate Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (freedom of expression) by fining a journalist and a publisher for 
publishing a defamatory article. 
 
On 15 March 1987 the periodical Forum published an article by Mr Prager, which contained 
criticism of the judges sitting in the Austrian criminal courts, including an attack on Judge "J". 
Following an action for defamation brought by judge "J"., Mr Prager and Mr Oberschlick - 
publisher of Forum - were sentenced to pay fines and damages. The Regional Court also 
ordered the confiscation of the remaining stocks of the relevant issue of Forum. The Court ruled 
that the interference in the applicants' freedom of expression was "prescribed by law" and that 
the aim pursued (protection of a reputation and maintenance of the authority of the judiciary) 
was legitimate. 
 
Although freedom of expression also applies to offensive information or ideas, the interference 
in this case was deemed not to be disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and was 
therefore held to have been "necessary in a democratic society". In conclusion, the Court found 
that no violation of Article 10 was established. 
 
• Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995, Series A no. 313.  
 
IRIS 1995-6/6 
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European Court of Human Rights: Defamation Award of £1.5m Violates Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Freedom of Expression) 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
In its judgment of 13 July 1995, the European Court of Human Rights has held that a 
defamation award of £1.5m constituted a violation of Article 10. The Court found that the 
award, having regard to its size taken in conjunction with the state of national (UK-) law at the 
relevant time, was not 'necessary in a democratic society' and thus was a violation of the 
applicant's rights under Article 10. The applicant, count Tolstoy Miloslavsky, wrote in March 
1987 a pamplet in which he accused lord Aldington of war crimes. An English jury awarded lord 
Aldington £1.5m in damages, which was approximately three times the largest amount 
previously awarded by an English libel jury. Having regard to the size of the award in this case 
in conjunction with the lack of adequate and effective safeguards at the relevant time against a 
disproportionately large award, the Court found that there had been a violation of the 
applicant's rights under Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B.  
 
IRIS 1995-8/4 
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European Court of Human Rights: The journalist's sources protected by Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgment of 27 March 1996 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
with an 11 to 7 majority came to the conclusion that a disclosure order requiring a British 
journalist to reveal the identity of his source and the fine imposed upon him for having refused 
to do so, constitutes a violation of the freedom of expression and information as protected by 
Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
 
In 1990 William Goodwin, a trainee-journalist working for "The Engineer", was found guilty by 
the House of Lords of Contempt of Court because he refused to disclose the identity of a person 
who previously supplied him with financial information derived from a confidential corporate 
plan of a private company. According to the House of Lords, the necessity of obtaining 
disclosure lay in the threat of severe damage to the private company which would arise if the 
information contained in their corporate plan was disseminated while their refinancing 
negotations were still continuing. The disclosure order was estimated to be in conformity with 
Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, as the disclosure was held to be necessary in 
the interest of justice. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, is of the opinion that the impugned disclosure 
order is in breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the 
disclosure order and the fine imposed upon Goodwin for having refused to reveal his source are 
"prescribed by law" and pursue a legitimate aim ("the protection of the rights of others"), the 
interference by the English courts in Goodwin's freedom of expression and information is not 
considered as necessary in a democratic society. The majority of the Court, and even the joint 
dissenters, firmly underline the principle that "protection of journalistic sources is one of the 
basic conditions for press freedom" and that "without such protection, sources may be deterred 
from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest". In its judgment 
the Court emphasizes that without protection of a journalist's sources "the vital public-
watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate 
and reliable information may be adversely affected". The Court considers that a disclosure order 
cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding 
requirement in the public interest. As the Court pointed out : "In sum, limitations on the 
confidentiality of journalistic sources call for the most careful scrutiny by the Court". The 
European Court in casu is of the opinion that the interests of the private company in 
eliminating, by proceedings against the source, the (residual) threat of damage through 
dissemination of the confidential information, are not sufficient to outweigh the vital public 
interest in the protection of the applicant journalist's source. 
 
The judgment of the European Court in the Goodwin case gives important and additional 
support in favour of the protection of journalistic sources as reflected already in some national 
laws and in international policy instruments on journalistic freedoms (see, for example, the 
Resolution of the European Parliament on the Confidentiality of Journalists' Sources, OJEC, 14 
February 1994, No C 44: 34 and the Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, 
adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe's Conferrence of ministers responsible for 
media policies, held in Prague, 7-8 December 1994 (see: IRIS, 1995-1: 4). 
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• Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II.  
 
IRIS 1996-4/4 
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European Court of Human Rights: Banning of blasphemous video not in breach of freedom of 
(artistic) expression 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 25 November 1996, the European Court of Human Rights decided in the Wingrove case that 
the refusal to grant a distribution certificate in respect of a video work considered 
blasphemous, was not in breach of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (see 
also the decision by the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Otto Preminger vs. 
Austria of 20 September 1994, Series A vol. 295, IRIS 1995-1: 3). 
 
Nigel Wingrove, a film director residing in London, was refused a certificate by the British Board 
of Film Classification, because his videofilm "Visions of Ecstasy" was considered as 
blasphemous. The film evocates the erotic fantasies of a sixteenth century Carmelite nun, St 
Teresa of Avila, her sexual passions in the film being focused inter alia on the figure of the 
crucified Christ. As a result of the Board's determination, Wingrove would have committed an 
offence under the Video Recordings Act 1984 if he were to supply the video in any manner, 
whether or not for reward. The director's appeal was rejected by the Video Appeals Committee. 
Wingrove applied to the European Commission of Human Rights, relying on Article 10 of the 
European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
Although the Commission in its report of 10 January 1995 (see IRIS 1995-5: 4) expressed the 
opinion that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court comes to the 
conclusion, by seven votes to two, that there had been no violation of the applicant's freedom 
of (artistic) expression, the British authorities being fully entitled to consider that the impugned 
measure was justified as being necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights 
of others. The Court underlined that whereas there is little scope for restrictions on political 
speech or on debate of questions of public interest, a wider margin of appreciation is available 
to the national authorities restricting freedom of expression in relation to matters within the 
sphere of morals or especially, religion. The Court also took into consideration that the English 
law on blasphemy does not prohibit the expression, in any form, of views hostile to the 
Christian religion: it is the manner in which these views are advocated which makes them 
blasphemous. 
 
On the other hand the Court did not find a counter argument in the fact that legislation on 
blasphemy exists only in few other European countries and that the application of these laws 
has become increasingly rare. Furthermore, the Court had no problem with the fact that the 
English law on blasphemy only extends to the Christian faith. Neither did the Court estimate 
the measure as disproportionate, although it was recognised that the measures taken by the 
authorities amounted to a complete ban of the film's distribution. Such a far-reaching measure 
involving prior restraint, was considered as necessary, because otherwise in practice, the film 
would escape any form of control by the authorities. The measure in other words had to be far-
reaching in order to be effective. Having viewed the film for itself, the Court is satisfied that the 
decisions by the national authorities cannot be considered to be arbitrary or excessive. The 
Court ultimatily reached the conclusion that the British authorities did not overstep their 
margin of appreciation and that the impugned measure against "Visions of Ecstasy" was not a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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• Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1996-V.  
 
IRIS 1997-1/8 
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European Court of Human Rights: The right of the press to criticise the courts 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 24 February 1997 the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of 
two journalists on Humo the weekly publication against Belgium. The case concerned the order 
that two journalists pay damages and interest for the defamation of four judges of the Antwerp 
Court of Appeal. The applicants had been ordered by the Brussels Court of Appeal to pay the 
token sum of one Belgian franc in non-material damages, and to have the judgment published 
in the weekly publication Humo and six daily newspapers, at the applicants' expense. The 
judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation. The Belgian courts felt that the journalists 
were at fault in attacking the honour and the reputation of the complainant judges by 
unjustifiable accusations and offensive insinuations in the disputed articles printed in Humo. 
 
Like the Commission (see IRIS 1996-3:4), the Court felt that interference in the applicants' 
freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society, as demanded by Article 10, 
paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court recalled that the press 
plays a vital role in a democratic society and that its role, while respecting its duties and 
responsibilities, is to communicate information and ideas on all matters of general interest, 
including those which concerns the functioning of the judicial authorities. The Court held that, 
although the commentaries by the two journalists did indeed contain severe criticism, this was 
not out of keeping with the emotion and indignation aroused by the facts alleged in the articles 
at issue, in particular concerning incest and the way in which the courts were dealing with it. As 
regards the polemic, or indeed aggressive, tone used by the journalists, the Court recalled that, 
apart from the substance of the ideas and information expressed, Article 10 also protects their 
mode of expression. The Court therefore decided that "journalistic freedom also covers possible 
recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation". Lastly, the Court held that the 
journalists based their work on extensive research and the opinions of a number of experts, and 
that only one passage was unacceptable. In conclusion, and in general, the Court held that, in 
view of the gravity of the matter and the questions at stake, the need to interfere in the 
exercise of the freedom of expression and information was not demonstrated. Article 10 of the 
Convention had therefore been violated (7 votes to 2). 
 
Moreover, the Brussels Court of Appeal had rejected the journalists' application for 
communication of the contents of the case documents or to hear at least certain witnesses in 
order to assess the justification of the allegations made by the journalists. The Court held that 
this "outright rejection had put journalists at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the plaintiffs". 
This contravened the principles of equality of arms and therefore Article 6 of the Convention 
had also been violated (unanimous decision). 
 
• De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I.  
 
IRIS 1997-3/10 
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European Court of Human Rights: The Freedom of Critical Political Journalism - Oberschlick No 
2 vs. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgement of 1 July 1997 the European Court of Human Rights once more confirmed the 
high level of freedom of political speech guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention 
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is the fourth condemnation of 
Austria on this issue (see also ECourtHR, 8 July 1986, Lingens, Series A, Vol. 103; ECourtHR, 23 
May 1991, Oberschlick Series A, Vol. 204; ECourtHR, 28 August 1992, Schwabe Series A, Vol. 
242-B). 
 
In October 1990 Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Liberal Party (FPÖ), held a speech in 
which he glorified the role of the generation of soldiers in World War II, whatever side they had 
been on. Some time later this speech was published in Forum, a political magazine printed in 
Vienna. The speech was commented critically by Gerhard Oberschlick, editor of the magazine. 
In his commentary, Oberschlick called Haider an `Idiot' (Trottel). On application by Haider, 
Oberschlick was found guilty for insult (Beleidigung) by the Austrian courts (Art. 115 Austrian 
Penal Code). 
 
Oberschlick appealed to the European Commission of Human Rights, arguing that the decisions 
in which he was convicted for having insulted Mr Haider, had infringed his right to freedom of 
expression as secured by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As the 
Commission in its report of 29 November 1995, the Court in its judgment of 1 July 1997 also 
comes to the conclusion that the conviction of Oberschlick by the Austrian Courts represented a 
disproportionate interference with the exercise of his freedom of (political) expression, an 
interference which is "not necessary in a democratic society". 
 
The Court reiterates that freedom of expression is applicable not only to information and ideas 
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also 
the "those that offend, shock or disturb". The limits of acceptable criticism are wider with 
regard to a politician acting in his public capacity than in relation to a private individual. The 
Court takes into account that Mr Haider clearly intended to be provocative and consequently 
could expect strong reactions on his speech. In the Court's view, the applicant's article may 
certainly be considered polemical, but it didn't constitute a gratuitous personal attack, as the 
author provided an objectively understandable explanation why he considered Haider as an 
"Idiot". The Court comes to the conclusion that "it is true that calling a politician a Trottel in 
public may offend him. In the instant case, however, the word does not seem disproportionate 
to the indignation knowingly aroused by Mr. Haider". By seven votes to two, the Court decided 
that there is a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Restriction on the Freedom of Expression Permitted for 
Maintaining the Authority and Impartiality of the Judiciary - Worm vs. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgement of 29 August 1997 the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on an 
interesting case in the field of media and justice. Mr Alfred Worm, an Austrian journalist writing 
for the magazine Profil , was convicted by the Vienna Court of Appeal because of the 
publication of an article reporting on a pending trial against the former Minister of Finance, Mr 
Androsch. The trial concerned a case of tax evasion. The Court convicted Mr Worm of having 
exercised prohibited influence on criminal proceedings and imposed on him a fine of ATS 
48,000 or 20 days of imprisonment in default of payment (Section 23 of the Austrian Media 
Act). According to the Vienna Court of Appeal there was no doubt that, at least with regard to 
the lay judges, the reading of the incriminated article published by Mr Worm was capable of 
influencing the outcome of the criminal proceedings against Mr Androsch. Mr Worm applied to 
the European Commission of Human Rights complaining that this conviction was in breach of 
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (freedom of expression and 
information). In its report of 23 May 1996 the Commission expressed the opinion that indeed 
there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
By a seven to two decision, the Court now reached the conclusion that the conviction of Mr 
Alfred Worm was not infringing Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
because this conviction is to be considered fully in accordance with the second paragraph of 
Article 10. The conviction as a matter of fact finds a legal basis in Section 23 of the Austrian 
Media Act which reads as follows : "Anyone who discusses, subsequent to the indictment (..) and 
before the judgement at first instance in criminal proceedings, the probable outcome of those 
proceedings or the value of evidence in a way capable of influencing the outcome of the 
proceedings shall be punished (..)". The conviction furthermore was aimed at maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary, which means that it thus pursued a legitimate aim 
under the Convention. Finally, the Court comes to the conclusion that in casu the conviction 
was also necessary in a democratic society. Although the Court recognises that the States are 
not entitled to restrict all forms of public discussion on matters pending before the courts, it 
emphasises that every person, - including a public figure such as Mr Androsch -, is entitled to 
the enjoyment of the guarantees of a fair trial set out in Article 6 of the European Convention. 
 
According to the Court this means that journalists, when commenting on pending criminal 
proceedings, may not publish statements which are likely to prejudice, whether intentionally or 
not, the chances of a person receiving a fair trial. The Court also states that it is the public 
prosecutor's role and not that of the journalist, to establish one's guilt. The Court paraphrases 
its judgement in the Sunday Times (No 1) case (26 April 1979, Series A vol. 30) by considering 
that it cannot be excluded that the public is becoming accustomed to the regular spectacle of 
pseudotrials in the news media which might in the long run have nefarious consequences for 
the acceptance of the courts as the proper forum for the determination of a person's guilt or 
innocence on a criminal charge. Against this background the European Court agreed with the 
Vienna Court of Appeal that the interference in the applicant's right to freedom of expression 
was justified and subsequently the Court decided that there was no breach of Article 10. 
 
• Worm v. Austria, 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case Radio ABC vs. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Radio ABC (Alternative Broadcasting Corporation) in 1989 was refused a licence to set up a 
private local radio station for the Vienna region. After exhausting all national remedies, Radio 
ABC applied to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1991, relying on Article 10 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The 
Commission, in its report of 11 April 1996, considered unanimously that the refusal to grant a 
licence for private broadcasting was in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court now in 
its judgement of 20 October 1997 comes to the same conclusion. The Court refers to its 
judgement in the Case of Informationsverein Lentia vs. Austria (ECourtHR, 24 November 1993, 
Series A, vol. 276), in which it decided that the restriction on the freedom to impart information 
by prohibiting private broadcasting, as this was based on the Austrian Broadcasting monopoly, 
was not necessary in a democratic society and hence was in breach of Article 10, par. 2 of the 
Convention. As in the period before the entry into force of the Regional Broadcasting Act (1 
January 1994) there was no legal basis whereby an operating licence for a local radio station 
could be granted because of the broadcasting monopoly guaranteed to the ORF, the situation 
of Radio ABC was identical to that of the applicants in the Informationsverein Lentia case. 
Accordingly for this period it was undisputed that there was a breach of Article 10. But even in 
the next period, after the coming into force of the Regional Broadcasting Act in 1994, there was 
still a breach of Article 10 of the European Convention, because of the fact that the 
Constitutional Court in its judgement of 27 September 1995 annulled some provisions of the 
Regional Broadcasting Act, which led to the legal situation which existed before 1994, so that 
the violation of Article 10 was prolonged. 
 
The Austrian Government at the hearing of 27 May 1997 however informed the Court of the 
amended version of the Regional Broadcasting Act of 1 May 1997, according to which new 
licence applications could be lodged in the period between 1 May and 12 June 1997. Although 
the European Court doesn't rule in abstracto whether legislation is compatible or not with the 
Convention, the Court nevertheless "notes with satisfaction that Austria has introduced 
legislation to ensure the fulfilment of its obligations under Article 10" of the European 
Convention. The Austrian Broadcasting Law opening access for private broadcasting finally 
seems to be in accordance with the freedom of expression and information as guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (see also ECourtHR, 9 June 1997, 
Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision vs. Austria, see IRIS 1997-7: 4). 
 
• Radio ABC v. Austria, 20 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Four Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Zana vs. Turkey, 25 November 1997 In this case the European Court of Human Rights comes 
to the conclusion that there was no breach of Article 10 of the European Convention for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Zana was convicted to several months 
of imprisonment in Turkey because of the publication of an interview in the newspaper 
Cumhuriyet, in which he said to support the PKK movement, although he disagreed with the 
massacres. And he added to this statement : "Anyone can make mistakes, and the PKK kill 
women and children by mistake...". 
 
According to the Court this statement is both contradictory and ambiguous, because it is 
difficult simultaneously to support the PKK, "a terrorist organisation which resorts to violence 
to achieve its ends", and to declare oneself opposed to massacres. The Court notes that the 
interview coincided with murderous attacks carried out by the PKK on civilians in south-east 
Turkey at the material time and that the publication of the interview had to be regarded as 
likely to exacerbate an already explosive situation in the region. The Court accordingly 
considers that the penalty imposed on Zana could reasonably be regarded as answering a 
"pressing social need" and hence as necessary in a democratic society. So there is no breach of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
2. Grigoriades vs. Greece, 25 November 1997 This case concerns the conviction of a lieutenant 
of the crime of insult to the army, insult which was contained in a letter the applicant sent to 
his unit's commanding officer. A sentence of three months was imposed on Grigoriades. 
According to the Court, Article 10 of the Convention which guarantees the freedom of 
expression and information, applies to military personnel as to all other persons within the 
jurisdiction of a Contracting State. The Court notes that the contents of the letter indeed 
included certain strong and intemperate remarks concerning the armed forces in Greece, but 
those remarks were made in the context of a general and lenghty discourse critical of army life 
and the army as an institution. Nor did the letter contain any insults directed against the 
recipient of the letter or any other person. The Court decides that the letter had no objective 
impact on military discipline and that the prosecution and conviction of Grigoriades cannot be 
justified as necessary in a democratic society. The Court comes to the conclusion that in this 
case Article 10 is violated by the Greek authorities. 
 
3. Guerra vs. Italy, 19 February 1998 In this case a group of inhabitants of Manfredonia 
complained of the fact that they had not received proper information from the authorities on 
the hazards of the industrial activity of a local chemical factory. Nor were they informed on the 
safety plans or emergency procedures in the event of an accident. The Court finds no 
infringment of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court argues that this article on the freedom 
of expression and information "basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from 
receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him. That freedom cannot 
be construed as imposing on a State, in circumstances such as those of the present case, 
positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion". Hence, no 
violation of Article 10. However the Court is of the opinion that the Italian authorities, by not 
giving essential information to the population involved, did not take the necessary steps to 
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ensure effective protection of the applicants' right to respect for their private and family life 
and consequently violated Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
4. Bowman vs. United Kingdom, 19 February 1998 (see IRIS 1998-3: 3) Mrs Bowman was 
prosecuted in the UK following the distribution of leaflets in election time. As the executive 
director of the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, Mrs Bowman campaigned against 
abortion. The leaflets contained information on the opinions of candidates standing for the 
general elections with regard to abortion. Mrs Bowman was charged with an offence under the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 which prohibits expenditure of more than five pounds 
sterling by an unauthorised person during the period before an election on conveying 
information to electors with a view to promoting of procuring the election of a candidate. 
Although Mrs Bowman at earlier occasions had been convicted for similar facts, this time she 
finally was acquitted by the Court. Nevertheless the European Court of Human Rights is of the 
opinion that the prosecution in itself can be regarded as an interference by the authorities in 
the applicants right of freedom of expression. The Court finds that the restrictive rule with 
regard to the distribution of leaflets in election time has the effect of a total barrier to Mrs 
Bowman's publishing information with a view to influencing the voters in favour of an anti-
abortion candidate. At the same time there were no restrictions placed upon the freedom of the 
press to support or oppose the election of any particular candidate. The Court concludes that 
the restriction in question is disproportionate to the aim pursued ("securing equality between 
candidates") and hence violates Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Zana v. Turkey, 25 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII. 
• Grigoriades v. Greece, 25 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII.  
• Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I.  
• Bowman v. the United Kingdom, 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: two recent judgements on the freedom of expression and 
information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Schöpfer vs. Switzerland, 20 May 1998. 
Conviction of a lawyer who criticised the local administration of justice at a press conference: 
no breach of Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. In 1992, Mr. Schoepfer, a lawyer and former politician, held a press 
conference in Lucerne at which he declared that in his local district human rights were 
flagrantly disregarded. More specifically, he complained about the pretrial detention of one of 
his clients. According to Mr. Schoepfer his client was detained without an arrest warrant. Mr. 
Schoepfer demanded the immediate resignation of the prefect and the district clerks. He 
pointed out that he was addressing the press as a last resort. 
 
Shortly thereafter the Lucerne Bar's Supervisory Board started disciplinary proceedings against 
Mr. Schoepfer on the ground that his statements at the press conference breached his 
professional ethics as a lawyer. The Supervisory Board was of the opinion that the tone used by 
Mr. Schoepfer in his criticism was unacceptable and that he had made allegations which were 
untrue. Mr. Schoepfer was fined 500 Swiss francs. An appeal against this decision was 
dismissed by the Federal Court. 
 
Mr. Schoepfer appealed to the European Commission of Human Rights alleging that the 
disciplinary penalty imposed on him constituted a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
Similar to the European Commission in its report of 9 April 1997, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) has now come to the conclusion that there has been no violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
With regard to the question whether the infringement of the applicant's right of freedom of 
expression was necessary in a democratic society in order to maintain the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, the Court reiterates that the special status of lawyers gives them a 
central position in the administration of justice as intermediaries between the public and the 
courts and that the courts as guarantors of justice must enjoy public confidence. Considering 
the key role of lawyers in this field, the ECHR found it legitimate to expect lawyers to 
contribute to the proper administration of justice, and thus to maintain public confidence 
therein. The ECHR notes that Mr. Schoepfer first publicly criticised the administration of justice 
and only afterwards exercised a legal remedy which proved effective with regard to the 
complaint in question. 
 
Recognising that the freedom of expression also extends to lawyers, who are certainly entitled 
to comment in public on the administration of justice, the ECHR, at the same time, emphasised 
that criticism must not overstep certain bounds. The right balance needs to be struck between 
the various interests involved, which include the public's right to receive information about 
questions arising from judicial decisions, the requirements of the proper administration of 
justice and the dignity of the legal profession. The Court concurred with the findings of the Bar 
Supervisory Board because it is better positioned than an international court to determine how, 
at a given time, the right balance can be struck in this context. Having regard also to the 
modest amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, the ECHR comes to the conclusion that 
there is no breach of Article 10 (seven votes to two).  
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2. Incal vs. Turkey, 9 June 1998. 
Conviction for contributing to the preparation of a leaflet criticising the Government and 
supporting political action by the Kurdish population, is estimated a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention. In 1992 Mr. Incal, a lawyer by profession but at the material time a member of the 
Izmir section of the People's Labour Party (HEP), was responsible for the editing of a leaflet 
criticising the local authorities for their campaign against the Kurdish population. Permission 
was asked to the Izmir prefecture in order to distribute the leaflet, but this was rejected 
because the leaflet was considered to contain separatist propaganda capable of inciting the 
people to resist the Government and commit criminal offences. Upon request of the public 
prosecutor's office, the National Security Court issued an injunction ordering the seizure of the 
leaflets and prohibiting their distribution. Criminal proceedings were started against Mr. Incal, 
who was sentenced by the Izmir Security Court to nearly seven months imprisonment and a 
fine, while the conviction also debarred Mr. Incal from the civil service and prevented him from 
participating in a number of political or social activities. 
 
Mr. Incal turned to the European Commission. In its report of 25 February 1997 the Commission 
came to the conclusion that Article 10 was violated, as was Article 6 (right to a fair trial). The 
ECHR has now come to the same conclusion. 
 
The Court reiterates its case law with regard to the essential role of the freedom of expression 
in a democratic society and emphasises the importance of this freedom particularly for political 
parties and their active members (see also ECHR, 30 January 1998, United Communist Party of 
Turkey and Others vs. Turkey). It is also underlined that the limits of permissible criticism are 
wider with regard to the Government than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician. In 
a democratic system the actions and omissions of the Government must be subject to the close 
scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of public opinion. The Court 
notes that the leaflet as a matter of fact contained virulent remarks about the policy of the 
Turkish Government and urged the population of Kurdish origin to band together to raise 
political demands and to organise "neighbourhood committees". According to the Court these 
appeals cannot, however, be taken as an incitement to violence, hostility or hatred between 
citizens. The Court also notes the radical nature of the interference by the Turkish police and by 
the judicial authorities and especially its preventive character. Referring to the problems linked 
to the prevention of terrorism in the region, the Court observes that the circumstances of the 
present case are not comparable to those found in the Zana case (see IRIS 1998-4: 3) and that 
Mr. Incal could not be held responsible in any way for the problems of terrorism in the Izmir 
region. The Court unanimously came to the conclusion that Mr. Incal's conviction was 
unnecessary in a democratic society and hence violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
It is to be underlined that the Court also found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention 
because Mr. Incal as a civilian had to appear before a court partly composed of members of the 
armed forces. The Court comes to the conclusion that the applicant had legitimate cause to 
doubt the independence and impartiality of the Izmir National Security Court. This accordingly 
means a breach of Article 6, par. 1 of the Convention which inter alia guarantees a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in criminal cases. 
 
• Schöpfer v. Switzerland, 20 May 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III. 
• Incal v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: One Recent Judgement on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Ahmed and others v. United Kingdom, 2 September 1998: Restrictions on the Political Activities 
by Local Government Officials  
 
This case concerns the application of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 and the 
Local Government Officers (Political Restrictions) Regulations 1990 according to which certain 
categories of (senior) local government officials are prohibited from taking part in certain kinds 
of political activities. Four local government officials and a trade union representing public 
sector workers applied to the European Commission alleging that the application of this 
legislation infringed, inter alia, their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 
of the Convention. The European Court recognises that the guarantees contained in Article 10 
of the Convention extend also to civil servants and that the effects of the legislation under 
dispute in various ways restricted the right of freedom of expression and the right to impart 
information and ideas to third parties in the political context. However, according to the Court 
this interference does not give rise to a breach of Article 10 of the Convention, because these 
restrictions are to be regarded as necessary in a democratic society (six votes to three). 
Referring also to the margin of appreciation, the Court notes that the measures were directed 
at the need to preserve the impartiality of carefully defined categories of officers whose duties 
involve the provision of advice to a local authority council or to its operational committees or 
who represent the council in dealings with the media. Hence the restrictions imposed can 
reasonably constitute a justifiable response to the maintenance of the impartiality of the local 
government officers and are likely to avoid a situation where in the eyes of the public the local 
government officers are linked with a particular party political line. The Court also came to the 
conclusion that there was no breach of Article 11 of the Convention (freedom of assembly), nor 
of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (the right to fully participate in the electoral 
process). 
 
• Ahmed and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 1998-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Three Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Hertel vs. Switzerland, 25 August 1998: the freedom of expression also extends to the 
criticising of certain economic goods, in casu microwave ovens. 
 
In 1992 in an article in the quarterly Journal Franz Weber referred a research paper of Mr. 
Hertel on the effects on human beings of the consumption of food prepared in microwave 
ovens. According to the journal the research findings of Mr. Hertel scientifically proved the 
(carcinogenic) danger of microwave ovens. In an editorial by Mr. Weber it was argued that 
microwave ovens should be banned. Some extracts of the research paper were also published. 
The Swiss Association of Manufacturers and Suppliers of Household Electrical Appliances 
started up proceedings against the editor of the journal and against Mr. Hertel under 
application of the Federal Unfair Competition Act (Section 3). While the application against the 
editor of the Journal was dismissed, in the case against Mr. Hertel the Berne Commercial Court 
allowed the application because the defendant had used unnecessarily wounding statements. 
Mr. Hertel was prohibited by the Court from stating that food prepared in microwave ovens was 
a danger to health and from using in publications and public speeches on microwave ovens the 
image of death. The imposed injunction was later confirmed by the Federal Court. Mr. Hertel 
applied to the European Commission for Human Rights, complaining especially of a violation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Just like the Commission in its report 
of 9 April 1997, the European Court comes to the conclusion that Mr. Hertel's freedom of 
expression was violated by this ban imposed on him by the Swiss Courts. Although the 
interference in the applicant's freedom of expression was prescribed by law and had a 
legitimate aim ("the protection of the rights of others"), the Court is of the opinion that the 
impugned measure was not necessary in a democratic society. The Court notes that there is a 
disparity between the measure and the behaviour it was intended to rectify. According to the 
Court "the effect of the injunction was partly to censor the applicant's work and substantially to 
reduce his ability to put forward in public views which have their place in a public debate 
whose existence cannot be denied". And the Court emphasised : "It matters little that this 
opinion is a minority one and may appear to be devoid of merit since, in a sphere in which it is 
unlikely that any certainty exists, it would be particularly unreasonable to restrict freedom of 
expression only to generally accepted ideas" (par. 50). By six votes to three the Court reached 
the conclusion that Article 10 of the European Convention was violated.  
 
2. Lehideux and Isorni vs. France, 23 September 1998: a conviction because of an 
advertisement presenting in a positive light certain acts of Marshal Pétain is considered a 
violation of the right of freedom of expression.  
 
On 13 July 1984 the newspaper Le Monde published a one-page advertisement bearing the title 
"People of France, you have short memories". The text presented Philippe Pétain, first as a 
soldier and later as French head of State under the Vichy Government, in a positive light. After 
a complaint by the National Association of Former Members of the Resistance a criminal 
procedure was started against Mr. Lehideux as the president of the Association for the Defence 
of the Memory of Marshal Pétain and against Mr. Isorni as the author of the text. The 
advertisement finally was estimated a public defence of the crimes of collaboration with the 
enemy, under application of section 23-24 of the Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881 
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(Paris Court of Appeal 26 January 1990). The civil parties were awarded damages of one franc 
and publication of excerpts from the judgment in Le Monde was ordered. The Court of 
Cassation in its judgment of 16 November 1993 was of the opinion that this conviction did not 
infringe the right to freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the European Convention. 
 
The European Court in Strasbourg, sitting in Grand Chamber (21 judges), has now reached a 
different conclusion. Although the interference in the applicants' right to freedom of expression 
was prescribed by law and pursued the protection of the reputation or rights of others and the 
prevention of disorder or crime, the criminal conviction of Lehideux and Isorni was not 
estimated as "necessary in a democratic society". Although the Court recognises that the 
litigious advertisement presented Pétain in an entirely favourable light and did not mention 
any of the offences for which he was sentenced to death by the High Court of Justice in 1945, 
the Court also underlines that the text explicitly contains a disapproval of "Nazi atrocities and 
persecutions" and of "German omnipotence and barbarism". Although the Court estimates the 
omissions in the advertisement of any reference to the responsibility of Pétain for the 
persecution and deportation to the death camps of tens of thousands of Jews "morally 
reprehensible", it evaluates the advertisement as a whole in the light of a number of 
circumstances of the case. Referring to the different decisions and judgments during the 
domestic proceedings, to the fact that the events in issue occurred more than forty years ago 
and to the circumstance that the publication in issue corresponds directly to the object of the 
associations which produced it without any other proceedings have ever been brought against 
them for pursuing their object, the Court reaches the conclusion that the impugned interference 
in the applicants' rights violates Article 10. The Court also refers to the seriousness of a 
criminal conviction for publicly defending the crimes of collaboration, having regard to the 
existence of other means of intervention and rebuttal, particularly through civil remedies. 
Taking all this into consideration, the Court reaches the conclusion that the criminal conviction 
of the applicants was disproportionate and as such unnecessary in a democratic society. 
Therefore, the conviction of Lehideux and Isorni has been a breach of Article 10 (fifteen votes 
to six). Having reached this conclusion, the Court does not consider it appropriate to rule on the 
application of Article 17of the Convention (prohibition of abuse of rights).  
 
3. Steel and others vs. United Kingdom, 23 September 1998: the arrest and detention of 
protesters for breach of the peace and the freedom of expression. 
 
The judgment of the European Court in the case Steel and others concerns 3 different cases 
with an analogue issue: the interference by the British authorities against protest and 
demonstrations by ecological or peace movement activists. In all 3 cases the applicants were 
arrested and kept in custody some time for reason of "breach of peace". The first applicant, Ms. 
Steel, took part in a protest against a grouse shoot. She walked in front of a hunter's shotgun, 
preventing him from firing. The second applicant, Ms. Lush, took part in a protest against the 
building of an extension to a motorway. Three other applicants had taken part in a protest 
against the sale of military helicopters : their protest took the form of the distribution of 
leaflets and holding up banners in front of a conference centre. The Court recognises that 
although the protest by the first and second applicant took the form of physically impeding the 
activities of which the applicants disapproved, this behaviour could be considered as the 
expression of an opinion within the meaning of Article 10. With regard to both cases the Court 
is of the opinion however that the detention and the imprisonment was to be considered as 
"necessary in democratic society" for the interest in maintaining public order, the rule of law 
and the authority of the judiciary. With regard to the detention of the protesters against the 
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military helicopters, the Court is of the opinion that this interference was not "prescribed by 
law", since the peaceful distribution of leaflets could not be considered as a breach of the 
peace. The Court does not find any indication that the applicants significantly obstructed or 
attempted to obstruct the conference taking place or that they took any other action likely to 
provoke others to violence. Additionally, the Court considered the interference in the 
applicants' right of freedom of expression as disproportionate to the aims of preventing 
disorder or protecting the rights of others. Unanimously the Court reached the conclusion that 
in this case there has been a violation of Article 10, just as there was a violation of Article 5, 
par. 1 of the Convention (right to liberty and security). 
 
• Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI.  
• Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-
VII.  
• Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions 1998-VII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: First Judgments on Freedom of Expression and Information 
after Reorganisation of the Court 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Fressoz and Roire v. France: the right of journalists to receive and publish confidential 
documents under the protection of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In its first judgment after the reorganisation of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg (1 November 1998, Protocol No. 11), the Court decided in favour of the protection of 
journalists and emphasised the importance of the freedom of the press and its vital role in a 
democratic society. The case concerns important aspects regarding the limits of journalistic 
freedom in reporting on matters of general interest. The applicants were both convicted in 
France for the publication of an article in the satirical newspaper Le Canard enchaîné. The 
article and the documents it contained showed that the managing director of Peugeot had 
received large pay increases while at the same time the management refused the demands of 
the workers at Peugeot for a pay rise. Mr. Fressoz, the publication director of the magazine at 
that time, and Mr. Roire, the journalist who wrote the article, were convicted for receiving and 
publishing photocopies that had been obtained through a breach of professional confidence by 
an unidentified tax official. They both claimed that these convictions violate their freedom of 
expression as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention. The Court emphasised that 
in principle journalists cannot be released from their duty to obey ordinary criminal law on the 
grounds that Article 10 affords them protection of freedom of expression. However, in 
particular circumstances the interest of the public to be informed and the vital role of the press 
may justify the publication of documents that fall under an obligation of professional secrecy. 
 
Taking into consideration the fact that the article contributed to a public debate on a matter of 
general interest, that the information on the salary of Mr. Calvet as head of a major industrial 
company did not concern his private life, and that the information was already known to a large 
number of people, the Court was of the opinion that there was no overriding requirement for 
the information to be protected as confidential. It was true that the conviction was based on 
the publication of documents of which the divulgation was prohibited, but the information they 
contained was not confidential. The Court emphasised that in essence Article 10 of the 
Convention "leaves it for journalists to decide whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such 
documents to ensure credibility. It protects journalists' rights to divulge information on issues 
of general interest provided that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis 
and provide 'reliable and precise' information in accordance with the ethics of journalism" (par. 
54). In the Court's view the publication of the tax assessments was relevant not only to the 
subject matter but also to the credibility of the information supplied, while at the same time 
the journalist had acted in accordance with the standards governing his profession as a 
journalist. 
 
The final and unanimous conclusion of the Court, sitting in Grand Chamber, as that there was 
no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the legitimate aim pursued by the 
journalist's conviction and the means deployed to achieve that aim, given the interest a 
democratic society had in ensuring and preserving freedom of the press. The Court decided that 
there had been violated Article 10 of the Convention and awarded the applicants FRF 60.000 
for costs and expenses.  
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2. Janowski vs. Poland: insulting civil servants acting in their official capacity is not allowed.  
 
Mr. Janowski, a journalist, was convicted because he insulted two municipal guards. He 
offended the guards by calling them "oafs" and "dumb" during an incident which took place in a 
square, witnessed by several bystanders. Mr. Janowksi argued before the European Court that 
his conviction violated his right of freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 of the 
Convention. In evaluating whether the interference in the applicant's right was necessary in a 
democratic society, the Court emphasised that civil servants must enjoy public confidence in 
conditions free of undue perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their tasks, and 
it may therefore prove necessary to protect them from offensive and abusive verbal attacks 
when on duty. According to the Court the applicant's remarks did not form part of an open 
discussion of matters of public concern and neither did they involve the issue of freedom of the 
press since the applicant, although a journalist by profession, was clearly acting as a private 
individual on this occasion. Not being persuaded that the applicant's conviction was to be 
considered as an attempt by the authorities to restore censorship and discouragement of the 
expression of criticism in the future, the Court decided by twelve votes to five that there had 
been no breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999-I.  
• Janowski v. Poland [GC], no. 25716/94, ECHR 1999-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Two Recent Judgements on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v. Norway: defamatory allegations, the publication of a secret 
document and article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights In 
1992, the newspaper company Bladet Tromso and its editor, Pal Stensaas, were convicted by a 
Norway District Court for defamation. The newspaper had published several articles on seal 
hunting as well as an official - but secret - report that referred to a series of violations of the 
seal-hunting regulations (the Lindberg report). The article and the report more specifically 
made allegations against five crew members of the seal-hunting vessel M/S Harmoni who were 
held responsible for using illegal methods of killing seals. Although the names of the persons 
concerned were deleted, the crew members of the M/S Harmoni brought defamation 
proceedings against the newspaper and its editor. The District Court was of the opinion that 
some of the contested statements in the article and the report as a matter of fact were "null 
and void", and the newspaper and its editor were ordered to pay damages to the plaintiffs. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, reached the conclusion that the conviction by 
the Norwegian district court was in breach of Article 10 of the European Convention. The Court 
took account of the overall background against which the statements in question had been 
made, notably the controversy that seal hunting represented at the time in Norway and the 
public interest in these matters. The Court also underlined that the manner of reporting in 
question should not be considered solely by reference to the disputed articles but in the wider 
context of the newspaper's coverage of the seal hunting issue. According to the Court "the 
impugned articles were part of an ongoing debate of evident concern to the local, national and 
international public, in which the views of a wide selection of interested actors were reported". 
The Court emphasized that Article 10 of the Convention does not guarantee an unrestricted 
freedom of expression even with respect to media coverage of matters of public concern, as the 
crew members can rely on their right to protection of their honour and reputation or their right 
to be presumed innocent of any criminal offence until proven guilty. According to the Court 
some allegations in the newspaper's articles were relatively serious, but the potential adverse 
effect of the impugned statements on each individual seal hunter's reputation or rights was 
significantly attenuated by several factors. In particular, the Court was of the opinion that "the 
criticism was not an attack against all the crew members or any specific crew member". On the 
other hand, the Court underlined that the press should normally be entitled, when contributing 
to public debate on matters of legitimate concern, to rely on the contents of official reports 
without having to undertake independent research, because otherwise, the "vital public-
watchdog role" of the press might be undermined. The Court reached the following conclusion: 
"Having regard to the various factors limiting the likely harm to the individual seal hunter's 
reputation and to the situation as it presented itself to Bladet Tromso at the relevant time, the 
Court considers that the paper could reasonably rely on the official Lindberg report, without 
being required to carry out its own research into the accuracy of the facts reported. It sees no 
reason to doubt that the newspaper acted in good faith in this respect.". It should be mentioned 
that 4 of the 17 judges dissented manifestly with the majority. In the dissenting opinions, 
annexed to the judgement, it is argued why the articles are to be considered as defamatory 
towards private individuals. According to the minority, the Court had not given sufficient weight 
to the reputation of the seal hunters. The minority opinion also disagrees with the publication 
of the secret report and the fact that the newspapers took the allegations formulated in the 
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report for granted: "How could it have been "reasonable" to rely on this report when the 
newspaper was fully aware that the Ministry had ordered that the report not be made public 
immediately because it had contained possibly libellous comments concerning private 
individuals?". In an unusually sharp conclusion, the minority held that the Court sends the 
wrong signal to the press in Europe and that the judgement undermines respect for the ethical 
principles which the media voluntarily adhere to. Their final conclusion was: "Article 10 may 
protect the right for the press to exaggerate and provoke but not to trample over the reputation 
of private individuals". 
 
However, let there be no misunderstanding: the judgement of 20 May 1999 in the case of 
Bladet Tromso v. Norway has far reaching implications for the interpretation of the balance 
between journalistic freedom and the protection of the rights or reputation of individuals. It is 
obvious that a clear majority of the Court argues in favour of the public watchdog-function of 
the media and the critical reporting of matters of public concern. And albeit that this freedom is 
not wholly unrestricted, according to the actual jurisprudence of the Court, the freedom with 
respect to press coverage of matters of serious public concern is very wide. 
 
2. Rekvényi v. Hungary: politics, police and freedom of expression  
 
This case concerns the constitutional ban in Hungary on political activities by police officers 
and members of the armed forces. According to Mr. Rekvényi, a police officer living in 
Budapest, the ban not only violates his freedom of assembly and association (article 11), but 
also his freedom of (political) expression (article 10). Although the Court agreed that the 
curtailing of the applicant's involvement in political activities interfered with the exercise of his 
right of freedom of expression, the Court was of the opinion that this interference is in 
accordance with the second paragraph of article 10. As a matter of fact, the Court held that the 
interference is prescribed by law, has a legitimate aim (the protection of national security and 
public safety and the prevention of disorder) and is necessary in a democratic society. The Court 
recognized that it is a legitimate aim in any democratic society to have a politically neutral 
police force. On the other hand, the Court stated that the ban on political activities by 
policemen is not an absolute one and that in fact police officers remain entitled to undertake 
some activities enabling them to articulate their political opinions and preferences, e.g., 
policemen may promote candidates, participate in peaceful assemblies, make statements to the 
press, appear on radio and television or publish works on politics. The Court unanimously 
reached the conclusion that there had been no violation of article 10 or of article 11 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, ECHR 1999-III.  
• Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, ECHR 1999-III. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Thirteen Judgments on Freedom of Expression and 
Information (8 July 1999) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 8 July 1999 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgments in thirteen cases 
against Turkey involving Article 10 of the Convention. In eleven of the thirteen cases the Court 
held that there was a violation of the freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. All the 
cases concerned various criminal convictions of the applicants arising from separatist 
propaganda against the Turkish nation and the territorial integrity of the State or (pro-Kurdish) 
propaganda against the indivisibility of the State contrary to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
1991. In all of the cases the European Court reiterated the fundamental principles underlying 
its former judgments relating to Article 10, according to which freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society (see also IRIS 1999-6: 3, 
IRIS 1999-2: 4, IRIS 1998-10: 4, IRIS 1998-9:3, IRIS 1998-7: 4, IRIS 1998-4:3). The Court 
emphasised once again that Article 10 of the Convention also protects information and ideas 
that "offend, shock or disturb" and recalled that there is little scope under Article 10 of the 
Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest. At 
the same time, the limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than 
in relation to a private citizen: in a democratic society the actions or omissions of the 
government must be subject to the close scrutiny of public opinion. According to the Court, the 
dominant position which the government occupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint 
in resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means are available for replying 
to the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its adversaries. It is incumbent on the press to impart 
information and ideas on political issues, including divisive ones and the public has also a right 
to receive such information and ideas. On the other hand, the Court recognised the competence 
of state authorities to take measures to guarantee public order and hence to interfere with 
freedom of expression in cases of incitement to violence against individuals, public officials or 
a sector of the population. It was also emphasized that the duties and responsibilities which 
accompany the exercise of the right of freedom of expression by media professionals assume 
special significance in situations of conflict and tension and that particular caution is required 
when the views of representatives or organisations which resort to violence against the State 
are published. Such interviews involve a risk that the media might become a vehicle for the 
dissemination of hate speech and the promotion of violence. 
 
After a thorough examination of the wording and the content of the publications concerned, 
and after considering the context of the political and the security situation in south-east 
Turkey, the Court in eleven of the cases came to the conclusion that the conviction and 
sentencing of the applicants was not necessary in a democratic society and that accordingly 
there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. In all of these cases the Court was of 
the opinion that the impugned articles, news reporting, books or speeches could not be said to 
incite to violence. In most cases, the Court was also struck by the severity of the sanctions 
imposed (20 months imprisonment, substantial fines, seizures of books...): the nature and 
severity of the penalties were also factors which lead to the conclusion that the interferences 
were disproportionate. The Court also underlined that some of these convictions and sentences 
were capable of discouraging the contribution of the press to open discussion on matters of 
public concern. 
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In most of the cases the Court also found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. The 
applicants had been denied the right to have their cases heard before an independent and 
impartial tribunal as they had been tried by the National Security Courts, in which one member 
of the bench of three judges was a military judge. In two cases the Court found no violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court was of the opinion that the impugned letters and the 
news commentary in a weekly review must be regarded as capable of inciting to further 
violence in the region. Hence, the conviction of the applicant in these two cases (Sürek n°1 and 
n°3) could be regarded as answering a "pressing social need". The Court was of the opinion that 
what was at issue in these cases was "hate speech and the glorification of violence" and 
"incitement to violence". The two judgments that found no violation of Article 10 are also 
important from another point of view. It must be underlined that Sürek was convicted while he 
was the owner/publisher of the weekly review in which the readers' letters and the news 
commentary were published. Although he did not write the articles personally and only had a 
commercial and not an editorial relationship with the review, this could not exonerate him 
from criminal liability. Sürek was the owner and "as such he had the power to shape the 
editorial direction of the review", according to the Court, who held "that for that reason, he was 
vicariously subject to the "duties and responsibilities" which the review's editorial and 
journalistic staff undertake in the collection and dissemination of information to the public and 
which assume an even greater importance in situations of conflict and tension". The general 
importance of the judgments of 8 July 1999 lies in the fact that the Court again strongly 
emphasised the relation between freedom of expression, democracy and pluralism. In other 
case law of the Court it was underlined "that one of the principal characteristics of democracy 
is the possibility it offers of resolving a country's problems through dialogue, without recourse 
to violence, even when they are irksome. Democracy thrives on freedom of expression". 
 
Judgements:  
• Arslan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23462/94, 8 July 1999. 
• Polat v. Turkey [GC], no. 23500/94, 8 July 1999. 
• Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, ECHR 1999-IV.  
• Karataş v. Turkey [GC], no. 23168/94, ECHR 1999-IV. 
• Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey [GC], nos. 25067/94 and 25068/94, ECHR 1999-IV.  
• Ceylan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23556/94, ECHR 1999-IV.  
• Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], no. 24246/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Gerger v. Turkey [GC], no. 24919/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999-IV.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 24122/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 3) [GC], no. 24735/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 4) [GC], no. 24762/94, 8 July 1999.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information (28 September 1999) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 28 September 1999 the European Court of Human Rights delivered its final judgment in two 
cases concerning Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the case of Dalban vs. Romania, the "grand chamber" of the Court unanimously reached the 
conclusion that there has been a violation of the freedom of expression by the Romanian 
authorities. The case concerned an application by Mr. Ionel Dalban who was a journalist and 
ran a local weekly magazine, the Cronica Romascana. In 1994, Dalban was convicted for 
criminal libel because of some articles that exposed a series of frauds allegedly committed by a 
senator (R.T.) and the chief executive (G.S.) of a State-owned agricultural company, 
Fastrom/State Farm. Dalban died on 13 March 1998. His widow continued the proceedings in 
Strasbourg in the applicant's stead. In the meantime, on 2 March 1999 the Romanian Supreme 
Court quashed the conviction of Dalban and acquitted the applicant of the charge of libelling 
G.S. The proceedings in the case on the charge relating to Senator R.T. were discontinued due 
to Mr. Dalban's death. In its judgment of 28 September 1999 the European Court was of the 
opinion that the applicant's conviction constituted an "interference by public authority" with his 
right to freedom of expression, without the interference being necessary in a democratic 
society. The Court underlines that the articles in issue concerned a matter of public interest and 
that the press has to fulfil an essential function in a democratic society. According to the Court 
there was no proof that the description of events given in the articles was totally untrue. It is 
also emphasised that Dalban did not write about aspects of the private life of senator R.T., but 
about his behaviour and attitudes in his capacity as an elected representative of the people. 
The European Court could not agree with the Romanian courts that the fact that there had not 
been a court case against R.T. or G.S. was sufficient to establish that the information contained 
in Dalban's articles was false. The Court reached the conclusion that the applicant's conviction 
of a criminal offence and the sentencing to imprisonment amounted to a disproportionate 
interference with the exercise of his freedom of expression as a journalist. 
 
The second case of 28 September 1999, Öztürk vs. Turkey, strongly reflects the Court's case-law 
of 8 July 1999 in the Turkish cases (IRIS 1999-8: 4-5). Öztürk was convicted for helping to 
publish and distribute a book that was considered by the Turkish courts to incite the people to 
crime, hatred and hostility. The book described the life (and torture in prison) of one of the 
founding members of the Communist Party of Turkey. While the publisher of the book was 
convicted, in a separate case the author of the book was acquitted. In evaluating the 
application of Article 10 of the Convention, the Strasbourg Court explicitly referred to its case-
law of 8 July 1999, in which it emphasised that "there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the 
Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest". The 
European Court was not convinced that in the long term the book could have had a harmful 
effect on the prevention of disorder or crime in Turkey. Nor was there any indication that Mr. 
Öztürk bore any responsibility whatsoever for the problems caused by terrorism in Turkey. 
Sitting in "grand chamber" the Court unanimously reached the conclusion that once again the 
Turkish authorities had violated the freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
• Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, ECHR 1999-VI.  
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• Öztürk v. Turkey [GC], no. 22479/93, ECHR 1999-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information and on the Right of a Fair Trial and Media Coverage of a Court Case 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment delivered on 28 October 1999 in the case of Wille v Liechtenstein, the European 
Court of Human Rights held that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. On 
25 November 1999 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment in two cases with 
regard to Article 10 of the Convention, one in a case against Norway, another in a case against 
the United Kingdom. In two judgments of 16 December 1999 the media coverage and extreme 
press interest in a court case were considered by the Court as relevant factors in the evaluation 
of the right of a fair trial (article 6 § 1 of the Convention). 
 
The case of Wille v Liechtenstein has to do with a reprimand and the refusal by the Prince to 
re-appoint the president of the High Administrative Court. This interference by the Prince was 
considered to be a reaction against the opinions that the judge in a public lecture had 
expressed on a dispute of constitutional law, opinions which were also published in a 
newspaper. The Court found that such an interference by a State authority can give rise to a 
breach of Article 10 unless it can be shown that it was in accordance with paragraph 2 of 
Article 10. According to the Court, the element that the applicant's opinion had political 
implications was not in itself a sufficient reason for the impugned interference. Moreover, there 
was no evidence to conclude that the applicant's lecture contained any remarks on pending 
cases, severe criticism of persons of public institutions or insults to high officials or the Prince. 
Even allowing for a certain margin of appreciation, the Prince's action appeared 
disproportionate to the aim pursued and was considered by the Court as a violation of Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
In the case of Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway, the Grand Chamber of the Court concluded that 
there was a violation of the applicants' freedom of expression. Nilsen and Johnsen, both 
policemen, were convicted in Norway because of defamatory statements published in the press. 
These public statements were made in response to various accusations of police brutality which 
were reported in a book and had received a lot of media coverage. The statements by Nilson 
and Johnson were considered by the Oslo City Court as having a defamatory character towards 
the author of the book, a professor of criminal law. According to the European Court in 
Strasbourg, the conviction by the Oslo City Court, upheld by the Norway Supreme Court, 
violated Article 10 of the European Convention for Human Rights. After referring to its classic 
principles with regard to the importance of freedom of expression and public debate in a 
democratic society, the European Court underlined that while there can be no doubt that any 
restrictions placed on the right to impart and receive information on arguable allegations of 
police misconduct call for a strict scrutiny on the part of the Court, the same must apply to 
speech aimed at countering such allegations since they form part of the same debate. In the 
Court's view, a degree of exaggeration should be tolerated in the context of such a heated 
public debate on affairs of general concern where professional reputations are at stake on both 
sides. The Court also noted that there was factual support for the assumption that false 
allegations of police brutality had been made by informers. For these reasons the Strasbourg 
Court was not satisfied that the litigious statements exceeded the limits of permissible criticism 
for the purpose of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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The jugdment in the case of Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom is one of the very rare 
examples in which the Court is of the opinion that an interference by a public authoritiy with 
the freedom of expression and information is not "prescribed by law". In its judgment of 25 
November 1999 the Grand Chamber of the Court had to evaluate the applicants' allegation of a 
violation of Article 10. Both applicants were held responsible by the Crown Court of Dorchester 
for unlawful actions and a deliberate attempt to interfere with fox-hunting. The behaviour of 
Hashman and Harrup was found to have been contra bonos mores, a behaviour which is to be 
considered as wrong rather than right in the judgment of the majority of contemporary fellow 
citizens. The applicants were bound over to be of good behavior for a period of one year. The 
Strasbourg Court however was of the opinion that the concept of behaviour contra bonos mores 
is so broadly defined that it does not comply with the requirement of foreseeability. The legal 
basis of such an interference by public authorities is imprecise and does not give the applicants 
sufficiently clear guidance as how they should behave in future. The Court also took into 
consideration that prior restraint on freedom of expression must call for the most careful 
scrutiny. With specific reference to the facts of the case the Court reached the conclusion that 
the interference did not comply with the requirement of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention that it 
be "prescribed by law". 
 
It is interesting to note that the media coverage of, and the extremely high levels of press and 
public interest in, a court case can be regarded as relevant elements in evaluating whether 
someone is denied a fair hearing in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In two judgments 
of 16 December 1999 in the cases T. v United Kingdom and V. v United Kingdom the Court 
came to the conclusion that the two applicants - who were both convicted for the abduction 
and murder of a two-year-old boy (James Bulger) - were not guaranteed sufficiently the right of 
a fair trial, taking into account that both were only eleven years old at the time of the trial 
before the Crown Court. According to the European Court, in respect of a young child charged 
with a grave offence attracting high levels of media and public interest, it is necessary to 
conduct the hearing in such a way as to reduce as far as possible the defendant's feelings of 
intimidation and inhibition. The Court inter alia took into consideration that the trial generated 
extremely high levels of press and public interest, to the extent that the judge in his summing-
up referred to the problems caused to witnesses by the blaze of publicity and asked the jury to 
take this into account when assessing the evidence. In such circumstances the applicants were 
unable to participate effectively in the criminal proceedings against them. This led the 
European Court to the conclusion that in casu the applicants were denied a fair hearing in 
breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
 
• Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], no. 28396/95, ECHR 1999-VII.  
• Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, ECHR 1999-VIII.  
• Hashman and Harrup v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25594/94, ECHR 1999-VIII.  
• T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, 16 December 1999.  
• V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, ECHR 1999-IX.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgment on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information and the Publication of Photographs of a Suspect 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 11 January 2000 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment in the case News 
Verlags GmbH & CoKG v. Austria. The case concerns an injunction by the Vienna Court of 
Appeal prohibiting a magazine to publish photographs of a person (B) in the context of its court 
reporting. B was suspected of being responsible for a letter-bomb campaign in 1993. According 
to the Court, the prohibition on publishing such photographs in connection with reports on the 
criminal proceedings is to be considered as an interference with the applicant's freedom of 
expression and information. The Court agrees that the interference was prescribed by Austrian 
law and pursued a legitimate aim, as the injunction had the aim of protecting the reputation or 
rights of B as well as the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court decided however 
that the injunction was disproportionate and hence violated article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The Court recalled that "it is not for the Court, or for the national courts for that matter, to 
substitute their own views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be 
adopted by journalists". Furthermore the media have not only the right, but even the duty, 
according to the Court to impart - in a manner consistent with their obligations and 
responsibilities - information and ideas on all matters of public concern, including reporting 
and commenting on court proceedings. The Court emphasised that the criminal case relating to 
the letter-bombs was a news item of major public concern at the time and that B was arrested 
as the main suspect. Although the injunction in no way restricted the applicant company's right 
to publish comments on the criminal proceedings against B, it was underlined, however, that it 
restricted the applicant's choice as to the presentation of its report, while undisputedly other 
media were free to continue to publish B's picture throughout the criminal proceedings against 
him. An absolute prohibition on publishing pictures of B in the press reports of the magazine 
"News" was considered by the Court to be a disproportionate measure. As the Court underlines: 
"The absolute prohibition on the publication of B's picture went further than was necessary to 
protect B against defamation or against violations of the presumption of innocence". It followed 
from these conclusions by the Court that the interference with the applicant's right to freedom 
of expression was not "necessary in a democratic society" and accordingly violated Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
• News Verlags GmbH & Co.KG v. Austria, no. 31457/96, ECHR 2000-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the case Fuentes Bobo v. Spain the Court reached the conclusion that the dismissal of an 
employee of the public broadcasting organisation TVE was to be considered a violation of the 
right to freedom of expression. In 1993 Fuentes Bobo co-authored an article in the newspaper 
Diario 16 criticising certain management actions within the Spanish public broadcasting 
organisation. Later in two radio programmes Fuentes Bobo made critical remarks about some 
TVE-managers. These remarks led to disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the applicant's 
dismissal in 1994. In its judgment of 29 February 2000 the Court (Fourth Section) was of the 
opinion that the dismissal of the applicant due to certain offensive statements was to be 
considered an interference by the Spanish authorities with the applicant's freedom of 
expression. The Court pointed out that Article 10 of the Convention is also applicable to 
relations between employer and employee and that the State has positive obligations in certain 
cases to protect the right of freedom of expression against interference by private persons. 
Although the interference was prescribed by law and was legitimate in order to protect the 
reputation or rights of others, the Court could not agree that the severe penalty imposed on the 
applicant met a "pressing social need". The Court underlined that the criticism by the applicant 
had been formulated in the context of a labour dispute within TVE and was to be included in a 
public discussion on the failings of public broadcasting in Spain at the material time. The Court 
also took into consideration that the offensive remarks attributed to the applicant appeared 
more or less to have been provoked during lively and spontaneous radio shows in which he 
participated. Because no other legal action had been taken against the applicant with regard to 
the "offensive" statements and because of the very severe character of the disciplinary sanction 
the Court finally came to the conclusion that the dismissal of Fuentes Bobo was a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In a judgment delivered on 16 March 2000 in the case of Özgür Gündem v. Turkey the European 
Court (Fourth Section) once more held that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention by the Turkish authorities. Özgür Gündem was a daily newspaper published in 
Istanbul during the period from 1992 to 1994, reflecting Turkish Kurdish opinions. After a 
campaign that involved killings, disappearances, injuries, prosecutions, seizures and 
confiscation, the newspaper ceased publication. The applicants submitted that the State 
authorities had failed to provide protection for the newspaper and complained of the 
convictions arising from its reporting on the Kurdish issue that was estimated as constituting 
separatist propaganda and provoking racial and regional hatred. In respect of the allegations of 
attacks on the newspaper and its journalists, the Court was of the opinion that the Turkish 
authorities should have better protected Özgür Gündem. The Court considered that although 
the essential object of many provisions of the Convention is to protect the individual against 
arbitrary interference by public authorities, there may be positive obligations inherent in an 
effective respect for the rights concerned. The Court stated that genuine, effective exercise of 
freedom of expression "does not depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may 
require positive measures of protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals". In 
the case of Özgür Gündem the Turkish authorities have not only failed in their positive 
obligation to protect the freedom of expression of the applicants. According to the Court the 
search operations, prosecutions and convictions for the reporting on the Kurdish problem and 
for criticising government policy violated Article 10 as well. The Court underlined that the 
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authorities of a democratic State must tolerate criticism, even if it may be regarded as 
provocative or insulting. The judgment also emphasised that the public enjoys the right to be 
informed of different perspectives on the situation in south-east Turkey, irrespective of how 
unpalatable those perspectives appear to the authorities. An important element was also that 
the reporting by Özgür Gündem was not to be considered as advocating or inciting the use of 
violence. The Court held unanimously that there was a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In a judgment of 21 March 2000 the European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) found no 
violation of the right to freedom of expression in the case of Andreas Wabl v. Austria. Wabl, a 
member of Parliament, has accused the newspaper Kronen-Zeitung of "Nazi journalism" after 
the newspaper had quoted a police officer calling for Wabl to have an AIDS-test. The police 
officer's arm had been scratched by Wabl in the course of a protest campaign. Proceedings 
against Wabl led to an injunction to prevent him repeating the impugned statement of "Nazi 
journalism". Although the article published in the Kronen-Zeitung was to be considered as 
defamatory, the Court had particular regard to the special stigma that attaches to activities 
inspired by National Socialist ideas and to the fact that according to Austrian legislation it is a 
criminal offence to perform such activities. The Court also took into account that the applicant 
was only prohibited from repeating the statement that the reporting in the Kronen-Zeitung 
amounted to "Nazi journalism" or the making of similar statements. Hence the applicant 
retained the right to voice his opinion regarding this reporting in other terms. The Court 
reached the conclusion that the Austrian judicial authorities were entitled to consider that the 
injunction was necessary in a democratic society and that accordingly there was no violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, no. 39293/98, 29 February 2000.  
• Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, no. 23144/93, ECHR 2000-III.  
• Wabl v. Austria, no. 24773/94, 21 March 2000.  
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European Court of Human Rights: New Judgment on the Journalistic Freedom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment delivered at Strasbourg on 2 May 2000 the European Court of Human Rights 
(Third Section) found unanimously that in the case of Bergens Tidende the Norwegian 
authorities have infringed Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The daily 
newspaper Bergens Tidende, its editor-in-chief and a journalist were convicted in 1994 by the 
Norwegian Supreme Court because of defamatory articles on the issue of plastic surgery. The 
articles, some of them accompanied by large colour photographs, described in detail how 
women had experienced their situation after allegedly failed operations and a lack of care and 
follow-up treatment by a certain Dr. R. The latter instituted defamation proceedings against the 
newspaper which finally led to a conviction by the Supreme Court. Because some accusations 
at the adress of Dr. R. and the practices in his clinic were considered by the Court as not been 
proven, the newspaper, its editor-in-chief and the journalist who wrote the articles were 
ordered to pay the plaintiff amounts totalling Norwegian Krone (NOK) 4,709,861 
(approximately 4 million French francs) in respect of damages and costs. According to the 
Supreme Court the fact that the newspaper only repeated the accusations made by others did 
not constitute a sufficient defence. 
 
As so often, the dispute before the European Court related to whether the interference was 
"necessary in a democratic society" as it was undisputed that the interference was "prescribed 
by law", namely section 3-6 of the Norwegian Damage Compensation Act 1969 and pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting "the reputation or rights of others". The Strasbourg Court observed 
at the outset that the impugned articles, which recounted the personal experiences of a 
number of women who had undergone cosmetic surgery, concerned an important aspect of 
human health and as such raised serious issues affecting the public interest. The Court also 
took note of the fact that the applicants had been acting in good faith in order to provide 
accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism and attached 
considerable weight to the fact that in the present case the women's accounts of their 
treatment by Dr. R. had been found not only to have been essentially correct but also to have 
been accurately recorded by the newspaper. It was true that, as pointed out by the national 
courts, the women had expressed themselves in graphic and strong terms and that it was these 
terms which had been highlighted in the newspaper articles. However, reading the articles as a 
whole, the Strasbourg Court did not find that the statements were excessive or misleading. The 
Court also referred to its standard jurisprudence according to which "news reporting based on 
interviews constitutes one of the most important means whereby the press is able to play its 
vital role of "public watchdog" (..), it is not for the Court, any more than it is for the national 
courts, to substitute its own views for those of the press as to what techniques of reporting 
should be adopted by journalists". 
 
In these circumstances the reasons relied on by the respondent State, although relevant, were 
not sufficient to show that the interference complained of was "necessary in a democratic 
society". The Court considered that there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the restrictions placed by the measures applied by the Supreme Court on the 
applicants' right to freedom of expression and the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly there 
was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Bergens Tidende and Others v. Norway, no. 26132/95, ECHR 2000-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression. The Cases 
of Erdogdu v. Turkey and Constantinescu v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Once again the European Court of Human Rights has held that the Turkish authorities have 
acted in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, this time by convicting Ümit Erdogdu, the 
editor of the review Isçilerin Sesi ("The Workers' Voice"). In 1993 Erdogdu was sentenced to six 
months' imprisonment and fined by the National Security Court: an article published in the 
review was considered to be propaganda against the territorial integrity of the State, which is 
an offence under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Court especially took into account that 
the article referred to parts of Turkish territory as Kurdistan and applauded acts of violence and 
the national resistance against the State by the PKK. In 1997 the National Security Court 
deferred sentencing Mr. Erdogdu, ordering that he would be sentenced if, within three years 
from the date of deferral, he was convicted in his capacity as editor of an offence with intent. 
 
In a judgment delivered at Strasbourg on 15 June 2000 the European Court of Human Rights 
(Fourth Section) has found that by convicting Erdogdu the judicial authorities of Turkey violated 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the Strasbourg Court, the 
Turkish authorities did not take sufficient account of the freedom of the press or the right of 
the public to have access to a different perspective on the Kurdish problem. Although the Court 
underlined its awareness of the concerns of the authorities regarding the fight against 
terrorism, it was not persuaded that the litigious article would have highly detrimental 
consequences for the prevention of disorder and crime in Turkey. Nor was the article to be 
considered as an incitement to violence and hatred. As to the applicant's benefiting from a 
deferral of sentence, the Court was of the opinion that because this order only took effect if Mr. 
Erdogdu committed no further offences with intent as an editor, this was to be considered as a 
ban effectively censoring the applicant's exercise of his profession. The Court also regarded the 
ban as unreasonable, as it forced Mr. Erdogdu to refrain from publishing any article that would 
be considered contrary to the interests of the State. Such a limitation on freedom of journalistic 
expression was disproportionate because it meant that only ideas that were generally accepted, 
welcome or regarded as inoffensive or neutral could be expressed. Consequently, the Court 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Turkish judge of 
the European Court of Human Rights, Judge Gölcüklü delivered a separate opinion. Although he 
voted with the majority of the Court, Judge Gölcüklü expressed his doubts on the political 
opportunity to protect the freedom of expression in a way that this freedom can be abused to 
undermine the democratic rights and freedoms itself. 
 
In the case of Constantinescu v. Romania, the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment 
of 27 June 2000 (First Section) found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The case 
concerns the applicant's conviction for criminal defamation. Constantinescu, the president of a 
teachers' trade union, was convicted by the Bucharest District Court in 1994 following the 
publication in the press of comments he had made regarding an internal dispute in the Union 
and the functioning of the judicial system. More specifically, in an interview with a journalist of 
the newspaper Tineretul Liber Constantinescu had referred to three members of the previous 
trade union leadership who had refused to return money belonging to the Union after the 
election of new leaders as delapidatori (receivers of stolen goods). It was also mentioned that 
the new leadership of the Union had lodged a criminal complaint against them. The Bucharest 
District Court considered these statements by Constantinescu as defamatory, as he must have 
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been aware when making this remarks in the presence of journalists that the prosecution had 
dropped the charges against the three teachers concerned. Before the Strasbourg Court 
Constantinescu alleged a violation of Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) 
of the European Convention. He maintained that he had not been allowed to prove that his 
comments were true and had not been informed that the charges had been dropped by the 
prosecution when the article appeared. As a matter of fact, the European Court of Human 
Rights noted a violation of Article 6 of the Convention because the Bucharest District Court 
found the applicant guilty of defamation without affording him an opportunity to give evidence 
and defend his case. On the other hand, the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The European Court of Human Rights underlined that the Bucharest District Court 
had based its conviction on the use of the defamatory word delapidatori by Constantinescu 
referring to the three teachers, and not on the fact that he had expressed opinions criticising 
the functioning of the system of justice in trade union disputes. The Court considered that 
Constantinescu could quite easily have voiced his criticism and contributed to a free public 
debate on trade union problems without using the word delapidatori, which explicitly refers to 
a criminal offence, of which the three teachers were never convicted. Accordingly, 
Constantinescu should have refrained from using this description. Hence, the Strasbourg Court 
reached the conclusion that the State's legitimate interest in protecting the reputation of the 
three teachers did not conflict with the applicant's interest in contributing to the 
aforementioned debate. The Court also found that the penalty imposed, namely a fine of 
50,000 ROL (leu) and an award of 500,000 ROL (leu) to each teacher for non-pecuniary damage, 
was not disproportionate. It was within their margin of appreciation for the Romanian courts to 
consider the conviction of Constantinescu "necessary in a democratic society" in order to 
protect the rights of others, which is fully in accordance with para. 2 of Article 10 of the 
Convention. In a partially dissenting opinion judge Casadevall (Andorra) expressed his opinion 
that the arguments developed by the Romanian authorities were neither pertinent nor 
sufficient to legitimise the interference in the applicant's freedom of expression. Casadevall 
inter alia referred to the judgment of the Romanian Supreme Court in 1999 which annuled the 
applicant's conviction because the motive of intent to defame was not proven. According to 
Casadevall this judgment in itself contained an implicit confirmation of a violation of Article 10 
of the European Convention. 
 
• Erdoğdu v. Turkey, no. 25723/94, ECHR 2000-VI.  
• Constantinescu v. Romania, no. 28871/95, ECHR 2000-VIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Judgment on the Freedom of Expression in the Case Sener v. 
Turkey. 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Once again the European Court of Human Rights has held that the Turkish authorities have 
acted in breach of Article 10 (and Article 6) of the Convention, this time by convicting the 
owner and editor of the weekly review Haberle Yorumda Gerçek ("The Truth of News and 
Comments"). In 1994 Sener was sentenced to six months' , imprisonment and a fine by the 
Istanbul State Security Court: an article published in the review was considered to be an 
offence under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991. In the proceedings before the European 
Court, the Turkish government asserted that the applicant was responsible for separatist 
propaganda since the article encouraged terrorist violence against the State. In the 
government's opinion, the message that the article conveyed was that the only means of 
resolving the Kurdish problem was the maintenance of terrorist activities against the State. 
 
In its judgment of 18 July 2000, the European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) has 
summarised the basic principles established in its case law concerning Article 10 of the 
Convention, referring in particular to the essential role of journalism and the media in ensuring 
the proper functioning of political democracy. The Court also underlined, in line with its case 
law, that there was little scope under Article 10 paragraph 2 for restrictions on political speech 
or on debate on matters of public interest. In contrast with the Turkish judicial authorities, the 
European Court was of the opinion that although the impugned article contained certain 
phrases that were aggressive in tone, the article as a whole did not glorify violence, nor did it 
incite people to hatred, revenge or armed resistance. On the contrary, the Strasbourg Court 
considereds the article to be an intellectual analysis of the Kurdish problem calling for an end 
to the armed conflict. The Court was of the opinion that the domestic authorities failed to give 
sufficient weight to the public's right to be informed of a different perspective on the situation 
in south-east Turkey, irrespective of how unpalatable that perspective might be for them. The 
Court finally came to the conclusion that by convicting Sener the Turkish judicial authorities 
infringed Article 10 , of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The Court also reached the conclusion that because of the presence of a military judge on the 
bench of the Istanbul State Security Court, Sener was denied a fair , trial, in breach of Article 6 
§ 1 of the Convention. 
 
The Turkish judge Gölcüklü expressed a dissenting opinion and argued that in the present case 
he did not find any violation imputable to the respondent State. 
 
• Şener v. Turkey, no. 26680/95, 18 July 2000.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 21 September 2000, the Austrian broadcasting legislation is once more being 
analysed by the Strasbourg Court (Second Section) from the perspective of Article 10 of the 
European Convention, this time after a complaint by a private organisation that did not obtain a 
licence to set up and operate a television transmitter in the Vienna area. In its judgment of 24 
November 1993 in the Informationsverein Lentia case, the European Court of Human Rights 
already decided that the monopoly of the Austrian public broadcasting organisation ORF was in 
breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
This point of view was confirmed in a judgment of 20 October 1997 in the case of Radio ABC v. 
Austria. The Court was of the opinion that at least until 1 May 1997 there was no legal basis 
whereby an operating licence could be granted to any radio station other than the Austrian 
Broadcasting Corporation, a situation which violated Article 10 of the European Convention 
(see IRIS 1997-10: 3). In its judgment of 21 September 2000, the European Court now notes 
that until 1 August 1996 it was not possible to obtain a licence to operate a television 
transmitter in Austria. Hence, the situation of Tele 1 was not different from that of the 
applicants in the Informationsverein Lentia case. Accordingly, there was a breach of Article 10 
during that period. The Strasbourg Court notes, however, that as of 1 August 1996 private 
broadcasters were free to create and transmit their own programmes via cable network without 
any conditions being attached, while terrestrial television broadcasting was still reserved to the 
ORF. The Court is of the opinion that cable television broadcasting offered private broadcasters 
a viable alternative to terrestrial broadcasting as almost all households receiving television in 
Vienna had the possibility of being connected to the cable net. Thus, the interference with the 
applicant's right to impart information resulting from the impossibility of obtaining a licence 
for terrestrial broadcasting can no longer be regarded as a breach of Article 10. The Court did 
not decide on the question whether or not the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Act, which 
came into force on 1 July 1997, is in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court 
underlines that the applicant has not made notification of any cable broadcasting activities nor 
had it submitted an application for a satellite broadcasting licence. Consequently, it is not 
necessary for the Court to rule on this period as it is not its task to rule in abstracto whether 
legislation is compatible with the Convention. The Court comes to the conclusion that there 
has been a breach of Article 10 in the first period (from 30 November 1993 to 1 August 1996), 
while there has been no violation of this Article in the second period (from 1 August 1996 to 1 
July 1997). 
 
In a judgment delivered at Strasbourg on 28 September 2000 the European Court of Human 
Rights (Fourth Section) has found that by convicting Lopes Gomes da Silva the judicial 
authorities of Portugal infringed Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Lopes Gomes da Silva, the manager of the daily newspaper Público, was sentenced by the 
Lisbon Court of Appeal for criminal libel through the press. The conviction was the result of a 
criminal complaint by a candidate for the local elections in 1993, Mr. Silva Resende. In an 
editorial published in Público shortly before the elections, Lopes Gomes da Silva referred to 
Resende as a "grotesque and clownish candidature" and as an "incredible mixture of reactionary 
coarseness, fascist bigotry and vulgar anti-Semitism". Lopes Gomes da Silva was ordered to pay 
PTE 150.0000 as a criminal fine and to pay PTE 250.000 to Silva Resende in damages. In a 
unanimous decision the Strasbourg Court held that this conviction was a breach of Article 10 of 
the Convention. The Court once more emphasised the particular importance of the freedom of 
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the press and underlined that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider with regard to a 
politician acting in his public capacity and that journalists could resort to a degree of 
exaggeration or even provocation. By reproducing a number of extracts from recent articles by 
Silva Resende alongside his editorial, Lopes Gomes da Silva had complied with the rules of 
journalism, a matter to which the Court attached considerable importance. Although the 
penalty had been minor, the Court decided that the conviction for libel was not a measure that 
was reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Consequently, the Court 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Tele 1 Privatfernsehgesellschaft mbH v. Austria, no. 32240/96, September 2000.  
• Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, no. 37698/97, ECHR 2000-X.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Finding against France on Violation of Article 10 
Charlotte Vier 
Légipresse 
 
Almost two years after the Canard Enchaîné case, the European Court of Human Rights has 
again found that France has violated the principles contained in Article 10 of the Human Rights 
Convention. 
 
The case concerned the finding against the director of a newspaper and a journalist who had 
reported on the proceedings brought by a company that managed hostels for immigrant 
workers against one of its former directors. It was taken on the basis of Article 2 of the Act of 2 
July 1931, which prohibits the publication before the Courts reach a verdict, of any information 
concerning proceedings instigated by an individual. The Court of Appeal in Paris, to which the 
case had been referred, had considered that the ban contained in the 1931 act was compatible 
with Article 10 of the Convention inasmuch as it was aimed at guaranteeing the presumption of 
innocence and therefore fell within the scope of the restrictions on freedom of expression 
authorised by the Act. 
 
As the Court of Cassation had rejected the appeal lodged against this decision, the plaintiffs 
took the case to the European Court of Human Rights ("Court"). In its decision of 3 October 
2000, the Court recalled firstly that journalists writing articles on current criminal proceedings 
must respect the rights of the parties involved. In considering whether interference with the 
course of justice was involved, the Court noted that the disputed ban - which was absolute and 
general, covering any type of information - only concerned proceedings instigated by an 
individual and not those instigated by the Public Prosecutor or on the basis of an ordinary 
complaint. The judges expressed surprise at this difference of treatment, which did not appear 
to be based on any objective reason, since the ban prevents the press informing the public of 
facts which may be of public interest (here, the case brought against political figures and their 
allegedly fraudulent acts in managing a public-sector company). 
 
The Court held that there were other mechanisms for protecting secrecy during investigation 
and enquiry procedures, such as Articles 11 and 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in 
particular Article 9-1 of the Civil Code, which provides that everyone is entitled to the benefit 
of the presumption of innocence. In addition, the latter provision states that in the event of a 
person against whom a charge has been brought and proceedings instigated by an individual 
being presented publicly, before any verdict is passed, as being guilty of the facts being 
investigated or enquired into by the courts, the judge may, even in urgent matters, order the 
insertion in the publication concerned of an announcement putting a stop to the infringement 
of the presumption of innocence. 
 
This range of provisions, which the Court found sufficient, made the total ban contained in the 
Act of 2 July 1931 unnecessary; France had therefore been found in violation of Article 10 since 
the ban was not proportionate to the pursuit of the legitimate aims intended. 
 
• Du Roy and Malaurie v. France, no. 34000/96, ECHR 2000-X.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 10 0ctobre 2000 the European Court of Human Rights (first section) has held 
in the case of Akkoç v. Turkey that a disciplinary sanction because of an interview published in 
a newspaper, was not in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant, a former 
teacher, received a disciplinary punishment in 1994 for a statement made to the press in which 
she declared that at a meeting some teachers were assaulted by the police. In 1998, however, 
the Supreme Administrative Court decided that the disciplinary sanction was unlawful. In 1999 
the Administrative Court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Administrative Court and 
finally cancelled the disciplinary sanction imposed on the applicant. The Strasbourg Court 
decided that although five years and nine months is a considerable period of time, it did not 
deprive the domestic procedures of efficacy in providing adequate redress. The Administrative 
Court quashed the disciplinary sanction which thereby ceased, retrospectively, to have any 
effect, vindicating the applicant's right of freedom of expression. In such circumstances the 
applicant cannot longer claim to be a victim of an interference with her right of freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the same case, however, the Court found a violation of Article 2 of the Convention (right to 
life) and Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the torture of the applicant in police custody. 
 
In another judgment of 10 October 2000 the European Court of Human Rights (3rd section) in 
the case of Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey concluded that Article 10 of the Convention had been 
violated. The applicant, a writer and former Member of Parliament, was convicted several times 
in Turkey for disseminating separatist propaganda. Neither the speech at a regional congress, 
nor the publication of an article in a weekly magazine, nor the content of a leaflet, could justify 
these convictions according to the Strasbourg Court. The Court was of the opinion that the 
speech, the article and the leaflet did not constitute an incitement to violence, armed 
resistance or an uprising. The Court emphasised that one of the principal characteristics of 
democracy is the possibility to resolve a country's problems through dialogue and without 
recourse to violence, even when it is irksome. According to the Strasbourg Court, the conviction 
of the applicant could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society and hence violated 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This judgment is not final. Either party 
to the case may, within three months from the date of the judgment of a Chamber, request that 
the case be referred to the Grand Chamber (Art. 43-44 of the Convention). 
 
• Akkoç v. Turkey, nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, ECHR 2000-X.  
• İbrahim Aksoy v. Turkey, nos. 28635/95, 30171/96 and 34535/97, 10 October 2000.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Judgment on the Freedom of Expression in the Case Tammer 
v. Estonia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment in the case Tammer v. Estonia the European Court of Human Rights held 
unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. In 1997 Tammer, 
a journalist and editor of the Estonian daily newspaper Postimees, was convicted of the offence 
of insult under Article 130 of the Criminal Code. He was found guilty and had to pay a fine of 
220 Estonian kroons because of the degradation of another person's honour or dignity in an 
improper form. Tammer was convicted after a private prosecution instituted by Ms. Laanaru, the 
second wife of Mr. Savisaar, the former Prime Minister of Estonia. The journalist had published 
an interview in his newspaper which contained some value judgments that were considered as 
insulting allegations with regard to Ms. Laanaru. More precisely, in an interview with the author 
who published a series of articles on the life of Ms. Laanaru, Tammer had raised the question if 
the publication of this kind of memoire did not make a hero of the wrong person. Tammer also 
formulated a critical value judgment in his question by putting it as follows : "A person 
breaking up another's marriage (abielulõhkuja), an unfit and careless mother deserting her child 
(rongaema): it does not seem to be the best example for young girls". After exhausting all 
national remedies before the Estonian courts, Tammer applied to the European Court of Human 
Rights alleging a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The Strasbourg Court however was of the opinion that the interference in the right of freedom 
of expression of Tammer met all three conditions of Article 10 paragraph 2. Tammer's 
conviction was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was to be considered as 
necessary in a democratic society. The Court noted the assesment of the domestic courts 
concerning the nature and use of the words in the circumstances of the case and considered 
that the applicant journalist could have formulated his criticism of Ms. Laanaru's actions 
without resorting to insulting language. The Strasbourg Court did not find it established that 
the use of the impugned terms in relation to Ms. Laanaru's private life was justified in terms of 
public concern or that they bore on a matter of general importance. The Court considered that 
the domestic courts properly balanced the various interests involved in the case. Taking into 
account the margin of appreciation, the Court reached the conclusion that the national 
authorities were indeed justified in the circumstances in interfering with the exercise of the 
applicant's right, noting also the limited amount of the fine imposed on Tammer as a penalty. 
Therefore, there had not been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention. 
 
This judgment will become final in accordance with the circumstances set out in Article 44 
paragraph 2 of the Convention. 
 
• Tammer v. Estonia, no. 41205/98, ECHR 2001-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgment on Freedom of Expression in the Case of 
Jerusalem v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 27 February 2001, the European Court of Human Rights once again recognised 
the importance of freedom of political debate in a democratic society, while re-emphasising the 
difference between factual allegations and value judgments. In the case of Jerusalem v. Austria, 
the applicant, Mrs Susanne Jerusalem, a member of the Vienna Municipal Council, alleged that 
an injunction prohibiting her from repeating certain statements violated her right to freedom of 
expression. In a speech in the course of a debate in the Municipal Council on the granting of 
public subsidies to associations, she had sharply criticised two associations, describing them as 
"sects" which had "a totalitarian character" and "fascist tendencies". The Regional Court granted 
an injunction prohibiting Mrs Jerusalem from repeating the statements. The injunction was 
upheld by the Court of Appeal and by the Supreme Court, both of which essentially reasoned 
that allegations such as "fascist tendencies" or "sects with a totalitarian character" were 
statements of fact which the applicant had failed to prove. 
 
However, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a 
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court observed that 
the applicant was an elected politician and that freedom of expression is especially important 
for elected public representatives. The applicant's statements were made in the course of a 
political debate and, although not covered by immunity as they would have been in a session of 
the Regional Parliament, the forum was comparable to Parliament insofar as the public interest 
in protecting the participants' freedom of expression was concerned. According to the Court, 
"Parliament or such comparable bodies are the essential fora for political debate [in a 
democracy]. Very weighty reasons must be advanced to justify interfering with the freedom of 
expression exercised therein". 
 
The Court regarded the statements of Mrs Jerusalem as value judgments and took into 
consideration the fact that she had offered documentary evidence which might have been 
relevant in showing that these value judgments were fair comment. By requiring the applicant 
to prove the truth of her statements, while at the same time depriving her of an effective 
opportunity to produce evidence to support them, the Austrian Courts had taken a measure that 
amounted to a disproportionate interference with her right to freedom of expression. The Court 
also stated that the requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to fulfil 
and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court concluded that the injunction preventing the repetition 
of the impugned statements was not necessary in a democratic society and hence violated 
Article 10. 
 
The judgment will become final in accordance with Article 44 of the Convention, which governs 
the finalisation of judgments by the Court. 
 
• Jerusalem v. Austria, no. 26958/95, ECHR 2001-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Cases of B. and P. v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the cases of B. and P. v. the United Kingdom, the applicants complained that they had been 
barred from divulging information about the proceedings on custody rights over their children. 
The judge dealing with the case had ordered that no documents used in the proceedings should 
be disclosed outside the court. B. had also been warned by the judge that any publication of 
information obtained in the context of the proceedings would amount to contempt of court. As 
the case was not heard in public and the judgments were not publicly pronounced, B. and P. 
complained in Strasbourg that these restricting measures on the publicity of their court case 
ought to have been considered to be in breach of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and 
Article10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In a judgment of 24 April 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) noted that 
the proceedings in question concerned the residence of each man's son following the parents' 
divorce or separation, which were prime examples of cases where the exclusion of the press 
and public might be justified to protect the privacy of the child and parties and to avoid 
prejudicing the interests of justice. Concerning the publication of the judgments in question, 
the Court observed that anyone who could establish an interest was able to consult and obtain 
a copy of the full text of the judgments in child residence cases, while some of these judgments 
were routinely published, thus enabling the public to study the manner in which the courts 
generally approach such cases and the principles applied in deciding them. Under these 
circumstances, the Court reached the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 
1, either regarding the applicants' complaints about the public hearing or the public 
pronouncement of the judgments. Finally, the Court held that it was not necessary to examine 
separately the applicants' complaint under Article 10 of the Convention, thereby implying that 
the Court did not find a violation of Article 10 of the Convention either. 
 
• B. and P. v. the United Kingdom, nos. 36337/97 and 35974/97, ECHR 2001-III.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Cyprus v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) of 10 May 2001 deals 
with one of the few cases in which the applicant is the government of another State Party to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In 
this case, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus alleged that due to Turkey's military 
operations in Northern Cyprus, and especially after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus in 1983 ("the TRNC"), the Government of Turkey was to be considered 
responsible for continuing violations of several human rights. One of the violations arising out 
of the living conditions of Greek Cypriots in Northern Cyprus concerned freedom of expression 
and information, as protected by Article 10 of the Convention. More specifically, it was asserted 
that the TRNC authorities engaged in excessive censorship of school-books and restricted the 
importation and distribution of media, especially Greek-language newspapers and books whose 
content they disapproved. Referring to the Commission's report, the Court was of the opinion 
that there was not sufficient evidence that restrictions were imposed on the importation of 
newspapers, the distribution of books or on the reception of electronic media. The Court, on the 
other hand, found that during the period under consideration, a large number of school-books, 
no matter how innocuous their content, were unilaterally censored or rejected by the 
authorities. According to the Court, the respondent Government failed to provide any 
justification for this form of wide-ranging censorship which far exceeded the limits of 
confidence-building methods and amounted to a denial of the right to freedom of information. 
These measures of excessive censorship were considered by the Court to be a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgment of 28 June 2001, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a 
remarkable approach with regard to the right of access to broadcast "non-commercial" 
television commercials. Although the judgment of the Court is essentialy declaratory, it can be 
interpreted as affording arguments for a "right to an antenna", ie a right of access to a 
particular media controlled by a third person. 
 
The case originates in an application against Switzerland because of the refusal in 1994 by the 
AG für das Werbefernsehen (Commercial Television Company, now Publisuisse) to broadcast a 
commercial concerning animal welfare at the request of the Verein gegen Tierfabriken 
(Association against industrial animal production - VGT). The television commercial was to be 
considered as a response to the advertisements of the meat industry, and ended with the words 
"eat less meat, for the sake of your health, the animals and the environment". The Commercial 
Television Company refused to broadcast the commercial, however, because it considered it to 
be a message with a clear political character, and Swiss broadcasting law prohibits political 
advertisements on radio and television. The applicant's administrative law appeal was 
dismissed by the Bundesgericht (Federal Court) on 20 August 1997, relying inter alia on the 
legitimate aim of the prohibition of political advertising stated in Section 18 Paragraph 5 of the 
Federal Radio and Television Act. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 28 June 2001 agreed that a ban on 
political advertisements on television as such can be considered to have a legitimate aim, in 
order to prevent financially-strong groups from obtaining a competitive advantage in politics 
and to spare the political process from undue commercial influence. Such a ban can also help 
to provide for a certain equality of opportunity between political movements in society, and to 
support the press which remained free to publish political advertisements. The Court also 
agreed that the commercial could be regarded as "political" within the meaning of Section 18 
Paragraph 5 of the Swiss Federal Radio and Television Act. Indeed, rather than inciting the 
public to purchase a particular product, it reflected some controversial opinions on an actual 
debate in society. 
 
On the decisive question of whether the refusal to broadcast the commercial was necessary in a 
democratic society, the Court took into account several factors. First of all, the Court observed 
that powerful financial groups obtain competitive advantages through commercial advertising 
and might therefore exercise pressure on, and eventually curtail, the freedom of the radio and 
television stations broadcasting the commercials. The Court underlined that such situations 
undermine the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society. Here, 
however, the applicant association, did not constitute a powerful financial group. Rather than 
seeking to abuse a competitive advantage, the association was intending to participate by 
means of its proposed commercial in an ongoing general debate on animal protection. 
Secondly: although a prohibition on political advertising can be compatible with the 
requirements of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court was of the opinion that Section 18 
Paragraph 5 of the Swiss Federal Radio and Television Act was in casu not applied in 
accordance with Article 10 of the European Convention. According to the Strasbourg Court, the 
Swiss authorities had not demonstrated in a "relevant and sufficient" manner why the grounds 
generally advanced in support of the prohibition on political advertising also served to justify 
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the interference in the particular circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the Court underlined 
that the domestic authorities did not adduce the disturbing nature of any particular sequence, 
or of any particular words of the commercial as a ground for refusing to broadcast it. Finally, it 
was also taken into consideration that the Commercial Television Company was the sole entity 
responsible for the broadcasting of commercials during programmes programmes broadcast 
nationally, which meant that there were few other possibilities to reach the entire Swiss public 
with the proposed advertisement. 
 
In light of all these elements, the Court held unanimously that the refusal to broadcast VGT's 
commercial could not be considered as necessary in a democratic society and that consequently 
there had been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention. 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 of the Convention. 
Within 3 months any party in the case may request a rehearing by the Grand Chamber of the 
Court. 
 
• VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, no. 24699/94, ECHR 2001-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Ekin Association v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 17 July 2001, the European Court of Human Rights analysed Section 14 of the 
French Act on Freedom of the Press, 1881, from the perspective of Articles 10 and 14 of the 
European Convention. This provision of the French Act empowers the Minister of the Interior to 
impose a ban on the circulation or distribution of foreign publications. The Court noted that 
Section 14 of the 1881 Act does not state the circumstances in which the power can be used. In 
particular, there is no definition of the concept of "foreign origin" and no indication of the 
grounds on which a publication could be banned. With regard to the banning in 1987 of the 
book "Euskadi at war", published by the Basque cultural organisation Ekin, the Court was of the 
opinion that the applicant had not been given the possibility to rely on an effective judicial 
review to prevent the abuse of Section 14 of the French Freedom of the Press Act. According to 
the Court, this provision also appeared to be in direct conflict with the actual wording of Article 
10 § 1 of the European Convention, which provides that the rights recognised in that Article 
subsist "regardless of frontiers". The Court ruled that a system of control on publications merely 
based on their foreign origin is indeed to be considered as a kind of discrimination. Finally, the 
Court held that the content of the book did not justify so serious an interference with the 
applicant's freedom of expression as that constituted by the ban imposed by the French 
Minister of the Interior. Besides the violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court also 
noted that the total length of the proceedings, more than nine years, could not be considered 
"reasonable", although the issue of the litigation was of particular importance. Consequently, 
there was also a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 of the Convention. 
Any party to the case may request a rehearing by the Grand Chamber of the Court within three 
months. 
 
• Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, ECHR 2001-VIII.  
 
IRIS 2001-8/2 
Back to overview of case-law 
93 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of Feldek v. Slovakia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 12 July 2001, the European Court of Human Rights decided, by five votes to 
two, that there had been a violation of Article 10 because of the conviction of a publicist who 
had sharply criticised the Slovak Minister of Culture and Education. This is the second time in 
only a short period that the Strasbourg Court has found a breach of the right to freedom of 
expression in Slovakia (See also: Judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (Second 
Section), Case of Marônek v. Slovakia, Application no. 32686/96 of 19 April 2001. 
 
After the publication in 1995 of a statement in several newspapers referring to the "fascist 
past" of the Minister of Culture and Education of the Slovak Republic, the author of this 
statement, Mr Feldek, was convicted by the Supreme Court. The Court applied Articles 11 and 
13 of the Slovak Civil Code, which offer protection against the unjustified infringement of one's 
personal rights, civil and human dignity. The statement was indeed considered as having a 
defamatory character and Feldek was ordered to ensure the publication of the final judgment in 
five newspapers. 
 
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights recalls that there is little scope under 
Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions 
of public interest and that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politician as 
such than as regards a private individual. Emphasising the promotion of free political debate as 
a very important feature in a democratic society, the Court underlined that allowing broad 
restrictions on political speech in individual cases would undoubtedly affect respect for 
freedom of expression in general in the state concerned. In the Feldek case, the Court was 
satisfied that the value judgment referring to the "fascist past" of the Slovak Minister of Culture 
was based on information which was already known to the wider public. The Strasbourg Court 
refused to subscribe to a restrictive definition of the term "fascist past", as such an 
interpretation could also mean that a person participated in a fascist organisation, as a 
member, even if this was not coupled with specific activities propagating fascist ideals. The 
Court of Human Rights reached the conclusion that the Slovak Court of Cassation had not 
convincingly established any pressing social need for putting the protection of the personal 
right of a public figure above the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the general 
interest of promoting this freedom when issues of public interest are concerned. As the 
interference complained of by Feldek was not necessary in a democratic society, the Court 
found that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 of the Convention. 
Any party to the case may request a rehearing by the Grand Chamber of the Court within three 
months. 
 
• Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, ECHR 2001-VIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Perna v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgment of 25 July 2001, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that 
there had been a violation of Article 10 on account of the applicant's conviction for alleging, by 
means of symbolic expression, that a senior Italian judicial officer had sworn an oath of 
obedience to the former Italian Communist Party. 
 
The applicant, Giancarlo Perna, who is a journalist, published an article in the Italian daily 
newspaper Il Giornale sharply criticising the communist militancy of a judicial officer, Mr G. 
Caselli, who was at that time the public prosecutor in Palermo. The article raised in substance 
two separate issues. Firstly, Perna questioned Caselli's independence and impartiality because 
of his political militancy as a member of the Communist Party. Secondly, Caselli was accused of 
an alleged strategy of gaining control of the public prosecutors' offices in a number of cities 
and the use of the pentito (i.e. criminalturned-informer) T. Buscetta against Mr Andreotti, a 
former Prime Minister of Italy. After a complaint by Caselli, Perna was convicted for defamation 
pursuant to Articles 595 and 61 § 10 of the Criminal Code and Section 13 of the Italian Press 
Act. Throughout the defamation proceedings before the domestic courts, the journalist was not 
allowed to admit the evidence he sought to adduce. In 1999 Perna alleged a violation of Article 
6 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The refusal by the Italian Courts was not considered by the Strasbourg Court as a breach of 
Article 6 § 1 and 3(d) of the Convention, which guarantee everyone charged with a criminal 
offence the right to examine witnesses or to have witnesses examined on their behalf. The 
Court was of the opinion that the applicant had not explained how evidence from the witnesses 
he wished to call could have contributed any new information whatsoever to the proceedings. 
 
After repeating the general principles of its case law on Article 10 of the Convention, the Court 
emphasised the distinction that is to be made between facts and value judgments in order to 
decide if there has been a breach of Article 10. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, 
whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. The Court noted that the 
criticism directed at the complainant had a factual basis that was not disputed, namely Caselli's 
political militancy as a member of the Communist Party. By such conduct, a judicial officer 
inevitably exposes himself to criticism in the press, which may rightly see the independence 
and impartiality of the State legal service as a major concern of public interest. The Court 
agreed that the terms chosen by Perna and the use of the symbolic image of the "oath of 
obedience" to the Communist Party was hard-hitting, but it also emphasised that journalistic 
freedom covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation. According 
to the Court, the conviction of Perna was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention as the 
punishment of a journalist for such kinds of criticism of a member of the judiciary is not 
necessary in a democratic society. 
 
With regard, however, to Perna's assertions about the alleged strategy of gaining control over 
the public prosecutors' offices in a number of cities and especially the use of the pentito 
Buscetta in order to prosecute Mr Andreotti, the Court came to the conclusion that the 
conviction of Perna was not in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. In contrast to the general 
criticism in the impugned newspaper article, these allegations obviously amounted to the 
attribution of specific acts to the complainant. As this part of the article did not mention any 
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evidence or cite any source of information, the Court considered that these allegations were 
not covered by the protection of Article 10. Referring to the extremely serious character of such 
allegations against a judicial officer, with a lack of factual basis, the Court came to conclusion 
that this part of Perna's article indeed overstepped the limits of acceptable criticism. 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 of the Convention. 
Any party to the case may request a rehearing by the Grand Chamber of the Court within three 
months. 
 
• Perna v. Italy, no. 48898/99, 25 July 2001.  
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 6 
May 2003. 
 
IRIS 2001-8/4 
Back to overview of case-law 
96 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Case Thoma v. Luxembourg 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 29 March 2001, the European Court of Human Rights once again recognised 
the importance of journalistic freedom in reporting on matters of public interest. Marc Thoma, a 
radio journalist working for RTL, alleged that his civil conviction for making a defamatory 
statement in a radio programme violated his right to freedom of expression. In that radio 
programme, he reported on alleged fraudulent practices in the field of reafforestation work. 
These allegations were based on an article published in the newspaper Tageblatt. Following 
legal action by 63 Forestry Commission officials, the journalist was convicted of defamation by 
the Luxembourg courts. 
 
The European Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court recalled its general principles, emphasising 
the important role of the press in a democratic society. Although the European Court 
recognised that some of the applicant's remarks were very serious and that the officials of the 
Water and Forestry Commission were indirectly identifiable, it noted at the same time that the 
issue raised in the radio programme had been widely debated in the Luxembourg media and 
concerned a problem of public interest. 
 
In particular, the fact that Thoma had based his defamatory remarks on an article published by 
a fellow journalist was a decisive element in this case. The European Court reiterated that 
punishing a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person 
would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to the discussion of matters of public 
interest and should not be envisaged unless there were particularly strong reasons for doing so. 
The Luxembourg courts had decided that a journalist who merely quoted from an article that 
had already been published would only escape liability if he formally distanced himself from 
that article. The European Court, however, is of the opinion that such a requirement for 
journalists to distance themselves systematically and formally from the content of a quotation 
that might defame or harm a third party was not reconcilable with the role of the press in 
providing information on current events, opinions and ideas. The Court noted that the applicant 
had taken the precaution of mentioning that he was quoting from a press article and that he 
had underlined that this article contained some "strongly worded" allegations. The Court also 
took into consideration the fact that the journalist had interviewed a third party, a woodlands 
owner, about whether he thought that the allegations of fraud in the reafforestation sector 
were true. Under these circumstances, the Court was not sufficiently convinced that the 
conviction of the applicant was necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the 
reputation and rights of others. 
 
• Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, ECHR 2001-III.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case Marônek v. Slovakia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 19 April 2001, the Court also held that there had been a violation of Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, this time in the case of Marônek v. Slovakia. In 
1992, the daily newspaper Smena published an article on the problems experienced by 
Vladimir Marônek with the allocation of a flat that was the property of a State-owned company. 
The article stated that the flat allocated to Marônek had been unlawfully occupied by A., a 
public prosecutor. It also criticised the fact that Marônek had no possibility of using the flat. A 
few weeks later, the newspaper published an open letter written by Marônek, criticising the 
fact that the flat which was at his disposal was occupied by A., emphasising again that A. was a 
public prosecutor and adding: "[S]hould our newly-born democracy have such representatives 
of law, it will not outlive its childhood and we can bury it right away". Marônek and the 
newspaper were sued and convicted of defamation. Marônek alleged before the European Court 
that his right to freedom of expression had been violated. 
 
The European Court noted that the purpose of Marônek's open letter was not only to resolve his 
individual problem, but also to urge others with a similar problem to take action. According to 
the Court, he expressed the view, apparently in good faith, that the resolution of the issue was 
important for strengthening the rule of law in a newly-born democracy. The open letter also 
raised issues of public interest, capable of affecting housing policy at a period when State-
owned apartments were about to be denationalised. Taken as a whole, the statements of 
Marônek did not appear to be excessive and most of the events on which he had relied had 
earlier been made public in the Smena article. Futhermore, and most importantly, the European 
Court reached the conclusion that the domestic courts lacked sufficient reasons to justify the 
relatively high amount of compensation awarded to the claimants. According to the Court, 
there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the measures applied and the 
legitimate aim pursued (the protection of the rights and reputation of others). Accordingly, the 
Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Marônek v. Slovakia, no. 32686/96, ECHR 2001-III.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 19 December 2001, the European Court of Human Rights announced its decision on 
admissibility in the case of Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States. 
The application was brought by six citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and 
concerned the bombing by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of the building of 
Radio Televizije Srbije (Radio-Television Serbia, RTS) during the Kosovo crisis in April 1999. 
The building was destroyed; 16 people were killed and 16 others were seriously injured. The 
applicants, all family members of the deceased or themselves injured in the bombing, 
complained that the bombardment of the RTS building violated not only Article 2 (right to life), 
but also Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of expression). 
 
The Court, however, unanimously declared the application inadmissible as the impugned act is 
to be considered as falling outside the jurisdiction of the respondent States. The Court came to 
the conclusion that there was no jurisdictional link between the persons who were victims of 
the act complained of and the respondent States. Accordingly, it was not satisfied that the 
applicants and their deceased relatives were capable of coming withinthe jurisdiction of the 
respondent States on account of the extra-territorial act in question. As to whether the 
exclusion of the applicants from the respondent States' jurisdiction would defeat the ordre 
public mission of the Convention and leave a regrettable vacuum in the Convention system of 
human rights protection, the Court's obligation was to have regard to the special character of 
the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order for the protection of 
individual human beings and its role was to ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by the Contracting States within their legal space. The FRY clearly did not fall 
within this legal space and the Convention is not considered to be designed for application 
throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of the Contracting States. 
 
The Court concluded that the impugned action of the respondent States does not engage their 
Convention responsibility and that the application could therefore be declared inadmissible. 
 
• Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of E.K. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1994, E.K., the secretary of the Istanbul section of the Human Rights Association, was 
convicted in two separate judgments by the State Security Court, which found that she had 
expressed support for the activities of the PKK and that she had undermined the territorial 
integrity and unity of the Turkish Nation. The first conviction related to an article by E.K., 
published in the Istanbul daily newspaper, Özgür Gündem, and entitled, "The world owes a debt 
to the Kurdish people". The article contained the text of a lecture by E.K. at a conference held 
in the Belgian Parliament. The article criticised the repressive approach of Turkish policy in 
Kurdistan and the violation of human rights by the Turkish army. The second case concerned an 
article in a book that was edited by E.K. The article described the situation in Turkish prisons. 
The State Security Court sentenced E.K. to terms of two years' and of six months' imprisonment 
and imposed substantial fines on her, pursuant to the Anti-terrorism Act. 
 
The applicant complained that her conviction in relation to the publication of the book 
constituted a violation of Article 7 (no punishment without law) and that both convictions 
infringed Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 6 (fair trial) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
The Court unanimously declared the conviction in relation to the publication of the book to be 
an infringement of Article 7 of the Convention, as according to Turkish law, prison sentences 
could only be imposed on the editors of periodicals, newspapers and magazines - and not 
books. The Court also unanimously declared that both convictions were in breach of Article 10 
of the Convention. The conviction in relation to the publication of the book applied a law which 
was no longer applicable at the time of the conviction by the State Security Court. Hence this 
interference by the Turkish public authorities was considered not to be prescribed by law. In 
more general and principled terms, the Court also found a breach of Article 10, as the Court 
emphasised once more the importance of freedom of expression, the role of the press in a 
genuine democracy and the right of the public to be properly informed. According to the Court, 
the impugned article published in Özgür Gündem did indeed sharply criticise the Turkish 
authorities, but it did not contain any incitement to violence, hostility or hatred between 
citizens. Nor was the conviction of the applicant as editor of the book to be considered 
"necessary in a democratic society". The Court emphasised that the impugned article was rather 
to be seen as a strong protest referring to a difficult political situation, and not as incitement to 
an armed struggle. Finally, with regard to the alleged violation of Article 6, the Strasbourg 
Court attached great importance to the fact that a civilian (lawyer, editor and human rights 
activist) had to appear before a court composed, even if only in part, of members of the armed 
forces. Hence the applicant could legitimately fear that because one of the judges of the State 
Security Court was a military judge, it might allow itself to be unduly influenced by 
considerations which had nothing to do with the nature of the case. In other words, E.K. had a 
legitimate cause and there were objective reasons to doubt the independence and impartiality 
of the State Security Court, which led to the finding of a violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention. 
 
• E.K. v. Turkey, no. 28496/95, 7 February 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Three Violations of Article 10 by Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In three judgments of 26 February 2002, all against Austria, the European Court of Human 
Rights found a breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The first case (Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria) concerned the publication 
in the periodical TATblatt of a leaflet referring to "racist agitation" by the Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party, FPÖ). The text criticised the racist policy proposals of the 
FPÖ and was followed by a list of addresses and telephone numbers of FPÖ members and 
offices, with an invitation to the readers of TATblatt to call the FPÖ politicians and tell them 
what they thought of them and their policy. The Austrian courts, following civil proceedings 
initiated by the FPÖ leader, Jörg Haider, were of the opinion that the statement concerning 
racial agitation was to be considered as an insult and went beyond the limits of acceptable 
criticism by reproaching the plaintiff with a criminal offence. An injunction not to repeat the 
statement was granted against the publisher of the magazine. The European Court, however, in 
its judgment of 26 February 2002, was of the opinion that the statement was to be situated in 
the context of a political debate and that it contributed to a discussion on subject matters of 
general interest, such as immigration and the legal status of aliens in Austria. The Court did not 
accept the qualification of the statement on "racist agitation" as an untrue statement of fact 
and considered the comment to be a value judgment, the truth of which is not susceptible of 
proof. In sum, the Court unanimously concluded that it could not find sufficient reasons to 
prevent the publisher from repeating the critical statement in question. For these reasons, the 
Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In a second case (Dichand and others v. Austria), the Austrian courts had issued an order to 
retract and not to repeat some critical statements published in the Neue Kronen Zeitung. These 
statements firmly criticised the strategies and interests of a politician-lawyer, Mr. Graff, who 
was the defence lawyer of another media group. The European Court again disagreed with the 
Austrian courts: according to the European Court, the impugned statements were value 
judgments which had an adequate factual basis and represented a fair comment on issues of 
general public interest. The Court accepted the criticism of Mr. Graff as a politician who was in 
a situation where his business and political activities overlapped. It was recognised by the 
Court that the statement contained harsh criticism in strong, polemical language. However, the 
Court recalled its standard jurisprudence that Article 10 also protects information and ideas 
that offend, shock or disturb. The Court unanimously came to the conclusion that the 
interference by the Austrian authorities had violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the third case (Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria), the European Court of Human Rights 
found that the Austrian courts had failed to take into account the essential function fulfilled by 
the press in a democratic society and its duty to impart information and ideas on matters of 
public interest. The case concerned the publication of an article, accompanied by photographs 
of a politician who had allegedly received unlawful salaries. A permanent injunction was 
granted by an Austrian court prohibiting the applicant company from publishing the politician's 
picture in connection with the article in question or similar articles. According to the Strasbourg 
Court, there was no valid reason why the newspaper should have been prevented from 
publishing the picture, especially as the photographs did not disclose any details of the private 
life of the politician concerned. The Court also referred to the fact that the picture of the 
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politician as a member of the Austrian Parliament was included on the Austrian Parliament's 
Internet site. The interference with the newspaper's right to freedom of expression was 
therefore not necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly, the Court held unanimously that 
there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, no. 28525/95, ECHR 2002-I.  
• Dichand and Others v. Austria, no. 29271/95, 26 February 2002.  
• Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria, no. 34315/96, 26 February 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of De Diego Nafría v. Spain 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1997, Mariano de Diego Nafría, a former civil servant with the rank of inspector at the Bank 
of Spain, was dismissed after he had written a letter to the Bank's inspectorate accusing the 
Governor and other senior officials of the Bank of different kinds of irregularities. After the 
Spanish Courts had confirmed the legitimate character of the dismissal of de Diego Nafría 
because of the defamatory character of the letter, de Diego Nafría alleged a violation of Article 
10 of the European Convention (freedom of expression) before the European Court of Human 
Rights, submitting that the content of the letter reflected the truth and that the terms held to 
be offensive were taken out of context. 
 
The European Court, by five votes to two, held that there had been no violation of Article 10, 
observing that the Spanish courts had pertinently and correctly weighed the conflicting 
interests against each other before concluding that the applicant had overstepped the 
acceptable limits of the right to criticise. The European Court was of the opinion that the 
judgment in which the Madrid High Court had ruled that it was insulting to make serious and 
totally unsubstantiated accusations against a number of directors of the Bank of Spain could 
not be considered unreasonable or arbitrary. 
 
In the dissenting opinion it was emphasised that this case is very similar to the case of Fuentes 
Bobo v. Spain (see IRIS 2000-4: 2). In a judgment of 29 February 2000, the Court came to the 
conclusion in that case that the dismissal of the applicant because of his criticism of the 
management of the Spanish public broadcasting organisation, TVE, was to be considered a 
breach of Article 10 of the Convention. According to the dissenting judges, the Court should 
have taken the same approach in the instant case of de Diego Nafría. The dissenting judges 
referred in particular to the fact that the letter was not made public, nor distributed to the 
media, but was exclusively and directly addressed to the Bank's inspectorate. These 
observations and arguments could not, however, dissuade the majority of the European Court 
from reaching the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, 
as the national courts had not exceeded their margin of appreciation in penalising the 
applicant. 
 
• De Diego Nafría v. Spain, no. 46833/99, 14 March 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Gaweda v. Poland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1993 and 1994, the Polish authorities refused to register two of Mr. Gaweda's periodicals. 
The title of the first periodical was The Social and Political Monthly - A European Moral 
Tribunal, while the second request concerned the registration of a periodical under the title 
Germany - a Thousand year-old Enemy of Poland. Both requests for registration were dismissed 
by the Polish courts, which considered that the name of a periodical should be relevant to its 
content, in accordance with the 1984 Press Act and the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice on 
the registration of periodicals. With regard to the first periodical, the Polish courts were of the 
opinion that the proposed name implied that a European institution was supporting or 
publishing the magazine, which was untrue and misleading. With regard to the second title, the 
courts considered that the title was also in conflict with reality, in that it unduly concentrated 
on negative aspects of Polish-German relations, thus giving an unbalanced picture of the facts. 
 
In a judgment of 14 March 2002, the European Court of Human Rights reached the conclusion 
that both refusals to register the title of a periodical magazine violated the applicant's freedom 
of expression, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. The European 
Court did not consider the obligation to register a title of a newspaper or a magazine as such to 
be a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. However, as the refusal of registration amounted 
to an interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression, this refusal must be in 
accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, which means in the first place that the 
interference with the freedom of expression of the applicant must be "prescribed by law". 
Referring to Article 20 of the Press Act and Article 5 of the Ordinance on the registration of 
periodicals, the Court was of the opinion that the applicable law was not formulated with 
sufficient precision, as the terms used in the Law and in the Ordinance are ambiguous and lack 
the clarity that one would expect in a legal provision of this nature. According to the Court, the 
legal provisions suggest rather that registration could be refused where the request for 
registration did not conform to the technical details specified in Article 20 of the Press Act. The 
refusal to allow registration because of the allegedly misleading title is to be considered as 
"inappropriate from the standpoint of freedom of the press". 
 
The European Court also observed that in the present case, the domestic courts had imposed a 
kind of prior restraint on "a printed media" in a manner which entailed a ban on publication of 
entire periodicals on the basis of their titles. Such an interference would at least require a 
legislative provision which clearly authorised the courts to do so. According to the European 
Court, the interpretation given by the Polish courts to Article 5 of the Ordinance introduced 
new criteria, which were not foreseeable on the basis of the text specifying situations in which 
the registration of a title can be refused. Therefore, the Court was of the opinion that the nature 
of the interference with the applicant's exercise of his freedom of expression was not 
"prescribed by law" within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Accordingly, the 
Court unanimously concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Gawęda v. Poland, no. 26229/95, ECHR 2002-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Nikula v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1996, Anne Nikula, a lawyer living in Helsinki, lodged an application against Finland with the 
European Court of Human Rights, alleging that her freedom of expression had been violated by 
her conviction for defamation for having criticised the public prosecutor in her own capacity as 
defence counsel. In a memorial which the applicant read out before the court, the public 
prosecutor, Mr. T., was criticised for "role manipulation and unlawful presentation of evidence". 
After a private prosecution was initiated by Mr. T., Nikula was convicted in 1994 of public 
defamation committed without better knowledge. The Supreme Court upheld the criminal 
conviction in 1996, but restricted the sanction to the payment of damages and costs only. 
 
In its judgment of 21 March 2002, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated that the 
special status of Sciences lawyers gives them a central position in the administration of justice 
as intermediaries between the public and the courts. Given the key role of lawyers in this field, 
it is legitimate to expect them to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. 
However, the Court referred as well to the possibility that an interference with the counsel's 
freedom of expression in the course of a trial could raise an issue under Article 6 of the 
Convention with regard to the right of an accused client to receive a fair trial. According to the 
Court, the "equality of arms" principle and more generally, the principle of a fair trial, militate in 
favour of free and even forceful argumentation between the parties, although this should not 
lead to unlimited freedom of expression for a defence counsel. 
 
In evaluating the legitimacy of the applicant's conviction, the Court - referring to the Interights 
Amicus Curiae report - reiterated the distinction between the role of the prosecutor as the 
opponent of the accused, and that of the judge. This should provide increased protection for 
statements whereby an accused person criticises a prosecutor, as opposed to verbally attacking 
the judge or the court as a whole. The Court also noted that the applicant's submissions were 
confined to the courtroom, as opposed to criticism of a judge or prosecutor voiced in the media. 
More substantially, the Court underlined that the threat of an ex post facto review of a 
counsel's criticism of the public prosecutor is difficult to reconcile with defence counsels' duty 
to defend their clients' interests zealously. The assessment of a defence argument should not 
be influenced by the potential chilling effect of a criminal sanction or an obligation to pay 
compensation for harm suffered or costs incurred. According to the Court, it is only in 
exceptional cases that a restrictioneven by way of a lenient criminal sanction - of a defence 
counsel's freedom of expression can be accepted as necessary in a democratic society. In the 
Court's view, such reasons were not shown to exist in the Nikula case. Therefore, the restriction 
on Ms. Nikula's freedom of expression failed to answer any pressing social need. The Court 
held, by five votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Nikula v. Finland, no. 31611/96, ECHR 2002-II.  
• Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the European Court of Human Rights by Interights, the 
International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights, pursuant to Rule 61 of the 
Rules of the Court, 26 March 2002. 
 
IRIS 2002-6/1 
Back to overview of case-law 
105 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of McVicar v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 7 May 2002, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in a case in which the 
defamation of a well-known sports figure was the central issue. In September 1995, an article 
was published in the magazine, Spiked, in which the journalist John McVicar suggested that the 
athlete Linford Christie used banned performance-enhancing drugs. Mr. Christie brought an 
action in the High Court for defamation against McVicar. For the greater part of the 
proceedings, McVicar represented himself as he could not afford to pay legal fees because of 
the non-availability of legal aid for defamation actions. His defence was that the allegations 
made in the article were true in substance and in fact. The trial judge, however, refused to 
admit the evidence of two witnesses upon which McVicar wished to rely. The judge found that 
to allow both witnesses to give evidence would have been unfair to Mr. Christie as he would 
not have had time to call counter-evidence and further, he would only have been made aware 
of the details about his alleged drugtaking when the witnesses would have taken the stand. In 
1998, the jury found that the article contained defamatory allegations and found that McVicar 
had not proved that the article was substantially true. McVicar was ordered to pay costs and 
was made the subject of an injunction preventing him from repeating the allegations. 
 
McVicar lodged an application with the European Court alleging that the inability of a 
defendant in a libel action to claim legal aid constituted a violation of Articles 6 para. 1 (fair 
trial) and 10 (freedom of expression and information) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. He also submitted that the exclusion of witness evidence at a trial, as well as the 
burden of proof which he faced in pleading a defence of justification, the order for costs and 
the injunction restricting future publication further violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court was of the opinion that McVicar was not prevented from presenting his 
defence to the defamation action effectively in the High Court, nor that the proceedings were 
unfair by reason of his ineligibility for legal aid. The Court noted, inter alia, that the applicant 
was a well-educated and experienced journalist who would have been capable of formulating a 
cogent argument before the Court. Therefore, there had been no violation of Article 6 or of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
As for the exclusion of evidence, the order to pay the costs arising from the defamation 
proceedings and the injunction measure, the Court held that there had been no violation of 
Article 10 either. The Court considered the potential consequences of the allegations made in 
the article for an individual who had achieved fame and fortune purely as a result of his athletic 
achievements to be very grave. The Court also emphasised that the offending article in itself 
made no mention of any authoritative basis for the drug-taking allegation. For those reasons, 
the Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention 
either. 
 
• McVicar v. the United Kingdom, no. 46311/99, ECHR 2002-III.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Colombani (Le Monde) v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 25 June 2002, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation by 
France of the right to freedom of expression. The case concerns the conviction of the 
publishing director and of a journalist of the newspaper, Le Monde. Both had been convicted by 
the Court of Appeal of Paris in 1997 for defamation of the King of Morocco, Hassan II. 
 
In its issue of 3 November 1995, Le Monde published an article about a confidential version of 
a report by the Geopolitical Drugs Observatory (OGD) on drug production and trafficking in 
Morocco. The report had been compiled at the request of the Commission of the European 
Communities. The article, which was sub-headed, "A confidential report casts doubt on King 
Hassan II's entourage", called into question the resolve of the Moroccan authorities, and 
principally the King, in combatting the increase in drug-trafficking on Moroccan territory. At the 
request of the King of Morocco, criminal proceedings were brought against Le Monde. Mr. 
Colombani, the publishing director, and Mr. Incyan, the journalist who wrote the article, were 
convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal under section 36 of the Law of 29 July 1881 for insulting 
a foreign head of state. According to the Court, the journalist had failed to check the 
allegations and the article was considered to have been inspired by malicious intent. 
 
The European Court, however, did not agree with these findings, emphasising in the first place 
that when contributing to a public debate on issues that raised legitimate concerns, the press 
had - in principle - to be able to rely on official reports without being required to carry out its 
own separate investigations. The Strasbourg Court also referred to other French case-law which 
was inclined to recognise that the offence under section 36 of the Law of 29 July 1881 
infringed freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention. 
Recent French jurisprudence itself appears to accept that this provision and its application were 
not necessary in a democratic society, particularly since heads of state or ordinary citizens who 
have been the target of insulting remarks or whose honour or reputation has been harmed, 
have an adequate criminal remedy in recourse to a prosecution for defamation. The special 
status for heads of states that derogated from the general law could not be reconciled with 
modern practice and political conceptions. In the Court's view, such a privilege went beyond 
what was necessary in a democratic society. The Court therefore found that, owing to the 
special nature of the protection afforded by the relevant provision of the Law on Freedom of 
the Press of 1881, the offence of insulting foreign heads of state was liable to infringe freedom 
of expression without meeting a "pressing social need". For these reasons, the Court held 
unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Colombani and Others v. France, no. 51279/99, ECHR 2002-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Wilson & the NUJ v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 2 July 2002, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation by the 
United Kingdom of the right to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 of the 
European Convention). The case concerns the use of financial incentives to induce employees 
to relinquish the right to union representation for collective bargaining. The case is especially 
interesting for the media sector, as it was brought before the Court of Human Rights jointly by 
David Wilson, a journalist working for the Daily Mail and by the National Union of Journalists 
(NUJ). Other applications by members of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport 
Workers were later joined to this initial application by Wilson and the NUJ. 
 
The case goes back to 1989 when Associated Newspapers Limited gave notice of its intention 
to de-recognise the NUJ and to terminate all aspects of collective bargaining. It also signalled 
that personal contracts were to be introduced with a 4.5% pay increase for journalists who 
signed and accepted the de-recognition. Wilson applied to the domestic courts, contesting the 
legality of the requirement to sign the personal contract and lose union rights, or accept a 
lower pay rise. After the House of Lords held that the collective bargaining over employment 
terms and conditions was not a sine qua non of union membership, Wilson and the NUJ lodged 
applications in Strasbourg, alleging that the law of the United Kingdom, by allowing the 
employer to de-recognise trade unions, failed to uphold their right to protect their interests 
through trade union representation and their right to freedom of expression, contrary to 
Articles 11 and 10 (and also in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (non-
discrimination)). 
 
With regard to Article 11, the Court is of the opinion that the absence in UK law of an 
obligation on employers to enter into collective bargaining did not give rise, in itself, to a 
breach of Article 11 of the Convention. However, the Court took the view that allowing 
employers to use financial incentives to induce employees to relinquish important union rights 
constituted a violation of Article 11. The Court referred to the fact that this feature of domestic 
law has been criticised by the Social Charter's Committee of Independent Experts and the 
International Labour Organisation's Committee on Freedom of Association. According to the 
Court, it is the State's responsibility to ensure that trade union members were not prevented or 
restrained from using their union to represent them in attempts to regulate their relations with 
their employers. The Court concluded that the United Kingdom had failed in its positive 
obligation to secure the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Article 11 of the Convention. 
 
As the Court considered that no separate issue arose under Article 10 of the Convention that 
had not already been dealt with in the context of Article 11, it held that it was not necessary to 
examine the complaint from the perspective of Article 10. The Court also found that it was 
unnecessary to consider the complaint raised under Article 14 of the Convention. 
 
• Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 30668/96, 
30671/96 and 30678/96, ECHR 2002-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Yagmurdereli v. Turkey and Seher Karatas v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In two recent judgments, the European Court of Human Rights again found violations of the 
right to freedom of expression in Turkey. 
 
The case of Esber Yagmurdereli concerns an application arising out of a sentence of ten 
months' imprisonment. The applicant, a lawyer, writer and doctor of philosophy, had given a 
speech at a meeting in 1991, in which he referred to Kurdistan as a part of the National 
Territory and to the terrorists acts carried out by the PKK as "a struggle for democracy and 
freedom". In 1994, he was convicted by the National Security Court for infringement of the anti-
terrorist law: the content of his speech was considered to amount to separatist propaganda 
aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of the State and national unity. 
 
The case of Seher Karatas concerns the conviction of the applicant, who was the publisher and 
editor of a fortnightly magazine, Gençligin Sesi ("The Voice of Youth"). After the publication of 
an article, which urged young people to unite with the working-class and which criticised the 
actual political system as heading towards instability and crisis, Ms. Karatas was charged with 
inciting the people to hatred and hostility, contrary to Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal Code. 
The National Security Court found Karatas guilty of this offence and imposed a fine and a term 
of imprisonment of one year and eight months, with the prison sentence being converted into a 
fine. 
 
In both cases, the European Court recognised the sensitivity of the security situation in south-
east Turkey and referred to the need for the authorities to fight against terrorism and to be 
vigilant in repressing acts liable to increase violence. That is why the Court held that the 
interferences with the applicants' freedom of expression pursued legitimate aims of protecting 
national security and territorial integrity and preventing disorder and crime. 
 
However, in both cases, the Court found that the applicants' comments had taken the form of a 
political speech, emphasising that the European Convention allowed very few restrictions on 
freedom of expression in the sphere of political speech or questions of general interest. The 
Court also noted that the Turkish authorities had not pointed to any passages containing a 
vindication of acts of terrorism, an incitement to hatred between citizens or a call for violence 
or bloody revenge. Accordingly, the Court concluded in both cases that the measures taken 
against the applicants could not be deemed to be necessary in a democratic society and held 
that there had been a violation of Article 10. The Court also found a violation of Article 6 para. 
1, as both applicants, as civilians, had not had a fair trial owing to the presence of a military 
judge on the bench of the National Security Court. 
 
• Yağmurdereli v. Turkey, no. 29590/96, 4 June 2002.  
• Seher Karataş v. Turkey, no. 33179/96, 9 July 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Stambuk v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 17 October 2002, the European Court of Human Rights came to the conclusion 
that a disciplinary action imposed on a doctor for disregarding a ban on advertising by medical 
practitioners by giving an interview to the press was to be considered a breach of Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In 1995, a fine was imposed on the applicant, an ophthalmologist, by a district Disciplinary 
Court for Medical Practitioners. An article in a newspaper, including an interview with, and a 
photograph of, Mr. Stambuk was considered as disregarding a ban on advertising by medical 
practitioners. The interview in which Mr. Stambuk explained the successful treatment with a 
new laser technique that he applied was seen as a kind of self-promotion, in breach of the 
[Baden-Württemberg] Rules of Professional Conduct of the Medical Practitioners' Council. 
According to section 25(2) of this Code, a medical practitioner should not allow pictures or 
stories which have an advertising character, indicate the name or show a photograph, to be 
published in respect of his/her professional activities. According to section 27, the cooperation 
of a medical practitioner in informative publications in the press is only permissible if these 
publications are limited to objective information, without the practitioner being presented in 
the form of an advertisement. The Disciplinary Appeals Court for Medical Practitioners upheld 
the sanction, taking into account that Mr. Stambuk had not only allowed an article which would 
go beyond objective information on a particular operation technique to be published, but had 
deliberately acted so as to give prominence to his own person. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recognised that restrictions on advertising by medical 
practitioners in the exercise of their liberal profession have a legitimate aim in protecting the 
rights of others or to protect health. However, the question of whether, in casu, a disciplinary 
action was necessary in a democratic society, was answered in the negative by the European 
Court. The Court recalled that, for the citizen, advertising is a means of discovering the 
characteristics of services and goods offered. The Court recognised that owing to the special 
circumstances of particular business activities and professions, advertising or commercial 
speech may be restricted. The Court also accepted that the general professional obligation on 
medical practitioners to care for the health of each individual and for the community as a 
whole might indeed explain restrictions on their conduct, including rules on their public 
communications or participation in public communications on professional issues. These rules 
of conduct in relation to the press are, however, to be balanced against the legitimate interest 
of the public in information and are limited to preserving the good functioning of the 
profession as a whole. They should not be interpreted as putting an excessive burden on 
medical practitioners to control the content of press publications, while also taking into 
account the essential function fulfilled by the press in a democratic society by imparting 
information and ideas on all matters of public interest. 
 
According to the Court, the article with the interview and a photo of Mr. Stambuk on the whole 
presented a balanced explanation of the specific operation technique, inevitably referring to 
the applicant's own experience. The article may well have had the effect of giving publicity to 
Mr. Stambuk and his practice, but, having regard to the principal content of the article, this 
effect proved to be of a secondary nature. According to the Court, the interference complained 
of by Mr. Stambuk did not achieve a fair balance between the interests at stake, namely the 
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protection of health and the interests of other medical practitioners and Mr. Stambuk's right to 
freedom of expression and the vital role of the press. In sum, there was a breach of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
• Stambuk v. Germany, no. 37928/97, 17 October 2002.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Cases of Ayse Öztürk v. Turkey and Karakoç and Others v. 
Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
With the adoption of friendly settlements in the cases of Altan v. Turkey on 14 May 2002 (see 
IRIS 2002-7: 2-3), Ali Erol v. Turkey on 20 June 2002, Özler v. Turkey on 11 July 2002, Sürek (no. 
5) v. Turkey on 16 July 2002 (see IRIS 2002-9: 4) and Mehmet Bayrak v. Turkey on 3 September 
2002 (see IRIS 2002-10: 3), several violations of the right to freedom of expression were 
recognised by the Turkish authorities. In two recent cases, the European Court of Human Rights 
again came to the conclusion that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights had 
not been respected by the Turkish authorities. 
 
In the case of Ayse Öztürk, the Court was asked to decide on the alleged violations of the right 
to freedom of expression after various seizures in 1994 of the fortnightly review Kizil Bayrak 
("The Red Flag"), of which Ayse Öztürk was the owner and editor-in-chief at that time. The 
applicant was sentenced to imprisonment and fines, with these sentences being suspended for 
three years. The impugned articles published in the review were considered to amount to 
inciting hostility and hatred based on a distinction according to race or ethnic origin, or 
separatist propaganda. The seizures and convictions were based on Article 28 of the 
Constitution, Articles 36 para. 1, 86 and 312 of the Criminal Code and Article 8 para. 1 of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act. 
 
In its judgment of 15 October 2002, the Court, without underestimating the difficulties inherent 
in the fight against terrorism and referring to the security situation in south-east Turkey, came 
to the conclusion that the seizures of the review and the conviction of the applicant could not 
be considered as "necessary in a democratic society". The Court especially emphasised that 
none of the impugned articles constituted an incitement to violence and that the comments in 
those articles took the form of political speech. As regards the fact that the sentences were 
suspended, the Court was of the opinion that such measures were tantamount to a ban on the 
applicant exercising her profession, as it required her to refrain from criticising the government 
or other authorities in a way that could be considered contrary to the interests of the State. This 
measure restricted her ability to express ideas, notably regarding the Kurdish Issue, that were 
part of a public debate and forced her to restrict her freedom of expression - as a journalist - to 
ideas that were generally accepted or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference. 
According to the Court, the measures in question were to be considered a violation of Article 10 
of the Convention. 
 
In the case of Karakoç and others, the applicants, two trade union leaders and a representative 
of a newspaper, complained of an infringement of their right to freedom of expression after 
they had been convicted for committing the offence of separatist propaganda under Article 8 of 
the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The applicants were sentenced to several months' 
imprisonment in 1994 because of the publication of a statement in the press criticising the 
policy of the Turkish authorities in southeast Turkey and in which reference was made to 
"massacres and extrajudicial executions". Taking into consideration the essential role of the 
press and its role of public watchdog, the applicants were considered to have alerted public 
opinion to concrete acts that were liable to infringe fundamental rights. The statement of the 
applicants was therefore considered as political speech by representatives of unions and the 
press, criticising the policy of the government, without inciting to violence or terrorism. 
Back to overview of case-law 
112 
 
Consequently, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10, as the applicants' 
sentences were disproportionate to the aims pursued and not necessary in a democratic society. 
The Court also found (once more) a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, as civilians 
accused of terrorist offences should not be tried by a court that includes a military judge: this 
indeed constituted a legitimate ground for fearing bias on the part of the court in the instant 
case. 
 
• Ayşe Öztürk v. Turkey, no. 24914/94, 15 October 2002.  
• Karakoç and Others v. Turkey, nos. 27692/95, 28138/95 and 28498/95, 15 October 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Demuth v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1997, Mr. Demuth complained to the European Court of Human Rights that the decision of 
the Swiss Bundesrat (Federal Council) refusing to grant Car Tv AG a broadcasting licence for 
cable television ran counter to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(freedom of expression). He considered that the refusal was arbitrary and discriminatory. In a 
decision of 16 June 1996, the Federal Council had decided that there was no right, either under 
Swiss law or under Article 10 of the European Convention, to obtain a broadcasting licence. 
With reference to the instructions for radio and television listed in Section 3 § 1 and Section 11 
§ 1 (a) of the Bundesgezetz über Radio und Fernsehen (Radio and Television Act - RTA), the 
Federal Council was of the opinion that the orientation of the programme content of Car Tv AG 
was not able to offer the required valuable orientation to comply with the general instructions 
for radio and television, as the programme focused mainly on entertainment and reports about 
automobiles. 
 
In its judgment of 5 November 2002, the European Court confirmed its earlier case-law that the 
refusal to grant a broadcasting licence is to be considered as an interference with the exercise 
of the right to freedom of expression, namely the right to impart information and ideas under 
Article 10 para. 1 of the Convention. The question is whether such an interference is legitimate. 
According to the third sentence of Article 10 para. 1, Member States are permitted to regulate 
by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, 
particularly in its technical aspects. It remains to be determined, however, whether the manner 
in which the licensing system is applied satisfies the relevant conditions of paragraph 2 of 
Article 10. 
 
The Court was of the opinion that the relevant provisions of the licensing system of the RTA 
were capable of contributing to the quality and balance of programmes. This was considered a 
sufficient legitimate aim, albeit not directly corresponding to any of the aims set out in Article 
10 para. 2. The Court also referred to the particular political and cultural structures in 
Switzerland that necessitate the application of sensitive political criteria such as cultural and 
linguistic pluralism and a balanced federal policy. The Court saw no reason to doubt the 
validity of these considerations, which are of considerable importance for a federal State. Such 
factors, which encourage in particular pluralism in broadcasting may legitimately be taken into 
account when authorising radio and television broadcasts. The Court came to the conclusion 
that the Swiss Federal Council’s decision, guided by the policy that television programmes shall 
to a certain extent also serve the public interest, did not go beyond the margin of appreciation 
left to national authorities in such matters. The Court also observed that the refusal to grant 
the requested licence was not categorical and did not exclude a broadcasting licence once and 
for all. Although the Court explicitly recognised that opinions may differ as to whether the 
Federal Council’s decision was appropriate and whether the broadcasts should have been 
authorised in the form in which the request was presented, the Court reached the conclusion 
that the restriction of the applicant’s freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic 
society. The Court took special note of the Government’s assurance that a licence would indeed 
be granted to Car Tv AG if it included cultural elements in its programme. The Court considered 
it unnecessary to examine the Government’s further ground of justification for refusing the 
licence, contested by the applicant, namely that there were only a limited number of 
frequencies available on cable television. By 6 votes to 1, the Court reached the conclusion that 
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there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The dissenting opinion of Judge G. 
Jörundsson is annexed to the judgment. 
 
• Demuth v. Switzerland, no. 38743/97, ECHR 2002-IX.  
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European Court of Human Rights: New Violations of Freedom of Political Expression in Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In two recent judgments, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion that 
freedom of political expression has been violated in Turkey. 
 
In the case of Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey, the Court was of the opinion that the confiscation of 
copies of a book and the applicant's sentence to one year's imprisonment and a fine of TRL 100 
million was an illegitimate infringement by the authorities of the right to freedom of 
expression. Kü ç ük was convicted for separatist propaganda as the book he had published 
contained an interview with Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader. The book referred to the Kurdish 
separatist movement and to the programme for Kurdish cultural autonomy. In its judgment of 5 
December 2002, the European Court of Human Rights recognised the need for the authorities 
to be alert to acts capable of fuelling additional violence in the region of south-east Turkey, but 
the Court found at the same time that the book did not constitute an incitement to violence, 
armed resistance or an uprising. The Court was also of the opinion that by confiscating copies 
of the book and convicting its author, the Turkish judicial authorities had failed to have 
sufficient regard to the general public's right to receive alternative forms of information and to 
assess the situation in south-east Turkey. Taking into account as well the nature and severity of 
the sentences imposed on the applicant, the interference with the applicant's right to freedom 
of expression was regarded as a breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
 
In the case of Dicle on behalf of the Democratic Party (DEP) v. Turkey, the Court was asked to 
decide on an alleged breach of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), Article 
10 (freedom of expression) and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the 
European Convention. The applicant alleged that the order of the Turkish Constitutional Court 
to dissolve the DEP, on the ground that its activities were liable to undermine the territorial 
integrity of the State and the unity of the nation, was a breach of several articles of the 
Convention. In its judgment of 10 December 2002, the European Court of Human Rights noted 
that the written declarations and the speeches of the leaders of the DEP that had led to the 
dissolution of the party were indeed fiercely critical of government policy towards citizens of 
Kurdish origin. However, the Court did not find those declarations and speeches to be contrary 
to fundamental principles, nor had the Constitutional Court established in accordance with the 
requisite standard that the DEP was seeking to undermine democracy in Turkey. Although one 
declaration made by the former president of the DEP in Iraq amounted to approval of the use of 
vio Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department Ghent University lence as a 
political tool, the Court was of the opinion that a single speech by a former leader of the party 
that had been made in another country, in a language other than Turkish and to an audience 
that was not directly concerned, could not be considered a sufficient reason to dissolve a 
political party. Consequently, the Court held that the dissolution of the DEP could not be 
regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" and therefore there had been a violation of 
Article 11. The Court considered it unnecessary to examine the case from the perspective of 
Articles 9 and 10, as the complaints concerned the same matters as those examined under 
Article 11. 
 
• Yalçın Küçük v. Turkey, no. 28493/95, 5 December 2002.  
• Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v. Turkey, no. 25141/94, 10 December 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of A. v. United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Although the case of A. v. United Kingdom is not an Article 10 case, the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 17 December 2002 can be considered as an important 
confirmation of the principle of freedom of speech and political debate. The case concerns the 
question of whether the statements of a Member of Parliament (MP) in the House of Commons 
are protected by parliamentary privilege under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. During a 
parliamentary debate on housing policy in 1996, an MP made offensive and derogatory remarks 
about the behaviour of A. and her children. The MP called the family of A. "neighbours from 
hell", a phrase which was also quoted in the newspapers. Following the MP's speech and 
hostile reports in the press, A. received hate-mail addressed to her and she was also stopped in 
the street and subjected to offensive language. A. was re-housed by the housing association as 
a matter of urgency and her children were obliged to change schools. A letter of complaint to 
the relevant MP (which was forwarded to the Office of the Parliamentary Speaker) and a letter 
to the then Prime Minister, Mr. John Major, did not result in effective measures being taken 
against the MP. A. was informed about the absolute character of parliamentary privilege. 
 
In Strasbourg, the applicant complained that the absolute nature of the privilege that protected 
statements about her made by the MP in Parliament violated, in particular, her right of access 
to the courts under Article 6 para. 1 of the European Convention. The European Court of Human 
Rights recognised the legitimate aim of protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining 
the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. The Court emphasised that 
in a democracy, Parliament or such comparable bodies are the essential fora for political 
debate. The Court was of the opinion that the absolute immunity enjoyed by MPs is designed to 
protect the interests of Parliament as a whole, as opposed to those of individual MPs: "in all the 
circumstances of this case, the application of a rule of absolute Parliamentary immunity cannot 
be said to exceed the margin of appreciation allowed to States in limiting an individual's right 
of access to court" (para. 87). The Court emphasised, however, that no immunity attaches to 
statements made outside of Parliament, or to an MP's press releases, even if their content 
repeats statements made during the parliamentary debate itself. 
 
The judgment reads: "[T]he Court agrees with the applicant's submissions to the effect that the 
allegations made about her in the MP's speech were extremely serious and clearly unnecessary 
in the context of a debate about municipal housing policy. The MP's repeated reference to the 
applicant's name and address was particularly regrettable. The Court considers that the 
unfortunate consequences of the MP's comments for the lives of the applicant and her children 
were entirely foreseeable. However, these factors cannot alter the Court's conclusion as to the 
proportionality of the parliamentary immunity at issue [...]. There has, accordingly, been no 
violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention as regards the parliamentary immunity enjoyed 
by the MP" (paras. 88 and 89). The absence of legal aid for defamation proceedings in the 
United Kingdom was not considered to be a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention 
either. The applicant was deemed to have had sufficient possibilities to bring defamation 
proceedings in respect of the non-privileged press releases. 
 
The Court also took into consideration the domestic law of the eight States that have made a 
third-party intervention in the case. Each of these laws makes provision for such an immunity, 
although the precise details of the immunities concerned vary. The Court believed that the rule 
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of parliamentary immunity, which is consistent with - and reflects - generally-recognised rules 
within the signatory States, the Council of Europe and the European Union, cannot in principle 
be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to the courts, as 
embodied in Article 6 para. 1. The Court found no violation of Article 8 (right to respect for 
private and family life), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) or Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination). 
 
• A. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35373/97, ECHR 2002-X.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
At the origin of this case lies an article in the Lëtzëbuerger Journal in which Robert Roemen 
reported that a Minister was convicted of tax evasion, commenting that such conduct was all 
the more shameful coming from a public person who should set an example. The article 
reported that the Minister had been ordered to pay a tax fine of LUF 100.000 (nearly EUR 
2.500). This information was based on an internal document that was leaked from the Land 
Registry and Land Property Office. The Minister lodged a criminal complaint and an 
investigation was opened in order to identify the civil servant(s) who had handled the file under 
a breach of confidence. Apart from carrying out searches at the journalist's home and 
workplace, the investigative judge also ordered a search of the office of the journalist's lawyer. 
Several applications lodged both by Roemen and Schmit because of the alleged violation of the 
protection of journalistic sources and the breach of confidentiality between the lawyer and her 
client (right of privacy) were dismissed. Finally, after the exhaustion of all domestic remedies, 
Roemen and Schmit lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
The Court came to the conclusion that the searching of the journalist's home and office is to be 
considered as a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Confirming its case law, the Court considered that "having regard to the importance of the 
Belgium protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the 
potentially chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, 
such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention, unless it is justifiable 
by an overriding requirement in the public interest" (see also ECourtHR 27 March 1996, 
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, par. 39 - see IRIS 1996-4: 5). The Court recognised that the 
searches carried out in the journalist's home and place of work were prescribed by law and 
pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the public order and preventing crime. However, 
because the article had discussed a matter of general interest, the search interferences could 
not be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless they were justified by an 
"overriding requirement in the public interest". The Court was of the opinion that the 
Luxembourg authorities had not shown that the balance between the interests at stake had 
been preserved. The Court underlined that the search warrant gave the investigative officers 
very wide powers to burst in on a journalist at his place of work and gave them access to all the 
documents in his possession. The reasons adduced by the Luxembourg authorities could not be 
regarded as sufficient to justify the searches of the journalist's home and place of work. 
Therefore the Court came to the conclusion that the investigative measures at issue had been 
disproportionate and had infringed Roemen's right to freedom of expression. 
 
The judgment also confirmed the Court's case law on the point that, in principle, the 
confidentiality of communication between a lawyer and his or her client falls under the 
protection of privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (see also ECourtHR 16 
December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany). The Court considered that the search carried out by the 
Luxembourg judicial authorities at the lawyer's office and the seizure of a document had 
amounted to an unacceptable interference with her right to respect for her private life, and 
hence amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court emphasised that the 
search carried out at Ms Schmit's office clearly amounted to a breach of the journalist's source 
through the intermediary of his lawyer. The Court held that the search had therefore been 
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disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, particularly in view of the rapidity with which 
the search order had been carried out. 
 
• Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, no. 51772/99, ECHR 2003-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Peck v. United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the case of Peck v. United Kingdom the applicant complained about the disclosure to the 
media of closed circuit television (CCTV) footage, which resulted in images of him being 
published and broadcast widely. The local authority operating the CCTV system, the Brentwood 
Borough Council, had released the images to the media with the aim of promoting the 
effectiveness of the system in the detection and the prevention of crime. Extracts of the 
footage, inter alia, were included in an Anglia Television news programme and in the BBC 
programme "Crime Beat". The masking was considered inadequate by the Independent 
Television Commission (ITC) and the Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC) as neighbours, 
colleagues, friends and family who saw the programmes recognised the applicant. The judicial 
authorities in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, did not consider that the disclosure of 
the CCTV material was a breach of the applicant's right to privacy under Article 8 of the 
European Convention. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, is of the opinion that the disclosure of the 
images to the media resulted in a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court emphasises 
that the applicant was in a public street but that he was not there for the purposes of 
participating in any public event, nor was he a public figure. The image of the applicant was 
shown in the media, including the audio-visual media, which are commonly acknowledged as 
having "often a much more immediate and powerful effect than the print media". As a result, 
the Court considers that the unforeseen disclosure by the Council operating the CCTV system of 
the relevant footage constituted a serious interference with the applicant's right to respect for 
his private life. The Court also comes to the conclusion that the disclosure was not "necessary 
in a democratic society". Although the Court recognises that the CCTV system plays an 
important role in detecting and preventing crime and that this role is rendered more effective 
and successful through advertising the CCTV system and its benefits, the Council had other 
options available to achieve these objectives. The Council could have taken steps to obtain the 
applicant's prior consent to disclosure, it could have itself masked the images before making 
them available to the media, or it could have taken the utmost care in ensuring that the media 
to which the disclosure was made masked the images. The Court notes that the Council did not 
explore the first or second options and considers that the steps taken in respect of the third 
option were inadequate. The Court is of the opinion that the Council should have demanded 
written undertakings from the media to mask the images, a requirement that would have 
emphasised the need to maintain confidentiality. As such, the disclosure constituted a 
disproportionate and therefore unjustified interference with the private life of the applicant and 
a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the applicant's complaint that he had no effective domestic remedy to have his 
right to privacy protected in the United Kingdom, it is interesting to underline that the 
European Court is of the opinion that the power of the BSC and the ITC is not sufficient to 
consider the procedures before these bodies as an effective remedy, as they cannot make 
monetary compensation available to an aggrieved individual who may have been injured by an 
infringement of the relevant broadcasting regulation. Neither did the Court accept the 
Government's argument that any acknowledgment of the need to have a remedy would 
undermine the important conflicting rights of the press as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention, as the media could have achieved their objectives by properly masking the 
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applicant's identity. Accordingly there has also been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention 
(right to effective remedy before a national authority). 
 
• Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, ECHR 2003-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Cordova no. 1 and Cordova no. 2 v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In two judgments of 30 January 2003, the European Court of Human Rights made a restrictive 
application of defamatory and insulting allegations expressed by two Members of Parliament. 
In the case of Cordova no. 1, the senator and former Italian president, Francesco Cossiga, had 
insulted by way of some sarcastic letters a public prosecutor, Mr. Cordova, while in the case of 
Cordova no. 2, the same public prosecutor had been criticised in very offensive terms by a 
member of the Italian parliament, Mr. Vittorio Sgarbi. In both cases Mr. Cordova lodged a 
criminal complaint because of these insulting and defamatory statements. In the case of 
Cordova no. 1, the Italian Senate considered that the acts of which Mr. Cossiga was accused 
were covered by parliamentary immunity, as his opinions had been expressed in the 
performance of his parliamentary duties. In the case of Cordova no. 2, the Court of Cassation 
accepted also the immunity of Mr. Sgarbi, referring to the decision of the Italian Chamber of 
Deputies interpreting the concept of "parliamentary duties" as encompassing all acts of a 
political nature, even those performed outside Parliament. These findings made it impossible to 
continue the proceedings that were under way and deprived Cordova of the opportunity to seek 
compensation for the damages he alleged he had sustained. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, is of the opinion that the decisions applying 
parliamentary immunity to Mr. Cossiga's and Mr. Sgarbi's acts constituted a violation of Article 
6 of the Convention (right to a fair trial - right of access to a court). The European Court, 
affirming its approach developed in the case of A. v. United Kingdom (ECourtHR 17 December 
2002, see IRIS 2003-3: 3), accepts that a State affords immunity to Members of its Parliament, 
as this principle constitutes a long-standing practice designed to ensure freedom of expression 
among representatives of the people and to prevent the possibility of politically-motivated 
prosecutions, interfering with the performance of parliamentary duties. Hence, the restriction 
on the applicant's right to a fair trial pursued the legitimate aims of protecting free speech in 
parliament and maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. 
In both the Cordova no. 1 and Cordova no. 2 cases, the European Court notes, however, that the 
statements by Mr. Cossiga and Mr. Sgarbi were not related to the performance of their 
parliamentary duties in the strict sense, but appeared to have been made in the context of 
personal disputes. According to the Strasbourg Court, a denial of access to a court cannot be 
justified solely on the ground that the dispute might have a political character or might relate 
to political activity. The Court considers that the decisions that Mr. Cossiga and Mr. Sgarbi 
could not be prosecuted for their alleged insulting or defamatory statements with regard to Mr. 
Cordova, had upset the fair balance that should be struck between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of protection of the individual's fundamental 
rights, such as the right to enjoy a good reputation and to have this enforced before an 
impartial judge. The Court attaches importance to the fact that, after the relevant resolutions 
had been passed by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Cordova had no other 
reasonable alternative means available for the effective protection of his rights under the 
Convention. The Court accordingly held that there had been a violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Cordova v. Italy (no. 1), no. 40877/98, ECHR 2003-I.  
• Cordova v. Italy (no. 2), no. 45649/99, ECHR 2003-I (extracts).  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Perna v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 6 May 2003, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has 
overruled the Court in the case of Perna v. Italy (see IRIS 2001-8: 3). While the Strasbourg Court 
in 2001 had come to the conclusion that the conviction of the Italian journalist Giancarlo Perna 
violated Article 10 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber has now reached the conclusion that 
the conviction of the journalist for defamation was in accordance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The case goes back to an article published in the newspaper Il Giornale in which Perna sharply 
criticised the communist militancy of a judicial officer, Mr. G. Caselli, who was at that time the 
public prosecutor in Palermo. The article raised in substance two separate issues. Firstly, Perna 
questioned Caselli's independence and impartiality because of his political militancy as a 
member of the Communist Party (PCI). Secondly, Caselli was accused of a strategy of gaining 
control of the public prosecutors' offices in a number of cities and of the manipulative use of a 
pentito (criminal-turned-informer) against Mr. Andreotti (a former Italian prime minister). After a 
complaint by Caselli, Perna was convicted for defamation in application of Articles 595 and 61 
paragraph 10 of the Italian Criminal Code and Section 13 of the Italian Press Act. Throughout 
the defamation proceedings before the domestic courts, the journalist was refused admittance 
of the evidence he sought to adduce. In 1999 Perna alleged a violation of Article 6 and Article 
10 of the European Convention. 
 
The refusal to allow the journalist to prove the truth of his statements before the Italian Courts 
was not considered by the Strasbourg Court to be a breach of Article 6 paragraphs 1 and 3 (d) of 
the Convention, which guarantee everyone charged with a criminal offence the right to 
examine witnesses or to have witnesses examined on their behalf. The Court, in its judgment of 
25 July 2001, was of the opinion that there were no indications that the evidence concerned 
could have contributed any new information whatsoever to the proceedings. The Grand 
Chamber has now confirmed this decision, emphasizing that it was not established that Perna's 
request to produce evidence would have been helpful in proving that the specific conduct 
imputed to Caselli had actually occurred. 
 
With regard to Article 10 of the Convention, the Second Section of the European Court, in its 
judgment of 25 July 2001, argued that the criticism directed at Caselli had a factual basis which 
was not disputed, namely Caselli's political militancy as a member of the Communist Party. The 
Court agreed that the terms chosen by Perna and the use of the symbolic image of the "oath of 
obedience" to the Communist Party was hard-hitting, but it also emphasized that journalistic 
freedom covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation. According 
to the Court, the conviction of Perna was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, as the 
punishment of a journalist for such kinds of criticism of a member of the judiciary was 
considered not to be necessary in a democratic society. With regard, however, to Perna's 
speculative allegations about the alleged strategy of gaining control over the public 
prosecutors' offices in a number of cities and especially the use of the pentito Buscetta in order 
to prosecute Mr. Andreotti, the Court came to the conclusion that the conviction of Perna was 
not in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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The Grand Chamber, in its judgment of 6 May 2003, has now come to the overall decision that 
the conviction of Perna did not violate Article 10 at all. The Court focuses on the article's 
overall content and its very essence, of which the unambiguous message was that Caselli had 
knowingly committed an abuse of authority, notably connected with the indictment of Mr. 
Andreotti, in furtherance of the alleged PCI strategy of gaining control of public prosecutors' 
offices in Italy. The Court is of the opinion that Perna at no time tried to prove that the specific 
conduct imputed to Caselli had actually occurred and that in his defence he argued, on the 
contrary, that he had expressed critical judgments that there were no need to prove. According 
to the Grand Chamber of the Court, the interference in Perna's freedom of expression could 
therefore be regarded as necessary in a democratic society to protect the reputation of others 
within the meaning of Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention. 
 
• Perna v. Italy [GC], no. 48898/99, ECHR 2003-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In Strasbourg, two journalists of Danmarks Radio (Danish national television) complained about 
their conviction for defamation of a Chief Superintendent. The journalists, Pedersen and 
Baadsgaard, had produced two programmes about a murder trial in which they criticised the 
police's handling of the investigation. At the end of one of the programmes, the question was 
raised if it was the Chief Superintendent who had decided that a report should not be included 
in the case or who concealed a witness's statement from the defence, the judges and the jury. 
Both journalists were charged with defamation and convicted. They were sentenced to 20 day-
fines of DKK 400 (EUR 53) and ordered to pay DKK 100.000 (EUR 13.400) compensation. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has now decided that this conviction breached neither 
Article 6 nor Article 10 of the European Convention. In its judgment of 19 June 2003, the Court, 
inter alia, emphasized that "[p]ublic prosecutors and superior police officers are civil servants 
whose task it is to contribute to the proper administration of justice. In this respect they form 
part of the judicial machinery in the broader sense of this term. It is in the general interest that 
they, like judicial officers, should enjoy public confidence. It may therefore be necessary for the 
State to protect them from accusations that are unfounded". 
 
The Court is of the opinion that the television programme left the viewers with the impression 
that the named Chief Superintendent had taken part in the suppression of a report in a murder 
case, and thus committed a serious criminal offence. The Court accepts that journalists divulge 
information on issues of general interest, provided however "that they are acting in good faith 
and on accurate factual basis and provide 'reliable and precise' information in accordance with 
the ethics of journalism". The Court is of the opinion that it is doubtful, having regard to the 
nature and degree of the accusation, that the applicants' research was adequate or sufficient to 
substantiate their concluding allegation that the Chief Superintendent had deliberately 
suppressed a vital fact in a murder case. The Court also takes into consideration that the 
programme was broadcast at peak viewing time on a national TV station devoted to objectivity 
and pluralism, and accordingly, was seen by a wide public. The Court reiterates that the audio-
visual media often have a much more immediate and powerful effect than the print media. The 
Court reaches the conclusion that the interference with the applicants' freedom of expression 
did not violate Article 10 of the Convention, as the conviction was necessary for the protection 
of the reputation and the rights of others. Three of the seven judges of the Court dissented, 
emphasizing the vital role of the press as public watchdog in imparting information of serious 
public concern. 
 
• Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, no. 49017/99, 19 June 2003.  
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 17 
December 2004. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Murphy v. Ireland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 10 July 2003 the European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that the 
applicant's exclusion from broadcasting an advertisement announcing a religious event, was 
considered to be prescribed by law, had a legitimate goal and was necessary in a democratic 
society. The decision by the Irish Radio and Television Commission (IRTC) to stop the broadcast 
of the advertisement was taken in application of Section 10(3) of the Irish Radio and Television 
Act, which stipulates that no advertisement shall be broadcast which is directed towards any 
religious or political end (see IRIS 1998-1: 6, IRIS 1998-7: 9 and IRIS 2003-2: 11). The Court 
accepted that the impugned provision sought to ensure respect for the religious doctrines and 
beliefs of others so that the aims of the prohibition were the protection of public order and 
safety together with the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Recognising that a 
wide margin of appreciation is available to the Member States when regulating freedom of 
expression in the sphere of religion, referring to the fact that religion has been a divisive issue 
and that religious advertising might be considered offensive and open to the interpretation of 
proselytism in Ireland, the Court was of the opinion that the prohibition on broadcasting the 
advertisement was not an irrelevant nor a disproportionate restriction on the applicant's 
freedom of expression. While there is not a clear consensus, nor a uniform conception of the 
legislative regulation of the broadcasting of religious advertising in Europe, reference was 
made to the existence in other countries of similar prohibitions on the broadcasting of religious 
advertising, as well as to Article 12 of Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 (Television 
without Frontiers Directive) according to which television advertising shall not prejudice 
respect for human dignity nor be offensive to religious or political beliefs. The Court also 
emphasized that the prohibition concerned only the audio-visual media, which have a more 
immediate, invasive and powerful impact, including on the passive recipient, and also the fact 
that advertising time is purchased and that this would lean in favour of unbalanced usage by 
religious groups with larger resources and advertising. For the Court it is important that the 
applicant, a pastor attached to the Irish Faith Centre, a bible based Christian ministry in Dublin, 
remained free to advertise in any of the print media or to participate as any other citizen in 
programmes on religious matters and to have services of his church broadcast in the audio-
visual media. The Court indeed accepts that a total ban on religious advertising on radio and 
television is a proportionate measure: even a limited freedom to advertise would benefit a 
dominant religion more than those religions with significantly less adherents and resources. 
This would jar with the objective of promoting neutrality in broadcasting, and in particular, of 
ensuring a "level playing field" for all religions in the medium considered to have the most 
powerful impact. The Court reached the conclusion that the interference with the applicant's 
freedom of expression did not violate Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Murphy v. Ireland, no. 44179/98, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts).  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Ernst and Others v. Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Four Belgian journalists applied to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging (among other 
complaints) that searches and seizures by the judicial authorities at their newspaper's offices, 
their homes and the head office of the French speaking public broadcasting organisation RTBF 
constituted a breach of their freedom of expression under Article 10 and a violation of their 
right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In 1995 searches were performed in connection with the prosecution of members of the police 
and the judiciary for breach of professional confidence following leaks in some highly sensitive 
criminal cases (the murder of the leader of the socialist party; investigations regarding 
industrial, financial and political corruption). The complaint lodged by the journalists against 
the searches and seizures at their places of work and homes was declared inadmissible by the 
Court of Cassation and the journalists were informed that no further action would be taken on 
their complaint. 
 
The European Court, in its judgment of 15 July 2003, has come to the conclusion that the 
searches and seizures violated the protection of journalistic sources guaranteed by the right to 
freedom of expression and the right to privacy. The Court agreed that the interferences by the 
Belgian judicial authorities were prescribed by law and were intended to prevent the disclosure 
of information received in confidence and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. The Court considered that the searches and seizures, which were intended to gather 
information that could lead to the identification of police officers or members of the judiciary 
who were leaking confidential information, came within the sphere of the protection of 
journalistic sources, an issue which called for the most careful scrutiny by the Court (see also 
ECourtHR 27 March 1996, Goodwin v. United Kingdom - see IRIS 1996-4: 5- and ECourtHR 25 
February 2003, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg - see IRIS 2003-5: 3). The Court emphasized 
the wide scale of the searches that had been performed, while at no stage had it been alleged 
that the applicants had written articles containing secret information about the cases. The 
Court also questioned whether other means could not have been employed to identify those 
responsible for the breaches of confidence, and in particular took into consideration the fact 
that the police officers involved in the operation of the searches had very wide investigative 
powers. The Court found that the Belgian authorities had not shown that searches and seizures 
on such a wide scale had been reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and 
therefore came to the conclusion that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court, for analogous reasons, also found a violation of the right to privacy 
protected by Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
• Ernst and Others v. Belgium, no. 33400/96, 15 July 2003.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Karkin v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The case of Karkin v. Turkey concerns the conviction of the secretary of a union who was 
sentenced by the National Security Court in 1997 to one year's imprisonment for making a 
speech inciting the people to hatred and hostility creating discrimination based on membership 
of a social class and race, a criminal conviction in application of Article 312 of the Turkish 
Criminal Code. Although the European Court of Human Rights clearly tion in south-east Turkey 
and the need for the authorities to be alert to acts capable of fuelling additional violence in the 
region, the Court did not agree that the conviction and punishment of Karkin was to be 
considered necessary in a democratic society. The Court was of the opinion that the applicant's 
speech was "political in nature" and was expressed during a peaceful gathering, far away from 
the conflict zone. As these circumstances significantly limited the potential impact of the 
comments on "national security", "public order" or "territorial integrity" and as the penalties 
imposed on the applicant were severe, the Court unanimously concluded that there was a 
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
• Karkın v. Turkey, no. 43928/98, 23 September 2003.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Kizilyaprak v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the case of Kizilyaprak v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that 
the Turkish national authorities did not take sufficient account of the public's right to be 
informed from different perspectives on the situation in south-east Turkey. The conviction of 
Kizilyaprak concerned the publication of a book entitled "How we fought against the Kurdish 
people! A soldier's memoirs". In this book, a Turkish soldier described what he experienced 
during his military service in south-east Turkey. As the content of the book was considered as 
disseminating separatist propaganda and incitement to hatred based on ethnic and regional 
differences (Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Article 312 of the Criminal Code), 
the owner of the publishing house, Zeynel Abidin Kizilyaprak, was sentenced to six months 
imprisonment by the National Security Court in 1993. In a crucial consideration the Strasbourg 
Court is of the opinion that, although some passages in the book painted an extremely negative 
picture of the Turkish State and the army and reflected a very hostile tone, the content of the 
book did not constitute an incitement to violence, armed resistance or an uprising. Referring 
also to the severity of the conviction, the Court unanimously concluded that the Turkish 
authorities had violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
• Kızılyaprak v. Turkey, no. 27528/95, 2 October 2003.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Müslüm Gündüz v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the case of Müslüm Gündüz v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights evaluated the 
necessity of a criminal conviction on the grounds of inciting the people to hatred and hostility. 
The applicant, in his capacity as the leader of an Islamic sect, during a TV-debate broadcast by 
HBB channel, demonstrated a profound dissatisfaction with contemporary democratic and 
secular institutions in Turkey by describing them as "impious". During the programme he also 
openly called for the introduction of the sharia. Because of these statements Müslüm Gündüz 
was found guilty by the state security court of incitement to hatred and hostility on the basis of 
a distinction based on religion. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. 
 
In its judgment of 4 December 2003, the European Court of Human Rights came to the 
conclusion that this interference by the Turkish authorities with the applicant's right to 
freedom of expression violated Article 10 of the Convention. Although the applicant's 
conviction was prescribed by Turkish criminal law and had the protection of morals and the 
rights of others as well as the prevention of disorder or crime as legitimate goals, the Court was 
not convinced that the punishment of Müslüm Gündüz was to be considered as necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court observed that the applicant was invited to participate in the 
programme to present the sect and its nonconformist views, including the notion that 
democratic values were incompatible with its conception of Islam. This topic was the subject of 
widespread debate in the Turkish media and concerned an issue of general interest. The Court 
once more emphasised that Article 10 of the Convention also protects information and ideas 
that shock, offend and disturb. At the same time, however, there can be no doubt that 
expressions propagating, inciting or justifying hatred based on intolerance, including religious 
intolerance, do not enjoy the protection of Article 10. In the Court's view, the comments and 
statements of Müslüm Gündüz expressed during the lively television debate could not be 
regarded as a call to violence or as "hate speech" based on religious intolerance. The Court 
underlined that merely defending the sharia, without calling for the use of violence to establish 
it, cannot be regarded as "hate speech". Notwithstanding the margin of appreciation accorded 
to the national authorities, the Court was of the opinion that for the purposes of Article 10 
there were insufficient arguments to justify the interference in the applicant's right to freedom 
of expression. By six votes to one the Court came to the conclusion that there had been a 
violation of Article 10. The Turkish Judge, M. Türmen, dissented with the majority of the Court. 
He was of the opinion that the statements of Müslüm Gündüz comprised "hate speech" and 
were offensive for the majority of the Turkish people who have chosen to live in a secular 
society. 
 
• Gündüz v. Turkey, no. 35071/97, ECHR 2003-XI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment of 9 March 2004, has come to the 
conclusion that Turkey has violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Convention. 
 
In the case of Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey, the applicant was convicted for making a speech during 
a meeting of the Ankara Democracy Forum criticising the Government's policy towards citizens 
of Kurdish origin and accusing the authorities of breaching human rights. The Ankara National 
Security Court in 1997 found Abdullah Aydin guilty of incitement to hatred and hostility on 
social, ethnic and regional differences, as he had drawn a distinction between the Turkish 
people and the Kurdish people and had not referred to the damage caused by the PKK 
(Workers' Party of Kurdistan). He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and a fine. 
 
Although the interference in the applicant's right to freedom of expression was prescribed by 
law (art. 312 paras. 1 and 2 Criminal Code) and pursued the legitimate aims of prevention of 
disorder and crime and the preservation of national security and territorial integrity, the 
European Court could not be convinced that the interference was necessary in a democratic 
society. The Court noted that the applicant indeed sharply criticised the Government's action 
and policy, but that his speech also contained repeated calls for peace, equality and freedom. 
For the European Court it is important that the speech at issue was political, was presented by 
a player on the Turkish political scene, during a meeting of a democratic platform, and 
especially that it did not encourage violence, armed resistance or insurrection. The Court also 
expressed the opinion that the applicant had been convicted not so much for his comments as 
for not referring to or denouncing the PKK's activities in south-east Turkey. Hence, the 
conviction was based especially on what the applicant had not said. The Court considered this 
an insufficient justification for the interference. Taking into account also the nature and 
severity of the penalties imposed, the Court unanimously reached the conclusion that the 
applicant's conviction had not been necessary in a democratic society and that there had been 
a violation of Article 10. In the same judgment, the Court also found a violation of Article 6 
para. 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial), referring to its standard opinion that civilians 
standing trial for offences under the Criminal Code had legitimate reason to fear that a national 
security court which included a military judge among its members might not be independent 
and impartial. The Court awarded the applicant EUR 10,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 
3,000 for costs and expenses. 
 
• Abdullah Aydın v. Turkey, no. 42435/98, 9 March 2004.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Radio France v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment of 30 March 2004, has agreed with the 
French authorities that Radio France, its editorial director and a journalist were to be held liable 
for the offence of public defamation of a civil servant. In a series of news flashes and bulletins 
in 1997, Radio France had mentioned an article published in the weekly magazine Le Point, 
which alleged that the deputy prefect of Pithiviers in 1942 and 1943, Mr. Michel Junot, had 
supervised the deportation of a thousand Jews. In 1998, the editorial director and the journalist 
were convicted for public defamation and were ordered to pay a fine and damages of 
approximately EUR 10,000. Radio France was also ordered to broadcast an announcement 
reporting the judgment every two hours for a period of 24 hours. The Paris Court of Appeal 
decided that Michel Junot's honour and dignity had been damaged, in particular because of the 
fact that in the news flashes it was said that the former deputy prefect had supervised the 
deportation of a thousand Jews (while in reality he had not taken the decision regarding the 
deportation); also, by comparing Mr. Junot's situation with that of Maurice Papon (who 
effectively has been convicted by the assizes Court for participation in crimes against humanity) 
and by suggesting that he had not been a member of the Resistance (while there was 
substantial evidence that Junot had been active in the Resistance). 
 
The Strasbourg Court recognized that the disputed broadcasts had taken place against the 
background of a public debate and that they mainly had quoted, with correct reference to their 
source, from a serious weekly magazine. However, some allegations in the news flashes on 
Radio France had not been published in Le Point and in the news flashes some facts were 
presented in a much more affirmative tone than in the magazine article. In view of the 
seriousness of the facts inaccurately attributed to Mr. Michel Junot and because the news 
flashes had been broadcast many times with national coverage (the audiovisual media being 
powerful instruments to reach and influence a large part of the population), the European Court 
came to the conclusion that the French jurisdictional authorities had correctly applied Article 
10 of the Convention, as the exercise of freedom of expression can be restricted or penalized 
taking into account the duties and responsibilities of media and journalists. According to the 
Strasbourg Court, the journalists and the director of Radio France should have exercised the 
utmost caution, as they must have been aware of the consequences for Mr. Junot of the 
bulletins that were broadcast to the whole of France. The conviction of Radio France, its director 
and a journalist was considered to be prescribed by law (Articles 29, 31 and 41 Press Act 1881), 
to pursue a legitimate goal (protection of the reputation and the rights of others, with reference 
also to the right of privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention) and to be necessary in 
a democratic society. The Court unanimously came to the conclusion that there had been no 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court also agreed that it was possible to consider 
the responsibility of the director in the circumstances of the case and that the order to 
broadcast the convicting judgment was to be considered as prescribed by law. Therefore, the 
Court also was of the opinion that there had been no breach of Article 6 para. 2, or of Article 7 
para. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
• Radio France and Others v. France, no. 53984/00, ECHR 2004-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of von Hannover v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in a judgment of 24 June 2004 has come to the 
conclusion that Germany has not awarded a sufficient level of protection to the right of privacy 
of Princess Caroline von Hannover. On several occasions Caroline von Hannover, the daughter 
of Prince Rainier III of Monaco, applied to the German courts for an injunction to prevent any 
further publication of a series of photographs which had appeared in the German magazines 
Bunte, Freizeit Revue and Neue Post. As Caroline von Hannover was undeniably to be considered 
as a contemporary public figure " par excellence ", the German courts were of the opinion that 
she had to tolerate she appeared with her children or with a friend in a secluded place in a 
restaurant. Other photos however showing Caroline von Hannover on horseback, shopping, 
cycling or skiing were to be considered as falling under the right of the press to inform the 
public on events and public persons in contemporary society, just like a series of photographs 
showing the Princess in the Monte Carlo Beach Club. 
 
In its judgment of 24 June, the Strasbourg Court agreed with Caroline von Hannover that the 
decisions of the German courts infringed her right to respect for her private life as guaranteed 
by Article 8 of the Convention. The Court recognizes that "the protection of private life has to 
be balanced against the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention", 
emphasizing at the same time that "the present case does not concern the dissemination of 
"ideas", but of images containing very personal or even intimate "information" about an 
individual. Furthermore, photos appearing in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of 
continual harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion 
into their private life or even of persecution". In such circumstances, priority has to be given to 
respect for the right to privacy. As a matter of fact "a fundamental distinction needs to be made 
between reporting facts - even controversial ones - capable of contributing to a debate in a 
democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and 
reporting details of the private life of an individual who, moreover, as in this case, does not 
exercise official functions. While in the former case the press exercises its vital role of 
"watchdog" in a democracy by contributing to "imparting information and ideas on matters of 
public interest", it does not do so in the latter case". According to the Court, the sole purpose of 
the publication of the photos was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding 
the details of the applicant's private life. In these conditions freedom of expression requires a 
narrower interpretation. The Court also stated that "increased vigilance in protecting private 
life is necessary to contend with new communication technologies which make it possible to 
store and reproduce personal data. This also applies to the systematic taking of specific photos 
and their dissemination to a broad section of the public". In the Court's view, merely classifying 
the applicant as a figure of contemporary society " par excellence ", does not suffice to justify an 
intrusion into her private life. The Court therefore considers that the criteria on which the 
domestic courts based their decisions were not sufficient to ensure the effective protection of 
the applicant's private life and that she should, in the circumstances of the case, have had a 
"legitimate expectation" of protection of her private life. The Court unanimously reached the 
conclusion that the German courts did not strike a fair balance between the competing rights 
and that there was a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
• Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Application by Österreichischer Rundfunk Declared 
Inadmissible 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in a decision of 25 May 2004, has come to the conclusion 
that Austria has not violated Article 10 of the Convention by prohibiting in 1999 the 
Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF) from publishing pictures of a person (B.) showing him as an 
accused during the well known letter-bomb campaign proceedings of some years before. B. had 
started proceedings in 1998 against the ORF requesting that the broadcasting company be 
prohibited from publishing without his consent pictures showing him as an accused in the 
courtroom, referring to the letter-bomb campaign without mentioning his final acquittal or if 
the impression was created that he was a neo-Nazi, was convicted of offences under the 
National Socialism Prohibition Act without mentioning that the imposed sentence had already 
been served or that he had been released on parole in the meanwhile. The Vienna Commercial 
Court and the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed B.'s claims, arguing that B's interests were not 
infringed by the neutral disclosure of his picture, that no impression was given that he had 
been convicted of participating in the letter-bomb assassinations, and that he had indeed been 
convicted of a serious crime. Therefore, B. could not enjoy unlimited protection of his identity. 
On 1 June 1999, the Supreme Court however was of the opinion that the publication of B.'s 
picture by ORF had obviously interfered with his interests as it reminded the public of B.'s court 
appearance three years after his trial and his release on parole. The Supreme Court decided 
that there was no longer a public interest in having B.'s picture published and ordered the ORF 
to refrain from publishing or disseminating B.'s pictures without his consent showing him in the 
courtroom in the circumstances mentioned above. 
 
The ORF complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the Supreme Court's judgment 
violated its right to freedom of expression. Without deciding on the Government's interesting 
preliminary objection contesting the ORF's locus standi within the meaning of Article 34 of the 
Convention (the applicant as a public broadcasting organisation being a governmental 
organisation), the Court unanimously reached the conclusion that the imposed measure by the 
Austrian Supreme Court did not violate Article 10 of the Convention and declared the 
application by the ORF inadmissible. The Court emphasizes the difference between the present 
case and the findings in the case of News Verlags GmbH & CoKG v. Austria (ECourtHR 11 
January 2000, Appl. 31457/96, see IRIS 2000-2: 2), as the Austrian courts in that case had 
issued a total prohibition on publication of B.'s picture by News Verlags, whereas in the present 
case the ORF was only prohibited from doing so in a specific context. Furthermore, the report in 
the News Verlags case was published at a time when the pending criminal proceedings against 
B. were to be considered as a matter of great public interest. In the present case there was no 
public interest involved in the publication of the picture of B. and there was no need for 
another public stigmatisation. The Court is of the opinion that the private interest of B. in 
seeking to reintegrate himself into society after having been released on parole outweighed the 
public interest in the disclosure of his picture by the media. The Court also found that the 
prohibition at issue could not be described as amounting to a general prohibition against 
publishing B.'s picture and therefore found that the measure was also proportionate to the aim 
pursued within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. The complaint by ORF was 
considered manifestly ill-founded and hence declared inadmissible. 
 
• Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria (dec.), no. 57597/00, 25 May 2004.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Plon v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
This case concerns the prohibition of the distribution of the book written by Dr. Gubler " Le 
Grand Secret ", about the former president Mitterrand and how his cancer had been diagnosed 
and medically treated. The central question is: was the prohibition of the distribution of the 
book in 1996 to be considered as necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the 
deceased president's honour, his reputation and the intimacy of his private life? Many items of 
information revealed in the book were indeed legally confidential and were capable of 
infringing the rights of the deceased and his family. But was this a sufficient reason to 
legitimise a blanket ban of the book? 
 
As to whether the interference by the French courts ordering the prohibition of the distribution 
of Dr. Gubler's book at the request of Mitterrand's widow and children met a pressing social 
need, the European Court emphasises in the first place that the publication of the book had 
taken place in the context of a general-interest debate. This debate had already been going on 
for some time in France and was related to the right of the public to be informed about the 
president's serious illnesses and his capacity to hold that office, being aware that he was 
seriously ill. 
 
The European Court considered that the interim ban on the distribution of " Le Grand Secret " a 
few days after Mitterrand's death and until the relevant courts had ruled on its compatibility 
with medical confidentiality and the rights of others as necessary in a democratic society for 
the protection of the rights of President Mitterrand and his heirs and successors. 
 
The ruling however, more than nine months after Mitterrand's death, to keep the ban on the 
book, is considered as a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, at the time when 
the French court ruled on the merits of the case 40,000 copies of the book had already been 
sold, the book had been published on the internet and it had been the subject of much 
comment in the media. Accordingly, preserving medical confidentiality could no longer 
constitute a major imperative. The Strasbourg Court consequently considered that when the 
French court gave judgment there was no longer a pressing social need justifying the 
continuation in force of the ban on distribution of " Le Grand Secret ". While the Court found no 
violation in regard to the injunction prohibiting distribution of the book issued as an interim 
measure by the urgent applications judge (summary proceedings), the European Court comes to 
the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in regard to the 
order maintaining that prohibition in force made by the civil court which ruled on the merits. 
 
• Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148/00, ECHR 2004-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Final Judgment in the Case of Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In Strasbourg, two journalists of Danmarks Radio (Danish National television) complained about 
their conviction for defamation of a Chief Superintendent. The journalists, Pedersen and 
Baadsgaard, had produced two programmes about a murder trial in which they had criticised 
the police's handling of the investigation. At the end of the programmes, the question was 
raised if it was the Chief Superintendent who had decided that a report should not be included 
in the case or who concealed a witness's statement from the defence, the judges and the jury. 
Both journalists were charged with defamation and convicted and sentenced to 20 day-fines of 
DKK 400, amounting to DKK 8,000 (equivalent to approximately EUR 1,078) and ordered to pay 
compensation to the estate of the deceased Chief Superintendent of DKK 100,000 (equivalent 
to approximately EUR 13,469). The domestic courts came to the conclusion that the journalists 
lacked a sufficient factual basis for the allegation that the named Chief Superintendent had 
deliberately suppressed a vital piece of evidence in the murder case. In a Chamber judgment of 
19 June 2003, the Court held by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 
10 (see IRIS 2003-9: 2). On 3 December 2003, the panel of the Grand Chamber accepted a 
request by the applicants for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber. The Danish Union 
of Journalists was given leave to submit written comments. The Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 17 December 2004 has now also come to 
the conclusion, by nine votes to eight, that there had been no violation of Article 10. The Court 
emphasised that the accusation against the named Chief Superintendent was an allegation of 
fact susceptible of proof, while the applicants never endeavoured to provide any justification 
for their allegation, and its veracity had never been proven. The applicants also relied on just 
one witness. The allegation of deliberate interference with evidence, made at peak viewing 
time on a national TV station, was very serious for the named Chief Superintendent and would 
have entailed criminal prosecution had it been true. The offence alleged was punishable by up 
to nine years' imprisonment. It inevitably not only undermined public confidence in him, but 
also disregarded his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. In the 
Court's view, the finding of a procedural failure in the conduct of the investigation in the 
murder case as such could not provide a sufficient factual basis for the applicants' accusation 
that the Chief Superintendent had actively tampered with evidence. The Court reached the 
conclusion that the interference in the applicants' freedom of expression did not violate Article 
10 of the Convention, as the conviction was necessary for the protection of the reputation and 
the rights of others. Eight of the 17 judges of the Grand Chamber Court dissented, emphasizing 
the vital role of the press as public watchdog in imparting information of serious public concern 
and the fact that the applicants had conducted a large-scale search for witnesses when 
preparing their programmes and that they had a sufficient factual basis to believe that a report 
did not contain the full statement of an important witness. According to the minority of the 
judges, a chief superintendent of police must accept that his acts and omissions in an important 
case should be subject to close and indeed rigorous scrutiny. 
 
• Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, ECHR 2004-XI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Final Judgment in Case Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Constantin Cumpana and Radu Mazare are both professional journalists who have been 
convicted in Romania of insult and defamation. In April 1994 they published an article in the 
Telegraf newspaper questioning the legality of a contract in which the Constan ta City Council 
had authorised a commercial company, Vinalex, to perform the service of towing away illegally 
parked vehicles. The article, which appeared under the headline "Former Deputy Mayor D.M. 
and serving judge R.M. responsible for series of offences in Vinalex scam", was accompanied by 
a cartoon showing the judge, Mrs R.M., on the former deputy mayor's arm, carrying a bag 
marked "Vinalex" containing banknotes. Mrs R.M., who had signed the contract with Vinalex on 
behalf of the city council while employed by the council as a legal expert, brought proceedings 
against Cumpana and Mazare. She submitted that the cartoon had led readers to believe that 
she had had intimate relations with the former deputy mayor, despite the fact that they were 
both married. In 1995 both journalists were convicted of insult and defamation and sentenced 
to seven months' imprisonment. They were also disqualified from exercising certain civil rights 
and prohibited from working as journalists for one year. In addition, they were ordered to pay 
Mrs R.M. a specified sum for non-pecuniary damage. In November 1996 the applicants were 
granted a presidential pardon releasing them from their custodial sentence. In a Chamber 
judgment of 10 June 2003 the Strasbourg Court held by five votes to two that there had been 
no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, emphasizing that the article and the cartoon were 
indeed damaging the authority, reputation and private life of judge R.M., overstepping the 
bounds of acceptable criticism. The Grand Chamber of the European Court in its judgment of 17 
December 2004 has now unanimously come to the conclusion that there has been a violation 
of Article 10. As the allegations and insinuations in the article did not have a sufficient factual 
basis, the Court is of the opinion that the Romanian authorities were entitled to consider it 
necessary to restrict the exercise of the applicants' right to freedom of expression and that 
their conviction for insult and defamation had accordingly met a "pressing social need". 
However, the Court observes that the sanctions imposed on the applicants have been very 
severe and disproportionate. In regulating the exercise of freedom of expression in order to 
ensure adequate protection by law of individuals' reputations, States should avoid taking 
measures that might deter the media from fulfilling their role of alerting the public to apparent 
or suspected misuse of public power. The imposition of a prison sentence for a press offence is 
compatible with journalists' freedom of expression only in exceptional circumstances, notably 
where other fundamental rights had been seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of 
hate speech or incitement to violence. In a classic case of defamation, such as the present case, 
imposing a prison sentence inevitably has a chilling effect. The order disqualifying the 
applicants from exercising certain civil rights is also to be considered particularly inappropriate 
and is not justified by the nature of the offences for which both journalists have been held 
criminally liable. The order prohibiting the applicants from working as journalists for one year 
is considered as a preventive measure of general scope contravening the principle that the 
press must be able to perform the role of public watchdog in a democratic society. The Court 
comes to the conclusion that, although the interference with both journalists' right to freedom 
of expression might have been justified as such, the criminal sanction and the accompanying 
prohibitions imposed on them by the Romanian courts have been manifestly disproportionate 
in their nature and severity to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court therefore holds that there 
has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in a judgment of 15 February 2005 has come 
unanimously to the conclusion that the United Kingdom has violated Article 6 (fair trial) and 
Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights in a libel case 
opposing the McDonald's Corporation against two United Kingdom nationals, Helen Steel and 
David Morris, who had distributed leaflets as part of an anti-McDonald's campaign. In 1986 a 
six-page leaflet entitled “What's wrong with McDonald's?” was distributed by Steel and Morris 
and in 1990 McDonald's issued a writ against them claiming damages for libel. The trial took 
place before a judge sitting alone from June 1994 until December 1996. It was the longest trial 
in English legal history. On appeal the judgment of the trial judge was upheld in substance, the 
damages awarded were reduced by the Court of Appeal from a total of GBP 60,000 to a total of 
GBP 40,000 and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. Throughout the trial and 
appeal proceedings Steel and Morris were refused legal aid: they represented themselves only 
with some help from volunteer lawyers. Steel and Morris applied to the European Court on 20 
September 2000, complaining that the proceedings were unfair, principally because they were 
denied legal aid, although they were unwaged and dependant on income support. 
 
The applicants also complained that the outcome of the proceedings constituted a 
disproportionate interference with their freedom of expression. With regard to the first 
complaint, under Article 6 para. 1 the Court is of the opinion that the denial of legal aid to the 
applicants had deprived them of the opportunity to present their case effectively before the 
Court and contributed to an unacceptable inequality of arms with McDonald's, who in this 
complex case, lasting 313 court days and involving 40,000 pages of documentation, had been 
represented by leading and junior counsel, experienced in defamation law and by two solicitors 
and other assistants. With regard to the second complaint, the Court reaches the conclusion 
that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Although it is not in principle 
incompatible with Article 10 to place on a defendant in libel proceedings the onus of proving 
to the civil standard the truth of defamatory statements, it is considered essential by the Court 
that when a legal remedy is offered to a large multinational company to defend itself against 
defamatory allegations, also the countervailing interest in free expression and open debate 
must be guaranteed by providing procedural fairness and equality of arms to the defendants in 
such a case. The Court also emphasizes the general interest in promoting the free circulation of 
information and ideas about the activities of powerful commercial entities, as well as the 
potential “chilling” effect on others an award of damages for defamation in this context may 
have. Moreover, according to the Strasbourg Court, the award of damages was disproportionate 
to the legitimate aim served in order to protect the right and reputation of McDonalds, as the 
sum of GBP 40,000 was not in a reasonable relation of proportionality to the injury to 
reputation suffered. Given the lack of procedural fairness and the disproportionate award of 
damages, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 10 in this case, which in the 
media has been labelled as the “McLibel” case. The United Kingdom is ordered to pay EUR 
35,000 to the applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damages and EUR 47,311 in respect of 
costs and expenses related to the Strasbourg proceedings. 
 
• Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, ECHR 2005-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Independent News and Media v. Ireland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 16 June 2005, the European Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that a 
conviction to pay an award of damages of EUR 381.000 because of defamatory statements in a 
press article criticizing a politician is not to be considered as a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. 
 
In 1997 a High Court jury in Ireland found an article published in the Sunday Independent 
robustly criticizing a national politician, Mr. de Rossa, to be defamatory and awarded Mr. de 
Rossa IEP 300.000 (EUR 381.000) in damages. The award, which was upheld by the Supreme 
Court, was three times the highest libel award previously approved in Ireland. The litigious 
article referred to some activities of a criminal nature of Mr. de Rossa's political party and 
criticised his former privileged relations with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union. According to the article, Mr. de Rossa's political friends in the Soviet Union 
“were no better than gangsters (..). They were anti-Semitic”. In upholding the award of 
damages, the Supreme Court took into account a number of factors, including the gravity of the 
libel, the effect on Mr. de Rossa as leader of a political party and on his negotiations to form a 
government at the time of publication, the extent of the publication, the conduct of the first 
applicant newspaper and the consequent necessity for Mr. de Rossa to endure three long and 
difficult trials. Having assessed these factors, it concluded that the jury would have been 
justified in going to the top of the bracket and awarding as damages the largest sum that could 
fairly be regarded as compensation. While IEP 300,000 was a substantial sum, it noted that the 
libel was serious and grave, involving an imputation that Mr. de Rossa was involved in or 
tolerated serious crime and personally supported anti-Semitism and violent Communist 
oppression. “Bearing in mind that a fundamental principle of the law of compensatory damages 
is that the award must always be reasonable and fair and bear a due correspondence with the 
injury suffered and not be disproportionate thereto”, the Supreme Court was not satisfied that 
“that the award made by the jury in this case went beyond what a reasonable jury applying the 
law to all the relevant considerations could reasonably have awarded and is not 
disproportionate to the injury suffered by the Respondent”. The press groups publishing the 
Sunday Independent lodged an application before the Strasbourg Court, complaining that the 
exceptional damages award and the absence of adequate safeguards against disproportionate 
awards violated their rights under Article 10 of the Convention (freedom of expression). The 
application was also supported by some other Irish media groups and by the National Union of 
Journalists (NUJ). 
 
Taking its judgment of 13 July 1995 in the case of Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. U.K. as a point of 
reference, the Court is of the opinion that the present jury award was sufficiently unusual as to 
require a review by the Court of the adequacy and effectiveness of the domestic safeguards 
against disproportionate awards. According to the Court, unpredictably large damages awards 
in libel cases are considered capable of having a chilling effect on the press and therefore 
require the most careful scrutiny. The Strasbourg Court however, referring to the judgment of 
the Irish Supreme Court upholding and legitimising the award of damages, comes to the 
conclusion, by 6 votes to 1, that there has been no violation of the right of freedom of 
expression in this case: “Having regard to the particular circumstances of the present case, 
notably the measure of appellate control, and the margin of appreciation accorded to a State in 
this context, the Court does not find that it has been demonstrated that there were ineffective 
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or inadequate safeguards against a disproportionate award of the jury in the present case”. In 
his dissenting opinion judge Cabral Barreto of Portugal argues that the amount of damages 
which the publishing group of the Sunday Independent was ordered to pay was so high “that 
the reasonable relationship of proportionality between the interference and the legitimate aim 
pursued was not observed”. The 6 judges of the majority however came to the conclusion that 
there has not been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited v. Ireland, no. 
55120/00, ECHR 2005-V (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Grinberg v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 21 July 2005, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion 
that the Russian authorities overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to member states 
by convicting a Russian citizen because of a defamatory statement in a press article criticizing a 
politician. It is the first judgment in which the European Court finds a violation of freedom of 
expression by the Russian authorities since the Russian Federation became a member of the 
Council of Europe and subscribed to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1996. The 
Strasbourg Court emphasizes the distinction that is to be made between statements of fact and 
value judgments and considers it unacceptable that the Russian law on defamation, as it stood 
at the material time, made no distinction between these notions, referring uniformly to 
statements and assuming that any statement was amenable of proof in civil proceedings. The 
case goes back to an article in the Guberniya newspaper written by Isaak Pavlovich Grinberg in 
2002. The article criticised the elected Governor of the Ulyanovsk Region, the former General 
V.A. Shamanov for “waging war” against the independent press and journalists. The article also 
referred to the support by Mr. Shamanov for a colonel who had killed an 18-year-old Chechen 
girl, considering that Mr. Shamanov had “no shame and no scruples”. On 14 November 2002, 
the Leninskiy District Court of Ulyanovsk found that the assertion that Mr. Shamanov had no 
shame and no scruples impaired his honour, dignity and professional reputation and that Mr. 
Grinberg had not proved the truthfulness of this statement. The judgment was later confirmed 
by the Regional Court, while the Supreme Court, on 22 August 2003, dismissed Mr. Grinberg's 
application for the institution of supervisory-review proceedings. 
 
Grinberg's complaint, under Article 10 of the Convention, that his right to impart information 
and ideas had been violated, turned out to be successful before the European Court in 
Strasbourg. The Court refers to its well-established case law considering freedom of expression 
as one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, emphasizing the essential function 
of the press to play its vital role of “public watchdog”, the fact that there is little scope under 
Article 10 para. 2 for restrictions on political speech and especially the distinction that is to be 
made in defamation cases between statements of fact and value judgments. While the 
existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of 
proof. The Court considers that the contested comment was a clear example of a value 
judgment that represented Mr. Grinberg's subjective appraisal of the moral dimension of Mr. 
Shamanov's behaviour who, in his eyes, only kept one promise after being elected as Governor, 
that of waging war against the independent press and journalists. The Court takes into account 
that the contested press article concerned an issue of public interest relating to the freedom of 
the media in the Ulyanovsk region and that it criticised an elected, professional politician in 
respect of whom the limits of acceptable criticism are wider than in the case of a private 
individual. The facts which gave rise to the criticism were not contested and Mr. Grinberg had 
after all expressed his views in an inoffensive manner. Nor did Mr. Grinberg's statements affect 
Mr. Shamanov's political career or his professional life. For these reasons the Strasbourg Court 
unanimously came to the conclusion that the domestic courts did not convincingly establish 
any pressing social need for putting the protection of the politician's personality rights above 
the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting this 
freedom where issues of public interest are concerned. Accordingly, the Court came to the 
conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of I.A. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in a judgment of 13 September 2005 has come to the 
conclusion that the Turkish authorities did not violate freedom of expression by convicting a 
book publisher for publishing insults against “God, the Religion, the Prophet and the Holy 
Book”. The managing director of the Berfin publishing house in France was sentenced to two 
years' imprisonment, which was later commuted to a fine. 
 
The European Court in Strasbourg is of the opinion that this interference in the applicant's right 
to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law (art. 175 §§ 3 and 4 of the Turkish 
Criminal Code) and had pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting 
morals and the rights of others. The issue for the Court was to determine whether the 
conviction of the publisher had been necessary in a democratic society. This involved the 
balancing of the applicant's right to impart his ideas on religious theory to the public, on the 
one hand, and the right of others to respect for their freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, on the other hand. The Court reiterates that religious people have to tolerate and 
accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of 
doctrines hostile to their faith. A distinction is to be made however between “provocative” 
opinions and abusive attacks on one's religion. According to the Court, one part of the book 
indeed contained an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam, whereas it is asserted that some of 
the statements and words of the Prophet were “inspired in a surge of exultation, in Aisha's 
arms… God's messenger broke his fast trough sexual intercourse, after dinner and before 
prayer”. In the book it is stated that “Mohammed did not forbid sexual intercourse with a dead 
person or a living animal”. The Court accepts that believers could legitimately feel that these 
passages of the book constituted an unwarranted and offensive attack on them. Hence, the 
conviction of the publisher was a measure that was intended to provide protection against 
offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by Muslims. As the book was not seized and the 
publisher had only to pay an insignificant fine, the Court comes, by four votes to three, to the 
conclusion that the Turkish authorities did not violate the right to freedom of expression. 
According to the three dissenting opinions (of the French, Portuguese and Czech judges) the 
majority of the Court followed its traditional case law on blasphemy leaving a wide margin of 
appreciation to the Member States. According to the three dissenters, the Court should 
reconsider its jurisprudence in the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria and Wingrove v. 
United Kingdom, as this approach gave too much support to conformist speech and to the 
“ pensée unique ”, implying a cold and frightening approach to freedom of expression. The 
majority of the Court however (the Turkish, Georgian, Hungarian and San Marino judges) argued 
that the conviction of the book publisher met a pressing social need ie protecting the rights of 
others. Accordingly there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• İ.A. v. Turkey, no. 42571/98, ECHR 2005-VIII.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 27 October 2005, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the 
conclusion that the Austrian authorities violated freedom of expression by convicting 
Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH, a limited liability company based in Vienna 
which owns and publishes the weekly magazine Profil. In November 1998, Profil published a 
review of a book written by a Member of the European Parliament and member of the Austrian 
Freedom Party. Profil's article criticised the author of the book for his treatment of Jörg Haider, 
the former leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), in that he pardoned “his belittlement of 
the concentration camps as `punishment camps'” (“ Dessen Verharmlosung der 
Konzentrationslager als 'Straflager' ”). Mr Haider successfully filed a compensation claim against 
Profil as the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court ordered the applicant company to pay EUR 3,633 
in compensation to Mr Haider. It also ordered the forfeiture of that particular issue of the 
magazine and instructed the company to publish its judgment. In its reasoning, the court said 
that Mr Haider's words had been taken out of context and that the article gave the impression 
that he had played down the extent of crimes committed in concentration camps when using 
the term punishment camps, and that he had thereby infringed the National Socialism 
Prohibition Act. 
 
In its judgment of 27 October 2005, the European Court reiterates that the limits of acceptable 
criticism are wider as regards a politician than as regards a private individual. The Court is of 
the opinion that Haider is a leading politician who has been known for years for his ambiguous 
statements about the National Socialist Regime and the Second World War and has, thus, 
exposed himself to fierce criticism inside Austria, but also at the European level. In the Court's 
view, Haider must therefore display a particularly high degree of tolerance in this context. In 
essence, the Strasbourg Court is not convinced by the domestic court's argument that the 
statement of belittling the concentration camps implied a reproach that Mr Haider had played 
down the extent of the Nazi crimes and therefore came close to a reproach of criminal 
behaviour under the Prohibition Act. The Court finds this conclusion somewhat far-fetched, as 
the standards for assessing someone's political opinions are quite different from the standards 
for assessing an accused person's responsibility under criminal law. According to the Court, the 
use of the term “punishment camp”, which implies that persons are detained there for having 
committed punishable offences, may reasonably be criticised as a belittlement of the 
concentration camps all the more so if that term was applied by someone whose ambiguity 
towards the Nazi era is well-known. The undisputed fact that Mr Haider had used the term 
punishment camp instead of concentration camp was a sufficient factual basis for the 
applicant's statement, which was therefore not excessive in the circumstances. In conclusion, 
the Court finds that the reasons adduced by the domestic courts were not relevant and 
sufficient to justify the interference. Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant was not only 
ordered to pay compensation to Mr Haider and to publish the judgment finding it guilty of 
defamation, but that the courts also ordered the forfeiture of the issue of Profil which is a 
severe and intrusive measure. Thus, the interference was not proportionate either. Therefore, 
the Court unanimously came to the conclusion that the interference complained of was not 
“necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 
Accordingly there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Tourancheau and July v. France (affaire Libération) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1996, the French newspaper Libération published an article focusing on a murder case in 
which adolescents were involved. The criminal investigation was still pending when the article 
was published and two suspects, a young man, B. and his girlfriend, A., had been under 
investigation. The article in Libération, written by Patricia Tourancheau, reproduced extracts 
from statements made by A. to the police and the investigating judge, and comments from B. 
contained in the case file. On the basis of section 38 of the Freedom of Press Act of 29 July 
1881, criminal proceedings were brought against Tourancheau and against the editor of 
Libération, Serge July. Section 38 of the 1881 Press Act prohibits the publication of any 
document of the criminal proceedings until the day of the court hearing. Both the journalist and 
the editor were found guilty and were each ordered to pay a fine of FRF 10,000 (approximately 
EUR 1,525). Their conviction was upheld on appeal and by the French Supreme Court, although 
payment of the fine was suspended. In the meantime, A. had been sentenced to eight years' 
imprisonment for murder and B. had received a five-year prison sentence for failure to assist a 
person in danger. 
 
In its judgment of 24 November 2005, the Strasbourg Court has come to the conclusion that 
the conviction of Tourancheau and July was not to be considered as a violation of Art. 10 of the 
Convention. The Court noted that section 38 of the 1881 Press Act defined the scope of the 
legal prohibition clearly and precisely, in terms of both content and duration, as it was 
designed to prohibit publication of any document relating to proceedings concerning serious 
crimes or other major offences until the day of the hearing. The fact that proceedings were not 
brought systematically on the basis of section 38 of the 1881 Act, the matter being left to the 
discretion of the public prosecutor's office, did not entitle the applicants to assume that they 
were in no danger of being prosecuted, since being professional journalists they were familiar 
with the law. They had therefore been in a reasonable position to foresee that the publication 
of extracts from the case file in the article might subject them to prosecution. In the Court's 
view, the reasons given by the French courts to justify the interference with the applicants' 
right to freedom of expression had been “relevant and sufficient” for the purposes of Article 10 
para. 2 of the Convention. The courts had stressed the damaging consequences of publication 
of the article for the protection of the reputation and rights of A. and B., for their right to be 
presumed innocent and for the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, referring to the 
possible impact of the article on the members of the jury. The Court took the view that the 
applicants' interest in imparting information concerning the progress of criminal proceedings 
and the interest of the public in receiving such information, were not sufficient to prevail over 
the considerations referred to by the French courts. The European Court further considered that 
the penalties imposed on the applicants were not disproportionate to the legitimate aims 
pursued by the authorities. In those circumstances, the Court held that the applicants' 
conviction had amounted to an interference with their right to freedom of expression which 
had been “necessary in a democratic society” in order to protect the reputation and rights of 
others and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. It therefore held that 
there had been no violation of Article 10. The Cypriot, Bulgarian, Croatian and Greek judge 
formed the smallest possible majority (4/3 decision). 
 
The judges Costa, Tulkens and Lorenzen (France, Belgium and Denmark) expressed a joint 
dissenting opinion, in which they argued why the conviction of the applicants is to be 
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considered a clear violation of the freedom of expression. Neither the breach of the 
presumption of innocence, nor the possible impact on the members of the jury are considered 
pertinent arguments in this case in order to legitimise the interference in the applicants' 
freedom of expression. According to the joint dissenting opinion, journalists must be able to 
freely report and comment on the functioning of the criminal justice system, as a basic 
principle enshrined in the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 2003 (13) on the 
provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings. Referring to the 
concrete elements reported in the newspaper's article and its context, the dissenting judges 
conclude that there is no reasonable and proportional relation between the imposed 
restrictions and the legitimate aim pursued. According to the dissenting judges Article 10 of the 
Convention has been violated. 
 
• Tourancheau and July v. France, no. 53886/00, 24 November 2005.  
 
IRIS 2006-2/2 
Back to overview of case-law 
153 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. Denmark 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In August 2002, by a judgment of the Højesteret (Danish Supreme Court), the applicant 
company, Nordisk Film, was compelled to hand over limited specified unedited footage and 
notes of a broadcast television programme investigating paedophilia in Denmark. In order to 
make the programme, a journalist went undercover. He participated in meetings of “The 
Paedophile Association” and, with a hidden camera, interviewed two members of the 
association who made incriminating statements regarding the realities of paedophilia in both 
Denmark and India, including advice on how to induce a child to chat over the internet and 
how easy it was to procure children in India. In the documentary, broadcast on national 
television, false names were used and all persons' faces and voices were blurred. The day after 
the programme was broadcast, one of the interviewed persons, called “Mogens”, was arrested 
and charged with sexual offences. For further investigation, the Copenhagen Police requested 
that the unshown portions of the recordings made by the journalist be disclosed. The journalist 
and the editor of the applicant company's documentary unit refused to comply with the 
request. The Copenhagen City Court and the High Court also refused to grant the requested 
court order having regard to the need of the media to be able to protect their sources. The 
Supreme Court, however, found against the applicant company, the latter was therefore 
compelled to hand over some parts of the unedited footage which solely related to “Mogens”. 
The court order explicitly exempted the recordings and notes that would entail a risk of 
revealing the identity of some persons (a victim, a police officer and the mother of a hotel 
manager), who where interviewed with the promise by the journalist that they could participate 
without the possibility of being identified. In November 2002, Nordisk Film complained in 
Strasbourg that the Supreme Court's judgment breached its rights under Article 10 of the 
Convention, referring to the European Court's case law affording a high level of protection to 
journalistic sources. 
 
In its decision of 8 December 2005, the Strasbourg Court has come to the conclusion that the 
judgment of the Danish Supreme Court did not violate Article 10 of the Convention. The 
Strasbourg Court is of the opinion that the applicant company was not ordered to disclose its 
journalistic sources of information, rather, it was ordered to hand over part of its own research 
material. The Court is not convinced that the degree of protection applied in this case can reach 
the same level as that afforded to journalists when it concerns their right to keep their sources 
confidential under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court is also of the opinion that it is the 
State's duty to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are 
not subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by 
private individuals. These measures should provide effective protection, in particular, of 
children and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment or 
sexual abuse of which the authorities had or ought to have knowledge. The European Court 
supports the opinion of the Danish Supreme Court that the non-edited recordings and the notes 
made by the journalist could assist the investigation and production of evidence in the case 
against “Mogens” and that it concerned the investigation of alleged serious criminal offences. 
 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court's judgment explicitly guaranteed that material 
which entailed the risk of revealing the identity of the journalist's sources was exempted from 
the court order and that the order only concerned the handover of a limited part of the 
unedited footage as opposed to more drastic measures such as, for example, a search of the 
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journalist's home and workplace. In these circumstances, the Strasbourg Court is satisfied that 
the order was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that the reasons given by 
the Danish Supreme Court in justification of those measures were relevant and sufficient. 
Hence, Article 10 of the Convention has not been violated. The application is manifestly ill-
founded and is declared inadmissible. 
 
The decision of the European Court makes it clear that the Danish Supreme Court's order to 
compel the applicant to hand over the unedited footage is to be considered as an interference 
in the applicant's freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the 
Convention. In casu, the interference however meets all the conditions of Article 10 § 2, 
including the justification as being “necessary in a democratic society”. The Strasbourg Court is 
also of the opinion that the Danish Supreme Court and legislation (Art. 172 and 804-805 of the 
Administration of Justice Act) clearly acknowledge that an interference with the protection of 
journalistic sources cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified 
by an overriding requirement of public interest. It thereby reflects the approach developed in 
the Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence in the cases of Goodwin v. UK (1996), Roemen and Schmit 
v. Luxembourg (2003) and Ernst and others v. Belgium (2003). 
 
• Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), no. 40485/02, ECHR 2005-XIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Giniewski v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1994, the newspaper Le quotidien de Paris published an article with the headline “The 
obscurity of error”, concerning the encyclical “The splendour of truth” ( Veritatis Splendor ) 
issued by Pope John Paul II. The article was written by Paul Giniewski, a journalist, sociologist 
and historian and contained a critical analysis of the particular doctrine developed by the 
Catholic Church and its possible links with the origins of the Holocaust. A criminal complaint 
was lodged against the applicant, the newspaper and its publishing director, alleging that they 
had published racially defamatory statements against the Christian community. The defendants 
were found guilty of defamation at first instance but were acquitted on appeal. Ruling 
exclusively on the civil claim lodged by the Alliance générale contre le racisme et pour le respect 
de l'identité française et chrétienne (General Alliance against Racism and for Respect for the 
French and Christian Identity - AGRIF), the Orléans Court of Appeal ruled that Giniewski was to 
pay damages to the AGRIF and that its decision was to be published at his expense in a 
national newspaper. The Orléans Court of Appeal considered the article defamatory toward a 
group of persons because of their religious beliefs. The applicant unsuccessfully contested the 
decision before the French Supreme Court. 
 
In a judgment of 31 January 2006, the European Court of Human Rights holds that the article in 
question had contributed to a debate on the various possible reasons behind the extermination 
of Jews in Europe: a question of indisputable public interest in a democratic society. In such 
matters, restrictions on freedom of expression are to be strictly interpreted. Although the issue 
raised in the present case concerned a doctrine endorsed by the Catholic Church, therefore a 
religious matter, an analysis of the article in question showed that it did not contain attacks on 
religious beliefs as such, but a view which the applicant had wished to express as a journalist 
and historian. The Court considered it essential that a debate on the causes of acts of particular 
gravity, resulting in crimes against humanity, take place freely in a democratic society. The 
article in question had, moreover, not been “gratuitously offensive” or insulting and had not 
incited disrespect or hatred. Nor had it cast doubt in any way on clearly established historical 
facts. 
 
From this perspective, the facts were different from those in I.A. v. Turkey regarding an 
offensive attack on the Prophet of Islam (see IRIS 2005-10: 3) and those in R. Garaudy v. France. 
The Court considered that the reasons given by the French courts could not be regarded as 
sufficient to justify the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. 
Specifically with regard to the order to publish a notice of the ruling in a national newspaper at 
the applicant's expense, the Court considers that while the publication of such a notice did not 
in principle appear to constitute an excessive restriction on freedom of expression, the fact that 
it mentioned the criminal offence of defamation undoubtedly had a deterrent effect. The 
sanction thus imposed appeared disproportionate with regard to the importance and interest of 
the debate in which the applicant had legitimately sought to take part. The Court therefore 
held that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Giniewski v. France, no. 64016/00, ECHR 2006-I.  
• Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts). 
 
Back to overview of case-law 
156 
 
IRIS 2006-4/1 
Back to overview of case-law 
157 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1998 and 1999 the Istanbul radio station Özgür Radyo was given three warnings and its 
licence was twice suspended by Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu (Turkish broadcasting regulatory 
authority - RTÜK). The first suspension was for a period of 90 days, the second suspension 
period lasted 365 days. Some of Özgür Radyo’s programmes had touched on various themes 
such as corruption, the methods used by the security forces to tackle terrorism and possible 
links between the State and the Mafia. The radio station was sanctioned by RTÜK because one 
programme was considered defamatory and other programmes had allegedly incited people to 
engage in violence, terrorism or ethnic discrimination and stirred up hatred or offended the 
independence, the national unity or the territorial integrity of the Turkish State. The radio 
station turned to the administrative courts for an order setting aside each of the penalties, but 
its applications were dismissed. 
 
In its complaint to the European Court of Human Rights, Özgür Radyo argued primarily that the 
penalties that had been imposed by the RTÜK entailed a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention (freedom of expression). There was no discussion as to the fact that the sanctions 
(both the warnings and the suspension of the licence) were prescribed by law (Art. 4 and 33 of 
the Turkish Broadcasting Act n° 3984 of 12 April 1991) and pursued a legitimate aim as listed 
in Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention. Thus, the decisive issue before the Court was whether 
the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been “necessary in a 
democratic society”. In assessing the situation, the Court said it would have particular regard to 
the words that had been used in the programmes and to the context in which they were 
broadcast, including the background to the case and in particular the problems linked to the 
prevention of terrorism. 
 
The Court emphasizes that the programmes covered very serious issues of general interest that 
had been widely debated in the media and that the dissemination of information on those 
themes was entirely consistent with the media’s role as a “watchdog” in a democratic society. 
The Court also notes that the information concerned had already been made available to the 
public. Some of the programmes had only reproduced orally, without further comment, 
newspaper articles that had already been published and for which no one had been prosecuted. 
Moreover, Özgür Radyo had been diligent in explaining that it was citing newspaper articles 
and in identifying the sources. The Court also observes that although certain particularly 
acerbic parts of the programmes had made them to some degree hostile in tone, they had not 
encouraged the use of violence, armed resistance or insurrection and did not constitute hate 
speech. The Court strongly underlines that this is an essential factor to be taken into 
consideration. Finally the Court refers to the severity of the penalties that had been imposed on 
the applicant, especially in terms of the suspension of the licence, first for a period of 90 days 
and in a second decision for a period of one year. The latter being the maximum penalty 
prescribed in Art. 33 of the Turkish Broadcasting Act n° 3984. Taking into account all these 
elements of the case, the Strasbourg Court considers the penalties disproportionate to the aims 
pursued and, therefore, not “necessary in a democratic society”. Consequently, the Court 
unanimously holds that there has been a violation of Article 10. 
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• Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 1), nos. 
64178/00, 64179/00, 64181/00, 64183/00 and 64184/00, 30 March 2006.  
 
IRIS 2006-5/2 
Back to overview of case-law 
159 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of Stoll v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In December 1996, the Swiss ambassador to the United States drew up a “strategic document”, 
classified as “confidential”, concerning the possible strategies regarding the compensation due 
to Holocaust victims for unclaimed assets deposited in Swiss banks. The document was sent to 
the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in Berne and to a limited list of other persons. Martin 
Stoll, a journalist working for Sonntags-Zeitung, also obtained a copy of this document, probably 
as a result of a breach of professional confidence by one of the initial recipients of such a copy. 
Soon afterwards, the Sonntags-Zeitung published two articles by Martin Stoll, featuring extracts 
from the document. Other newspapers soon followed suit. In 1999, Stoll was sentenced to a 
fine of CHF 800 (EUR 520) for publishing “official confidential deliberations” within the 
meaning of Article 293 of the Criminal Code. This provision not only targets the person who is 
responsible for the breach of confidence of official secrets, but also those who were 
accomplices in giving publicity to such secrets. The Swiss Press Council, to which the case also 
had been referred in the meantime, found that Stoll had irresponsibly made some extracts 
appear sensational and shocking by shortening the analysis and failing to sufficiently place the 
report in context. 
 
In a judgment of 25 April 2006, the European Court of Human Rights held, by four votes to 
three, that the conviction of Stoll is to be considered as a breach of the journalist’s freedom of 
expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Human Rights’ Convention. For the Court, it is 
crucial that the information contained in the report manifestly raised matters of public interest, 
that the role of the media as critic and public watchdog also applies to matters of foreign and 
financial policy and that the protection of confidentiality of diplomatic relations, although 
justified, could not be secured at any price. The publication of the report did not undermine the 
very foundations of Switzerland. The Court therefore believes that the interests deriving from 
freedom of expression in a democratic society could legitimise the public discussion brought 
about by the document, initially classified as confidential. Fining Stoll for revealing the content 
of the document had amounted to a kind of censorship which would be likely to discourage him 
from expressing criticism of that kind again in the future. The Strasbourg Court considers the 
conviction of Stoll by the Swiss judiciary as liable to hamper the press in performing its task as 
purveyor of information and public watchdog. Furthermore, as Stoll had only been convicted for 
publishing parts of the document in the newspaper, the European Court believes the finding by 
the Swiss Press Council that he had neglected his professional ethics by presenting some 
extracts in a sensationalist way, should not be taken into account to determine whether or not 
publishing the document was legitimate. The Court once more underlines that press freedom 
also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. The dissenting 
opinion from Judges Wildhaber, Borrego Borrego and Šikuta emphasises the importance of 
respecting official secrets and Stoll’s lack of professionalism in ignoring some fundamental 
rules of journalistic ethics. The dissenting judges also consider it as an important element that 
the articles at hand had not contributed in a useful way to the public debate on the issue of the 
unclaimed assets deposited in Swiss Banks. The majority of the Court however held that there 
has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, as Stoll’s conviction was not necessary in a 
democratic society, having regard to the interest of a democratic society in ensuring and 
maintaining the freedom of the press. 
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• Stoll v. Switzerland, no. 69698/01, 25 April 2006.  
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 10 
December 2007. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Dammann v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 25 April 2006, the Court unanimously held that the Swiss authorities violated 
Article 10 of the Convention by convicting a journalist, Viktor Dammann, for inciting an 
administrative assistant of the public prosecutor’s office to disclose confidential data. The 
assistant had forwarded data relating to criminal records of suspects in a spectacular robbery. 
By punishing the journalist in this case, a step had been taken prior to publication and such a 
sentence would be likely to deter journalists from contributing to public discussion of issues 
affecting the life of the community. It was thus likely to hamper the press in its role as provider 
of information and public watchdog. Furthermore, no damage had been done to the rights of 
the persons concerned, as the journalist had himself decided not to publish the data in 
question. In these circumstances, the Court considered that Dammann’s conviction had not 
been reasonably proportionate to the pursuit of the legitimate aim in question, having regard 
to the interest of a democratic society in ensuring and maintaining the freedom of the press. 
 
• Dammann v. Switzerland, no. 77551/01, 25 April 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Tatlav v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1992, Erdoğan Aydin Tatlav, a journalist living in Istanbul, published a five volume book 
under the title Islamiyet Gerçeği (The Reality of Islam). In the first volume of the book he 
criticised Islam as a religion legitimising social injustice by portraying it as “God’s will”. 
Following a complaint on the occasion of the fifth edition of the book in 1996, the journalist 
was prosecuted for publishing a work intended to defile one of the religions (Art. 175 of the 
Criminal Code). He was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, which was reduced to a fine. 
 
Tatlav complained before the European Court of Human Rights that this conviction was in 
breach of Article 10 of the Convention, referring to the right of freedom of expression “without 
interference by public authority”. Essentially, the Court assessed whether the interference in the 
applicant’s right in view of protecting the morals and the rights of others could be legitimised 
as “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court is of the opinion that certain passages of the 
book contained strong criticism of religion in a socio-political context, but that these passages 
had no insulting tone and did not contain an abusive attack on Muslims or on sacred symbols of 
Muslim religion (see [I.A. v. Turkey] IRIS 2005-10: 3). The Court did not exclude that Muslims 
could nonetheless feel offended by the caustic commentary on their religion, but this was not 
considered to be a sufficient reason to justify the criminal conviction of the author of the book. 
The Court also took account of the fact that although the book had first been published in 
1992, no proceedings had been instituted until 1996, when the fifth edition was published. It 
was only following a complaint by an individual that proceedings had been brought against the 
journalist. With regard the punishment imposed on Tatlav, the Court is of the opinion that a 
criminal conviction involving, moreover, the risk of a custodial sentence, could have the effect 
of discouraging authors and editors from publishing opinions about religion that are non-
conformist and could impede the protection of pluralism, which is indispensable for the healthy 
development of a democratic society. Taking into consideration all these elements of the case, 
the Strasbourg Court considers the interference by the Turkish authorities disproportionate to 
the aims pursued. Consequently, the Court holds unanimously that there has been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention (see IRIS 2006-4: 2). 
 
• Aydın Tatlav v. Turkey, no. 50692/99, 2 May 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Erbakan v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights held by six votes to one that the criminal proceedings 
instituted in 1998 against the leader of a political party - because of a public speech during an 
election campaign in 1994 - and the ensuing sentence of imprisonment delivered by the State 
Security Court, had been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In its judgment, the Court especially considered the interest of a democratic society in ensuring 
and maintaining freedom of political debate. The Court also found there was a breach of Article 
6 § 1 of the Convention, as civilians standing trial for offences under the Criminal Code had 
legitimate reason to fear that a State Security Court which included a military judge among its 
members might not be independent and impartial. 
 
The case concerns the application of Necmettin Erbakan, who was Prime Minister of Turkey 
from June 1996 to June 1997. In 1997 and 1998, he was the chairman of Refah Partisi (the 
Welfare Party), a political party which was dissolved in 1998 for engaging in activities contrary 
to the principles of secularism (see also ECHR, 13 February 2003). In February 1994, the 
applicant gave a public speech in Bingöl, a city in south-east Turkey. More than four years later 
criminal proceedings were brought against Erbakan for incitement to hatred or hostility 
through comments made in his 1994 speech about distinctions between religions, races and 
regions (Article 312 § 2 of the Criminal Code). The applicant contested the accusations against 
him, in particular disputing the authenticity and reliability of a video cassette, produced by the 
public prosecutor’s office, containing a recording of the speech. In March 2000, the State 
Security Court convicted Erbakan and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment and a fine. In 
reaching its judgment, the State Security Court took into account the situation at the material 
time in the city of Bingöl, where the inhabitants had been victims of terrorist acts perpetrated 
by an extremist organisation. It concluded that the applicant, in particular by making a 
distinction between “believers” and “non-believers”, had overstepped the acceptable limits of 
freedom of political debate. A few months later, the Court of Cassation dismissed the 
applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the conviction. In January 2001, pursuant to 
Laws no. 4454 and 4616, the State Security Court stayed the execution of the sentence, a 
decision which was confirmed by the Court of Diyarbakir in April 2005. 
 
Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant complained before the European Court of 
Human Rights that his conviction had infringed his right to freedom of expression. 
 
In its judgment of 6 July 2006, the Court held that by using religious terminology in his 
speech,Erbakan had indeed reduced diversity - a factor inherent in any society - to a simple 
division between “believers” and “non-believers” and had called for a political line to be formed 
on the basis of religious affiliation. The Court also pointed out that combating all forms of 
intolerance and hate speech was an integral part of human rights protection and that it was 
crucially important that politicians avoid making comments in their speeches likely to foster 
such intolerance. However, in view of the fundamental nature of freedom of political debate in 
a democratic society, a severe penalty in relation to political speech can only be justified by 
compelling reasons. The Court noted in this perspective that the Turkish authorities had not 
sought to establish the content of the speech in question until five years after the rally, and had 
done so purely on the basis of a video recording the authenticity of which was disputed. The 
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Court concluded that it was particularly difficult to hold the applicant responsible for all the 
comments cited in the indictment. Furthermore, it had not been established that the speech 
had given rise to, or been likely to give rise to, a “present risk” and an “imminent danger”. Also 
taking into account the severity of the one year’s imprisonment sentence, the Court found that 
the interference in the applicant’s freedom of expression had not been necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court accordingly held that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Erbakan v. Turkey, no. 59405/00, 6 July 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has, on several occasions, recognised “the right of the 
public to be properly informed” and “the right to receive information”, but until recently the 
Court was very reluctant to derive from Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights a right to have access to public or administrative documents. In the cases of Leander v. 
Sweden (1987), Gaskin v. United Kingdom (1989) and Sîrbu v. Moldova (2004)), the Strasbourg 
Court has indeed recognised “that the public has a right to receive information as a corollary of 
the specific function of journalists, which is to impart information and ideas on matters of 
public interest”. However, the Court was of the opinion that the freedom to receive information 
basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from receiving information that 
others wish or may be willing to impart to that person. It was decided in these cases that the 
freedom to receive information as guaranteed by Article 10 could not be construed as imposing 
on a State a positive obligation to disseminate information or to disclose information to the 
public. 
 
In a recent decision (10 July 2006) on an application’s admissibility, the European Court of 
Human Rights has, for the first time, applied Article 10 of the Convention in a case where a 
request for access to administrative documents was refused by the authorities. The case 
concerns a refusal to grant an ecological NGO access to documents and plans regarding a 
nuclear power station in Temelin, Czech Republic. Although the Court is of the opinion that 
there has not been a breach of Article 10, it explicitly recognised that the refusal by the Czech 
authorities is to be considered as an interference with the right to receive information as 
guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. Hence, the refusal must meet the conditions set 
out in Article 10 para. 2. In the case of Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic, the Court 
refers to its traditional case law, emphasising that the freedom to receive information “aims 
largely at forbidding a State to prevent a person from receiving information which others would 
like to have or can consent to provide”. The Court is also of the opinion that it is difficult to 
derive from Article 10 a general right to have access to administrative documents, The Court, 
however, recognises that the refusal to grant access to administrative documents, in casu 
relating to a nuclear power station, is to be considered as an interference in the applicant’s 
right to receive information. Because the Czech authorities have reasoned in a pertinent and 
sufficient manner the refusal to grant access to the requested documents, the Court is of the 
opinion that there has been no breach of Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention in this case. The 
refusal was justified in the interest of protecting the rights of others (industrial secrets), 
national security (risk of terrorist attacks) and public health. The Court also emphasised that the 
request to have access to essentially technical information about the nuclear power station did 
not reflect a matter of public interest. For these reasons, it was obvious that there had not been 
an infringement of Article 10 of the Convention, thus, the Court declared the application 
inadmissible. 
 
The ruling in the case of Sdružení Jihočeské Matky is nonetheless important as it contains an 
explicit and undeniable recognition of the application of Article 10 in cases of a rejection of a 
request for access to public or administrative documents. The right to access administrative 
documents is not an absolute one and can indeed be restricted under the conditions of Article 
10 para. 2, which implies that such a rejection must be prescribed by law, have a legitimate aim 
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and must be necessary in a democratic society. The Court’s decision of 10 July 2006 gives 
additional support and opens new perspectives for citizens, journalists and NGOs for accessing 
administrative documents in matters of public interest. 
 
 Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic (dec.), no. 19101/03, 10 July 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Monnat v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 21 September 2006, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the 
conclusion that the Swiss authorities have violated the freedom of expression of a journalist by 
placing a programme broadcast by the Swiss Public Broadcasting Corporation SSR under a legal 
embargo. In 1997, the SSR broadcast a critical documentary on the position of Switzerland 
during the Second World War. The documentary was part of a news programme, entitled Temps 
présent (“Present time”), for which the applicant, Daniel Monnat, was then responsible. The 
programme described the attitude of Switzerland and of its leaders, emphasising their alleged 
affinity with the far right and their penchant for a rapprochement with Germany. It also 
contained an analysis of the question of anti-Semitism in Switzerland and of its economic 
relations with Germany, focusing on the laundering of Nazi money by Switzerland and on the 
role of Swiss banks and insurance companies in the matter of unclaimed Jewish assets. The 
programme elicited reactions from members of the public. Viewers’ complaints, within the 
meaning of section 4 of the Federal Broadcasting Act, were filed with the Autorité indépendante 
d’examen des plaintes en matière de radiotélévision (Independent Broadcasting Complaints 
Commission). The Complaints Commission was of the opinion that the programme had 
breached the duty to report objectively in such a way as to reflect the plurality and diversity of 
opinion. The Complaints Commission found against the SSR and requested the broadcasting 
company to take appropriate measures. The Commission particularly found that the method 
used, namely politically engaged journalism, had not been identified as such. The News Editors’ 
Conference of SSR informed the Complaints Commission that it had taken note of its decisions 
and would take them into account when dealing with sensitive issues. Being satisfied with the 
measures, the Commission declared the proceedings closed. In the meantime, the registry of 
the court of Geneva decided to place the programme under a legal embargo, which led to the 
suspension of the sale of videotapes of the programme. 
 
Mr. Monnat alleged before the European Court of Human Rights that the programme scrutiny 
introduced by Swiss law and the decision of the Complaints Commission, upheld by the Federal 
Court, had hampered him in the exercise of his freedom of expression, as provided for by 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court dismissed the applicant’s 
complaint as to the inappropriateness of the programme scrutiny introduced by the Federal 
Broadcasting Act, because he was challenging general legal arrangements in abstract terms. 
However, in his capacity as a programme-maker he could claim to be the victim of a violation 
of the Convention because of the legal embargo. 
 
The Strasbourg Court noted that the impugned programme had undoubtedly raised a question 
of major public interest, at a time when Switzerland’s role in the Second World War was a 
popular subject in the Swiss media and divided public opinion in that country. As regards the 
journalist’s duties and responsibilities, the Court was not convinced that the grounds given by 
the Federal Court had been “relevant and sufficient” to justify the admission of the complaints, 
even in the case of information imparted in a televised documentary on a state-owned 
television channel. As to the sanctions imposed in this case, the Court noted that whilst they 
had not prevented the applicant from expressing himself, the admission of the complaints had 
nonetheless amounted to a kind of censorship, which would be likely to discourage him from 
making criticisms of that kind again in future. In the context of debate on a subject of major 
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public interest, such a sanction would be likely to deter journalists from contributing to public 
discussion of issues affecting the life of the community. By the same token, it was liable to 
hamper the media in performing their task as purveyor of information and public watchdog. 
Moreover, the censorship had subsequently taken on the form of a legal embargo on the 
documentary, formally prohibiting the sale of the product in question. For these reasons, the 
Court considered that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
 Monnat v. Switzerland, no. 73604/01, ECHR 2006-X.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of White v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1996, the two main evening newspapers in Sweden, Expressen and Aftonbladet , published a 
series of articles in which various criminal offences were ascribed to Anthony White, a British 
citizen residing in Mozambique. The articles also included an assertion that he had murdered 
Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, in 1986. Mr White was a well-known figure whose 
alleged illegal activities had already been at the centre of media attention. The newspapers 
also reported statements of individuals who rejected the allegations made against Mr White. In 
an interview published in Expressen , Mr White denied any involvement in the alleged offences. 
 
Mr White brought a private prosecution against the editors of the newspapers for defamation 
under the Freedom of Press Act and the Swedish Criminal Code. The District Court of Stockholm 
acquitted the editors and found that it was justifiable to publish the statements and pictures, 
given that there was considerable public interest in the allegations. It further considered that 
the newspapers had a reasonable basis for the assertions and that they had performed the 
checks that were called for in the given circumstances, taking into regard the constraints of a 
fast news service. The Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision. 
 
Mr White complained before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg that the 
Swedish courts had failed to provide due protection for his name and reputation. He relied on 
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention. The European Court 
found that a fair balance must be struck between the competing interests, namely freedom of 
expression (Article 10) and the right to respect for privacy (Article 8), also taking into account 
that under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention individuals have a right to be presumed innocent of 
any criminal offence until proven guilty in accordance with the law. The Court first noted that 
as such the information published in both newspapers was defamatory. The statements clearly 
tarnished his reputation and disregarded his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
as it appeared that Mr. White had not been convicted of any of the offences ascribed to him. 
However in the series of articles, the newspapers had endeavoured to present an account of the 
various allegations made which was as balanced as possible and the journalists had acted in 
good faith. Moreover, the unsolved murder of the former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme 
and the ongoing criminal investigations were matters of serious public interest and concern. 
The Strasbourg Court considered that the domestic courts made a thorough examination of the 
case and balanced the opposing interests involved in conformity with Convention standards. 
The European Court found that the Swedish courts were justified in finding that the public 
interest in publishing the information in question outweighed Mr White’s right to the protection 
of his reputation. Consequently, there had been no failure on the part of the Swedish State to 
afford adequate protection of the applicant’s rights. For these reasons, the Court considered 
that there had been no violation of Article 8. 
 
• White v. Sweden, no. 42435/02, 19 September 2006.  
 
IRIS 2006-10/3 
Back to overview of case-law 
170 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of Klein v. Slovakia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In March 1997, the weekly magazine Domino Efekt published an article written by Martin Klein, 
a journalist and film critic. In this article, Klein criticised Archbishop Ján Sokol’s televised 
proposal to halt the distribution of the film “The People v. Larry Flint” and to withdraw the 
poster advertising it. The article contained slang terms and innuendos with oblique vulgar and 
sexual connotations, allusions to the Archbishop’s alleged cooperation with the secret police of 
the former communist regime and an invitation to the members of the Catholic Church to leave 
their church. 
 
On complaints filed by two associations, criminal proceedings were brought against Klein. The 
journalist was convicted of public defamation of a group of inhabitants of the Republic for their 
belief. For this criminal offence, he was sentenced to a fine of EUR 375, in application of Article 
198 of the Slovakian Criminal Code. The Regional Court of Košice considered the article in 
question as vulgar, ridiculing and offending, hence not eligible for protection under Article 10 
of the European Convention. It concluded that the content of Klein’s article had violated the 
rights, guaranteed by the Constitution, of a group of adherents to the Christian faith. 
 
Contrary to the domestic courts’ findings, the European Court of Human Rights was not 
persuaded that the applicant had discredited and disparaged a section of the population on 
account of their Catholic faith. The applicant’s strongly-worded pejorative opinion related 
exclusively to the Archbishop, a senior representative of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. The 
fact that some members of the Catholic Church could have been offended by the applicant’s 
criticism of the Archbishop and by the statement that he did not understand why decent 
Catholics did not leave that Church could not affect that position. The Court accepts the 
applicant’s argument that the article neither unduly interfered with the right of believers to 
express and exercise their religion, nor denigrated the content of their religious faith. Given 
that the article exclusively criticised the person of the Archbishop, convicting the applicant of 
defamation of others’ beliefs was in itself inappropriate in the particular circumstances of the 
case. 
 
For those reasons, and despite the vulgar tone of the article, the Court found that it could not 
be concluded that by publishing the article the applicant had interfered with the right to 
freedom of religion of others in a manner justifying the sanction imposed on him. The 
interference with his right to freedom of expression therefore neither corresponded to a 
pressing social need, nor was it proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court held 
unanimously that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was not 
“necessary in a democratic society” and that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention. 
 
• Klein v. Slovakia, no. 72208/01, 31 October 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Ciné Revue v. Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 9 November 2006, the European Court of Human Rights found no violation of 
freedom of expression in a case concerning the withdrawal from sale and ban on distribution of 
an issue of the Belgian weekly magazine Ciné Télé Revue. On 30 January 1997, the magazine 
published an article containing extracts from the preparatory file and personal notes that an 
investigating judge, D., had handed to a parliamentary commission of inquiry. The article was 
advertised on the front cover of the magazine via the headline, which was superimposed on a 
photograph of the judge. The disclosures received substantial press coverage, as the issue was 
related to the “Dutroux case” and the manner in which the police and the judiciary had handled 
the investigations into the disappearance, kidnapping, sexual abuse and murder of several 
children. 
 
Following a special judicial procedure for urgent applications before a judge in Brussels, 
investigating judge D. obtained an injunction for the magazine editor and its publisher to take 
all necessary steps to remove every copy of the magazine from sales outlets and the prohibition 
of the subsequent distribution of any copy featuring the same cover and the same article. The 
court order was based on the grounds that the published documents were subject to the rules 
on confidentiality of parliamentary inquiries and that their publication appeared to have 
breached the right to due process and also the judge’s right to respect for her private life. 
 
In an application before the European Court of Human Rights, the applicants complained that 
the ruling against them infringed Article 10 of the Convention and they maintained that Article 
25 of the Belgian Constitution, which forbids censorship of the press, afforded a greater degree 
of protection than Article 10 of the Convention and that its application should accordingly have 
been safeguarded by Article 53 of the Convention (the Convention’s rights and freedoms being 
“minimum rules”). 
 
The Court noted that although the offending article was related to a subject of public interest, 
its content could not be considered as serving the public interest. Moreover, the parliamentary 
commission’s hearings had already received significant media exposure, including via live 
broadcasts on television. The Court found that the article in question contained criticism that 
was especially directed against the judge’s character and that it contained in particular a copy 
of strictly confidential correspondence which could not be regarded as contributing in any way 
to a debate of general interest to society. The use of the file handed over to the commission of 
inquiry and the comments made in the article had revealed the very essence of the “system of 
defence” that the judge had allegedly adopted or could have adopted before the commission. 
The Court is of the opinion that the adoption of such a “system of defence” belonged to the 
“inner circle” of a person’s private life and that the confidentiality of such personal information 
had to be guaranteed and protected against any intrusion. As the Court found that the article in 
question and its distribution could not be regarded as having contributed to any debate of 
general interest to society it considered that the grounds given by the Belgian courts to justify 
the ban on the distribution of the litigious issue of the magazine were relevant and sufficient 
and that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression was proportionate 
to the aim pursued. The Court considered that such interference could be seen as “necessary in 
a democratic society” and did not amount to a violation of Article 10. 
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With regard to the alleged negligence to apply Article 53, the Court referred back to its finding 
that the interference in question had been “prescribed by law” and further observed that the 
decision to withdraw the magazine from circulation did not constitute a pre-publication 
measure but, having been taken under the special procedure for urgent applications, sought to 
limit the extent of damage already caused. As such interference was not considered by the 
Belgian Court of Cassation as a form of censorship, the European Court did not consider it 
necessary to examine separately the complaint under Article 53 based on an alleged breach of 
Article 25 of the Belgian Constitution. 
 
• Leempoel & S.A. ED. Ciné Revue v. Belgium, no. 64772/01, 9 November 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Radio Twist v. Slovakia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 19 December 2006, the European Court of Human Rights considered the 
sanctioning of a radio station to be a violation of freedom of expression as guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant, Radio Twist is a radio broadcasting company that 
was convicted for broadcasting the recording of a telephone conversation between the State 
Secretary at the Ministry of Justice and the Deputy Prime Minister in a news programme. The 
recording was accompanied by a commentary, clarifying that the recorded dialogue related to a 
politically influenced power struggle in June 1996 between two groups which had an interest in 
the privatisation of a major national insurance provider. Mr. D., the Secretary at the Ministry of 
Justice subsequently filed a civil action against Radio Twist for protection of his personal 
integrity. He argued that Radio Twist had broadcast the telephone conversation despite the fact 
that it had been obtained in an illegal manner. Radio Twist was ordered by the Slovakian courts 
to offer Mr. D. a written apology and to broadcast that apology within 15 days. The 
broadcasting company was also ordered to pay compensation for damage of a non-pecuniary 
nature, as the Slovakian courts considered that the dignity and reputation of Mr. D. had been 
tarnished. This was, in particular, related to the broadcasting of the illegally tapped 
conversation, which was considered an unjustified interference in the personal rights of Mr. D., 
as the protection of privacy also extends to telephone conversations of public officials. 
 
The Strasbourg Court however disagreed with these findings of the Slovakian Courts. Referring 
to the general principles that the European Court of Human Rights has developed in its case 
law regarding freedom of expression in political matters, regarding the essential function of the 
press in a democratic society, and regarding the limits of acceptable criticism of politicians, the 
Court emphasised that the context and content of the recorded conversation was clearly 
political and that the recording and commentary contained no aspects relevant to the 
concerned politician’s private life. Furthermore, the Court referred to the fact that the news 
reporting by Radio Twist did not contain untrue or distorted information and that the 
reputation of Mr. D. seemed not to have been tarnished by the impugned broadcast, as he was 
shortly afterwards elected as a judge of the Constitutional Court. The Court points out that 
Radio Twist was sanctioned mainly due to the mere fact of having broadcast information that 
had been illegally obtained by someone else who had forwarded this to the radio station. The 
Court was, however, not convinced that the mere fact that the recording had been obtained by 
a third person contrary to the law could deprive the broadcasting company of the protection 
afforded by Article 10 of the Convention. The Court also noted that it was, at no stage, alleged 
that the broadcasting company or its employees or agents were in any way liable for the 
recording or that its journalists transgressed criminal law while obtaining or broadcasting it. 
The Court observed that there was no indication that the journalists of Radio Twist acted in bad 
faith or that they pursued any objective other than reporting on matters which they felt obliged 
to make available to the public. For these reasons, the Court concluded that by broadcasting 
the telephone conversation in question, Radio Twist did not interfere with the reputation and 
rights of Mr. D. in a manner that could justify the sanction imposed upon it. Hence the 
interference with its rights to impart information did not correspond to a pressing social need. 
The interference was not necessary in a democratic society, thus it amounted to a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Mamère v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 11 October 2000, the Paris Criminal Court found Mr. Noël Mamère, a leading member of the 
ecologist party Les Verts and Member of Parliament, guilty of having publicly defamed Mr. 
Pellerin, the director of the Central Service for Protection against Ionising Radiation (SCPRI). 
Mr. Mamère was ordered to pay a fine of FRF 10,000 (app. EUR 1,525). The Paris Court of 
Appeal upheld the conviction considering that Mr. Mamère’s comments during a television 
programme were defamatory as they had compromised Mr. Pellerin’s “honour and reputation” 
by accusing him of repeatedly having “knowingly provided, in his capacity as a specialist on 
radioactivity issues, erroneous or simply untrue information about such a serious problem as 
the Chernobyl disaster, which could potentially have had an impact on the health of the French 
population”. The Court found that Mr. Mamère had not acted in good faith, as he had not 
adopted a moderate tone in insisting forcefully and peremptorily that Mr. Pellerin had 
repeatedly sought to lie and to distort the truth about the consequences of the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident (the latter occurred in the spring of 1986). Mr. Mamère had also attributed 
“pejorative characteristics” to Mr. Pellerin by using the adjective “sinister” and by saying that he 
suffered from “the Asterix complex”. In May 2006, following a complaint by certain individuals 
suffering from thyroid cancer, the Commission for Research and Independent Information on 
Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) and the French Association of Thyroid Disease Sufferers (AFMT) 
recognised that the official services at the time had lied and had underestimated the 
contamination of soil, air and foodstuffs following the Chernobyl disaster. 
 
In its judgment of 7 November 2006, the Strasbourg Court observed that the conviction of Mr. 
Mamère for aiding and abetting public defamation of a civil servant had constituted an 
interference with his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed in the Freedom of the Press 
Act of 29 July 1881. It also considered that it had pursued one of the legitimate aims listed in 
Article 10 § 2, namely the protection of the reputation of others (in this case the reputation of 
Mr Pellerin). The Court, however, considered the interference as not necessary in a democratic 
society, as the case obviously was one in which Article 10 required a high level of protection of 
the right to freedom of expression. The Court underlined that the applicant’s comments 
concerned topics of general concern, namely the protection of the environment and of public 
health. Mr. Mamère had also been speaking in his capacity as an elected representative 
committed to ecological issues, so that his comments were to be regarded as being a political 
or “militant” expression. The Court reiterated that those who have been prosecuted on account 
of their comments on a matter of general concern should have the opportunity to absolve 
themselves of liability by establishing that they have acted in good faith and, in the case of 
factual allegations, by proving that they were true. In the applicant’s case, the comments made 
were value judgments as well as factual allegations, so the applicant should have been offered 
both those opportunities. As regards the factual allegations, since the acts criticised by the 
applicant had occurred more than ten years earlier, the 1881 Freedom of the Press Act barred 
him from proving that his comments were true. While in general the Court could see the logic 
of such a prescription, it considered that where historical or scientific events were concerned, it 
might on the contrary be expected that over the course of time the debate would be enriched 
by new information that could improve people’s understanding of reality. Furthermore, the 
Court was not persuaded by the reasoning of the French Court as to Mr. Mamère’s lack of good 
faith and the insulting character of some of his statements. According to the Strasbourg Court, 
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Mr. Mamère’s comments could be considered sarcastic but they remained within the limits of 
acceptable exaggeration or provocation. Furthermore, the question of Mr. Pellerin’s personal 
and “institutional” liability was an integral part of the debate on a matter of general concern: as 
director of the SCPRI he had had access to the measures being taken and had on several 
occasions made use of the media to inform the public of the level of contamination, or rather, 
one might say, the lack of it, within the territory of France. In those circumstances, and 
considering the extreme importance of the public debate in which the comments had been 
made, Mr. Mamère’s conviction for defamation could not be said to have been proportionate 
and hence “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court therefore held that there had been a 
violation of Article 10. 
 
• Mamère v. France, no. 12697/03, ECHR 2006-XIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 7 December 2006, the European Court of Human Rights found that the 
Austrian authorities had acted in violation of the right to freedom of expression. The case 
concerned a reaction to a news item on the Austrian public television channel Österreichischer 
Rundfunk (ORF). In a news programme broadcast by ORF in 1999, a picture was shown of a 
person, Mr. S, who had been released on parole a few weeks earlier. Mr. S. was convicted to 
eight years imprisonment in 1995 because he had been found to be a leading member of a neo-
Nazi organisation. At the request of Mr. S., the Austrian courts prohibited ORF from showing his 
picture in connection with any report stating that he had been convicted under the 
Verbotsgesetz (National Socialist Prohibition Act) either once the sentence had been executed or 
once he had been released on parole. The courts found that the publication of Mr. S.’s picture in 
that context had violated his legitimate interests within the meaning of both Section 78 of the 
Copyright Act and Section 7a of the Media Act (“right to one’s image”). 
 
The ORF complained in Strasbourg that the Austrian courts’ decisions violated its right to 
freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Despite its being a public broadcasting organisation, the European Court of Human Rights was 
of the opinion that ORF does not qualify as a governmental organisation and hence may claim 
to be a “victim” of an interference by the Austrian authorities in its right to freedom of 
expression, within the meaning of articles 34 and 35 of the Convention (see IRIS 2004-5: 3). 
Referring inter alia to the guarantee of the ORF’ s editorial and journalistic independence and 
its institutional autonomy as a provider of a public service, the Court was of the opinion that 
the ORF does not fall under government control. As to the question of the prohibition to show 
Mr. S.’s picture in the context of his conviction under the Prohibition Act, the Court took into 
account several elements: the Court referred to the position of the ORF as a public broadcaster 
with an obligation to cover any major news item in the field of politics, to Mr. S.’s position as a 
well-known member of the neo-Nazi scene in Austria and to the nature and subject-matter of 
the news report, the latter being of relevance to the public interest. The Court furthermore 
underlined the fact that the injunction granted by the domestic courts was phrased in very 
broad terms and that the news item on ORF referred to persons recently released on parole 
after having been convicted of crimes with a clear political relevance. Taking into account all 
these elements the Strasbourg Court found that the reasons adduced by the Austrian courts to 
justify the injunction were not relevant and sufficient to warrant the interference in ORF’ s right 
to freedom of expression. Thus, there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, no. 35841/02, 7 December 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 22 February 2007, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the 
convictions of both a journalist and a publishing company as being violations of the right to 
freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The case concerned an 
article in the magazine Profil about a road accident in which the well-known Austrian skiing 
champion, Hermann Maier, injured his leg. The article, written by the journalist Rainer Nikowitz, 
suggested that one of Mr. Maier’s competitors, the Austrian skiing champion Stephan 
Eberharter, was pleased with the accident because he would finally be able to win something, 
and that he even hoped his competitor would break his other leg too. The article was satirical 
and was written in response to public hysteria following the accident. It was accompanied by a 
portrait of Mr. Maier together with the caption: “Hero Hermann’s leg is causing millions of 
Austrians pain”. 
 
Subsequently, Mr. Eberharter brought a private prosecution for defamation against Mr. Nikowitz 
and a compensation claim under the Mediengesetz (Media Act) against the publishing company. 
In 2001, the Vienna Landesgericht (Regional Criminal Court) found Mr. Nikowitz and the 
publishing company guilty of defamation. Apart from the order to pay a suspended fine, costs 
and compensation for damages, the Court also ordered Verlagsgruppe News to publish extracts 
of the judgment. Mr. Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News appealed unsuccessfully to the Vienna 
Court of Appeal, which found that the satirical meaning of the article would be lost on the 
average reader, and that the personal interests of Mr. Eberharter outweighed the right to 
freedom of artistic expression. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, approached the case from another perspective, 
emphasising that the article in question dealt with an incident that had already attracted the 
attention of the Austrian media, and that it was written in an ironic and satirical style and 
intended as a humorous commentary. The article also sought to make a critical contribution to 
an issue of general interest, namely the attitude of society towards a sports star. It could, at 
most, be understood as the author’s value judgment of Mr. Eberharter’s character, expressed in 
the form of a joke. According to the ECHR, the article remained within the limits of acceptable 
satirical comment in a democratic society. The Court was also of the opinion that the Austrian 
courts showed no moderation in interfering with the applicant’s rights by convicting the 
journalist of defamation and ordering him to pay a fine, and by ordering the publishing 
company to pay compensation and to publish the judgment. It followed that the interference 
under complaint was not “necessary in a democratic society” and therefore there had been a 
violation of Article 10. 
 
• Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, no. 5266/03, 22 February 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Tønsberg Blad AS and Marit Haukom v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2000, the Norwegian newspaper Tønsberg Blad published an article about a list drafted by 
the Municipal Council of Tjøme. The list identified property owners suspected of breaching 
permanent residence requirements applying to certain properties. The article referred to a well-
known singer and a well-known businessman (Mr. Rygh) stating that they might be “forced to 
sell their properties at Tjøme”. The article included a small photo of Mr. Rygh with the caption: 
“it must be due to a misunderstanding, says Tom Vidar Rygh”. A few weeks later, after being 
informed that the Rygh family’s property had been removed from the list, the newspaper 
published an additional article, which noted that Mr. Vidar Rygh and the singer had “got off” the 
list. The newspaper criticised the fact there were “major loopholes” in the system, in that the 
regulations did not apply to houses that had been built by the owners. In a further article, 
entitled “Tønsberg Blad clarifies”, the paper stated that the properties belonging to the singer 
and the Rygh family had been removed from the list in question, as the regulations did not 
apply to their properties. 
 
Mr. Rygh brought private criminal proceedings against the newspaper and its editor-in-chief, 
Mrs. Haukom. Under Article 253 of the Penal Code (defamation), Lagmannsrett (the High Court) 
declared the impugned statements to be null and void and ordered the publishing firm and the 
editor-in-chief to pay Mr. Rygh NOK 50,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The 
Court was of the opinion that there had not been sufficient evidence for the allegations against 
Mr. Rygh. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and ordered Tønsberg Blad and Haukom to 
pay Mr Rygh NOK 673,879 for costs. 
 
In their case taken before the European Court of Human Rights,Tønsberg Bladand Haukom 
complained, under Article 10 of the Convention, that the Norwegian Courts’ decisions had 
entailed an interference with their right to freedom of expression that could not be regarded as 
necessary in a democratic society. 
 
The ECHR, in the first place, found that the purpose of the article was to illustrate a problem 
about which the public had an interest in being informed. Indeed, a possible failure of a public 
figure to observe laws and regulations aimed at protecting serious public interests, even in the 
private sphere, might in certain circumstances constitute a matter of legitimate public interest. 
The Court recalled that protection of the right of journalists to impart information on issues of 
general interest required that they act in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and 
provide “reliable and precise” information in accordance with the ethics of journalism. Even 
though the news item had been presented in a somewhat sensationalist style, the overall 
impression given by the newspaper report was that, rather than inviting the reader to reach any 
foregone conclusion about any failure on Mr. Rygh’s part, it had raised question marks with 
respect to both whether he had breached the requirements in question, and whether those 
requirements should be maintained, modified or repealed. The ECHR was of the opinion that 
the overall news coverage by Tønsberg Blad on that matter was presented in a balanced way 
and that the disputed allegations were presented with precautionary qualifications. The Court 
does not find that the impugned accusation was capable of causing such injury to personal 
reputation as could weigh heavily in the balancing exercise to be carried out under the 
necessity test in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 
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As to the question of whether the applicants had acted in good faith and complied with the 
ordinary journalistic obligation to verify a factual allegation, the European Court found 
substantial evidence to corroborate the newspaper’s contention that the Municipality at the 
time held the view that Mr. Rygh was in breach of the relevant residence requirements.The 
journalist could not in the Court’s opinion be blamed for not having ascertained for himself, 
whether the residence requirements were applicable to Mr. Rygh’s property. On the contrary, in 
view of the relatively minor nature and limited degree of the defamation at issue and the 
important public interests involved, the Court was satisfied that the newspaper had taken 
sufficient steps to verify the truth of the disputed allegation and acted in good faith. 
 
However, the applicants had had to face judicial defamation proceedings pursued at three 
levels. These proceedings had led to their statements being declared null and void and to their 
being ordered to pay the plaintiff NOK 50,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and 
to reimburse him NOK 673,829 for his legal expenses, in addition to bearing their own costs. In 
the circumstances, the proceedings had resulted in an excessive and disproportionate burden 
being placed on the applicants, which was capable of having a chilling effect on press freedom 
in the relevant State. 
 
The ECHR came to the conclusion that the reasons relied on by the Norwegian authorities, 
although relevant, were not sufficient to show that the interference complained of had been 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The Court considered that there had been no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the restrictions placed by the measures applied by the 
Supreme Court on the applicants' right to freedom of expression and the legitimate aim 
pursued. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Tønsbergs Blad A.S. and Haukom v. Norway, no. 510/04, 1 March 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Colaço Mestre and SIC v. Portugal 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has once again ruled in favour of freedom of expression, 
this time regarding an interview on television. The Court considered the conviction of a 
journalist, Mr. Colaço Mestre and of the broadcasting company, Sociedade Independente de 
Comunicação (SIC), as a violation of the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention. In 1996, as part of a television programme entitled Os donos da bola (masters of 
the ball), SCI broadcast an interview conducted by Mr. Colaço Mestre with Gerhard Aigner, who 
at the time was General Secretary of UEFA. The interview, in French, focused on allegations 
concerning the bribery of referees in Portugal and the actions of Mr. Pinto da Costa, the then 
President of the Portuguese Professional Football League and Chairman of the football club FC 
Porto. Mr. Colaço Mestre described Mr. Pinto da Costa as “the referees’ boss” and seemed to be 
eliciting comments from his interviewee about the concurrent functions exercised by Mr. Pinto 
da Costa at the time. Mr. Pinto da Costa lodged a criminal complaint against Mestre and SIC 
accusing them of defamation. The Oporto Criminal Court sentenced Mr. Colaço Mestre to a fine 
or an alternative 86-day term of imprisonment, and ordered the journalist and the television 
channel to pay the claimant damages of approximately EUR 3,990. In 2002 the Oporto Court of 
Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by Mestre and SIC and upheld their conviction 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, is of the opinion that this sanction was a 
breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court noted that Mr. Pinto da Costa played a major 
role in Portuguese public life and that the interview concerned the debate on bribery in 
football, a question of public interest. Moreover, the interview had not addressed the private 
life, but solely the public activities of Mr. Pinto da Costa as Chairman of a leading football club 
and President of the National League. As to the expressions used during the interview, the 
Court considered that there had been no breach of journalistic ethics. In the context of the 
heated debate at the time about bribery of Portuguese referees, the interview had been 
broadcast in a Portuguese football programme intended for an audience with a particular 
interest in, and knowledge of, the subject-matter. The Court further considered that the fact 
that Mr. Colaço Mestre had not been speaking in his mother tongue when he conducted the 
interview with the UEFA-Secretary General, which might have had an impact on the wording of 
his questions. The Court also found that the punishment of a journalist by sentencing him to 
pay a fine, together with an award of damages against him and the television channel 
employing him, might seriously hamper the contribution of the press to the discussion of 
matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there were particularly strong 
reasons for doing so. However, that was not the case here. In those circumstances the Court 
considered that, whilst the reasons advanced by the Portuguese courts to justify the applicants’ 
conviction might be regarded as relevant, they were not sufficient and, accordingly, did not 
serve to meet a pressing social need. The Court therefore held that there had been a violation 
of Article 10. 
 
• Colaço Mestre and SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicação, S.A. v. Portugal, nos. 
11182/03 and 11319/03, 26 April 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Dupuis and Others v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 7 June 2007, the European Court of Human Rights expressed the unanimous 
opinion that the French authorities have violated the freedom of expression of two journalists 
and a publisher (Fayard). Both journalists were convicted for using confidential information 
published in their book Les Oreilles du President (The Ears of the President). The book focused 
on the “Elysée eavesdropping operations”, an illegal system of telephone tapping and record-
keeping, orchestrated by the highest office of the French State and directed against numerous 
figures of civil society, including journalists and lawyers. The French Courts found the two 
journalists, Dupuis and Pontaut, guilty of the offence of using information obtained through a 
breach of the confidentiality of the investigation, or of professional confidentiality. It was also 
argued that the publication could be detrimental to the presumption of innocence of Mr. G.M., 
the deputy director of President Mitterrand’s private office at the time of the events, who was 
placed under formal investigation for breach of privacy under suspicion of being the 
responsible person for the illegal telephone tapping. 
 
The ECHR observed that the subject of the book concerned a debate of considerable public 
interest, a state affair, which was of interest to public opinion. The Court also referred to the 
status of Mr. G.M. as a public person, clearly involved in political life at the highest level of the 
executive wherein the public had a legitimate interest in being informed about the trial, and in 
particular, about the facts dealt with or revealed in the book. The Court found it legitimate that 
special protection should be granted to the confidentiality of the judicial investigation, in view 
of the stakes of criminal proceedings, both for the administration of justice and for the right of 
persons under investigation to be presumed innocent. However, at the time the book was 
published, the case had already been widely covered in the media and it was already well 
known that Mr. G.M. had been placed under investigation in this case. Hence, the protection of 
the information on account of its confidentiality did not constitute an overriding requirement. 
The Court also questioned whether there was still an interest in keeping information 
confidential when it had already been at least partly made public and was likely to be widely 
known, having regard to the media coverage of the case. The Court further considered that it 
was necessary to take the greatest care in assessing the need to punish journalists for using 
information obtained through a breach of the confidentiality of an investigation or of 
professional confidentiality when those journalists are contributing to a public debate of such 
importance, thereby playing their role as “watchdogs” of democracy. According to the Court, the 
journalists had acted in accordance with the standards governing their profession as journalists: 
the impugned publication was relevant, not only to the subject matter, but also to the 
credibility of the information supplied. Lastly, the Court underlined the fact that the 
interference with freedom of expression might have a chilling effect on the exercise of that 
freedom - an effect that the relatively moderate nature of the fine, as in the present case, 
would not sufficiently negate. As the conviction of the two journalists had constituted a 
disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression, it was therefore not 
necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Dupuis and Others v. France, no. 1914/02, 7 June 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Hachette Filipacchi Associés (Paris-Match) v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Shortly after the Prefect of Corsica, Claude Erignac, was murdered in Ajaccio in February 1998, 
an issue of the weekly magazine Paris-Match featured an article entitled “ La République 
assassinée ” (The murdered Republic). The article was illustrated by a photograph of the 
Prefect’s body lying on the road, facing the camera. The widow and children of Prefect Erignac 
sought injunctions against several companies, including the publishing company of Paris-Match 
, Hachette Filipacchi Associés. They contended that publication of the photograph of the 
bloodied and mutilated body of their relative was not information, which could possibly be 
useful to the public, but was prompted purely by commercial considerations and constituted a 
particularly intolerable infringement of their right to respect for their privacy. The urgent 
applications judge issued an injunction requiring the Hachette Filipacchi company to publish at 
its own expense in Paris-Match a statement informing readers that Mrs. Erignac and her 
children had found the photograph showing the dead body of Prefect Erignac deeply 
distressing. A few days, later the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the injunction, noting, among 
other considerations, that publication of the photograph, while Prefect Erignac’s family were 
still mourning his loss, and given the fact that they had not given their consent, constituted a 
gross intrusion in their grief, and accordingly of the intimacy of their private life. It ruled that 
such a photograph infringed human dignity and ordered the Hachette Filipacchi company to 
publish at its own expense in Paris-Match a statement informing readers that the photograph 
had been published without the consent of the Erignac family, who considered its publication 
an intrusion in the intimacy of their private life. On 20 December 2000, the Cour de Cassation 
(Supreme Court) dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant company. 
 
Relying on Article 10, the publishing house of Paris-Match complained before the European 
Court of Human Rights regarding the injunction requiring it to publish, on pain of a coercive 
fine, a statement informing readers that the photograph had been published without the 
consent of the Erignac family. 
 
The Court considered that the obligation to publish a statement amounted to an interference 
by the authorities in the company’s exercise of its freedom of expression. The Court noted that 
the practice of requiring publication of a statement was sanctioned by a long tradition of 
settled French case-law and was regarded by the French courts as “one of the ways of making 
good damage caused through the press”. It considered that this case-law satisfied the 
conditions of accessibility and foreseeability required for a finding that this form of interference 
was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 
 
The Court also considered that the interference complained of had pursued a legitimate aim 
(the protection of the rights of others) and it noted that the rights concerned fell within the 
scope of Article 8 of the Convention, guaranteeing the right to respect for private and family 
life. The crucial question that the Court had to answer was whether the interference had been 
“necessary in a democratic society”, within the framework of duties and responsibilities 
inherent in the exercise of freedom of expression. In this respect, the Court reiterated that the 
death of a close relative and the ensuing mourning, which were a source of intense grief, must 
sometimes lead the authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure respect for the private 
and family lives of the persons concerned. In the present case, the offending photograph had 
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been published only a few days after the murder and after the funeral. The Court considered 
that the distress of Mr. Erignac’s close relatives should have led journalists to exercise 
prudence and caution, given that he had died in violent circumstances which were traumatic for 
his family, who had expressly opposed publication of the photograph. The result of the 
publication, in a magazine with a very high circulation, had been to heighten the trauma felt by 
the victim’s close relatives in the aftermath of the murder, so that they were justified in arguing 
that there had been an infringement of their right to respect for their privacy. 
 
The Court also considered that the wording of the statement Paris-Match had been ordered to 
publish, revealed the care the French courts had taken to respect the editorial freedom of Paris-
Match . That being so, the Court considered that of all the sanctions which French legislation 
permitted, the order to publish the statement was the one which, both in principle and as 
regards its content, was the sanction entailing the least restrictions on the exercise of the 
applicant company’s rights. It noted that the Hachette Filipacchi company had not shown in 
what way the order to publish the statement had actually had a restrictive effect on the way 
Paris-Match had exercised and continued to exercise its right to freedom of expression. 
 
The Court concluded that the order requiring Paris-Match to publish a statement, for which the 
French courts had given reasons which were both “relevant and sufficient”, had been 
proportionate to the legitimate aim it pursued, and therefore “necessary in a democratic 
society”. Accordingly, the Court held by five votes to two that there had been no violation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The two dissenting judges expressed 
their firm disagreement with the finding of the majority in two separate dissenting opinions, 
annexed to the judgment. 
 
• Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, no. 71111/01, 14 June 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Lionarakis v. Greece 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1999 Nikitas Lionarakis, the presenter and coordinator of a radio programme broadcast live 
by the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation ERT, invited the journalist E.V. to debate various 
aspects of Greek foreign policy. During the broadcast, E.V. raised the subject of “the Öcalan 
case”. He referred to the fact that Öcalan, the ex-leader of the PKK who was prosecuted by the 
Turkish authorities for terrorism, had been helped by certain persons in Greece to illegally enter 
the country and to escape to Kenya. E.V. referred to F.K., a lawyer who had stood as a candidate 
in past legislative and European elections and who had been actively involved in the Öcalan 
case, being a contact for Öcalan after he escaped to Kenya. F.K. also had given several 
interviews in the press after Öcalan had been arrested by the Turkish authorities. According to 
the interviewed journalist, F.K. was, along with several others, to be considered as belonging to 
a “para-state”, belonging to a network of “vociferous criminals of the press” and being “neurotic 
pseudo-patriots”. In June 1999 F.K. brought an action for damages alleging insult and 
defamation by Lionarakis, ERT and E.V. The domestic courts found against Lionarakis and 
ordered him to pay EUR 161,408 for the damage sustained, an amount that was, after a 
settlement reached with F.K. in the domestic courts, reduced to EUR 41,067.48. 
 
Lionarakis complained under Article 10 of a violation of his right to freedom of expression, 
arguing that he should not be held liable for remarks made by a third party during a radio 
programme of a political nature. The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention, particularly when taking into account the fact that the insulting or 
defamatory statements were to be considered as value judgments, which had some factual 
basis. According to the Court, the domestic courts had failed to make a distinction between 
allegations of facts and value judgments. The Court also underlined the fact that these value 
judgments had been expressed orally, during a political type programme being broadcast live, 
while the programme also had a format that invited the participants to a free exchange of 
opinions. The Court considered, in particular, that the journalist and coordinator could not be 
held liable in the same way as the person who had made remarks that were possibly 
controversial, insulting or defamatory. It reiterated that requiring that journalists distance 
themselves systematically and formally from the content of a statement that might defame or 
harm a third party is not reconcilable with the press’s role of providing information on current 
events, opinions and ideas. Finally, the Court referred to the fact that F.K. was not a “simple 
private” person, but a contemporary public figure and that the amount of damages the 
journalist was compelled to pay as compensation was rather arbitrary and possibly too high. As 
the interference in the freedom of expression of Lionarakis had not sufficiently and pertinently 
been justified by the Greek authorities, the Court concluded that the inference was not 
necessary in a democratic society and amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
The Court also found a violation of Article 6 § 1 in this case (right to a fair hearing), as 
Lionarakis had been denied the right of access to the Court of Cassation. 
 
 Lionarakis v. Greece, no. 1131/05, 5 July 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2000 Glas Nadezhda EOOD, managed by Mr. Elenkov, applied to the Bulgarian State 
Telecommunications Commission (STC) for a licence to set up a radio station to broadcast 
Christian programmes in and around Sofia. The STC refused to grant the licence, basing its 
refusal on the decision taken by the National Radio and Television Committee (NRTC) which 
found that, on the basis of the documents submitted by Glas Nadezhda EOOD, the proposed 
radio station would not meet its requirements to make social and business programmes or to 
target regional audiences. The proposal also failed to fully meet the requirements to produce 
original programmes, to ensure audience satisfaction and to provide the professional and 
technological resources required. 
 
Glas Nadezhda EOOD brought proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court for judicial 
review of the decisions of both STC and NRTC, but finally the Court held that the NRTC had 
total discretion in assessing whether an application for a broadcasting licence had met certain 
criteria and that this discretion was not open to judicial scrutiny. In the meantime, Mr. Elenkov 
attempted to obtain a copy of the minutes of the NRTC’s deliberations, which were meant to be 
available to the public under the Access to Public Information Act 2000. Despite his requests 
and a court order, Mr. Elenkov was not given access to those minutes. 
 
Relying on Articles 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 10 (freedom of 
expression), the applicants complained that they had been refused a broadcasting licence. They 
also complained under Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) about the ensuing judicial 
review proceedings. 
 
The Court is of the opinion that the interference in the freedom of expression of the applicants 
did not meet the requirements of lawfulness as prescribed by Article 10 § 2. The NRTC had not 
held any form of public hearing and its deliberations had been kept secret, despite a court 
order obliging it to provide the applicants with a copy of its minutes. Furthermore, the NRTC 
had merely stated in its decision that Glas Nadezhda EOOD had not, or had only partially, 
addressed a number of its criteria. No reasoning was given to explain why the NRTC came to 
that conclusion. In addition, no redress had been given for that lack of reasoning in the ensuing 
judicial review proceedings because it had been held that the NRTC’s discretion was not subject 
to review. This, together with the NRTC’s vagueness concerning certain criteria for programmes, 
had denied the applicants legal protection against arbitrary interference with their freedom of 
expression. The Court notes that the guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe in the broadcasting regulation domain call for open and transparent 
application of the regulations governing the licensing procedure and specifically recommend 
that “[a]ll decisions taken ... by the regulatory authorities ... be ... duly reasoned [and] open to 
review by the competent jurisdictions” (Recommendation Rec (2000)23 on the independence 
and functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector). Consequently, the Court 
concludes that the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression had not been lawful 
and held that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
Having regard to its findings under Article 10, the Court considers that it is not necessary to 
additionally examine whether there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. The 
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Court on the other hand comes to the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 13. 
The Court observes that the Supreme Administrative Court made it clear that it could not 
scrutinise the manner in which that body had assessed the compliance of Glas Nadezhda 
EOOD's programme documents with the relevant criteria, as that assessment was within the 
NRTC's discretionary powers. The Supreme Administrative Court thus refused to interfere with 
the exercise of the NRTC's discretion on substantive grounds and did not examine the issues 
relevant to the merits of the applicants' Article 10 grievance. Referring to its case law in similar 
cases, the Court concludes that the approach taken by the Supreme Administrative Court - 
refusing to interfere with the exercise of the NRTC's discretion on substantive grounds - fell 
short of the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention. 
 
• Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, no. 14134/02, 11 October 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Filatenko v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In the year 2000, the journalist Aleksandr Grigoryevich Filatenko was convicted of defamation. 
The reason behind the defamation proceedings was a critical question he formulated during a 
broadcast live show he was presenting as a journalist working for Tyva, the regional state 
television and radio broadcasting company in the Tyva Republic of the Russian Federation. The 
controversial question, based on a question raised by a viewer phoning in, referred to an 
incident during which the Tyva Republic flag had been torn off a car, which was campaigning in 
support of the Otechestvo Party candidate. It was a matter of disagreement as to how Filatenko 
had worded that question during the programme. The opinion of the plaintiff was that 
Filatenko had presented the incident as if the Tyva flag had been torn down and stamped on by 
people from the Edinstvo Campaign Headquarters. Filatenko denied having made any such 
allegation: he only admitted to having specified that the incident had taken place near the 
Edinstvo Campaign Headquarters. In the defamation proceedings brought against Filatenko and 
the broadcasting company by members of the Edinstvo Movement, the Kyzyl District Court 
accepted the plaintiff’s version as to how the question had been worded. As the video recording 
of the show had been lost, the district court relied solely on witness testimonies confirming the 
plaintiff’s version of Filatenko’s wording of the question. Filatenko was found guilty of 
defamation and ordered to pay approximately EUR 347 compensation for damages. Tyva was 
ordered to broadcast a rectification in the same time slot as the original show. 
 
In a judgment of 6 December 2007, the European Court of Human Rights was of the opinion 
that this conviction and court order violate Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The Court reiterated that, as a general rule, any opinions and information aired during 
an electoral campaign should be considered part of a debate on questions of public interest 
and that there is little scope under Article 10 for restrictions on such debate. Similarly, 
punishing a journalist for having worded a question in a certain way, thus seriously hampering 
the contribution of the press to a matter of public interest, should not be envisaged unless 
there is a particularly strong justification. Therefore, the timing (just before elections) and 
format of the show (live and aimed at encouraging lively political debate), required very good 
reasons for any kind of restriction on its participants’ freedom of expression. The European 
Court found that the Russian courts have failed to make an acceptable assessment of the 
relevant facts and have not given sufficient reasons for finding that Filatenko’s wording of the 
question had been defamatory. Furthermore, there was no indication that the assumed 
allegation contained in Filatenko’s question had represented an attack on anyone’s personal 
reputation. The Court was also of the opinion that there could be no serious doubts about 
Filatenko’s good faith. He had merely requested a reaction from the show’s participants on an 
event of major public concern, without making any affirmations. According to the European 
Court Filatenko could not be criticised for having failed to verify facts, given the obvious 
constraints of a live television show, while a representative of the Edinstvo political movement 
had been present and invited to respond to the question. The Court therefore concluded that 
the interference with Filatenko’s freedom of expression had not been sufficiently justified, and 
hence violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Filatenko v. Russia, no. 73219/01, 6 December 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Grand Chamber Judgment in Case of Stoll v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In December 1996 the Swiss ambassador to the United States drew up a “strategic document”, 
classified as “confidential”, concerning possible strategies with regard the compensations due 
to Holocaust victims for unclaimed assets deposited in Swiss banks. The report was sent to the 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in Bern and to a limited list of other persons. Martin 
Stoll, a journalist working for the Sonntags-Zeitung, also obtained a copy of this document, 
probably as a result of a breach of professional confidence by one of the persons who had 
received a copy of this strategic paper. Shortly afterwards the Sonntags-Zeitung published two 
articles by Martin Stoll, accompanied by extracts from the document. In the following days 
other newspapers also published extracts from the report. In 1999, Stoll was sentenced to a 
fine of CHF 800 (EUR 520) for publishing “official confidential deliberations” within the 
meaning of Article 293 of the Criminal Code. This provision not only punishes the person who 
is responsible for the breach of confidence of official secrets, but also those who helped, as an 
accomplice, to publish such secrets. The Swiss Press Council, to which the case had also been 
referred in the meantime, found that the way in which Stoll had focused on the confidential 
report, by shortening the analysis and failing to place the report sufficiently into context, had 
irresponsibly made some extracts appear sensational and shocking. In a judgment of 25 April 
2006, the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights held, by four votes to three, that the conviction of 
Stoll was to be considered as a breach of the journalist’s freedom of expression as guaranteed 
by Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention. For the Court, it was of crucial importance that 
the information contained in the report manifestly raised matters of public interest, that the 
role of the media as critic and watchdog also applies to matters of foreign and financial policy 
and that the protection of confidentiality of diplomatic relations, although a justified principle, 
could not be protected at any price. Furthermore, as Stoll had only been convicted because he 
published parts of the document in the newspaper, the European Court was of the opinion that 
the finding by the Swiss Press Council that he had neglected his professional ethics by focusing 
on some extracts in a sensationalist way, should not be taken into account to determine 
whether or not the publishing of the document was legitimate. 
 
In a judgment of 10 December 2007, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights has now, with twelve votes to five, overruled this finding of a violation of Article 10. 
Although the Grand Chamber recognises that the information contained in the ambassador’s 
paper concerned matters of public interest and that the articles from Stoll were published in 
the context of an important public, impassioned debate in Switzerland with an international 
dimension, it is of the opinion that the disclosure of the ambassador’s report was capable of 
undermining the climate of discretion necessary to the successful conduct of diplomatic 
relations, and of having negative repercussions on the negotiations being conducted by 
Switzerland. The judgment underlines that the fact that Stoll did not himself act illegally by 
obtaining the leaked document is not necessarily a determining factor in assessing whether or 
not he complied with his duties and responsibilities: as a journalist he could not claim in good 
faith to be unaware that disclosure of the document in question was punishable under Article 
293 of the Swiss Criminal Code. Finally the Court emphasised that the impugned articles were 
written and presented in a sensationalist style, that they suggested inappropriately that the 
ambassador’s remarks were anti-Semitic, that they were of a trivial nature and were also 
inaccurate and likely to mislead the reader. Similar to the Swiss Press Council, the Court 
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observes a number of shortcomings in the form of the published articles. The Court comes to 
the conclusion that the “truncated and reductive form of the articles in question, which was 
liable to mislead the reader as to the ambassador’s personality and abilities, considerably 
detracted from the importance of their contribution to the public debate” and that there has 
been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The five dissenting judges expressed the 
opinion that the majority decision is a “dangerous and unjustified departure from the Court’s 
well-established case-law concerning the nature and vital importance of freedom of expression 
in democratic societies”. The judgment of the Grand Chamber also contrasts remarkably with 
the principle enshrined in the 19 December 2006 Joint Declaration by the UN, OSCE, OAS and 
ACHPR according to which “journalists should not be held liable for publishing classified or 
confidential information where they have not themselves committed a wrong in obtaining it” 
[see IRIS 2007-2: Extra]. 
 
• Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, ECHR 2007-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Cases of Nur Radyo and Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In two judgments the European Court of Human Rights considered the suspension of 
broadcasting licences by the Radio ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (Turkish Radio and Television 
Supreme Council – RTÜK) as a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the case of Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı A.Ş. the applicant company complained 
about the temporary broadcasting ban imposed on it by the RTÜK. In 1999 RTÜK censured Nur 
Radyo for broadcasting certain comments by a representative of the Mihr religious community, 
who had described an earthquake in which thousands of people had died in the Izmit region of 
Turkey (August 1999) as a “warning from Allah” against the “enemies of Allah”, who had 
decided on their “death”. The RTÜK found that such comments breached the rule laid down in 
section 4 (c) of Law no. 3984 prohibiting broadcasting that was contrary to the principles 
forming part of the general principles laid down in the Constitution, to democratic rules and to 
human rights. As the applicant company had already received a warning for breaching the same 
rule, the RTÜK decided to suspend its radio broadcasting licence for 180 days. Nur Radyo 
challenged this measure in the Turkish courts, but to no avail. Finally it applied before the 
European Court of Human Rights, alleging a violation of its right to freedom of expression. Nur 
Radyo argued, in particular, that it had put forward a religious explanation for the earthquake, 
which all listeners were free to support or oppose. The European Court acknowledged the 
seriousness of the offending comments and the particularly tragic context in which they were 
made. It also notes that they were of a proselytising nature in that they accorded religious 
significance to a natural disaster. However, although the comments might have been shocking 
and offensive, they did not in any way incite to violence and were not liable to stir up hatred 
against people. The Court reiterated that the nature and severity of the penalty imposed were 
also factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference. It 
therefore considered that the broadcasting ban imposed on the applicant company had been 
disproportionate to the aims pursued, which constitutes a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
In the other case, the applicant company was Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım 
Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. The case concerned the 365-day suspension of the company’s operating licence 
on account of a song that it had broadcast. The RTÜK took the view that the words of the 
offending song infringed the principle set forth in section 4(g) of Law no. 3984, prohibiting the 
broadcasting of material likely to incite the population to violence, terrorism or ethnic 
discrimination, and of a nature to arouse feelings of hatred. After exhausting all national 
remedies, Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon lodged a complaint in Strasbourg under Article 
10 of the Convention that the Turkish authorities had interfered with its right to freedom of 
expression in a manner that could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. In its 
judgment, the European Court considered that the song reflected a political content and 
criticised the military. The song however referred to events that took place more than 30 years 
ago. Over and above, the lyrics of the song were very well known in Turkey and the song had 
been distributed over many years, with the authorisation of the Ministry of Culture. According 
to the Court the song did present a risk of inciting to hatred or hostility amongst the 
population. There was no pressing social need for the interference and the sanction suspending 
the broadcaster’s licence for such a long period was not proportionate to the legitimate aim of 
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the protection of public order. The Court found that there had been a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
• Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı A.Ş. v. Turkey, no. 6587/03, 27 November 2007.   
• Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 11369/03, 
4 December 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Cases of Voskuil v. the Netherlands and Tillack v. Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In two recent judgments, the European Court of Human Rights has given substantial protection 
to journalists’ right of non-disclosure of their sources under Article 10 of the Convention. The 
case of Voskuil v. the Netherlands concerns Mr Voskuil’s allegations that he was denied the 
right not to disclose his source for two articles he had written for the newspaper Sp!ts and that 
he was detained for more than two weeks in an attempt to compel him to do so. Voskuil had 
been summoned to appear as a witness for the defence in the appeal proceedings concerning 
three individuals accused of arms trafficking. The court ordered the journalist to reveal the 
identity of a source, in the interests of those accused and the integrity of the police and judicial 
authorities. Voskuil invoked his right to remain silent ( zwijgrecht ) and, subsequently, the court 
ordered his immediate detention. Only two weeks later, the Court of Appeal decided to lift the 
order for the applicant’s detention. It considered that the report published by the applicant was 
implausible and that the statement of Voskuil was no longer of any interest in the proceedings 
concerning the arms trafficking. In Strasbourg, Voskuil complained of a violation of his right to 
freedom of expression and press freedom, under Article 10 of the Convention. The European 
Court recalled that the protection of a journalist’s sources is one of the basic conditions for 
freedom of the press, as reflected in various international instruments, including the Council of 
Europe’s Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (2000) 7. Without such protection, 
sources might be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public 
interest and, as a result, the vital public-watchdog role of the press might be undermined. The 
order to disclose a source can only be justified by an overriding requirement in the public 
interest. In essence, the Court was struck by the lengths to which the Netherlands authorities 
had been prepared to go to learn the source’s identity. Such far-reaching measures cannot but 
discourage those who have true and accurate information relating to an instance of 
wrongdoing from coming forward in the future and sharing their knowledge with the press. The 
Court found that the Government’s interest in knowing the identity of the journalist’s source 
had not been sufficient to override the journalist’s interest in concealing it. There had, 
therefore, been a violation of Article 10. 
 
The other case concerns the journalist H.M. Tillack, who complained of a violation, by the 
Belgian authorities, of his right to protection of sources. Tillack, a journalist working in Brussels 
for the weekly magazine Stern, was suspected of having bribed a civil servant, by paying him 
EUR 8,000, in exchange for confidential information concerning investigations in progress in 
the European institutions. The European Anti-Fraud Office OLAF opened an investigation in 
order to identify Tillack’s informant. After the investigation by OLAF failed to unmask the 
official at the source of the leaks, the Belgian judicial authorities where requested to open an 
investigation into an alleged breach of professional confidence and bribery involving a civil 
servant. On 19 March 2004, Tillack’s home and workplace were searched and almost all his 
working papers and tools were seized and placed under seal (16 crates of papers, two boxes of 
files, two computers, four mobile phones and a metal cabinet). Tillack lodged an application 
with the European Court of Human Rights, after the Belgian Supreme Court rejected his 
complaint under Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court emphasised that a 
journalist’s right not to reveal her or his sources could not be considered a mere privilege, to be 
granted or taken away depending on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources, but was 
part and parcel of the right to information and should be treated with the utmost caution ( even 
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more so in the applicant’s case, since he had been under suspicion because of vague, 
uncorroborated rumours, as subsequently confirmed by the fact that no charges were placed. 
The Court also took into account the amount of property seized and considered that although 
the reasons given by the Belgian courts were “relevant”, they could not be considered 
“sufficient” to justify the impugned searches. The European Court accordingly found that there 
had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
 Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752/01, November 2007.  
 Tillack v. Belgium, no. 20477/05, 27 November 2007.  
 
IRIS 2008-4/2
Back to overview of case-law 
197 
 
European Court of Human Rights: case of Guja v. Moldova 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recently delivered a judgement on a very particular and 
interesting case, concerning the position of a “whistle-blower” who leaked two letters to the 
press and was subsequently dismissed. The Court held that the divulgence of the internal 
documents to the press was in casu protected by Article 10 of the Convention, which 
guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart 
information and ideas. The applicant, Mr. Guja, was Head of the Press Department of the 
Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office, before he was dismissed, on the grounds that he had 
handed over two secret letters to a newspaper and that, before doing so, he had failed to 
consult the heads of other departments of the Prosecutor General’s Office, a behaviour which 
constituted a breach of the press department’s internal regulations. Guja was of the opinion 
that the letters were not confidential and that, as they revealed that the Deputy Speaker of 
Parliament, Vadim Mişin, had exercised undue pressure on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, he 
had acted in line with the President’s anti-corruption drive and with the intention of creating a 
positive image of the Office. Guja brought a civil action against the Prosecutor General’s Office 
seeking reinstatement, but this action was not successful. Relying on Article 10 of the 
Convention, he complained to the European Court of Human Rights about his dismissal. 
 
The European Court held that, given the particular circumstances of the case, external 
reporting, even to a newspaper, could be justified, as the case concerned the pressure exerted 
by a high-ranking politician on pending criminal cases. At the same time, the Public Prosecutor 
had given the impression that he had succumbed to political pressure. The Court also referred 
to the reports of international non-governmental organisations (the International Commission 
of Jurists, Freedom House, and the Open Justice Initiative), which had expressed concern about 
the breakdown of the separation of powers and the lack of judicial independence in Moldova. 
There is no doubt that these are very important matters in a democratic society, about which 
the public has a legitimate interest in being informed and which fall within the scope of 
political debate. The Court considered that the public interest in the provision of information 
on undue pressure and wrongdoing within the Prosecutor's Office is so important in a 
democratic society, that it outweighs the interest in maintaining public confidence in the 
Prosecutor General's Office. The open discussion of topics of public concern is essential to 
democracy and it is of great importance if members of the public are discouraged from voicing 
their opinions on such matters. The Court, being of the opinion that Guja had acted in good 
faith, finally noted that it was the heaviest sanction possible (dismissal) that had been imposed 
on the applicant. The sanction not only had negative repercussions on the applicant's career, 
but could also have a serious chilling effect on other employees from the Prosecutor's Office 
and discourage them from reporting any misconduct. Moreover, in view of the media coverage 
of the applicant's case, the sanction could also have a chilling effect on other civil servants and 
employees. 
 
Being mindful of the importance of the right to freedom of expression on matters of general 
interest, of the right of civil servants and other employees to report illegal conduct and 
wrongdoing at their place of work, the duties and responsibilities of employees towards their 
employers and the right of employers to manage their staff, and having weighed up the other 
different interests involved in the applicant’s case, the Court came to the conclusion that the 
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interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression, in particular his right to impart 
information, was not “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, there has been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, ECHR 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Yalçin Küçük (nr. 3) v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 22 April 2008, the European Court of Human Rights found a breach of freedom of 
expression in the case of Yalçin Küçük (nr. 3) v. Turkey. Küçük, a university professor and a 
writer, who was prosecuted on account of various speeches he gave and articles he wrote 
concerning the Kurdish question. In 1999, the Ankara State Security Court found him guilty of 
inciting hatred and hostility, of emitting separatist propaganda and of belonging to an armed 
group (art. 312 § 2 and art. 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and art. 8 of the Antiterrorism Act nr. 
3713). He was also convicted of assisting an armed group (art. 169 Criminal Code) on the basis 
of an interview for Med-TV in which Küçük had welcomed the PKK-leader Abdullah Öcalan as 
“Mister President” and had invited him to make a statement about the Kurdish question. 
 
Küçük had to undergo a prison sentence of six years and six months and was ordered to pay a 
fine of EUR 1,300. Relying on Article 6 § 1 and Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, he complained that the proceedings had been unfair and that his right to 
freedom of expression had been breached. 
 
The European Court in its judgment of 22 April 2008 considered that the grounds adopted by 
the Turkish courts could not be regarded in themselves as sufficient to justify interference with 
Külçük’s right to freedom of expression. While certain comments in the offending articles and 
speeches sought to justify separatism, which thus made them hostile in tone, taken as a whole 
they did not, however, advocate the use of violence, armed resistance or an uprising and did 
not constitute hate speech, which, in the Court’s view, was the essential factor to be taken into 
consideration. One speech by Külçük, however, contained a sentence considered as incitement 
to violence and therefore could not invoke the protection guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
The European Court, referring to the nature and the severity of the sanctions, found that 
Külçük’s conviction as a whole had been disproportionate to the aims pursued and, accordingly, 
was not “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court in particular referred to the severity of 
the sentence of imprisonment for six years and six months. The Court held, unanimously, that 
there had been a violation of Article 10 and that it did not need to examine the complaints 
submitted under Article 6 of the Convention. It awarded Küçük EUR 3,000 in respect of non-
pecuniary damage. 
 
• Yalçın Küçük v. Turkey (no. 3), no. 71353/01, 22 April 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Meltex Ltd. and Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 17 June 2008 the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that the 
refusal by the Armenian authorities, on several occasions, to grant the Meltex television 
company requests for broadcasting licences amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court firstly recognized that the independent 
broadcasting company Meltex was to be considered as a “victim” of an interference with its 
freedom of expression by the Armenian public authorities: by not recognising the applicant 
company as the winner in the calls for tenders it competed in, the NTRC (National Radio and 
Television Commission) effectively refused the applicant company's bids for a broadcasting 
licence and such refusals do indeed constitute interferences with the applicant company's 
freedom to impart information and ideas. The Court also made clear that States, however, are 
permitted to regulate by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is 
organised in their territories, particularly in its technical aspects, and that the grant of a licence 
may also be made conditional on matters such as the nature and objectives of a proposed 
station, its potential audience at national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a 
specific audience and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments. The 
compatibility of such interferences must be assessed in light of the requirements of paragraph 
2 of Article 10 of the Convention, which means inter alia that the interference must be 
prescribed by law in a way that guarantees protection against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities. Indeed, the manner in which the licensing criteria are applied in the licensing 
process must provide sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness, including the proper reasoning 
by the licensing authority of its decisions denying a broadcasting licence (see IRIS 2008-1: 3, 
ECtHR 11 October 2007, Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria). 
 
The Court noted that the NTRC’s decisions had been based on the Broadcasting Act (2000) and 
other complementary legal acts defining precise criteria for the NTRC to make its choice, such 
as the applicant company’s finances and technical resources, its staff’s experience and whether 
it produced predominately in-house Armenian programmes. However, the Broadcasting Act had 
not explicitly required at that time that the licensing body give reasons when applying those 
criteria. Therefore, the NTRC had simply announced the winning company without providing 
any explanation as to why that company, and not Meltex, had met the requisite criteria. There 
was no way of knowing on what basis the NTRC had exercised its discretion to refuse a licence. 
On this point, the Court noted that the guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe in the broadcasting regulation domain call for open and transparent 
application of the regulations governing the licensing procedure and specifically recommend 
that “all decisions taken ... by the regulatory authorities ... be ... duly reasoned” (Rec. (2000)23 - 
See also Declaration of the Committee of Ministers of 26 March 2008 on the independence and 
functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector). The Court further took note of 
the relevant conclusions reached by the PACE in its Resolution of 27 January 2004 concerning 
Armenia, where it stated that “the vagueness of the law in force had resulted in the NTRC being 
given outright discretionary powers”. The Court considered that a licensing procedure whereby 
the licensing authority gives no reasons for its decisions does not provide adequate protection 
against arbitrary interferences by a public authority with the fundamental right to freedom of 
expression. The Court therefore concluded that the interference with Meltex’s freedom to 
impart information and ideas, namely the seven denials of a broadcasting licence, had not met 
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the requirement of lawfulness under the European Convention and hence violated Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
• Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia, no. 32283/04, 17 June 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: case of Flux nr. 6 v. Moldova on Journalistic Ethics 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
After several successful complaints before the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights related to the 
freedom of critical journalistic reporting, this time the European Court, by four votes to three, 
came to the conclusion that the conviction of the Moldovan newspaper Flux was not to be 
considered a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The approach taken by the majority of 
the Court regarding the (lack of) journalistic ethical quality of the litigious articles published by 
Flux is strikingly different to that of the dissenting judges. 
 
In 2003 Flux published an article about a High School in Chisinau, sharply criticising its 
principal. The article merely quoted an anonymous letter Flux had received from a group of 
students' parents. The letter alleged inter alia that the school's principal used the school's funds 
for inappropriate purposes and that he had received bribes of up to USD 500 for enrolling 
children in the school. Flux refused a short time later to publish a reply from the school’s 
principal. The text of the reply was then published in another newspaper, the Jurnal de 
Chisinău . The reply stated that Flux had published an anonymous letter without even visiting 
the school or conducting any form of investigation, which showed that its aim was purely 
sensationalism . It was said that Flux had acted contrary to journalistic ethics. Flux reacted to 
this reply by publishing a new article, repeating some of the criticism published in the first 
article and arguing that Fluxwould certainly find persons willing to testify in front of a court 
about the bribes. The principal then brought civil proceedings for defamation against Flux and 
the district court found the allegations of bribery to be untrue and defamatory. The court stated 
that it had no reason to believe the three witnesses who had testified in court that bribes were 
taken for the enrolment of children in the school. The district court expressed the opinion that 
“to be able to declare publicly that someone is accepting bribes, there is a need for a criminal-
court decision finding that person guilty of bribery”. Since there was no such finding against the 
principal, he should not have been accused of bribery, according to the Moldovan district court. 
The judgment of the district court was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Chisinau and the 
appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice was dismissed. The newspaper was ordered to issue 
an apology and to pay the principal MDL 1,350, the equivalent of EUR 88 at the time. 
 
Flux complained to Strasbourg under Article 10 of the Convention that the Moldovan courts' 
decisions constituted an interference with its right to freedom of expression that could not be 
regarded as necessary in a democratic society. The European Court, in its judgment of 29 July 
2008, attached major importance to the fact that, despite the seriousness of the accusations of 
bribery, the journalist ofFlux who wrote the article made no attempt to contact the principal to 
ask his opinion on the matter nor conducted any form of investigation into the matters 
mentioned in the anonymous letter. Furthermore, a right of reply was refused by Flux to the 
principal, although the language used in this reply was not offensive. Flux’s reaction to the 
reply published in Jurnal de Chisinău was regarded by the Court as a form of reprisal for 
questioning the newspaper's professionalism. The Court underlined however that it does not 
accept the reasoning of the district court, namely that the allegations of serious misconduct 
levelled against the principal of the school should have first been proved in criminal 
proceedings. But the Court also made clear that the right to freedom of expression cannot be 
taken to confer on newspapers an absolute right to act in an irresponsible manner by charging 
individuals with criminal acts in the absence of a basis in fact at the material time and without 
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offering them the possibility to counter the accusations. As there are limits to the right to 
impart information to the public, a balance must be struck between that right and the rights of 
those injured, including the right to be presumed innocent of any criminal offence until proven 
guilty. The Court also referred to the unprofessional behaviour of the newspaper and the 
relatively modest award of damages which it was required to pay in the context of a civil action 
and finds that the solution of the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the competing 
interests involved. The Court came to the conclusion that the newspaper acted in flagrant 
disregard of the duties of responsible journalism and thus undermined the Convention rights of 
others, while the interference with the exercise of its right to freedom of expression was 
justified. On these grounds, the Court held by four votes to three that there has been no 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The three dissenting judges in their joint opinion made clear however that they voted without 
hesitation in favour of a finding of a violation of Article 10. They argued that in this case the 
Court attached more value to professional behaviour on behalf of journalists than to the 
unveiling of corruption. According to the dissenters, the facts show that the newspaper made 
enquiries about persistent rumours, found three witnesses whose integrity has not been 
questioned and who supported the allegations of corruption on oath. The dissenters underlined 
that the Court has penalised the newspaper not for publishing untruths, but for so-called 
“unprofessional behaviour”. The dissenting opinions expressed the fear that this judgment of 
the Court has thrown the protection of freedom of expression as far back as it possibly could, 
stating that “Even if alarming facts are sufficiently borne out by evidence, in the balancing 
exercise to establish proportionality, disregard for professional norms is deemed by Strasbourg 
to be more serious than the suppression of democratic debate on public corruption. To put it 
differently, in the Court's view the social need to fight poor journalism is more pressing than 
that of fighting rich corruption. The 'chilling effect' of sanctions against press freedom dreaded 
by the Court's old case-law has materialised through the Court's new one. (..) The serious 
inference of this judgment is that freedom of expression also ceases to exist when it is 
punished for pushing forward for public debate allegations of public criminality made by 
witnesses certified as credible but in a manner considered unprofessional. When subservience 
to professional good practice becomes more overriding than the search for truth itself it is a sad 
day for freedom of expression”. 
 
• Flux v. Moldova (no. 6), no. 22824/04, 29 July 2008.  
 
IRIS 2008-9/1 
Back to overview of case-law 
204 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of Petrina v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1997, during a television programme that focused on the problems with access to 
administrative documents stored in the archives of the former Romanian State security services, 
C.I., a journalist with the satirical weekly ‘Caţavencu’, alleged that a politician, Liviu Petrina, 
had been active in the secret police Securitate. A few weeks later, the same journalist published 
an article reiterating his allegations. Similar allegations of collaboration by Petrina with the 
Securitate under the regime of Ceauşescu were also published by another journalist, M.D. 
Petrina lodged two sets of criminal proceedings against the journalists, C.I. and M.D., for insult 
and defamation, but both journalists were acquitted. The Romanian Courts referred to the 
European Court’s case law regarding Article 10 of the Convention, guaranteeing the right of 
journalists to report on matters of public interest and to criticise politicians, esp. as the 
allegations expressed by the journalists had been general and indeterminate. A few years later, 
however, a certificate was issued by the national research council for the archives of the State 
Security Department Securitate, stating that Petrina was not among the people listed as having 
collaborated with the Securitate. 
 
Following the acquittal of the two journalists by the Romanian Courts, Petrina complained in 
Strasbourg that his right to respect for his honour and his good name and reputation had been 
violated, relying on Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life). The 
Court accepted that the acquittal of the journalists could raise an issue under the positive 
obligations of the Romanian authorities to help with ensuring respect of Petrina’s privacy, 
including his good name and reputation. 
 
The European Court recognised that the discussion on the collaboration of politicians with the 
Securitate was a highly sensitive social and moral issue in the Romanian historical context. 
However, the Court found that, in spite of the satirical character of Caţavencu and in spite of 
the mediatisation of the debate, the articles in question were intended to offend Petrina, as 
there was no evidence at all that Petrina had ever belonged to the Securitate. It also found that 
the allegations were very concrete and direct, not “general and undetermined”, and were 
devoid of irony or humour. The Court did not believe that C.I. and M.D. could invoke, in this 
case, the right of journalists to exaggerate or provoke, as there was no factual basis at all for 
the allegations. The journalists’ allegations overstepped the bounds of acceptability , accusing 
Petrina of having belonged to a group that used repression and terror to serve the regime of 
Nikolai Ceauşescu. 
 
Accordingly, the European Court was not convinced that the reasons given by the domestic 
courts for protecting the journalists’ freedom of expression (Article 10) were sufficient to take 
precedence over Petrina’s reputation, as protected under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court 
found unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Petrina was 
awarded 5,000 EUR in non-pecuniary, moral damages. 
 
• Petrina v. Romania, no. 78060/01, 14 October 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: case of Leroy v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2002, the French cartoonist Denis Leroy (pseudonym Guezmer) was convicted for complicity 
in condoning terrorism because of a cartoon published in a Basque weekly newspaper Ekaitza. 
On 11 September 2001, the cartoonist submitted to the magazine’s editorial team a drawing 
representing the attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, with a caption which 
parodied the advertising slogan of a famous brand: “We have all dreamt of it... Hamas did it” 
(Cfr. “Sony did it”). The drawing was published in the magazine on 13 September 2001. In its 
next issue, the magazine published extracts from letters and emails received in reaction to the 
drawing. It also published a reaction of the cartoonist himself, in which he explained that when 
he made the cartoon he was not taking into account the human suffering (“la douleur humaine”) 
caused by the attacks on WTC. He emphasized that his aim was to illustrate the decline of the 
US-symbols and he also underlined that cartoonists illustrating actual events do not have much 
time for distanced reflection: “Quant un dessinateur réagit sur l’actualité, il n’a pas toujours le 
bénéfice du recul”. He also explained that his real intention was governed by political and 
activist expression, namely that of communicating his anti-Americanism through a satirical 
image and illustrating the decline of American imperialism. 
 
The public prosecutor, on request of the regional governor, brought proceedings against the 
cartoonist and the newspaper’s publishing director in application of Article 24, section 6 of the 
French Press Act of 1881, which penalizes, apart from incitement to terrorism, also condoning 
(glorifying) terrorism: “l’apologie du terrorisme”. The publishing director was convicted for 
condoning terrorism, while Mr. Leroy was convicted for complicity in condoning terrorism. Both 
were ordered to pay a fine of EUR 1,500 each, to publish the judgment at their own expense in 
Ekaitza and in two other newspapers and to pay the costs of the proceedings. The Pau Court of 
Appeal held that “by making a direct allusion to the massive attacks on Manhattan, by 
attributing these attacks to a well-known terrorist organisation and by idealising this lethal 
project through the use of the verb ‘to dream’, [thus] unequivocally praising an act of death, the 
cartoonist justifies the use of terrorism, identifies himself through his use of the first person 
plural (“We”) with this method of destruction, which is presented as the culmination of a dream 
and, finally, indirectly encourages the potential reader to evaluate positively the successful 
commission of a criminal act.” 
 
The cartoonist lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, relying on 
Article 10 of the Convention guaranteeing freedom of expression. Mr. Leroy complained that 
the French courts had denied his real intention, which was governed by political and activist 
expression, namely that of communicating his anti-Americanism through a satirical image. Such 
an expression of an opinion, he argued, should be protected under Article 10 of the Convention. 
The Court considered that Mr. Leroy’s conviction amounted indeed to an interference with the 
exercise of his right to freedom of expression. It refused to apply Article 17 of the Convention 
(prohibition of abuse of rights) in this case, although the French government invoked this 
article arguing that the cartoon, by glorifying terrorism, should be considered as an act aimed 
at the destruction of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
protection of Human Rights and that, therefore, the cartoonist could not rely at all on the 
freedom of expression guaranteed by the Convention. The Court underlined that the message 
of the cartoon - the destruction of US imperialism - did not amount to a denial of the 
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fundamental values of the Convention, in contrast e.g. with incitement to racism, anti-
Semitism, Holocaust negationism and Islamophobia. Hence, in principle the cartoon was 
entitled to Article 10 protection. As the conviction of Mr. Leroy was prescribed by French law 
and pursued several legitimate aims, having regard to the sensitive nature of the fight against 
terrorism, namely the maintenance of public safely and the prevention of disorder and crime, it 
especially remained to be determined whether the interference by the French authorities was 
“necessary in a democratic society”, according to Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 
 
The Court noted at the outset that the tragic events of 11 September 2001, which were at the 
origin of the impugned expression, had given rise to global chaos, and that the issues raised on 
that occasion were subject to discussion as a matter of public interest. The Court however 
considered that the drawing was not limited to criticism of American imperialism, but 
supported and glorified the latter’s violent destruction. It based its finding on the caption which 
accompanied the drawing and noted that the applicant had expressed his moral support for 
those whom he presumed to be the perpetrators of the attacks of 11 September 2001. Through 
his choice of language, the applicant commented approvingly on the violence perpetrated 
against thousands of civilians and diminished the dignity of the victims, as he submitted his 
drawing on the day of the attacks and it was published on 13 September, with no precautions 
on his part as to the language used. In the Court’s opinion, this factor - the date of publication - 
was such as to increase the cartoonist’s responsibility in his account of, and even support for, a 
tragic event, whether considered from an artistic or a journalistic perspective. Also the impact 
of such a message in a politically sensitive region, namely the Basque Country, was not to be 
overlooked. According to the Court, the cartoon had provoked a certain public reaction, capable 
of stirring up violence and demonstrating a plausible impact on public order in the region. All 
in all, the Court considered that the grounds put forward by the domestic courts in convicting 
Mr. Leroy had been “relevant and sufficient”. Having regard to the modest nature of the fine 
and the context in which the impugned drawing had been published, the Court found that the 
measure imposed on the cartoonist was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 
Accordingly, there has not been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Leroy v. France, no. 36109/03, 2 October 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of TV Vest SA and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 11 December 2008, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment regarding a 
ban on political advertising on television. The crucial question the Court had to decide was 
whether a blanket ban on political advertisements on TV, as it was applied in Norway, was to 
be considered “necessary in a democratic society'” within the meaning of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In principle, there is little scope under Article 10 of the 
Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest. 
However, a ban on paid political advertisements on TV exists in many countries in Europe, such 
as the UK, Sweden, Denmark, France, Belgium and Norway. According to Art. 3, 1 (3) of the 
Norwegian Broadcasting Act 1992, broadcasters “cannot transmit advertisements for life 
philosophy or political opinions through television”. The Court has now decided unanimously 
that an application of this ban was in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The case goes back to the application by TV Vest AS Ltd., a television company in Stavanger, on 
the west coast of Norway, and the regional branch of a Norwegian political party, Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti (the Rogaland Pensioners Party). A fine was imposed on TV Vest for broadcasting 
adverts for the Pensioners Party, in breach of the Broadcasting Act. This fine had been imposed 
by the Statens medieforvaltning (State Media Administration) and had been confirmed by the 
Høyesterett (Supreme Court), which found, inter alia , that allowing political parties and interest 
groups to advertise on television would give richer parties and groups more scope for 
marketing their opinions than their poorer counterparts. The Supreme Court also maintained 
that the Pensioners Party had many other means available to put across its message to the 
public. The Pensioners Party had argued that it was a small political party, representing only 
1.3 % of the electorate, without powerful financial means or support from strong financial 
groups, that it seldom got any focus in editorial television broadcasting and, thus, had a real 
need to establish direct communication between itself and the electorate. The Party was never 
identified either in national or local opinion polls. 
 
The European Court said that to accept that the lack of consensus in Europe regarding the 
necessity to ban political advertisements on TV spoke in favour of granting States greater 
discretion than would normally be allowed in decisions with regard to restrictions on political 
debate. The Court however came to the conclusion that the arguments in support of the 
prohibition in Norway, such as the safeguarding of the quality of political debate, guaranteeing 
pluralism, maintaining the independence of broadcasters from political parties and preventing 
powerful financial groups from taking advantage through commercial political advertisements 
on TV were relevant, but not sufficient, reasons to justify the total prohibition of this form of 
political advertising. The Court especially noted that the Pensioners Party did not come within 
the category of parties or groups that had been the primary targets of the prohibition. In 
contrast to the major political parties, which were given a large amount of attention in the 
edited television coverage, the Pensioners Party was hardly ever mentioned on Norwegian 
television. Therefore, paid advertising on television had become the only way for the Party to 
get its message across to the public through that type of medium. 
 
The Court was not persuaded that the ban had the desired effect and it explicitly rejected the 
view expounded by the Norwegian Government that there was no viable alternative to a 
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blanket ban. In the Court's view, there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the legitimate aim pursued by the prohibition on political advertising and the means 
employed to achieve that aim. The restriction that the prohibition and the imposition of the 
fine entailed on the applicants' exercise of their freedom of expression could not therefore be 
regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly, there had been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• TV Vest AS and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, no. 21132/05, ECHR 2008 (extracts).  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicants, Adnan Khurshid Mustafa and his wife, Weldan Tarzibachi, are Swedish nationals 
of Iraqi origin. Relying on Article 10 (freedom to receive information) and Article 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life), they complained that they and their three children had been 
forced to move from their rented flat in Rinkeby (a suburb of Stockholm) in June 2006. The 
reason for their eviction was their refusal to remove a satellite dish in their flat after the 
landlord had initiated proceedings against them, because he considered the installation of a 
satellite antenna as a breach of the tenancy agreement that stipulated that “outdoor antennae” 
were not allowed to be set up on the house. The proceedings continued even after Mr. Khursid 
Mustafa and Mrs. Tarzibachi had dismantled the outdoor antenna and replaced it with an 
antenna installation in the kitchen on an iron stand from which an arm, on which the satellite 
dish was mounted, extended through a small open window. Eventually, the Swedish Court of 
Appeal found that the tenants had disregarded the tenancy agreement and that they should 
dismantle the antenna, if the tenancy agreement were not cancelled. The Swedish Court was of 
the opinion that the tenants were fully aware of the importance the landlord attached to the 
prohibition of the installation of satellite antennae and that, although the installation in the 
kitchen did not pose a real safety threat, their interests in keeping the antenna installation, 
based on their right to receive television programmes of their choice, could not be permitted to 
override the weighty and reasonable interest of the landlord that order and good custom be 
upheld. 
 
The fact that the case involved a dispute between two private parties was not seen as sufficient 
reason for the European Court to declare the application inadmissible. Indeed, the Court found 
that the applicants’ eviction was the result of a domestic court’s ruling, making the Swedish 
State responsible, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, for any resultant breach of 
Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court observed that the satellite dish enabled the 
applicants to receive television programmes in Arabic and Farsi from their country of origin 
(Iraq). That information included political and social news and was of particular interest to 
them as an immigrant family who wished to maintain contact with the culture and language of 
their country of origin. At the time, there were no other means for the applicants to gain access 
to such programmes and the dish could not be placed anywhere else. Nor could news obtained 
from foreign newspapers and radio programmes in any way be equated with information 
available via television broadcasts. It was not shown that the landlord had installed broadband 
or internet access or other alternative means which might have given the tenants in the 
building the possibility of receiving these television programmes. Furthermore, the landlord’s 
concerns about safety had been examined by the domestic courts, who had found that the 
installation had been safe. And there were certainly no aesthetic reasons to justify the removal 
of the antenna, as the flat was located in one of Stockholm’s suburbs, in a tenement house with 
no particular aesthetic aspirations. Moreover, the applicants’ eviction, with their three children, 
from their home, a flat in which they had lived for more than six years, was disproportionate to 
the aim pursued, namely the landlord’s interest in upholding order and good custom. The Court 
therefore concluded that the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of information 
had not been “necessary in a democratic society”: Sweden had failed in its positive obligation to 
protect the right of the applicants to receive information. The European Court held 
unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10, while it further held unanimously 
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that there was no need to examine the complaint under Article 8. The applicants were awarded 
EUR 6,500 in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 
EUR 10,000 for costs and expenses. 
 
• Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, no. 23883/06, 16 December 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Times Newspapers Ltd. (nos. 1 and 2) v. UK 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has held unanimously that there had been no violation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Times Newspapers v. the 
UK, because the British courts’ finding that the Times Newspapers Ltd had libelled G.L. by the 
continued publication on its Internet site of two articles did not represent a disproportionate 
restriction on the newspaper’s freedom of expression. 
 
The applicant in this case, Times Newspapers Ltd, is the owner and publisher of The Times 
newspaper, registered in England. It published two articles, in September and October 1999 
respectively, reporting on a massive money-laundering scheme carried out by an alleged 
Russian mafia boss, G.L., whose name was set out in full in the original article. Both articles 
were uploaded onto The Times website on the same day as they were published in the paper 
version of the newspaper. In December 1999, G.L. brought proceedings for libel against the 
Times Newspapers Ltd, its editor and the two journalists who signed the two articles printed in 
the newspaper. The defendants did not dispute that the articles were potentially defamatory, 
but contended that the allegations were of such a kind and seriousness that they had a duty to 
publish the information and the public had a corresponding right to know. While the first libel 
action was underway, the articles remained on The Times website, where they were accessible 
to Internet users as part of the newspaper’s archive of past issues. In December 2000, G.L. 
brought a second action for libel in relation to the continuing Internet publication of the 
articles. Following this, the defendants added a notice to both articles in the Internet archive 
announcing that they were subject to libel litigation and were not to be reproduced or relied on 
without reference to the Times Newspapers Legal Department. 
 
Times Newspapers subsequently argued that only the first publication of an article posted on 
the Internet should give rise to a cause of action in defamation and not any subsequent 
downloads by Internet readers. Accordingly, Times Newspapers submitted, the second action 
had been commenced after the limitation period for bringing libel proceedings had expired. 
The British courts disagreed, holding that, in the context of the Internet, the common law rule 
according to which each publication of a defamatory statement gives rise to a separate cause of 
action meant that a new cause of action accrued every time the defamatory material was 
accessed (“the Internet publication rule”). 
 
Relying on Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention, the Times Newspapers Ltd 
complained before the Strasbourg Court that the Internet publication rule breached its freedom 
of expression by exposing them to ceaseless liability for libel. The European Court noted that 
while Internet archives were an important source for education and historical research, the 
press had a duty to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism, including by 
ensuring the accuracy of historical information. Further, the Court observed that limitation 
periods in libel proceedings were intended to ensure that those defending actions were able to 
defend themselves effectively and that it was, in principle, for contracting States to set 
appropriate limitation periods. The Court considered it significant that, although libel 
proceedings had been commenced in respect of the two articles in question in December 1999, 
no qualification was added to the archived copies of the articles on the Internet until December 
2000. The Court noted that the archive was managed by the applicant itself and that the 
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domestic courts had not suggested that the articles be removed from the archive altogether. 
Accordingly, the Court did not consider that the requirement to publish an appropriate 
qualification to the Internet version of the articles constituted a disproportionate interference 
with the right to freedom of expression. There was accordingly no violation of Article 10. 
 
Having regard to this conclusion, the Court did not consider it necessary to consider the 
broader chilling effect allegedly created by the Internet publication rule. It nonetheless 
observed that, in the present case, the two libel actions related to the same articles and both 
had been commenced within 15 months of the initial publication of the articles. The Times 
Newspaper’s ability to defend itself effectively was therefore not hindered by the passage of 
time. Accordingly, the problems linked to ceaseless liability did not arise. However, the Court 
emphasised that, while individuals who are defamed must have a real opportunity to defend 
their reputations, libel proceedings brought against a newspaper after too long a period might 
well give rise to a disproportionate interference with the freedom of the press under Article 10 
of the Convention. 
 
• Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, 
ECHR 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Faccio v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has declared inadmissible the application in a case 
concerning the sealing by the authorities of a television set because a person had not paid his 
licence fee. 
 
In 1999, the applicant, Mr. Faccio, filed a request with the Radiotelevisione italiana (RAI) 
subscriptions bureau to terminate his subscription to the public television service. On 29 
August 2003, the tax police sealed his television set in a nylon bag so that it could no longer be 
used. Relying on Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 8 (right to respect for private 
and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights, Mr. Faccio complained before 
the Court of a violation of his right to receive information and of his right to respect for his 
private and family life. He alleged that the act of making his television set unusable was a 
disproportionate measure, as it also prevented him from watching private channels. He further 
relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) to the Convention. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights noted that it was not in dispute that the sealing of the 
television set had constituted interference with the applicant’s right to receive information and 
with his right to respect for his property and for his private life. It further found that the 
measure, taken under the provisions of Italian law, had pursued a legitimate aim: to dissuade 
individuals from failing to pay a tax or, in other words, to dissuade them from terminating their 
subscriptions to the public television service. The licence fee represents a tax that is used for 
the financing of the public broadcasting service. In the Court’s view, regardless of whether or 
not Mr. Faccio wished to watch programmes on public channels, the mere possession of a 
television set obliged him to pay the tax in question. Moreover, a system whereby viewers 
would be able to watch only private channels without paying the licence fee, assuming that 
this were technically feasible, would amount to depriving the tax of its very nature, since it is a 
contribution to a community service and not the price paid by an individual in return for 
receiving a particular channel. 
 
In view of the foregoing considerations and the reasonable amount of the tax (which, by way of 
example, amounts to EUR 107.50 for 2009), the Court concluded that the measure consisting of 
sealing the applicant’s television set in a bag was proportionate to the aim pursued by the 
Italian authorities. It thus declared the application manifestly ill-founded. 
 
• Bruno Antonio Faccio v. Italy (dec.), no. 33/04, 31 March 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of A. v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court in a recent judgment clarified the relation of the freedom of the press (Art. 
10) vis à vis the right of privacy (Art. 8) and the presumption of innocence (Art. 6 para. 2) in a 
case of crime-reporting in the media. The applicant, A, is a Norwegian national with a criminal 
past. The case concerns A’s complaint about the unfavourable outcome of a defamation suit he 
brought against the Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper, following its publication of two articles 
concerning the preliminary investigation into a murder case which implicated him. A had been 
questioned as a possible witness about the murder of two young women, but was released after 
10 hours. The police’s interest in A attracted considerable media attention. Fœdrelandsvennen 
disclosed details of A’s criminal convictions and stated that he had allegedly been seen by 
witnesses in the very same area and at the same time as the girls were killed. A television 
station, TV2, also reported in a news broadcast on the case and presented A as a murderer. 
 
A brought defamation proceedings against the Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper and TV2, as 
further investigation and proceedings made it clear that he had nothing to do with the murder 
case. The Norwegian courts found in his favour and awarded him compensation as regards the 
TV2 report. In respect of the newspaper articles, however, the domestic courts agreed that the 
publications had been defamatory, in as much as they were capable of giving the ordinary 
reader the impression that the applicant was regarded as the most probable perpetrator of the 
murders, yet concluded that, on balance, the newspaper had been right to publish the articles, 
as it had acted in the interest of the general public, which had the right to be informed of the 
developments in the investigation and the pursuit of the perpetrators. Relying on Article 6§2 
(presumption of innocence) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), A 
complained in Strasbourg that the domestic courts’ findings - to the extent that the 
Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper was found to have a right to publish defamatory material about 
him - had negatively affected his right to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise, as well 
as his private life. 
 
The Court dismissed A’s allegations under Article 6 para. 2, as it found that Article not 
applicable to the matters at hand, given in particular that no public authority had charged A 
with a criminal offence and that the disputed newspaper publications did not amount to an 
affirmation that he was guilty of the crimes in question. The Court, however, was of the opinion 
that the articles had been defamatory in nature, as they had given the impression that the 
applicant had been a prime suspect in the murder case of the two girls. While it is undisputed 
that the press have the right to deliver information to the public and the public have the right 
to receive such information, these considerations did not justify the defamatory allegations 
against A and the consequent harm done to him. Indeed, the applicant had been persecuted by 
journalists seeking to obtain pictures and interviews from him, this being during a period in his 
life when he had been undergoing rehabilitation and reintegration into society. As a result of 
the journalistic reports, he found himself unable to continue his work, had to leave his home 
and was driven to social exclusion. In the Court's view there was no reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the interests relied on by the domestic courts in safeguarding 
Fædrelandsvennen' freedom of expression and those of the applicant in having his honour, 
reputation and privacy protected. The Court was therefore not satisfied that the national courts 
struck a fair balance between the newspaper's freedom of expression under Article 10 and the 
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applicant's right to respect for his private life under Article 8, notwithstanding the wide margin 
of appreciation available to the national authorities. The Court concluded that the publications 
in question had gravely damaged A’s reputation and honour and had been especially harmful to 
his moral and psychological integrity and to his private life, in violation of Article 8. 
 
• A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, 9 April 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of TASZ v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In April 2009, the European Court of Human Rights delivered an important judgment in which it 
recognised the right of access to official documents. The Court made it clear that, when public 
bodies hold information that is needed for public debate, the refusal to provide documents in 
this matter to those who are requesting access, is a violation of the right to freedom of 
expression and information guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. The case concerns a 
request by the Társaság a Szabadságjogokért (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union - TASZ) to 
Hungary’s Constitutional Court to disclose a parliamentarian's complaint questioning the 
legality of new criminal legislation concerning drug-related offences. The Constitutional Court 
refused to release the information. As the Court found that the applicant was involved in the 
legitimate gathering of information on a matter of public importance and that the 
Constitutional Court's monopoly of information amounted to a form of censorship, it concluded 
that the interference with the applicant's rights was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court’s judgment refers to the “censorial power of an information monopoly”, 
when public bodies refuse to release information needed by the media or civil society 
organisations to perform their “watchdog” function. The Court refers to its consistent case law, 
in which it has recognised that the public has a right to receive information of general interest 
and that the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is called for when the measures 
taken by the national authority are capable of discouraging the participation of the press, one 
of society's “watchdogs”, in the public debate on matters of legitimate public concern, including 
measures which merely make access to information more cumbersome. It is also underlined 
that the law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions, which may become a form of indirect 
censorship should the authorities create obstacles to the gathering of information, this by itself 
being an essential preparatory step in journalism and inherently a protected part of press 
freedom. The Court emphasised once more that the function of the press, including the creation 
of forums of public debate, is not limited to the media or professional journalists. Indeed, in the 
present case, the preparation of the forum of public debate was conducted by a non-
governmental organisation. The Court recognises the important contribution of civil society to 
the discussion of public affairs and categorised the applicant association, which is involved in 
human rights litigation, as a social “watchdog”. The Court is of the opinion that, in these 
circumstances, the applicant’s activities warrant similar Convention protection to that afforded 
to the press. Furthermore, given that the applicant's intention was to impart to the public the 
information gathered from the constitutional complaint in question, and thereby to contribute 
to the public debate concerning legislation on drug-related offences, its right to impart 
information was clearly impaired. 
 
It should be emphasised that the European Court’s judgment is obviously a further step in the 
direction of the recognition by the Court of a right of access to public documents under Article 
10 of the Convention, although the Court is still reluctant to affirm this explicitly. The Court 
recalls that “Article 10 does not (..) confer on the individual a right of access to a register 
containing information on his personal position, nor does it embody an obligation on the 
Government to impart such information to the individual” and that “it is difficult to derive from 
the Convention a general right of access to administrative data and documents”. But the 
judgment also states that “the Court has recently advanced towards a broader interpretation of 
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the notion of “freedom to receive information” (..) and thereby towards the recognition of a 
right of access to information”, referring to its decision in the case of Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky 
v. Czech Republic (ECHR 10 July 2006, Appl. No. 19101/03). The Court notes that “the right to 
freedom to receive information basically prohibits a Government from restricting a person from 
receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him”. In this case, the 
information sought by the applicant was ready and available and did not require the collection 
of any data by the Government. Therefore, the Court considers that the State had an obligation 
not to impede the flow of information sought by the applicant. 
 
• Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, no. 37374/05, 14 April 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Kenedi v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In May 2009, the Court confirmed once more the applicability of the right to freedom of 
expression and information guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention to matters of access 
to official documents. The case concerns the attempt by a historian, Mr. János Kenedi, to have 
access to certain documents deposited at the Ministry of the Interior regarding the functioning 
of the State Security Services in Hungary in the 1960s. Mr Kenedi, who had previously 
published several books on the functioning of secret services in totalitarian regimes, 
complained to the European Court about the Hungarian authorities’ protracted reluctance to 
enforce a court order granting him unrestricted access to these documents. For several years 
Kenedi tried to get access to the relevant information from the Ministry, but to no avail. After 
continued refusals, he obtained domestic court orders to enforce access. The Ministry, however, 
continued to obstruct him, for example by requiring that Kenedi sign a declaration of 
confidentiality. Kenedi refused, among other reasons because the Court order had not 
mentioned confidentiality as a requirement. At the time of the proceedings in Strasbourg, 
Kenedi still had not been granted access to all the documents he had requested. 
 
The European Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a 
fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights, on account of the excessive length 
of the proceedings - over ten years - that Mr Kenedi had launched so as to gain and enforce his 
access to documents concerning the Hungarian secret services. Article 10 (freedom of 
expression and information) was also violated in the Court's view. It reiterated that "access to 
original documentary sources for legitimate historical research was an essential element of the 
exercise of the applicant's right to freedom of expression". The Court noted that Mr Kenedi had 
obtained a court judgment granting him access to the documents in question, while the 
domestic courts had repeatedly found in his favour in the ensuing enforcement proceedings. 
The administrative authorities had persistently resisted their obligation to comply with the 
domestic judgment, thus hindering Mr Kenedi’s access to documents he needed to write his 
study. The Court concluded that the authorities had acted arbitrarily and in defiance of 
domestic law. Their obstructive actions had also led to the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 
of the Convention. The Court held, therefore, that the authorities had misused their powers by 
delaying Mr Kenedi in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, in violation of Article 
10. 
 
Finally, Article 13 ECHR (effective remedy) had also been violated, since the Hungarian system 
did not provide for an effective way of remedying the violation of Mr Kenedi’s freedom of 
expression in this situation. The Court found that the procedure available in Hungary at the 
time and designed to remedy the violation of Mr Kenedi’s Article 10 rights had proven 
ineffective. There had, therefore, been a violation of Article 13, in conjunction with Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
Again, the Court does not formulate a general right of access to (official) documents. The Court 
is however of the opinion that the granting of access was necessary for the applicant to 
accomplish the publication of a historical study. The Court noted that the intended publication 
fell within the applicant’s freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
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• Kenedi v. Hungary, no. 31475/05, 26 May 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Féret v. Belgium 
 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In an interesting but highly controversial judgment, the European Court focused on the limits of 
freedom of expression in a case of incitement to hatred and discrimination (“hate speech”). The 
Court held by four votes to three that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights in respect of the conviction of the chairman of the Belgian 
political party “Front National”, Mr. Daniel Féret. Mr. Féret was convicted by a Belgian criminal 
court for publicly inciting to racism, hatred and discrimination, following complaints concerning 
leaflets distributed by the Front National during election campaigns. 
 
Between July 1999 and October 2001, the distribution of leaflets and posters by the Front 
National led to complaints by individuals and associations for incitement to hatred, 
discrimination and violence, filed under the law of 30 July 1981, which penalised certain acts 
and expressions inspired by racism or xenophobia. Mr. Féret was the editor in chief of the 
party’s publications and was a member of the Belgian House of Representatives at the time. His 
parliamentary immunity however was waived at the request of the Public Prosecutor and in 
November 2002 criminal proceedings were brought against Féret as author and editor-in-chief 
of the offending leaflets, which were also distributed on the Internet on the website of Féret 
and Front National. 
 
In 2006, the Brussels Court of Appeal found that the offending conduct on the part of Mr. Féret 
had not fallen within his parliamentary activity and that the leaflets contained passages that 
represented a clear and deliberate incitement to discrimination, segregation or hatred, for 
reasons of race, colour or national or ethnic origin. The court sentenced Mr. Féret to 250 hours 
of community service related to the integration of immigrants, commutable to a 10-month 
prison sentence. It declared him ineligible to stand for parliament for ten years and ordered 
him to pay EUR 1 to each of the civil parties. 
 
Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Féret applied to the 
European Court of Human Rights alleging that the conviction for the content of his political 
party’s leaflets represented an excessive restriction on his right to freedom of expression. The 
European Court however disagreed with this assumption, as it considered that the sanction by 
the Belgian authorities was prescribed by law sufficiently precisely and was necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of public order and for the protection of the reputation 
and the rights of others, thereby meeting the requirements of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 
The European Court observed that the leaflets presented immigrant communities as criminally-
minded and keen to exploit the benefits they derived from living in Belgium and that they also 
sought to make fun of the immigrants concerned, with the inevitable risk of arousing, 
particularly among less knowledgeable members of the public, feelings of distrust, rejection or 
even hatred towards foreigners. Although the Court recognised that freedom of expression is 
especially important for elected representatives of the people, it reiterated that it was crucial 
for politicians, when expressing themselves in public, to avoid comments that might foster 
intolerance. The impact of racist and xenophobic discourse was magnified by the electoral 
context, in which arguments naturally become more forceful. To recommend solutions to 
immigration-related problems by advocating racial discrimination was likely to cause social 
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tension and undermine trust in democratic institutions. In the present case there had been a 
compelling social need to protect the rights of the immigrant community, as the Belgian courts 
had done. With regard to the penalty imposed on Mr. Féret, the European Court noted that the 
Belgian authorities had preferred a 10-year period of ineligibility to stand for parliament rather 
than a penal sanction, in accordance with the Court’s principle of restraint in criminal 
proceedings. The Court thus found that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court furthermore found that Article 17 of the Convention (abuse clause) was 
not applicable in this case. Three dissenting judges disagreed with the findings of the Court on 
the non-violation of Article 10, arguing that the leaflets were in essence part of a sharp 
political debate during election time. The dissenting judges expressed the opinion that the 
leaflets did not incite to violence nor to any concrete discriminatory act and that criminal 
convictions in the domain of freedom of political debate and hate speech should only be 
considered as necessary in a democratic society in cases of direct incitement to violence or 
discriminatory acts. They argued that the reference to a potential impact of the leaflets in terms 
of incitement to discrimination or hatred does not sufficiently justify an interference with 
freedom of expression. The dissenting judges also emphasised the disproportionate character 
of the sanction of 250 hours of community service or a 10-month suspended prison sentence, 
together with the Belgian Court’s decision declaring Mr. Féret’s ineligibility to stand for 
parliament for a period of ten years. The majority of the European Court however could not be 
persuaded by the dissenting judges’ arguments: the four judges of the majority were of the 
opinion that the Belgian authorities acted within the scope of the justified limitations 
restricting freedom of political expression, as the litigious leaflets contained, in the eyes if the 
Court, incitement to hatred and discrimination based on nationality or ethnic origin. 
 
• Féret v. Belgium, no. 15615/07, 16 July 2009.  
 
IRIS 2009-8/1
Back to overview of case-law 
222 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In one of its recent judgments the European Court of Human Rights found that the freedom of 
expression of a journalist employed by the Polish public television broadcaster (Telewizja 
Polska Spółka Akcjna, TVP) had been unduly restricted. The journalist, Helena Wojtas-Kaleta, 
received a disciplinary sanction after criticising in public the direction the TVP had taken. This 
sanction, and its confirmation by the Polish courts, was found to constitute a violation of Article 
10 of the European Convention for Human Rights. 
 
In 1999 the national newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza published an article reporting that two 
classical music programmes had been taken off the air by TVP. The article quoted an opinion 
expressed by Ms Wojtas-Kaleta in her capacity as the President of the Polish Public Television 
Journalists’ Union, in which she criticised this decision of the director of TVP. In addition, Ms 
Wojtas-Kaleta signed an open letter in protest at the above measure. The letter was addressed 
to the Board of TVP and stated among other things that, while classical music is the heritage of 
the nation, its continuous dissemination was seriously jeopardised by reducing its time on the 
air and by instead polluting air time with violence and pseudo-musical kitsch. Ms Wojtas-Kaleta 
was reprimanded in writing by her employer for failing to observe the company’s regulations, 
which required her to protect her employer’s good name. Following an unsuccessful objection 
to the reprimand, she brought a claim against TVP before the district court, requesting the 
withdrawal of the reprimand. However, first the district court and subsequently the court of 
appeal dismissed her claim and found that Ms Wojtas-Kaleta had behaved in an unlawful 
manner and that this was a necessary and sufficient prerequisite for the disciplinary measure 
imposed on her. The courts found that she had acted to the detriment of her employer by 
breaching her obligation of loyalty and, consequently, the employer had been entitled to 
impose the reprimand. 
 
Ms Wojtas-Kaleta complained in Strasbourg that the Polish judicial authorities had violated her 
freedom of expression by taking into account merely her obligations as an employee, while 
disregarding her right as a journalist to comment on matters of public interest. The Court 
considered that, where a State has decided to create a public broadcasting system, the 
domestic law and practice have to guarantee that the system provides a pluralistic audiovisual 
service. The Polish public television company had been entrusted with a special mission 
including, among other things, assisting the development of culture, with emphasis on the 
national intellectual and artistic achievements. In her comments and open letter Ms Wojtas-
Kaleta had essentially referred to widely-shared concerns of public interest about the declining 
quality of music programmes on public television, while her statements had relied on a 
sufficient factual basis and, at the same time, amounted to value judgments which were not 
susceptible to proof. The Court further noted that Ms Wojtas-Kaleta had to enjoy freedom of 
expression in all her capacities: as an employee of a public television company, as a journalist 
or as a trade union leader. The Court observed that the Polish courts took no note of her 
argument that she had been acting in the public interest. They limited their analysis to a 
finding that her comments amounted to acting to the employer's detriment. As a result, they 
did not examine whether or how the subject matter of Ms Wojtas-Kaleta’s comments and the 
context in which they had been made could have affected the permissible scope of her freedom 
of expression. Such an approach is not compatible with Convention standards. The Court noted 
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that the tone of the impugned statements was measured and that she did not make any 
personal accusations against named members of the management. Finally, the journalist’s good 
faith had never been challenged either by her employer or by the domestic authorities involved 
in the proceedings. Being mindful of the importance of the right to freedom of expression on 
matters of general interest, Ms Wojtas-Kaleta’s professional obligations and responsibilities as 
a journalist, and of the duties and responsibilities of employees towards their employers, as 
well as having weighed up the other different interests involved in the present case, the Court 
came to the conclusion that the interference with her right to freedom of expression was not 
“necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, the Court held that there had been a violation 
of Article 10. 
 
• Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, no. 20436/02, 16 July 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Manole a.o. v Moldova 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights found that from February 2001 until September 2006 the 
Moldovan authorities violated freedom of expression by not sufficiently guaranteeing the 
independence of Teleradio-Moldova (TRM), the State-owned broadcasting company, which 
became a public broadcasting company in 2002. Nine journalists, editors and producers, who 
were all employed by TRM during that period, complained that the public broadcasting 
company was subjected to political control by the government and the ruling political party, 
with a lack of guarantees of pluralism in its editorial policy and news and information 
programmes. Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention, they complained that as 
journalists at TRM they were subjected to a censorship regime. They also claimed that the 
political control over news and political information worsened after February 2001, when the 
Communist Party won a large majority in Parliament: senior TRM management was replaced by 
those who were loyal to the Government, only a trusted group of journalists were used for 
reports of a political nature, which where then edited to present the ruling party in a favourable 
light, other journalists were reprimanded, interviews were cut and programmes were taken off 
the air, while opposition parties were allowed only very limited opportunities to express their 
views. After a strike by TRM journalists protesting against the government’s media policy and 
control over TRM, a large number of journalists were not retained in their posts during a 
structural reorganisation of TRM. The journalists claimed that they were dismissed for political 
reasons and appealed the decision in court. They were unsuccessful, however. In the meantime, 
a number of reports by international organisations and non-governmental organisations, such 
as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the Moldovan Centre for Independent Journalism (IJC), 
affirmed that domestic law in Moldova did not sufficiently guarantee the independence of 
editorial policy at TRM and that the political parties of the opposition were not adequately 
represented in TRM news and information programmes. The nine journalists lodged an 
application with the European Court in March 2002, arguing that their right to freedom of 
expression had been violated, due to the censorship regime imposed on them. They also 
claimed that the Moldovan State had not discharged its positive obligations under Article 10, 
because it had failed to enact legislation which would offer safeguards against abusive 
interferences by public authorities. 
 
In its judgment, the European Court took as the starting point of its reasoning the fundamental 
truism that there can be no democracy without pluralism. A situation whereby a powerful 
economic or political group in a society is permitted to obtain a position of dominance over the 
audiovisual media and thereby exercise pressure on broadcasters and eventually curtail their 
editorial freedom undermines the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic 
society, as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention, in particular where it serves to impart 
information and ideas of general interest, which the public is moreover entitled to receive. The 
Court further observed that it is the State itself that must be the ultimate guarantor of 
pluralism and that the State has a duty to ensure that the public has access through television 
and radio to impartial and accurate information and a range of opinions and comments, 
reflecting the diversity of political outlook within the country. Journalists and other 
professionals working in the audiovisual media should not be prevented from imparting this 
information and commentary. Furthermore, it is indispensable for the proper functioning of 
democracy that a (dominant) public broadcaster transmits impartial, independent and balanced 
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news, information and comment and, in addition, provides a forum for public discussion in 
which as broad a spectrum as possible of views and opinions can be expressed. The Court 
concluded, on the basis of the evidence and reports by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and IJC, 
that there was a significant bias towards reporting on the activities of the President and the 
Government in TRM’s television news and other programming and that this policy by TRM had 
indeed affected the applicants as journalists, editors and producers at TRM. The Court also 
found that domestic law from February 2001 onwards did not provide any guarantee of political 
balance in the composition of TRM’s senior management and supervisory body nor any 
safeguard against interference from the ruling political party in the bodies’ decision-making 
and functioning. Also, after 2002, there was no safeguard to prevent 14 of the 15 members of 
the Observers’ Council being appointees loyal to the ruling party, despite the fact that this 
Council was precisely responsible for appointing TRM’s senior management and monitoring its 
programmes for accuracy and objectivity. In the light, in particular, of the virtual monopoly 
enjoyed by TRM over audiovisual broadcasting in Moldova, the Court found that the Moldovan 
State authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation. The legislative framework 
throughout the period in question was flawed: it did not provide sufficient safeguards against 
the control of TRM's senior management, and thus its editorial policy, by the political organ of 
the Government. As Moldovan law did not provide any mechanism or effective domestic remedy 
to challenge at the national level the administrative practice of censorship and political control 
over TRM, the Court also rejected the Moldovan Government’s objection that the applicants had 
not exhausted the remedies available to them under national law, as required by Article 35 
para. 1 of the Convention. On that basis, the Court found a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Manole and Others v. Moldova, no. 13936/02, ECHR 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v 
Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
After two earlier judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, the Grand Chamber of the 
Court again held that there has been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights on account of the continued prohibition on 
broadcasting on Swiss Television a commercial by an animal rights association. In response to 
various advertisements produced by the meat industry, Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) 
made a television commercial expressing criticism of battery pig-farming, including a scene 
showing a noisy hall with pigs in small pens. The advertisement concluded with the 
exhortation: “Eat less meat, for the sake of your health, the animals and the environment!” 
Permission to broadcast the commercial was refused on 24 January 1994 by the Commercial 
Television Company and at final instance by the Federal Court, which dismissed an 
administrative law appeal by VgT on 20 August 1997. The commercial was considered to be 
political advertising, prohibited under the Swiss Broadcasting Act. VgT lodged an application 
with the European Court of Human Rights, which in a judgment of 28 June 2001 (see IRIS 2001-
7: 2) held that the Swiss authorities’ refusal to broadcast the commercial in question was a 
breach of freedom of expression. According to the European Court, VgT had simply intended to 
participate in an ongoing general debate on the protection and rearing of animals and the 
Swiss authorities had not demonstrated in a relevant and sufficient manner why the grounds 
generally advanced in support of the prohibition on political advertising could also serve to 
justify interference in the particular circumstances of the case. The Court found a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention and awarded VgT CHF 20,000 (approximately EUR 13,300 at the 
time) in costs and expenses. 
 
On 1 December 2001, on the basis of the European Court’s judgment, VgT applied to the Swiss 
Federal Court for a review of the final domestic judgment prohibiting the commercial from 
being broadcast. In a judgment of 29 April 2002 the Federal Court however dismissed the 
application, holding among other things that VgT had not demonstrated that there was still any 
purpose in broadcasting the commercial. As the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, which is responsible for supervising the execution of the European Court’s judgments, 
had not been informed that the Federal Court had dismissed VgT’s application for a review, it 
adopted a final resolution regarding the case in July 2003, referring to the possibility of 
applying to the Federal Court to reopen the proceedings. 
 
In July 2002, VgT lodged an application with the European Court concerning the Federal Court’s 
refusal of its request to reopen the proceedings and the continued prohibition on broadcasting 
its television commercial. In a Chamber judgment of 4 October 2007, the European Court held 
by five votes to two that there had been a violation of Article 10. On 31 March 2008, the panel 
of the Grand Chamber accepted a request by the Swiss Government for the case to be referred 
to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention. The Swiss government argued inter 
alia that the application by VgT was inadmissible, as it concerned a subject - execution of the 
Court’s judgments - which, by virtue of Article 46, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Grand Chamber of the European Court 
reiterated that the findings of the European Court of a violation were essentially declaratory 
and that it was the Committee of Ministers’ task to supervise execution. The Committee of 
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Ministers’ role in that sphere did not mean, however, that measures taken by a respondent 
State to remedy a violation found by the Court could not raise a new issue and thus form the 
subject of a new application. In the present case, the Federal Court’s judgment of 29 April 2002 
refusing to reopen the proceedings had been based on new grounds and therefore constituted 
new information of which the Committee of Ministers had not been informed and which would 
escape all scrutiny under the Convention if the Court were unable to examine it. Accordingly, 
the Government’s preliminary objection on that account was dismissed. 
 
On the merits of the case, the Court firstly noted that the refusal of VgT’s application to reopen 
the proceedings following the Court’s judgment of 28 June 2001 constituted fresh interference 
with the exercise of its rights under Article 10 para. 1. The Court emphasized that freedom of 
expression is one of the preconditions for a functioning democracy and that genuine, effective 
exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but could 
also require positive measures. In the present case, Switzerland had been under an obligation 
to execute the Court’s judgment of 28 June 2001 in good faith, abiding by both its conclusions 
and its spirit. In view of this, the reopening of domestic proceedings had admittedly been a 
significant means of ensuring the full and proper execution of the Court’s judgment, but could 
certainly not be seen as an end in itself, especially since the Federal Court dismissed the 
application of VgT on overly formalistic grounds. Moreover, by deciding that VgT had not 
sufficiently shown that it still had an interest in broadcasting the commercial, the Federal Court 
did not offer an explanation of how the public debate on battery farming had changed or 
become less topical since 1994, when the commercial was initially meant to have been 
broadcast. Nor did it show that after the European Court's judgment of 28 June 2001 the 
circumstances had changed to such an extent as to cast doubt on the validity of the grounds on 
which the Court had found a violation of Article 10. The European Court also rejected the 
argument that VgT had alternative options for broadcasting the commercial in issue, for 
example via private and regional channels, since that would require third parties, or VgT itself, 
to assume a responsibility that falls to the national authorities alone: that of taking appropriate 
action on a judgment of the European Court. Finally the argument that the broadcasting of the 
commercial might be seen as unpleasant, in particular by consumers or meat traders and 
producers, could not justify its continued prohibition, as freedom of expression is also 
applicable to “information” or “ideas” that offend, shock or disturb. Such are indeed the 
demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without which there is no “democratic 
society”. In the absence of any new grounds that could justify continuing the prohibition from 
the standpoint of Article 10, the Swiss authorities had been under an obligation to authorise 
the broadcasting of the commercial, without taking the place of VgT in judging whether the 
debate in question was still a matter of public interest. The Court therefore held by 11 votes to 
six that there had been a violation of Article 10. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the 
Convention the Court awarded VgT EUR 4,000 in costs and expenses. 
 
• Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, ECHR 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Pasko v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the 
highly controversial case of Pasko v. Russia. The case concerns Grigoriy Pasko, a Russian 
national who at the time of the events was a naval officer and worked as a military journalist 
on the Russian Pacific Fleet’s Newspaper “Boyevaya Vakhta”. Mr Pasko had been reporting on 
problems of environmental pollution, accidents with nuclear submarines, transport of military 
nuclear waste and other issues related to the activities of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Mr Pasko 
had also been in contact on a free-lance basis with a Japanese TV station and a newspaper and 
had supplied them with openly available information and video footage. These contacts with 
Japanese journalists and a Japanese TV station and newspaper were pursued by Mr Pasko of his 
own volition and were not reported to his superiors. 
 
In November 1997, Mr Pasko was searched at the Vladivostok airport before flying to Japan. A 
number of his papers were confiscated with the explanation that they contained classified 
information. He was arrested upon his return from Japan and charged with treason through 
espionage for having collected secret information with the intention of transferring it to a 
foreign national. Mr Pasko was sentenced in December 2001 to four years’ imprisonment by the 
Pacific Military Fleet Court, as he was found guilty of treason through espionage for having 
collected secret and classified information containing actual names of highly critical and secure 
military formations and units, with the intention of transferring this information to a foreign 
national. He was released on parole in January 2003. 
 
Relying on Articles 7 (no punishment without law) and 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, Mr Pasko complained that the Russian authorities had applied criminal 
legislation retrospectively and had subjected him to an overly broad and politically motivated 
criminal persecution as a reprisal for his critical publications. The Court considered that the 
essence of the case was the alleged violation of Article 10, since Mr Pasko’s complaints under 
Article 7 concerned the same facts as those related to Article 10. The Court therefore decided 
to examine the complaints under Article 10 only. 
 
After having accepted that the Russian authorities acted on a proper legal basis, the Court 
observed that, as a serving military officer, the applicant had been bound by an obligation of 
discretion in relation to anything concerned with the performance of his duties. The domestic 
courts had carefully scrutinised each of his arguments. The courts had found that he had 
collected and kept, with the intention of transferring to a foreign national, information of a 
military nature that had been classified as a State secret and which had been capable of 
causing considerable damage to national security. Finally, the applicant had been convicted of 
treason through espionage as a serving military officer and not as a journalist. According to the 
European Court, there was nothing in the materials of the case to support the applicant’s 
allegations that his conviction had been overly broad or politically motivated or that he had 
been sanctioned for any of his publications. The Court found that the domestic courts had 
struck the right balance of proportionality between the aim of protecting national security and 
the means used to achieve that purpose, namely the sentencing of the applicant to a “lenient 
sentence”, much less severe than the minimum stipulated in law. Accordingly, the Court held by 
six votes to one that there had not been a violation of Article 10. 
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• Pasko v. Russia, no. 69519/01, 22 October 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Ürper a.o. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The Court’s judgment in the case of Ürper a.o. v. Turkey firmly condemns the bans on the future 
publication of four newspapers. At the material time the applicants were the owners, executive 
directors, editors-in-chief, news directors and journalists of four daily newspapers published in 
Turkey: Ülkede Özgür Gündem, Gündem, Güncel and Gerçek Demokrasi. The publication of all 
four newspapers was suspended, pursuant to section 6(5) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(Law no. 3713) by various Chambers of the Istanbul Assize Court, between 16 November 2006 
and 25 October 2007, for periods ranging from 15 days to a month in response to various news 
reports and articles. The impugned publications were deemed to publish propaganda in favour 
of a terrorist organisation, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, as well as to express approval of crimes 
committed by that organisation and its members. 
 
The applicants alleged, under Article 10 of the Convention, that the suspension of the 
publication and distribution of their newspapers constituted an unjustified interference with 
their freedom of expression. The European Court reiterates that Article 10 of the Convention 
does not, in its terms, prohibit the imposition of prior restraints on publication. However, the 
dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny. This is 
especially true as far as the press is concerned, for news is a perishable commodity and to delay 
its publication, even for a short period of time, may well deprive it of all its value and interest. 
As freedom of the press was at stake in the present case, the national authorities had only a 
limited margin of appreciation to decide whether there was a “pressing social need” to take the 
measures in question. The Court was of the opinion that, as opposed to earlier cases that have 
been brought before it, the restraints under scrutiny were not imposed on particular types of 
news reports or articles, but on the future publication of entire newspapers, whose content was 
unknown at the time of the national court's decisions. In the Court's view, both the content of 
section 6(5) of Law no. 3713 and the judges' decisions in the instant case stem from the 
hypothesis that the applicants, whose “guilt” was established without trial in proceedings from 
which they were excluded, would re-commit the same kind of offences in the future. The Court 
found, therefore, that the preventive effect of the suspension orders entailed implicit sanctions 
on the applicants to dissuade them from publishing similar articles or news reports in the 
future and to hinder their professional activities. The Court considered that less draconian 
measures could have been envisaged, such as the confiscation of particular issues of the 
newspapers or restrictions on the publication of specific articles. The Court concluded that by 
suspending the publication and distribution of the four newspapers involved, albeit for short 
periods, the domestic courts largely overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to 
them and unjustifiably restricted the essential role of the press as a public watchdog in a 
democratic society. The practice of banning the future publication of entire periodicals on the 
basis of section 6(5) of Law no. 3713 went beyond any notion of a “necessary” restraint in a 
democratic society and, instead, amounted to censorship. There has accordingly been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Ürper and Others v. Turkey, nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 
47245/07, 50371/07, 50372/07 and 54637/07, 20 October 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Financial Times a.o. v. UK 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Eight years ago the British courts decided in favour of a disclosure order in the case of 
Interbrew SA v. Financial Times and others. The case concerned an order against four 
newspapers (FT, The Times, The Guardian and The Independent) and the news agency Reuters 
to deliver up their original copies of a leaked and (apparently) partially forged document about 
a contemplated takeover by Interbrew (now: Anheuser Bush InBev NV) of SAB (South African 
Breweries). In a judgment of 15 December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (Fourth 
Section) came to the conclusion that this disclosure order constituted a violation of the right of 
freedom of expression and information, which includes press freedom and the right of 
protection of journalistic sources, as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. 
 
On the basis of a leaked report by a person X and further investigations by journalists, the 
British media in November and December 2001 reported that Interbrew (now: Anheuser Bush 
InBev NV) had been plotting a bid for SAB. The media coverage had a clear impact on the 
market on shares of Interbrew and SAB, with Interbrew’s share price decreasing, while both the 
share price and the volume of SAB’s shares traded obviously increased. At the request of 
Interbrew, the High Court on 19 December 2001 ordered delivery up of the documents under 
the so-called Norwich Pharmacal principle. This principle implies that if a person through no 
fault of his own becomes involved in the wrongdoing of others so as to facilitate that 
wrongdoing, he comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him 
full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoer. The four newspapers and the 
news agency were ordered not to alter, deface, dispose or otherwise deal with the documents 
received by person X and to deliver up the documents to Interbrew’s solicitor within 24 hours. 
The newspapers and Reuters appealed, but the disclosure order was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal. In the London Court’s judgment it was emphasised that what mattered critically in this 
case was the source’s purpose: “It was on any way a maleficent one, calculated to do harm 
whether for profit or for spite, and whether to the investing public or Interbrew or both.” The 
public interest in protecting the source of such a leak was considered not sufficient to 
withstand the countervailing public interest in letting Interbrew seek justice in the courts 
against the source. It was also underlined that there is “no public interest in the dissemination 
of falsehood”, as the judge had found that the document, leaked by person X to the media, was 
partially forged. The Court of Appeal said: “While newspapers cannot be asked to guarantee the 
veracity of everything they report, they in turn have to accept that the public interest in 
protecting the identity of the source of what they have been told is disinformation may not be 
great.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. On 9 July 2002, the House of 
Lords refused the newspapers leave to appeal, following which Interbrew required that the 
newspapers and Reuters comply with the court order for delivery up of the documents. The 
newspapers and Reuters however continued to refuse to comply and applied to the European 
Court of Human Rights, arguing that their rights under Article 10 of the Convention had been 
violated. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights came to the conclusion that the British judicial 
authorities in the Interbrew case did indeed neglect the interests related to the protection of 
journalistic sources, by overemphasising the interests and arguments in favour of source 
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disclosure. The Court accepted that the disclosure order in the Interbrew case was prescribed 
by law (Norwich Pharmacal and Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981) and was 
intended to protect the rights of others and to prevent the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, both of which are legitimate aims. The Court however did not consider the 
disclosure order to be necessary in a democratic society. First, the Court in general terms 
reiterated that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society and that, in that context, the safeguards guaranteed to the press are 
particularly important: “protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom. Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in 
informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result, the vital “public watchdog” role 
of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable 
reporting may be adversely affected” (§59). Disclosure orders in relation to journalistic sources 
have a detrimental impact not only on the source in question, whose identity may be revealed, 
but also on the newspaper against which the order is directed, whose reputation may be 
negatively affected in the eyes of future potential sources by the disclosure, and on the 
members of the public, who have an interest in receiving information imparted through 
anonymous sources and who are also potential sources themselves. The Court accepted that it 
may be true that the public perception of the principle of non-disclosure of sources would 
suffer no real damage when overridden in circumstances where it is clear that a source was 
acting in bad faith with a harmful purpose and disclosed intentionally falsified information. The 
Court made clear however that domestic courts should be slow to assume, in the absence of 
compelling evidence, that these factors are present in any particular case. The Court 
emphasised most importantly that “the conduct of the source can never be decisive in 
determining whether a disclosure order ought to be made but will merely operate as one, albeit 
important, factor to be taken into consideration in carrying out the balancing exercise required 
under Article 10 §2” (§63). 
 
Applying these principles to the Interbrew case. the European Court of Human Rights came to 
the conclusion that the British Courts had given too much weight to the alleged bogus 
character of the leaked document and to the assumption that the source had acted mala fide. 
While the Court considered that there may be circumstances in which the source's harmful 
purpose would in itself constitute a relevant and sufficient reason to make a disclosure order, 
the legal proceedings against the four newspapers and Reuters did not allow X's purpose to be 
ascertained with the necessary degree of certainty. The Court therefore did not place significant 
weight on X's alleged purpose in the present case, but did clearly emphasise the public interest 
in the protection of journalistic sources. The Court accordingly found that Interbrew's interests 
in eliminating, by proceedings against X, the threat of damage through future dissemination of 
confidential information and in obtaining damages for past breaches of confidence were, even 
if considered cumulatively, insufficient to outweigh the public interest in the protection of 
journalists' sources. The judicial order to deliver up the report at issue was considered to 
constitute a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court was unanimous in its 
judgment, although it took the Court seven years to come to its conclusion. 
 
• Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 821/03, 15 December 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Laranjeira Marques da Silva v. Portugal 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In one of its first judgments of 2010 the European Court of Human Rights has clarified how 
court and crime reporting can rely on the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 
10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Convicting a journalist or a publisher for breach of the secrecy of a criminal investigation or 
because of defamation of a politician can only be justified when it is necessary in a democratic 
society and under very strict conditions. 
 
The applicant in this case, Mr Laranjeira Marques da Silva, was the editor of the regional 
weekly newspaper Notícias de Leiria at the relevant time. In 2000 he wrote two articles about 
criminal proceedings brought against J., a doctor and politician well-known in the region, for 
the sexual assault of a patient. In an editor’s note he called upon readers to supply further 
testimonies relating to other possible incidents of a similar nature involving J. A short time later 
Mr Laranjeira Marques da Silva was charged with a breach of the segredo de justiça, a concept 
similar to confidentiality of judicial investigation, and with the defamation of J. The Leiria 
District Court held in 2004 that Mr Laranjeira Marques da Silva had overstepped his 
responsibilities as a journalist and had aroused widespread suspicion of J. by insinuating, 
without justification, that the latter had committed similar acts involving other victims. He was 
found guilty of a breach of the segredo de justiça and of defamation. He was sentenced to a 
daily fine payable within 500 days and ordered to pay EUR 5,000 in damages to J. On appeal, 
the applicant challenged his conviction concerning the segredo de justiça on the ground that he 
had obtained access to the information in question lawfully. On the defamation issue, he 
argued that he had simply exercised his right to freedom of expression and that his articles had 
been based on fact and, moreover, were related to a subject of general interest. The Court of 
Appeal dismissed his appeal in 2005. A constitutional appeal and later an extraordinary appeal 
seeking harmonisation of the case law with the Supreme Court were also unsuccessful. In 
Strasbourg, Mr. Laranjeira Marques da Silva complained essentially that his conviction had 
infringed his right to freedom of expression. 
 
As to the applicant’s conviction for breach of the segredo de justiça, the European Court was of 
the opinion that the Portuguese authorities’ interference with his freedom of expression had 
been “prescribed by law” and that the interference in question had pursued the legitimate aim 
of protecting the proper administration of justice and the reputation of others. The Court 
however pointed out that neither the concern of safeguarding the investigation nor the concern 
of protecting the reputation of others can prevail over the public’s interest in being informed of 
certain criminal proceedings conducted against politicians. It stressed that in this case there 
was no evidence of any damaging effects on the investigation, which had been concluded by 
the time the first article was published. The publication of the articles did not breach the 
presumption of innocence, as the case of Mr. J. was in hands of professional judges. 
Furthermore, there was nothing to indicate that the conviction of Mr. Laranjeira Marques da 
Silva had contributed to the protection of the reputation of others. The Court held unanimously 
that the interference with the right of freedom of expression of the applicant was 
disproportionate and that therefore there had been a violation of Article 10. 
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As to the conviction for defamation, the Court accepted that the disputed articles dealt with 
matters of general interest, as the public had the right to be informed about investigations 
concerning politicians, including investigations which did not, at first sight, relate to their 
political activities. Furthermore, the issues before the courts could be discussed at any time in 
the press and by the public. As to the nature of the two articles, the Court pointed out that Mr 
Laranjeira Marques da Silva had simply imparted information concerning the criminal 
proceedings in question, despite adopting a critical stance towards the accused. The Court 
observed that it was not its place or that of the national courts to substitute their own views for 
those of the press as to what reporting techniques should be adopted in the journalistic 
coverage of a court case. As to the editor’s note, the Court took the view that, notwithstanding 
one sentence that was more properly to be regarded as a value judgment, it had a sufficient 
factual basis in the broader context of the media coverage of the case. Hence, while the 
reasons given by the national courts for Mr Laranjeira Marques da Silva’s conviction had been 
relevant, the authorities had not given sufficient reasons justifying the necessity of the 
interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. The Court further noted that 
the penalties imposed on the applicant had been excessive and liable to discourage the 
exercise of media freedom. The Court therefore held, by five votes to two, that the conviction 
for defamation did not correspond to a pressing social need and that there had been a violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Laranjeira Marques da Silva v. Portugal, no. 16983/06, 19 January 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Alfantakis v. Greece 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recently delivered a judgment on the right to freedom of 
expression of a lawyer convicted for the insult and defamation of a public prosecutor during a 
television interview. In a case that received considerable media coverage, Georgis Alfantakis, a 
lawyer in Athens, was representing a popular Greek singer (A.V.). The singer had accused his 
wife, S.P., of fraud, forgery and use of forged documents causing losses to the State of nearly 
EUR 150,000. On the recommendation of the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal, 
D.M., it was decided not to bring charges against S.P. While appearing live as a guest on 
Greece’s main television news programme ‘Sky’, Mr Alfantakis expressed his views on the 
criminal proceedings in question, commenting in particular that he had “laughed” on reading 
the public prosecutor’s report, which he described as a “literary opinion showing contempt for 
his client”. The public prosecutor sued Mr Alfantakis for damages, arguing that his comments 
had been insulting and defamatory. Mr Alfantakis was ordered by the Athens Court of Appeal to 
pay damages of about EUR 12,000. Alfantakis applied to the European Court of Human Rights, 
relying on Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. He complained about the 
civil judgment against him which he considered an unacceptable interference in his freedom of 
expression. 
 
According to the European Court it was not disputed that the interference by the Greek 
authorities with Alfantakis’s right to freedom of expression had been ‘prescribed by law’ - by 
both the Civil Code and the Criminal Code - and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting 
the reputation of others. The Court took notice of the fact that the offending comments were 
directed at a member of the national legal service, thus creating the risk of a negative impact 
both on that individual’s professional image and on public confidence in the proper 
administration of justice. Lawyers are entitled to comment in public on the administration of 
justice, but they are also expected to observe certain limits and rules of conduct. However, 
instead of ascertaining the direct meaning of the phrase uttered by the applicant, the Greek 
courts had relied on their own interpretation of what the phrase might have implied. In doing 
so, the domestic courts relied on particularly subjective considerations, potentially ascribing to 
the applicant intentions he had not in fact had. Nor had the Greek courts made a distinction 
between facts and value judgments, instead simply determining the effect produced by the 
phrases “when I read it, I laughed” and “literary opinion”. The Greek courts had also ignored the 
extensive media coverage of the case, in the context of which Mr Alfantakis’s appearance on 
the television news was more indicative of an intention to defend his client’s arguments in 
public than of a desire to impugn the public prosecutor’s character. Lastly, they had not taken 
account of the fact that the comments had been broadcast live and could therefore not be 
rephrased. The Court came to the conclusion that the civil judgment ordering Mr Alfantakis to 
pay damages was not based on sufficient and pertinent arguments and therefore had not met a 
“pressing social need”. Hence, there had been a violation of Article 10. The Court awarded Mr 
Alfantakis EUR 12,939 in pecuniary damages. 
 
• Alfantakis v. Greece, no. 49330/07, 11 February 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Flinkkilä a.o. and four other connected cases v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in five judgments of 6 April 2010 came to the conclusion 
that Finland had violated the right of freedom of expression by giving too much protection to 
the right of private life under Article 8 of the Convention. In all five cases the Court was of the 
opinion that the criminal conviction of journalists and editors-in-chief and the order to pay 
damages for disclosing the identity of a public person’s partner amounted to an unacceptable 
interference with the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
 
All applicants in all five cases were journalists, editors-in-chief and publishing companies that 
were involved in the publishing in 1997 of a total of nine articles in a newspaper and in several 
magazines concerning A., the National Conciliator at the time, and B., his female partner. The 
articles focused primarily on the private and professional consequences for A. of an incident in 
1996. This incident, including the revelation of B’.s identity, had earlier been reported upon in 
the Finnish print media and on television. During that incident A. and B. entered A.’s home late 
at night while A.’s wife was there and, as a result of an ensuing fight, B. was fined and A. was 
sentenced to a conditional term in prison. A few weeks later, a newspaper and several 
magazines revisited the incident and the court case, this time with more background 
information, interviews or comments. All articles mentioned B. by name and in addition gave 
other details about her, including her age, name of her workplace, her family relationships and 
her relationship with A., as well as her picture. 
 
A. and B. requested that criminal investigations be conducted in respect of the journalists for 
having written about the incident and the surrounding circumstances. The journalists and 
media companies were ordered by the domestic courts to pay fines and damages for the 
invasion of B.’s private life. The Finnish courts found in particular that, since B. was not a public 
figure, the fact alone that she happened to be the girlfriend of a well-known person in society 
was not sufficient to justify revealing her identity to the public. In addition, the fact that her 
identity had been revealed previously in the media did not justify subsequent invasions of her 
private life. The courts further held that even the mere dissemination of information about a 
person’s private life was sufficient to cause them damage or suffering. Therefore, the absence 
of intent to hurt B. on the part of the applicants was irrelevant. The Finnish courts concluded 
that the journalists and the media had had no right to reveal facts relating to B.’s private life or 
to publish her picture as they did. 
 
The journalists, editors-in-chief and media companies complained under Article 10 of the 
Convention about their convictions and the high amounts they had to pay in damages to B. 
Having examined in earlier case law the domestic Criminal Code provision in question, the 
European Court found its contents quite clear: the spreading of information, an insinuation or 
an image depicting the private life of another person, which was conducive to causing 
suffering, qualified as an invasion of privacy. In addition, even the exception stipulated in that 
provision - concerning persons in a public office or function, in professional life, in a political 
activity or in another comparable activity - was equally clearly worded. Even though there had 
been no precise definition of private life in the law, if the journalists or the media had had any 
doubts about the remit of that term, they should have either sought advice about its content or 
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refrained from disclosing B.’s identity. In addition, the applicants were professional journalists 
and therefore could not claim not to have known the boundaries of the said provision, since the 
Finnish Guidelines for Journalists and the practice of the Council for Mass Media, albeit not 
binding, provided even stricter rules than the Criminal Code. 
 
However, there had been no evidence, or indeed any allegation, of factual misrepresentation or 
bad faith on the part of the applicants. Nor had there been any suggestion that they had 
obtained information about B. by illicit means. While it had been clear that B. was not a public 
figure, she was involved in an incident together with a well-known public figure with whom 
she had been in a close relationship. Therefore, B. could have reasonably been seen as having 
entered the public domain. In addition, the disclosure of B.’s identity was of clear public 
interest in view of A.’s conduct and his ability to continue in his post as a high-level public 
servant. The incident was widely publicised in the media, including in a programme broadcast 
nationwide on prime-time television. Thus, the articles in question had not disclosed B.’s 
identity in this context for the first time. Moreover, even if the events were presented in a 
somewhat colourful manner to boost sales of the magazines, this was not in itself sufficient to 
justify a conviction for breach of privacy. Finally, in view of the heavy financial sanctions 
imposed on the applicants, the European Court noted that B. had already been paid a 
significant sum in damages by the television company for having exposed her private life to the 
general public. Similar damages had been ordered to be paid to her also in respect of other 
articles published in other magazines by the other applicants listed above, which all stemmed 
from the same facts. Accordingly, in view of the severe consequences for the applicants in 
relation to the circumstances of the cases, the European Court held that there had been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention in all five cases. 
 
Under Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfaction), the Court held that Finland was to pay 
the applicants sums ranging between EUR 12,000 and EUR 39,000 for pecuniary damages, 
between EUR 2,000 and EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damages and between EUR 3,000 and 
EUR 5,000 in respect of costs and expenses. 
 
• Flinkkilä and Others v. Finland, no. 25576/04, 6 April 2010.  
• Jokitaipale and Others v. Finland, no. 43349/05, 6 April 2010.  
• Iltalehti and Karhuvaara v. Finland, no. 6372/06, 6 April 2010.  
• Soila v. Finland, no. 6806/06, 6 April 2010.  
• Tuomela and Others v. Finland, no. 25711/04, 6 April 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Renaud v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recently delivered a judgment regarding defamation and 
insult on the Internet. The Court was of the opinion that the sharp and polemical criticism of 
the public figure in question was part of an ongoing emotional political debate and that the 
criminal conviction for defamation and insult amounted to a violation of the freedom of 
expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
 
The applicant in the case was Patrice Renaud. He is the founder of a local association (Comité 
de défense du quartier sud de Sens) opposing a big construction project planned in the city of 
Sens. To this end he also initiated a website, sharply criticising the mayor of Sens, who 
supported and promoted the building project. In 2005, and on appeal in 2006, Renaud was 
convicted in criminal proceedings for defamation and for publicly insulting a citizen 
discharging a public mandate, on account of remarks concerning the mayor of Sens. On the 
website he had inter alia compared the urban policy of the mayor to the policy of the former 
Romanian dictator Ceaucescu. Renaud was convicted for defamation because of the specific 
allegation that the mayor was stimulating and encouraging delinquency in the city centre in 
order to legitimise her policy of security and public safety. Also the insinuation that the mayor 
was illegally putting public money in her own pockets was considered defamatory, while the 
article on the association’s website in which Renaud had written that the mayor was cynical, 
schizophrenic and a liar was considered to be a public insult. Renaud was ordered to pay a fine 
of EUR 500 and civil damages to the mayor of EUR 1,000. 
 
Relying on Article 10 (freedom of expression), Renaud complained of his conviction before the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 
The European Court recognised that the applicant, being the chairman of the local association 
of residents opposing the construction project and the webmaster of the Internet site of the 
association, was participating in a public debate when criticising public officials and politicians. 
The Court admitted that some of the phraseology used by Renaud was very polemic and 
virulent, but stated that on the other hand a mayor must tolerate such kind of criticism as part 
of public debate which is essential in a democracy. The Court was of the opinion that when a 
debate relates to an emotive subject, such as the daily life of the local residents and their 
housing facilities, politicians must show a special tolerance towards criticism and that they 
have to accept “les débordements verbaux ou écrits” (free translation: “oral or written outbursts”). 
The Court considered the allegations of Renaud to be value judgments with a sufficient factual 
basis and came to the conclusion that the French judicial authorities had neglected the 
interests and importance of freedom of expression in the matter at issue. The conviction of 
Renaud was thus an interference with his right to freedom of expression which did not meet 
any pressing social need, while at the same time such a conviction risks engendering a chilling 
effect on participation in public debates of this kind. Therefore, the European Court found a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Renaud v. France, no. 13290/07, 25 February 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Jean-Marie Le Pen v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
A few years ago, Le Pen, the president of the French National Front party, was fined EUR 
10,000 for incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence towards a group of people because 
of their origin or their membership or non-membership of a specific ethnic group, nation, race 
or religion, on account of statements he had made about Muslims in France in an interview 
with the Le Monde daily newspaper. In the interview, Le Pen asserted, among other things, that 
“the day there are no longer 5 million but 25 million Muslims in France, they will be in charge”.  
 
He was subsequently sentenced to another fine after he commented on the initial fine, in the 
following terms, in a weekly magazine: “When I tell people that when we have 25 million 
Muslims in France we French will have to watch our step, they often reply: ‘But Mr Le Pen, that 
is already the case now!’ - and they are right.” The French courts held that Le Pen’s freedom of 
expression was no justification for statements that were an incitement to discrimination, hatred 
or violence towards a group of people. The Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal lodged by 
Le Pen in which he argued that his statements were not an explicit call for hatred or 
discrimination and did not single out Muslims because of their religion and that the reference 
to Islam was aimed at a political doctrine and not a religious faith. 
 
In a decision of 20 April 2010 the European Court declared the application of Le Pen, which 
relied on Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression), manifestly ill-founded and hence 
inadmissible. 
The Court was of the opinion that the French authorities’ interference with Le Pen’s freedom of 
expression, in the form of a criminal conviction, was prescribed by law (Arts. 23-24 of the 
French Press Freedom Act - Loi sur la Liberté de la Presse) and pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting the reputation or rights of others. Again it was crucial to decide whether or not the 
conviction of Le Pen was to be considered necessary in a democratic society, taking into 
account the importance of freedom of expression in the context of political debate in a 
democratic society. The Court reiterated that freedom of expression applies not only to 
“information” or “ideas” that were favourably received, but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb. Furthermore, anyone who engages in a debate on a matter of public interest can resort 
to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation, provided that they respect the reputation and 
rights of others. When the person concerned is an elected representative, like Le Pen, who 
represents his voters, takes up their concerns and defends their interests, the Court has to 
exercise the strictest supervision of this kind of interference with freedom of expression. Le 
Pen’s statements had indeed been made in the context of a general debate on the problems 
linked to the settlement and integration of immigrants in their host countries. Moreover, the 
varying importance of the problems concerned, which could conceivably generate 
misunderstanding and incomprehension, required that considerable latitude be left to the State 
in assessing the need for interference with a person’s freedom of expression. 
 
In this case, however, Le Pen’s comments had certainly presented the Muslim community as a 
whole in a disturbing light likely to give rise to feelings of rejection and hostility. He had set 
the French as a group against a community whose religious convictions were explicitly 
mentioned and whose rapid growth was presented as an already latent threat to the dignity 
and security of the French people. The reasons given by the domestic courts for convicting Le 
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Pen had thus been relevant and sufficient. In addition, the penalty imposed had not been 
disproportionate. The Court recognised that the fine imposed on Le Pen was significant, but 
underlined the fact that Le Pen under French law had risked a sentence of imprisonment. 
Therefore, the Court did not consider the sanction to be disproportionate. On these grounds the 
Court found that the interference with Le Pen’s enjoyment of his right to freedom of expression 
had been “necessary in a democratic society”. LePen’s complaint was accordingly rejected. 
 
Le Pen is confronted with a boomerang effect of the Court’s case law, as in an earlier case the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court had found that defamatory and insulting statements 
about Le Pen published in a book were not protected by Article 10 of the Convention, as these 
statements were to be considered as a form of hate speech. The Grand Chamber in Lindon, 
Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France had regard “to the nature of the remarks made, in 
particular to the underlying intention to stigmatise the other side, and to the fact that their 
content is such as to stir up violence and hatred, thus going beyond what is tolerable in 
political debate, even in respect of a figure who occupies an extremist position in the political 
spectrum” (Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 22 October 2007, §57). It is precisely 
this argument, that hate speech is beyond what is tolerable in political debate, which has now 
turned against Le Pen. 
 
• Jean-Marie Le Pen v. France (dec.), no. 18788/09, 20 April 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Akdaş v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicant in this case, Rahmi Akdaş is a publisher, residing in Bandirma, Turkey. In 1999 he 
published the Turkish translation of the erotic novel “Les onze mille verges” by the French 
writer Guillaume Apollinaire (“The Eleven Thousand Rods”, “On Bir Bin Kırbaç” in Turkish). The 
novel contains graphic descriptions of scenes of sexual intercourse, including various practices 
such as sadomasochism, vampirism and paedophilia. Akdaş was convicted under the Criminal 
Code for publishing obscene or immoral material liable to arouse and exploit sexual desire 
among the population. The publisher argued that the book was a work of fiction, using literary 
techniques such as exaggeration or metaphor and that the post face to the edition in question 
was written by specialists in literary analysis. He added that the book did not contain any 
violent overtones and that the humorous and exaggerated nature of the text was more likely to 
extinguish sexual desire. 
 
The criminal court of Istanbul ((Istanbul Asliye Ceza Mahkemesi) ordered the seizure and 
destruction of all copies of the book and Akdaş was given a “severe” fine of EUR 1,100, a fine 
that may be converted into days of imprisonment. In a final judgment of 11 March 2004, the 
Court of Cassation quashed the part of the judgment concerning the order to destroy copies of 
the book in view of a 2003 legislative amendment. It upheld the remainder of the judgment. 
Akdaş paid the fine in full in November 2004. 
 
Relying on Article 10, Akdaş complained about this conviction and about the seizure of the 
book. Before the European Court it was not disputed that there had been an interference with 
Akdaş’ freedom of expression, that the interference had been prescribed by law and that it had 
pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of morals. The Court however found the 
interference not necessary in a democratic society. The Court reiterated that those who 
promoted artistic works also had “duties and responsibilities”, the scope of which depended on 
the situation and the means used. As the requirements of morals vary from time to time and 
from place to place, even within the same State, the national authorities are supposed to be in 
a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those 
requirements, as well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” intended to satisfy them. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court had regard in the present case to the fact that more then a century had 
elapsed since the book had first been published in France (in 1907), to its publication in various 
languages in a large number of countries and to the recognition it had gained through 
publication in the prestigious “La Pléiade” series. Acknowledgment of the cultural, historical 
and religious particularities of the Council of Europe’s member states could not go so far as to 
prevent public access in a particular language, in this instance Turkish, to a work belonging to 
the European literary heritage. Accordingly, the application of the legislation in force at the 
time of the events had not been intended to satisfy a pressing social need. In addition, the 
heavy fine imposed and the seizure of copies of the book had not been proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued and had thus not been necessary in a democratic society, within the 
meaning of Article 10. For that reason, the Court found a violation of Akdaş’ right to freedom of 
expression. 
 
 Akdaş v. Turkey, no. 41056/04, 16 February 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Having been convicted of defamation and threat of terrorism and while serving a prison 
sentence, the founder and chief editor of the newspapers Gündəlik Azərbaycan and Realny 
Azerbaijan, Mr. Fatullayev, applied successfully before the European Court of Human Rights 
against a violation of his freedom of expression and right to a fair trial. The European Court 
ordered the Azerbaijani authorities to release Fatullayev immediately. 
 
In 2007 two sets of criminal proceedings were brought against Fatullayev in connection with 
two articles published by him in Realny Azerbaijan. The first set of criminal proceedings related 
to an article and to separate Internet postings. The statements made in the article and the 
postings differed from the commonly accepted version of the events that took place at the 
town of Khojaly during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, according to which hundreds of 
Azerbaijani civilians had been killed by the Armenian armed forces with the reported assistance 
of the Russian army. Four Khojaly survivors and two former soldiers involved in the Khojaly 
battle brought a criminal complaint against Fatullayev for defamation and for falsely accusing 
Azerbaijani soldiers of having committed an especially grave crime. The courts upheld the 
claims, convicted Fatullayev of defamation and sentenced him to imprisonment for a term of 
two years and six months. Fatullayev was arrested in the courtroom and taken to a detention 
centre. In addition, in civil proceedings brought against Fatullayev before the above-mentioned 
first set of criminal proceedings, he was ordered to publish a retraction of his statements, an 
apology to the refugees from Khojaly and the newspaper’s readers and to pay approximately 
EUR 8,500 personally, as well as another EUR 8,500 on behalf of his newspaper, in respect of 
non-pecuniary damages. 
 
The second set of criminal proceedings related to an article entitled “The Aliyevs Go to War”. In 
it Fatullayev expressed the view that, in order for President Ilham Aliyev to remain in power in 
Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani government had sought the support of the United States in 
exchange for Azerbaijan’s support for US “aggression” against Iran. He speculated about a 
possible US-Iranian war in which Azerbaijan could also become involved and provided a long 
and detailed list of strategic facilities in Azerbaijan that would be attacked by Iran if such a 
scenario developed. He concluded that the Azerbaijani government should have maintained 
neutrality in its relations with both the US and Iran and that it had not realised all the 
dangerous consequences of the geopolitical game it was playing, like for example the possible 
deaths of Azeris in both Azerbaijan and Iran. Before Fatullayev was formally charged with the 
offence of threat of terrorism, the Prosecutor General made a statement to the press, noting 
that Fatullayev’s article constituted a threat of terrorism. A short time later, Fatullayev was 
indeed found guilty as charged and convicted of threat of terrorism. The total sentence 
imposed on him was imprisonment for eight years and six months. In his defence speech at the 
trial and in his appeals to the higher courts, Fatullayev complained that his presumption of 
innocence was breached as a result of the Prosecutor General’s statement to the press and that 
his right to freedom of expression as a journalist was violated. His complaints were summarily 
rejected. 
 
Apart from finding breaches of Art. 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial, no impartial tribunal) and Art. 6 § 2 
(breach of presumption of innocence) of the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court 
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found that the conviction of Fatullayev in both criminal cases amounted to a manifest violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the first criminal conviction, the Court acknowledged the very sensitive nature of 
the issues discussed in Fatullayev’s article and that the consequences of the events in Khojaly 
were a source of deep national grief. Thus, it was understandable that the statements made by 
Fatullayev may have been considered shocking or disturbing by the public. However, the Court 
recalled that freedom of information applies not only to information or ideas that were 
favourably received, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. In addition, it is an integral 
part of freedom of expression to seek historical truth. Various matters related to the Khojaly 
events still appear to be open to ongoing debate among historians and as such should have 
been a matter of general interest in modern Azerbaijani society. It is essential in a democratic 
society that a debate on the causes of acts of particular gravity which might amount to war 
crimes or crimes against humanity should be able to take place freely. Further, the press plays 
the vital role of a “public watchdog” in a democratic society. Although it ought not to overstep 
certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, the duty of the 
press is to impart information and ideas on political issues and on other matters of general 
interest. The Court considered that the article had been written in a generally descriptive style 
with the aim of informing Azerbaijani readers of the realities of day-to-day life in the area in 
question. The public was entitled to receive information about what was happening in the 
territories over which their country had lost control in the aftermath of the war. Fatullayev had 
attempted to convey, in a seemingly unbiased manner, various ideas and views of both sides in 
the conflict and the article had not contained any statements directly accusing the Azerbaijani 
military or specific individuals of committing the massacre and deliberately killing their own 
civilians. 
 
As regards the Internet postings, the Court accepted that, by making those statements without 
relying on any relevant factual basis, the applicant might have failed to comply with the 
journalistic duty to provide accurate and reliable information. Nevertheless, taking note of the 
fact that he had been convicted of defamation, the Court found that those postings had not 
undermined the dignity of the Khojaly victims and survivors in general and, more specifically, 
the four private prosecutors who were Khojaly refugees. It therefore held that the domestic 
courts had not given “relevant and sufficient” reasons for Fatullayev’s conviction of defamation. 
In addition, the Court held that the imposition of a prison sentence for a press offence would be 
compatible with journalists’ freedom of expression only in exceptional circumstances, notably 
where other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired, as, for example, in cases of hate 
speech or incitement to violence. As this had not been the case, there had been no justification 
for the imposition of a prison sentence on Fatullayev. There had accordingly been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention in respect of his first criminal conviction. 
 
With regard to the second criminal conviction, the Court reached a similar conclusion. The 
article “The Aliyevs Go to War” had focused on Azerbaijan’s specific role in the dynamics of 
international politics relating to US-Iranian relations. As such, the publication had been part of 
a political debate on a matter of general and public concern. The applicant had criticised the 
Azerbaijani Government’s foreign and domestic political moves. At the same time, a number of 
other media sources had also suggested during that period that, in the event of a war, 
Azerbaijan was likely to be involved and speculated about possible specific Azerbaijani targets 
for Iranian attacks. The fact that the applicant had published a list of specific possible targets in 
itself had neither increased nor decreased the chances of a hypothetical Iranian attack. The 
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applicant, as a journalist and a private individual, had not been in a position to influence or 
exercise any degree of control over any of the hypothetical events discussed in the article. 
Neither had Fatullayev voiced any approval of any such possible attacks or argued in favour of 
them. It had been his task, as a journalist, to impart information and ideas on the relevant 
political issues and express opinions about possible future consequences of specific decisions 
taken by the Government. Thus, the domestic courts’ finding that Fatullayev had threatened the 
State with terrorist acts had been arbitrary. The Court considered that Fatullayev’s second 
criminal conviction and the severity of the penalty imposed on him had constituted a grossly 
disproportionate restriction of his freedom of expression. Further, the circumstances of the case 
had not justified the imposition of a prison sentence on him. There had accordingly been a 
violation of Article 10 in respect of Fatullayev’s second criminal conviction as well. 
 
In application of Article 46 of the Convention (execution of the judgment), the Court noted that 
Fatullayev was currently serving the sentence for the press offences in respect of which it had 
found Azerbaijan in violation of the Convention. Having considered it unacceptable that the 
applicant still remained imprisoned and the urgent need to put an end to the violations of 
Article 10, the Court held, by six votes to one, that Azerbaijan had to release the applicant 
immediately. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court held that 
Azerbaijan is to pay Fatullayev EUR 25,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damages and EUR 2,822 
in respect of costs and expenses. 
 
 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, no. 40984/07, 22 April 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Andreescu v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicant, Gabriel Andreescu, is a well-known human rights activist in Romania. He was 
among those who campaigned for the introduction of Law No. 187, which gives all Romanian 
citizens the right to inspect the personal files held on them by the Securitate (the former 
Romanian intelligence service and secret police). The law also allows access to information of 
public interest relating to persons in public office who may have been Securitate agents or 
collaborators. A public agency, the Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii 
(National Council for the Study of the Archives of the Securitate - CNSAS) is responsible for the 
application of Law No. 187. In 2000, Andreescu submitted two requests to the CNSAS: one to be 
allowed access to the intelligence file on him personally and the other seeking to ascertain 
whether or not the members of the Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church had collaborated 
with the Securitate. He received no reply and organised a press conference at which he 
criticised A.P., a member of the CNSAS, making reference to some of A.P.’s past activities. 
Andreescu’s remarks on A.P.’s past received widespread media coverage. 
 
A.P. made a criminal complaint against Andreescu accusing him of insult and defamation. After 
being acquitted in first instance, Andreescu was ordered by the Bucharest County Court to pay a 
criminal fine together with a high amount in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The 
appeal Court ruled that he had not succeeded in demonstrating the truth of his assertion that 
A.P. had collaborated with the Securitate. Furthermore, a certificate issued by the CNSAS had 
meanwhile stated that A.P. had not collaborated. 
 
Relying on the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Andreescu 
lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights concerning his conviction for 
defamation. Although the interference by the Romanian authorities with Andreescu’s freedom 
of expression had been prescribed by law and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting 
A.P.’s reputation, the European Court considered that the sanction was a violation of Article 10 
of the Convention. The Court held that Andreescu’s speech had been made in the specific 
context of a nationwide debate on a particularly sensitive topic of general interest, namely the 
application of the law concerning citizens’ access to the personal files kept on them by the 
Securitate, enacted with the aim of unmasking that organisation’s nature as a political police 
force, and on the subject of the ineffectiveness of the CNSAS’s activities. In that context, it had 
been legitimate to discuss whether the members of that organisation satisfied the criteria 
required by law for holding such a position. Andreescu’s remarks had been a mix of value 
judgments and factual elements and he had especially alerted public opinion to the fact that he 
was voicing suspicions rather than certainties. The Court noted that those suspicions had been 
supported by references to A.P.’s conduct and to undisputed facts, such as his membership with 
the transcendental meditation movement and the modus operandi of Securitate agents. 
According to the Court, Andreescu had acted in good faith in an attempt to inform the public. 
As his remarks had been made orally at a press conference, he had no opportunity of 
rephrasing, refining or withdrawing them. The European Court was also of the opinion that the 
Romanian court, by convicting Andreescu, had paid no attention to the context in which the 
remarks at the press conference had been made. It had certainly not given “relevant and 
sufficient” reasons for convicting Andreescu. The Court noted furthermore that the high level of 
damages - representing more than 15 times the average salary in Romania at the relevant time 
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- could be considered as a measure apt to deter the media and opinion leaders from fulfilling 
their role of informing the public on matters of general interest. As the interference with 
Andreescu’s freedom of expression had not been justified by relevant and sufficient reasons, 
the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10. It also found a breach of Article 6 § 
1 of the Convention (right to fair trial) due to Andreescu’s conviction without evidence being 
taken from him in person, especially after he had been acquitted at first instance. The Court 
held that Romania was to pay Andreescu EUR 3,500 in respect of pecuniary damage, EUR 5,000 
for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,180 for costs and expenses. 
 
 Andreescu v. Romania, no. 19452/02, 8 June 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Aksu v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2000 the Turkish Ministry of Culture published a book entitled “The Gypsies of Turkey”, 
written by an associate professor. A few months later Mr. Mustafa Aksu, who is of Roma/Gypsy 
origin, filed a petition with the Ministry of Culture on behalf of the Turkish Gypsy associations. 
In his petition, he stated that in twenty-four pages of the book Gypsies were presented as being 
engaged in illegitimate activities, living as “thieves, pickpockets, swindlers, robbers, usurers, 
beggars, drug dealers, prostitutes and brothel keepers” and being polygamist and aggressive. 
Gypsy women were presented as being unfaithful to their husbands and several other 
expressions were humiliating and debasing to Gypsies. Claiming that the expressions 
constituted criminal offences, Mr. Aksu requested that the sale of the book be stopped and all 
copies seized. During the same period Mr. Aksu also took an action in regard to a dictionary 
entitled “Turkish Dictionary for Pupils” which was financed by the Ministry of Culture. According 
to Mr. Aksu, certain entries in the dictionary were insulting to, and discriminatory against, 
Gypsies. The Ministry of Culture and later the judicial authorities in Ankara however rejected 
these complaints and Mr. Aksu lodged two applications with the European Court of Human 
Rights. He submitted that the remarks in the book and the expressions in the dictionary 
reflected clear anti-Roma sentiment, that he had been discriminated against on account of his 
ethnic identity and that his dignity had been harmed because of the numerous passages in the 
book which used discriminatory and insulting language. He argued that that the refusal of the 
domestic courts to award compensation demonstrated an obvious bias against the Roma and 
he therefore invoked Articles 6 (fair trial) and 14 (non-discrimination) of the Convention. The 
Court considered, however, that it was more appropriate to deal with the complaints under 
Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 (right of privacy) of the Convention. 
 
In its judgment of 27 July 2010 the Court began by referring to the vulnerable position of 
Roma/Gypsies, the special needs of minorities and the obligation of the European states to 
protect their security, identity and lifestyle, not only for the purpose of safeguarding the 
interests of the minorities themselves, but also to preserve a cultural diversity of value to the 
whole community. The Court also emphasised that racial discrimination requires that the 
authorities exert special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the 
authorities must use all available means to combat racism, thereby reinforcing democracy's 
vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat. Regarding the book, the Court 
accepted that the passages and remarks cited by Mr. Aksu, when read on their own, appear to 
be discriminatory or insulting. However, when the book is examined as a whole it is not 
possible to conclude that the author acted with bad faith or had any intention of insulting the 
Roma community. The conclusion to the book also clarified that it was an academic study that 
had conducted a comparative analysis and focused on the history and socio-economic living 
conditions of the Roma people in Turkey. The passages referred to by Mr. Aksu were not the 
author's own comments, but examples of the perception of Roma people in Turkish society, 
while the author sought to correct such prejudices and make it clear that the Roma people 
should be respected. Bearing these considerations in mind and stressing its subsidiary role, 
which leaves a broad margin of appreciation to the national authorities, the Court was not 
persuaded that the author of the book had insulted the applicant's integrity or that the 
domestic authorities had failed to protect the applicant's rights. Regarding the dictionary, the 
Court observed that the definitions provided therein were prefaced with the comment that the 
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terms were of a metaphorical nature. Therefore it found no reason to depart from the domestic 
courts' findings that Mr. Aksu’s integrity was not harmed and that he had not been subjected to 
discriminatory treatment because of the expressions described in the dictionary. The Court 
concluded that in the present cases it cannot be said that Mr. Aksu was discriminated against 
on account of his ethnic identity as a Roma or that there was a failure on the part of the 
authorities to take the necessary measures to secure respect for the applicant's private life. 
 
Three dissenting judges, including the president of the second section of the Court, expressed 
their concern about the approach of the majority, as various passages of the book convey a 
series of highly discriminatory prejudices and stereotypes that should have given rise to serious 
explanation by the author and are more forceful in tone than the work's concluding comments. 
The dissenting judges also found that the dictionary contained seriously discriminatory 
descriptions and that in a publication financed by the Ministry of Culture and intended for 
pupils, the Turkish authorities had an obligation to take all measures to ensure respect for 
Roma identity and to avoid any stigmatisation. They also referred to data and reports collected 
by the European Union's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) showing that more vigilance is 
needed towards Roma. These arguments and references however could not persuade the (slim) 
majority of the Court, which accepted that the publication of the book and the dictionary were 
not to be considered as violating the rights of Mr. Aksu under Articles 14 and 8 of the 
Convention. 
 
 Aksu v. Turkey, nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, 27 July 2010.  
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 15 
March 2012. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 31 March 2009 the Chamber of the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) delivered a highly controversial judgment in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the 
Netherlands. In a 4/3 decision, the Court was of the opinion that the order to hand over a CD-
ROM with photographs in the possession of the editor-in-chief of a weekly magazine claiming 
protection of journalistic sources did not amount to a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. The finding and motivation of the majority of the Chamber was 
not only strongly disapproved of in the world of media and journalism, but was also firmly 
criticised by the dissenting judges. Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. requested a referral to the Grand 
Chamber, this request being supported by a large portion of the media, NGOs advocating media 
freedom and professional organisations of journalists. On 14 September 2009, the panel of five 
Judges decided to refer the case to the Grand Chamber in application of Article 43 of the 
Convention. By referring the case to the Grand Chamber the panel accepted that the case raised 
a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of Article 10 of the Convention 
and/or concerned a serious issue of general importance. 
 
On 14 September 2010, the 17 judges of the Grand Chamber unanimously reached the 
conclusion that the order to hand over the CD-ROM to the public prosecutor was a violation of 
the journalists’ rights to protect their sources. It noted that orders to disclose sources 
potentially had a detrimental impact, not only on the source, whose identity might be revealed, 
but also on the newspaper or publication against which the order was directed, whose 
reputation might be negatively affected in the eyes of future potential sources by the 
disclosure, and on members of the public, who had an interest in receiving information 
imparted through anonymous sources. Protection of journalists’ sources is indeed to be 
considered “a cornerstone of freedom of the press, without which sources may be deterred from 
assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital 
public-watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide 
accurate and reliable information to the public may be adversely affected”. In essence, the 
Grand Chamber was of the opinion that the right to protect journalistic sources should be 
safeguarded by sufficient procedural guarantees, including the guarantee of prior review by a 
judge or an independent and impartial decision-making body, before the police or the public 
prosecutor have access to information capable of revealing such sources. Although the public 
prosecutor, like any other public official, is bound by the requirements of basic integrity, in 
terms of procedure he or she is a “party” defending interests potentially incompatible with 
journalistic source protection and can hardly be seen as being objective and impartial so as to 
make the necessary assessment of the various competing interests. Since in the case of Sanoma 
Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands an ex ante guarantee of a review by a judge or independent 
and impartial body was not in existence, the Grand Chamber was of the opinion that “the 
quality of the law was deficient in that there was no procedure attended by adequate legal 
safeguards for the applicant company in order to enable an independent assessment as to 
whether the interest of the criminal investigation overrode the public interest in the protection 
of journalistic sources”. Emphasizing the importance of the protection of journalistic sources for 
press freedom in a democratic society, the Grand Chamber of the European Court found a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The judgment implies that member states of the 
Convention should build procedural safeguards into their national law in terms of judicial 
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review or other impartial assessment by an independent body based on clear criteria of 
subsidiarity and proportionality and prior to any disclosure of information capable of revealing 
the identity or the origin of journalists’ sources. 
 
 Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, 14 September 2010.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Gillberg v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a judgment in an interesting case with a 
peculiar mix of issues related to freedom of expression, academic research, medical data, 
privacy protection and access to official documents. The defendant state is Sweden, a country 
very familiar with the principle and practice of access to official documents. The right of access 
to official documents has a history of more than two hundred years in Sweden and is 
considered one of the cornerstones of Swedish democracy. The case shows how access to 
official documents, including research documents containing sensitive personal data, can be 
granted to researchers, albeit under strict conditions. It furthermore demonstrates that Sweden 
applies effective procedures to implement orders granting access to official documents: those 
who refuse to grant access to official documents after a court decision has so ordered can be 
convicted on the basis of criminal law. The case reflects the idea that progress in scientific 
knowledge would be hindered unduly if the research methodology of a study or scientific data 
analysis and the conclusions build on the data were not open to scrutiny, discussion and 
debate, albeit under strict conditions of privacy protection regarding medical data. 
 
In this case, a Swedish professor at the University of Gothenburg, Mr. Gillberg, has been 
responsible for a long-term research project on hyperactivity of children and attention-deficit 
disorders. Certain assurances were made to the children's parents and later to the young people 
themselves concerning the confidentiality of the collected data. According to Mr. Gillberg, the 
university's ethics committee had made it a precondition for the project that sensitive 
information about the participants would be accessible only to himself and his staff and he had 
therefore promised absolute confidentiality to the patients and their parents. The research 
papers, called the Gothenburg study, were voluminous and consisted of a large number of 
records, test results, interview replies, questionnaires and video and audio tapes. They 
contained a very large amount of privacy-sensitive data about the children and their relatives. 
Some years later, two other researchers not connected to the University of Gothenburg 
requested access to the research material. One had no interest in the personal data as such but 
in the method used and the evidence the researchers had for their conclusions, the other 
wanted access to the material to keep up with current research. Both requests were refused by 
the University of Gothenburg, but the two researchers appealed against the decisions. The 
Administrative Court of Appeal found that the researchers should be granted access to the 
material, as they had shown a legitimate interest and could be assumed to be well acquainted 
with the appropriate ways of handling confidential data. It was also considered to be important 
to the neuropsychiatric debate that the material in question be exposed to independent and 
critical examination. A list of conditions was set for each of the two researchers, which included 
restrictions on the use of the material and the prohibition of removing copies from the 
university premises. Notified by the university's vice-chancellor that the two researchers were 
entitled to access by virtue of the judgments, first Mr. Gillberg and later the university refused 
to give access to the researchers. The university decisions were annulled however by two 
judgments of the Administrative Court of Appeal. A few days later, the research material was 
destroyed by a few colleagues of Mr. Gillberg. 
 
The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman brought criminal proceedings against Mr. Gillberg, 
who a short time later was convicted of misuse of office. Mr. Gillberg was given a suspended 
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sentence and a fine of the equivalent of EUR 4,000. The university's vice president and the 
officials who had destroyed the research material were also convicted. Mr. Gillberg's conviction 
was upheld by the Court of Appeal and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused. A 
short time later, Mr. Gillberg lodged an application with the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights. 
He complained in particular that his criminal conviction breached his rights under Articles 8 
(right of privacy, including personal reputation) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the 
Convention. Mr. Gillberg also complained under Articles 6 (fair trial) and 13 (effective remedy) 
of the Convention that in the civil proceedings concerning access to the research material he 
did not have a standing before the Administrative Courts. Several times Mr. Gillberg’s requests 
for relief for substantive defects to the Supreme Administrative Court were refused because he 
could not be considered a party to the case. As Mr. Gillberg lodged his application before the 
Court more than six months after these judgments, this part of the application had been 
submitted too late and was rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§1 and 4 of the Convention. While 
on the face of it the case raised important ethical issues involving the interests of the children 
participating in the research, medical research in general and public access to information, the 
Court considered itself to only be in a position to examine whether Mr. Gillberg's criminal 
conviction for refusing to execute a court order granting access to official documents was 
compatible with the Convention. The Court found that the conviction of Mr. Gillberg did not as 
such concern the university's or the applicant's interest in protecting professional secrecy with 
clients or the participants in the research. That part was settled by the Administrative Court of 
Appeal's judgments. For reasons of inadmissibility of the application regarding the judgments 
of the Administrative Courts, the European Court was prevented from examining any alleged 
violation of the Convention by these judgments. 
 
Regarding the remaining and hence crucial complaints under Article 8 and 10, Mr. Gillberg 
emphasised that there had been a promise of confidentiality to the participants in the research, 
as a precondition for carrying out his research and that the order to grant access to the research 
material and his conviction for refusing to do so amounted to a violation of his right to private 
life and his right to negative freedom of expression (the right to refuse to communicate). 
 
The European Court left the question whether there had been an interference with Mr. 
Gillberg's right to respect for his private life for the purpose of Article 8 open, because even 
assuming that there had been such an interference, it found that there had been no violation of 
that provision. According to the Court, Convention States have to ensure in their domestic legal 
systems that a final binding judicial decision did not remain inoperative to the detriment of one 
party; the execution of a judgment is an integral part of a trial. The Swedish State therefore had 
to react to Mr. Gillberg's refusal to execute the judgments granting the two external 
researchers access to the material. The Court noted Mr. Gillberg's argument that the conviction 
and sentence were disproportionate to the aim of ensuring the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others, because the university's ethics committee had required an absolute 
promise of confidentiality as a precondition for carrying out his research. However, the two 
permits by the committee he had submitted to the Court did not constitute evidence of such a 
requirement. The Swedish courts had moreover found that the assurances of confidentiality 
given to the participants in the study went further than permitted by the Secrecy Act. As 
regards Mr. Gillberg's argument that the Swedish courts should have taken into account as a 
mitigating circumstance the fact that he had attempted to protect the privacy and integrity of 
the participants in the research, the European Court agreed with the Swedish criminal courts 
that the question of whether the documents were to be released had been settled in the 
proceedings before the administrative courts. Whether or not the university considered that 
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they were based on erroneous or insufficient grounds had no significance for the validity of the 
administrative courts’ judgments. It had thus been incumbent on the university administration 
to release the documents and Mr. Gillberg had intentionally failed to comply with his 
obligations as a public official arising from the judgments. The Court therefore did not find that 
his conviction or sentence was arbitrary or disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. It 
concluded, by five votes to two, that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the alleged violation of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of 
the Convention, Mr. Gillberg invoked his "negative right" to remain silent. The Court accepted 
that some professional groups indeed might have a legitimate interest in protecting 
professional secrecy as regards clients or sources and it even observed that doctors, 
psychiatrists and researchers may have a similar interest to that of journalists in protecting 
their sources. However, Mr. Gillberg had been convicted for misuse of office for refusing to 
make documents available in accordance with the instructions he received from the university 
administration after a Court decision; he was thus part of the university that had to comply with 
the judgments of the administrative courts. Moreover, his conviction did not as such concern 
his own or the university's interest in protecting professional secrecy with clients or the 
participants in the research. The Court unanimously concluded that there had been no violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The judgment of the European Court is certainly an eye-opener for many actors in countries of 
the Council of Europe working in the domain of access to official or administrative documents, 
academic research, the processing of sensitive personal data and data protection authorities. 
The jurisprudence of the Swedish courts and of the European Court of Human Rights 
demonstrates that confidentiality of data used for scientific research and protection of sensitive 
personal data is to be balanced against the interests and guarantees related to transparency 
and access to documents of interest for the research society or society as a whole. The 
concurring opinion of Judge Ann Power, which is annexed to the judgment in the case of 
Gillberg v. Sweden, elaborates the importance of this approach by emphasising that “the public 
has an obvious interest in the findings and implications of research. Progress in scientific 
knowledge would be hampered unduly if the methods and evidence used in research were not 
open to scrutiny, discussion and debate. Thus, the requests for access, in my view, represented 
important matters of public interest”, without however disregarding the principles and values 
of protection of personal data. 
 
• Gillberg v. Sweden, no. 41723/06, 2 November 2010.  
 
Editor’s Note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 3 
April 2012. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2002 the Turkish Broadcasting Authority (Radio ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu - the “RTÜK”) 
revoked the broadcasting licence of Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. (Nur Radyo), a 
broadcasting company established in Istanbul at that time. In its motivation the RTÜK mainly 
referred to the fact that, despite six temporary broadcasting bans for programmes that had 
breached the constitutional principle of secularism or had incited hatred, Nur Radyo had 
continued to broadcast religious programmes. The RTÜK referred in particular to a programme 
“along the editorial line of Nur Radyo” that was broadcast on 19 November 2001 - during one 
of the bans - from Bursa. That concerned a pirate broadcast, transmitted via satellite and 
terrestrial links. RTÜK held Nur Radyo responsible for it and considered this new violation of 
the Turkish law as justifying the revocation of its broadcasting licence. In addition, criminal 
proceedings were initiated against the managers of Nur Radyo, in their personal capacity, on 
account of the pirate broadcast of 19 November 2001. The managers were acquitted, as the 
criminal court found that there was insufficient evidence of their presumed responsibility for 
the broadcasting of the pirated programme. Nur Radyo subsequently sought the review and 
immediate suspension of the RTÜK’s decision to revoke its broadcasting licence, but was 
unsuccessful. 
 
Nur Radyo then lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, arguing in 
particular that the revocation of its broadcasting licence had constituted an unjustified 
interference with its right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The European Court noted that, in essence, the revocation of the licence was a reaction to a 
pirate broadcast, via satellite and terrestrial links, using a frequency that had not been 
allocated to the company and that came from Bursa, whereas Nur Radyo’s broadcasting centre 
was in Istanbul. It further noted that the main reason why the RTÜK had found Nur Radyo to be 
responsible for that programme was because it reflected its editorial line. However, the 
criminal court had acquitted the managers of the company for lack of evidence of any 
responsibility for the pirate broadcast in question. The European Court thus took the view that 
it had been arbitrary to include the seventh programme in the aggregate assessment of the 
offences that led to the revocation. It concluded that the additional penalty imposed on Nur 
Radyo on the basis of offences for which other sanctions had already been imposed was not 
compatible with the principle of the rule of law. The European Court accordingly found that the 
breach of the freedom of expression of Nur Radyo had not been necessary in a democratic 
society and that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 42284/05, 12 October 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: MGN Limited v. United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Ten years ago, in 2001, the newspaper Daily Mirror published an article on its front page under 
the title: “Naomi: I am a drug addict”. Another longer article inside the newspaper elaborated 
on top model Naomi Campbell’s addiction treatment, illustrated by photos taken secretly near 
the Narcotics Anonymous centre she was attending at the time. As the newspaper continued to 
publish more articles and new pictures related to her attendance at Narcotics Anonymous, Ms. 
Campbell sued the Daily Mirror for breach of her privacy. At a final stage of the domestic 
proceedings, the House of Lords found that the publication of the articles could have been 
justified as a matter of public interest, as Ms Campbell had previously publicly denied drug use. 
The publication of the pictures however, in combination with the articles, had breached her 
right to the respect for her private life. Apart from a modest award of damages of 3500 GBP, the 
Daily Mirror’s publishing group, MGN, was ordered to pay Ms. Campbell’s legal costs, including 
the “success fees” agreed between Ms Campbell and her lawyers. The total amount of the legal 
costs was more than 1 million GBP. 
 
Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention MGN lodged an application with the 
European Court of Human Rights, complaining that the finding by the British courts that it had 
breached Ms Campbell’s privacy disregarded the right to freedom of expression. MGN also 
argued that the requirement to pay disproportionately high success fees amounted to a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. This part of the application was supported by third 
parties, such as the Open Society Justice Initiative, the Media Legal Defence Initiative, Index on 
Censorship and Human Rights Watch, all referring to the chilling effect of high costs in 
defamation proceedings in the United Kingdom on NGOs and small media organisations. 
 
Regarding the breach of privacy, the European Court recalled that a balance had to be struck 
between the public interest in the publication of the articles and the photographs of Ms 
Campbell and the need to protect her private life. By six votes to one the Court held that there 
was no breach of Article 10. The Court agreed with the reasoning of the House of Lords that the 
public interest had already been satisfied by the publication of the articles, while adding that 
the photographs was a disproportionate breach of her right to respect for her private life. 
Therefore, the interference in the right to freedom of expression of the Daily Mirror was 
considered necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the rights of Ms Campbell. 
 
However, the order to pay the success fees of up to more than 365.000 GBP was considered by 
the European Court as a disproportionate interference in the right to freedom of expression, 
having regard to the legitimate aims sought to be achieved. The Court took into consideration 
that the system of recoverable success fees may have a chilling effect on media reporting and 
hence on freedom of expression. The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
 MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, 18 January 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Yleisradio Oy a.o. v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2004 Yleisradio Oy broadcast a current affairs programme focusing on some legal aspects of 
incest cases in the context of child custody disputes. Genuine cases were used as examples. In 
one case, A. appeared undisguised and using his own first name. He was introduced as a 55-
year old driver from Helsinki and it was further announced that A. had been convicted and 
sentenced to imprisonment for sexual abuse of his two children, X. and Y., their gender and 
current age being mentioned. The judgment concerning A.’s conviction for sexual offences had 
been declared confidential by the Court of Appeal and the case file had also been declared 
confidential. However, some information included in that file was revealed during the 
programme and some details about the court proceedings and the conduct of the children’s 
mother were mentioned. Z., the children’s mother, filed a criminal complaint and the public 
prosecutor charged A., the editor and the editor-in-chief on grounds of dissemination of 
information violating personal privacy and aggravated defamation. 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that it was probable that several persons could have connected 
A. with X. and Y. on the basis of the information given in the programme and that information 
had been disseminated violating the personal privacy of X., Y. and Z., although the disclosure of 
this confidential information had not been based on the need to inform the public. On the 
contrary, it had been necessary to conceal that information. A. and the two journalists were 
fined and ordered to pay damages and costs. The broadcasting company and its two journalists 
complained under Article 10 of the European Convention that the Supreme Court’s judgment 
violated their right to freedom of expression. 
 
Although the European Court was of the opinion that the programme clearly involved an 
element of general importance and that in such situations any restrictions on freedom of 
expression should be imposed with particular caution, it noted that the two under-age victims 
of sexual offences and their mother were private persons and that sensitive information about 
their lives was revealed on air nationwide. The European Court did not find arbitrary the 
Finnish Supreme Court’s finding that the relevant criminal provision did not, in general, require 
that the victims be recognised de facto and that, in this particular case, it was probable that 
several people, even if a very limited group, could have connected the victims to the person 
interviewed. The Court was satisfied that the reasons relied on by the Supreme Court were 
relevant and sufficient to show that the interference complained of was “necessary in a 
democratic society” and that a fair balance between the competing interests was struck. 
Unanimously, the Court rejected the application by Yleisradio Yo and its editor and editor-in-
chief as being manifestly ill-founded. For these reasons the Court unanimously declared the 
application inadmissible. Hence Article 10 of the Convention was not found to be violated in 
this case. 
 
• Yleisradio Oy a.o. v. Finland (dec.), no. 30881/09, 12 June 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 15 March the European Court of Human Rights decided that an elected 
representative’s conviction for causing serious insult to the King of Spain was contrary to his 
freedom of expression. The case concerns the criminal conviction of a politician of a Basque 
separatist political party, Mr. Arnaldo Otegi Mondragon, following comments made to the press 
during an official visit by the King to the province of Biscay. During a press conference Otegi 
Mondragon, as spokesperson for his parliamentary group, Sozialista Abertzaleak, stated in reply 
to a journalist’s question that the visit of the King to Biscay was a “genuine political disgrace”. 
He said that the King, as “supreme head of the Guardia Civil (police) and of the Spanish armed 
forces” was the person in command of those who had tortured those detained in a recent police 
operation against a local newspaper, amongst them the main editors of the newspaper. Otegi 
Mondragon called the King “he who protects torture and imposes his monarchical regime on 
our people through torture and violence”. Otegi Mondragon was convicted for insult of the King 
on the basis of Article 490 §3 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment 
and suspension of his right to vote during that period. The Spanish courts categorised the 
impugned comments as value judgments and not statements of fact, affecting the inner core of 
the King’s dignity, independently of the context in which they had been made. The European 
Court of Human Rights, however, considers this criminal conviction a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention, as Otegi Mondragon’s remarks had not been a gratuitous personal attack 
against the King nor did they concern his private life or his personal honour. While the Court 
acknowledged that Otegi Mondragon’s language could be considered provocative, it reiterated 
that it was permitted, in the context of a public debate of general interest, to have recourse to 
a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. The King being the symbol of the State cannot 
be shielded from legitimate criticism, as this would amount to an over-protection of Heads of 
State in a monarchical system. The phrases used by Otegi Mondragon, addressed to journalists 
during a press conference, concerned solely the King’s institutional responsibility as Head of 
State and a symbol of the State apparatus and of the forces which, according to Otegi 
Mondragon, had tortured the editors of a local newspaper. The comments in issue had been 
made in a public and political context that was outside the “essential core of individual dignity” 
of the King. The European Court further emphasised the particular severity of the sentence. 
While the determination of sentences was in principle a matter for the national courts, a prison 
sentence imposed for an offence committed in the area of political discussion was compatible 
with freedom of expression only in extreme cases, such as hate speech or incitement to 
violence. Nothing in Otegi Mondragon’s case justified such a sentence, which inevitably had a 
dissuasive effect. Thus, even supposing that the reasons relied upon by the Spanish courts 
could be accepted as relevant, they were not sufficient to demonstrate that the interference 
complained of had been “necessary in a democratic society”. The applicant’s conviction and 
sentence were thus disproportionate to the aim pursued, in violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, no. 2034/07, ECHR 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: RTBF v Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 29 March 2011 the European Court found a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the case Radio-télévision belge de la communauté 
française (RTBF) v Belgium. The case concerned an interim injunction ordered by an urgent-
applications judge against the RTBF, preventing the broadcasting of a programme on medical 
errors and patients’ rights. The injunction prohibited the broadcasting of the programme until a 
final court decision in a dispute between a doctor named in the programme and the RTBF. As 
the injunction constituted an interference by the Belgian judicial authorities with the RTBF’s 
freedom of expression, the European Court in the first place had to ascertain whether that 
interference had a legal basis. Whilst Article 10 does not prohibit prior restraints on 
broadcasting, such restraints require a particularly strict legal framework, ensuring both tight 
control over the scope of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any abuse. As news is a 
perishable commodity, delaying its publication, even for a short period, might deprive it of all 
its interest. In ascertaining whether the interference at issue had a legal basis, the Court 
observed that the Belgian Constitution authorised the punishment of offences committed in the 
exercise of freedom of expression only once they had been committed and not before. 
Although some provisions of the Belgian Judicial Code permitted in general terms the 
intervention of the urgent-applications judge, there was a discrepancy in the case law as to the 
possibility of preventive intervention in freedom of expression cases by that judge. The Belgian 
law was thus not clear and there was no constant jurisprudence that could have enabled the 
RTBF to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the possible consequences of the broadcasting of the 
programme in question. The European Court observed that, without precise and specific 
regulation of preventive restrictions on freedom of expression, many individuals fearing attacks 
on them in television programmes - announced in advance - might apply to the urgent-
applications judge, who would choose different solutions to their cases and that this would not 
be conducive to preserving the essence of the freedom of imparting information. Although the 
European Court considers a different treatment between audiovisual and print media not 
unacceptable as such, e.g., regarding the licensing of radio and television, it did not agree with 
the Belgian Court of Cassation decision to refuse to apply the essential constitutional safeguard 
against censorship of broadcasting. According to the European Court, this differentiation 
appeared artificial, while there was no clear legal framework to allow prior restraint as a form 
of censorship on broadcasting. The Court was of the opinion that the legislative framework, 
together with the case-law of the Belgian courts, did not fulfil the condition of forseeability 
required by the Convention. As the interference complained of could not be considered to be 
prescribed by law, there had thus been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The 
judgment contains an important message to all member states of the European Convention on 
Human Rights: prior restraints require a particularly strict, precise and specific legal framework, 
ensuring both tight control over the scope of bans both in print media and in audiovisual media 
services, combined with an effective judicial review to prevent any abuse by the domestic 
authorities. 
 
• RTBF v. Belgium, no. 50084/06, ECHR 2011.  
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In the case Mosley v. the United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights decided that 
the right of privacy guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights does 
not require the media to give prior notice of intended publications to those who feature in 
them. The applicant in this case is Max Rufus Mosley, the former president of the International 
Automobile Federation. In 2008, the Sunday newspaper News of the World published on its 
front page an article entitled “F1 Boss Has Sick Nazi Orgy with 5 Hookers”, while several pages 
inside the newspaper were also devoted to the story and included still photographs taken from 
video footage secretly recorded by one of the participants in the sexual activities. An edited 
extract of the video, in addition to still images, were also published on the newspaper’s website 
and reproduced elsewhere on the Internet. Mr Mosley brought legal proceedings against the 
newspaper claiming damages for breach of confidence and invasion of privacy. In addition, he 
sought an injunction to restrain the News of the World from making available on its website the 
edited video footage. The High Court refused to grant the injunction because the material was 
no longer private, as it had been published extensively in print and on the Internet. In 
subsequent privacy proceedings the High Court found that there was no public interest and 
thus no justification for publishing the litigious article and accompanying images, which had 
breached Mr. Mosley’s right to privacy. The court ruled that News of the World had to pay to Mr. 
Mosley 60,000 GBP in damages. 
 
Relying on Article 8 (right to private life) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the 
European Convention, Mr. Mosley complained that, despite the monetary compensation 
awarded to him by the courts, he remained a victim of a breach of his privacy as a result of the 
absence of a legal duty on the part of the News of the World to notify him in advance of their 
intention to publish material concerning him, thus giving him the opportunity to ask a court for 
an interim injunction and prevent the material’s publication. The European Court found indeed 
that the publications in question had resulted in a flagrant and unjustified invasion of Mr. 
Mosley’s private life. The question which remained to be answered was whether a legally 
binding pre-notification rule was required. The Court recalled that states enjoy a certain margin 
of appreciation in respect of the measures they put in place to protect people’s right to private 
life. In the United Kingdom, the right to private life is protected with a number of measures: 
there is a system of self-regulation of the press; people can claim damages in civil court 
proceedings; and, if individuals become aware of an intended publication touching upon their 
private life, they can seek an interim injunction preventing publication of the material. As a pre-
notification requirement would inevitably also affect political reporting and serious journalism, 
the Court stressed that such a measure would require careful scrutiny. In addition, a 
parliamentary inquiry on privacy issues had been recently held in the UK and the ensuing 
report had rejected the need for a pre-notification requirement. The Court further noted that 
Mr. Mosley had not referred to a single jurisdiction in which a pre-notification requirement as 
such existed nor had he indicated any international legal texts requiring states to adopt such a 
requirement. Furthermore, as any pre-notification obligation would have to allow for an 
exception if the public interest were at stake, a newspaper would have to be able to opt not to 
notify an individual if it believed that it could subsequently defend its decision on the basis of 
the public interest in the information published. The Court observed in that regard that a 
narrowly defined public interest exception would increase the chilling effect of any pre-
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notification duty. Anyway, a newspaper could choose, under a system in which a pre-
notification requirement was applied, to run the risk of declining to notify, preferring instead to 
pay a subsequent fine. The Court emphasised that any pre-notification requirement would only 
be as strong as the sanctions imposed for failing to observe it. But at the same time the Court 
emphasised that particular care had to be taken when examining constraints which might 
operate as a form of censorship prior to publication. Although punitive fines and criminal 
sanctions could be effective in encouraging pre-notification, they would have a chilling effect 
on journalism, including political and investigative reporting, both of which attract a high level 
of protection under the Convention. Such as scheme would therefore run the risk of being 
incompatible with the Convention’s requirements of freedom of expression, guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the Convention. Having regard to the chilling effect to which a pre-notification 
requirement risked giving rise, to the doubts about its effectiveness and to the wide margin of 
appreciation afforded to the UK in this area, the Court concluded that Article 8 did not require a 
legally binding pre-notification requirement. 
 
• Mosley v. the United Kingdom, no. 48009/08, 10 May 2011.  
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This case concerns a complaint by a broadcasting company regarding a number of decisions by 
the Cyprus Radio and Television Authority (CRTA) imposing fines on the company for violations 
of legislation concerning radio and television programmes in its broadcasts and the alleged 
unfairness of the related domestic proceedings. The breaches found by the CRTA concerned 
advertisements for children’s toys; the duration of advertising breaks; the placement of 
sponsors’ names during news programmes; product placement in a comedy series; news 
programmes that lacked objectivity or contained material unsuitable for minors or were 
disrespectful of crime victims and their relatives; films, series and trailers that contained 
offensive remarks and inappropriate language or included scenes of violence unsuitable for 
children; and, in one particular case, racist and discriminatory remarks in an entertainment 
series. 
 
Sigma RTV alleged substantially that it had been denied a fair hearing before an independent 
and impartial tribunal, invoking Article 6 of the Convention. In this connection it complained 
about the proceedings before the CRTA and the judicial review proceedings before the Supreme 
Court. Sigma RTV’s grievance as to the proceedings before the CRTA concentrated on the 
multiplicity of its functions in prosecuting, investigating, trying and deciding cases and 
imposing sanctions. In addition, Sigma RTV complained that the members and staff of the CRTA 
had a direct and personal interest in imposing fines, as the amounts thus collected were 
deposited in the CRTA’s Fund, from which their salaries and/or remuneration were paid. 
 
The European Court notes that a number of uncontested procedural guarantees were available 
to Sigma RTV in the proceedings before the CRTA: the company was given details of the 
probable violation or the complaint made against it and the reasoned decisions were arrived at 
after a hearing had been held, while Sigma RTV was able to make written submissions and/or 
oral submissions during the hearing. Furthermore, it was open to Sigma RTV to make a wide 
range of complaints in the context of the judicial review proceedings before the CRTA. Despite 
the existence of these safeguards, the combination of the different functions of the CRTA and, 
in particular, the fact that all fines are deposited in its own fund for its own use, gives rise, in 
the Court’s view, to legitimate concerns that the CRTA lacks the necessary structural 
impartiality to comply with the requirements of Article 6. Nonetheless, the Court reiterates that 
even where an adjudicatory body, including an administrative one as in the present case, which 
determines disputes over “civil rights and obligations” does not comply with Article 6 §1 in 
some respect, no violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body 
are “subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has ‘full’ jurisdiction and does provide 
the guarantees of Article 6 §1”. Although the Supreme Court could not substitute its own 
decision for that of the CRTA and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited, it could have 
annulled the decisions on a number of grounds, including if the decision had been reached on 
the basis of a misconception of fact or law, if there had been no proper enquiry or a lack of due 
reasoning, or on procedural grounds. The European Court notes that indeed the Supreme Court 
examined all the above issues, point by point, without refusing to deal with any of them and 
that the Supreme Court gave clear reasons for the dismissal of the Sigma RTV’s points. The 
Court came to the conclusion that Sigma RTV’s allegations as to shortcomings in the 
proceedings before the CRTA, including those concerning objective partiality and the breach of 
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the principles of natural justice, were subject to review by the Supreme Court and that the 
scope of the review of the Supreme Court in the judicial review proceedings in the present case 
was sufficient to comply with Article 6 of the Convention. 
 
The Court also dismissed Sigma RTV’s complaints regarding the alleged violation of Article 10 
of the Convention as all decisions by the CRTA were in accordance with Art. 10 §2, the 
sanctions and fines being prescribed by law, being proportionate and being pertinently justified 
on the basis of legitimate aims. These aims, in general, included the protection of consumers 
and children from unethical advertising practices, the protection of children from broadcasts 
containing violence or any other material likely to impair their physical, mental or moral 
development, the importance of ensuring that viewers were informed of the true content of the 
broadcasts by the use of appropriate acoustic and visual warnings, the protection of pluralism 
of information, the need for a fair and accurate presentation of facts and events and the 
protection of the reputation, honour, good name and privacy of persons involved in or affected 
by the broadcast. The Court found therefore, that the interference with Sigma RTV’s exercise of 
their right to freedom of expression in these cases can reasonably be regarded as having been 
necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others. The Court 
accordingly declared inadmissible, as manifestly ill-founded, Sigma RTV’s complaints under 
Article 10 in respect of the CRTA’s decisions. One complaint however received a more thorough 
analysis on the merits: the complaint regarding the racist and discriminatory content of a 
fictional series. The Court emphasises that it is particularly conscious of the vital importance of 
combating racial and gender discrimination in all its forms and manifestations and that the 
CRTA could not be said in the circumstances to have overstepped its margin of appreciation in 
view of the profound analysis at the national level, even though the remarks had been made in 
the context of a fictional entertainment series. Lastly, as to the proportionality of the impugned 
measure, the Court found, bearing in mind the amount of the fine and the fact that the CRTA, 
when imposing the fine, took into account the repeated violations by the applicant in other 
episodes of the same series, that the fine imposed (approximately EUR 3,500) was 
proportionate to the aim pursued. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
Finally the Court also dismissed the complaint regarding the alleged discrimination against 
Sigma RTV, operating as a private broadcaster under stricter rules, restrictions and monitoring 
than the national public broadcasting company in Cyprus, CyBC. The European Court was of the 
opinion that, given the differences in the legal status and the applicable legal frameworks and 
the different objectives of private stations and the CyBC in the Cypriot broadcasting system, it 
cannot be said that they are in a comparable position for the purposes of Article 14 of the 
Convention. The Court found, therefore, that the present case does not indicate discrimination 
contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. 
 
• Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus, nos. 32181/04 and 35122/05, 21 July 2011.  
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In a remarkable judgment the European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion that 
Romania breached the right of privacy of a journalist when the Romanian courts acquitted the 
director and the coordinator of the press office of the Romanian Television Company (SRTV) in 
criminal defamation and insult proceedings. 
 
At the heart of the case lies a press release published by the management of the Romanian 
State TV channel, after removing the applicant, Ms. Maria Sipoş, from a programme that she 
produced and presented on the National State channel România 1. Following her replacement 
as a presenter, Ms. Sipoş made a number of statements to the press alleging that SRTV was 
engaged in censorship. The broadcaster responded in turn by issuing a press release, explaining 
that Ms. Sipoş had been replaced due to audience numbers. The press release, quoted by six 
national newspapers, also made reference to Ms. Sipoş’ emotional state due to family problems, 
it questioned her discernment, referred to allegedly antagonistic relations between her and her 
colleagues and suggested she was a victim of political manipulation. Ms. Sipoş claimed that 
SRTV’s press release had infringed her right to her reputation, and she brought criminal 
proceedings before the Bucharest District Court against the channel’s director and the 
coordinator of the SRTV’s press office, accusing both of insults and defamation. The Bucharest 
County Court acknowledged that the press release contained defamatory assertions about Ms. 
Sipoş, but having regard to the fact that the defendants had not intended to insult or defame 
her and in view of their good faith, it dismissed Ms. Sipoş’ claims. 
 
Before the European Court of Human Rights Ms. Sipoş complained that the Romanian 
authorities had failed in their obligation, under Article 8 of the Convention, to protect her right 
to respect for her reputation and private life against the assertions contained in the press 
release issued by the SRTV. Referring to the positive obligations a State has in securing respect 
for private life, even in the sphere of relations between private individuals, the European Court 
clarified that it had to determine whether Romania had struck a fair balance between, on the 
one hand, the protection of Ms. Sipoş’ right to her reputation and to respect for her private life, 
and on the other, the freedom of expression (Article 10) of those who had issued the impugned 
press release. For that purpose the Court examined the content of the press release and found, 
in particular, that the assertions presenting Ms. Sipoş as a victim of political manipulation were 
devoid of any proven factual basis, since there was no indication that she had acted under the 
influence of any particular vested interest. As regards the remarks about her emotional state, 
the Court noted that they were based on elements of her private life whose disclosure did not 
appear necessary. As to the assessment about Ms. Sipoş’ discernment, it could not be regarded 
as providing an indispensable contribution to the position of the SRTV, as expressed through 
the press release, since it was based on elements of the applicant’s private life known to the 
SRTV’s management. The Court noted that, given the chilling effect of criminal sanctions, a civil 
action would have been more appropriate, but it concluded nonetheless that the statements 
had crossed the acceptable limits and that the Romanian courts had failed to strike a fair 
balance between protecting the right to reputation and freedom of expression. Thus, there had 
been a violation of Article 8, and Ms. Sipoş was awarded EUR 3,000 in damages. 
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One dissenting judge, Judge Myer, drew attention to a particular issue in this case. Although the 
Third Chamber of the Court recognized that criminal sanctions have a chilling effect on speech 
and that it would have been more appropriate to initiate the civil proceedings available to the 
applicant, nevertheless the majority of the European Court found that the criminal sanction of 
the director and press officer of the SRTV was necessary in a democratic society in order to 
protect Ms. Sipoş’ right to her reputation and private life, an approach that contrasts with 
Resolution 1577(2007) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe urging the 
decriminalization of defamation and insult. 
 
• Sipoş v. Romania, no. 26125/04, 3 May 2011.  
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The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a decision regarding the criminalization of 
the possession, reproduction and public display of child pornography, freely downloaded from 
the Internet, and its compatibility with freedom of (artistic) expression. The issue before the 
European Court was whether the conviction of an artist for including child pornography in a 
work exhibited at an art exhibition violated the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 
of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
 
Ms. Ulla Annikki Karttunen is a Finnish artist who exhibited her work “the Virgin-Whore Church” 
in an art gallery in Helsinki in 2008. The work included hundreds of photographs of teenage 
girls or otherwise very young women in sexual poses and acts. The pictures had been 
downloaded from free Internet pages. One day after the opening of the exhibition, the police 
seized the pictures and the exhibition was closed down. The police also seized Karttunen’s 
computer and the public prosecutor pressed charges against the artist. The domestic courts 
convicted the artist of possessing and distributing sexually obscene pictures depicting children 
under the age of 18, also referring to the finding that some of the pictures were of an 
extremely violent or degrading nature. Even though the artist’s intention had not been to 
commit a criminal act but, on the contrary, to criticise easy Internet access to child 
pornography, the possession and distribution of sexually obscene pictures depicting children 
were still to be considered criminal acts according to Chapter 17, sections 18/19 of the Finnish 
Penal Code. Taking into account that Karttunen had intended to provoke general discussion 
about child pornography and that the crimes were minor and excusable, the Finnish court did 
not impose any sanctions on the artist. Instead, all the pictures were ordered to be confiscated. 
 
Karttunen complained in Strasbourg under Article 10 of the Convention that her right as an 
artist to freedom of expression had been violated. She argued that she had incorporated the 
pornographic pictures into her work in an attempt to encourage discussion and raise awareness 
of how widespread and easily accessible child pornography was. The European Court noted that 
the artist’s conviction, even if no sanction was imposed on her, constituted an interference with 
her right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 Â§ 1 of the Convention. As the 
interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting morals as well 
as the reputation or rights of others, within the meaning of Article 10 Â§ 2, it still was to be 
determined whether the interference in the artist’s freedom of artistic expression was necessary 
in a democratic society. The European Court considered that the domestic courts had 
adequately balanced the artist’s freedom of expression with the countervailing interests. The 
Court referred to the finding by the Finnish courts that the possession and public display of 
child pornography was still subject to criminal liability, the criminalization of child pornography 
and the artist’s conviction being mainly based on the need to protect children against sexual 
abuse, as well as violation of their privacy and on moral considerations. The Court also noted 
that the domestic courts had acknowledged the artist’s good intentions, by not imposing any 
sanctions. Having regard as well to the aspect of “morals” involved and to the margin of 
appreciation afforded to the state in this area, the Court considered that the interference was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Thus, the Court concluded that “it does not follow 
from the applicant’s claim that her conviction did not, in all the circumstances of the case, 
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respond to a genuine social need”. The Court declared the artist’s application manifestly ill-
founded and therefore inadmissible. 
 
 Karttunen v Finland (dec.), no. 1685/10, 10 May 2011.  
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In a judgment of 5 July 2011 the European Court of Human Rights found that five women 
broadcast on national television in a sauna romp with police officers should have received 
higher financial compensation for the breach of their privacy. This judgment became final on 5 
October 2011. 
 
The applicants in this case are five young women, all friends, who complained about the 
broadcasting on Moldovan national television of an intimate video footage showing them in a 
sauna with five men, four of whom were police officers. At the time, three of the applicants 
were journalists, the first two for the investigative newspaper Accente. The women claimed 
that they first had contact with the police officers when the editor in chief of Accente was 
arrested on charges of corruption and that, from that point on, the officers provided them with 
material for their articles. One of the applicants had even become romantically involved with 
one of the officers. The footage was used in a programme on national television about 
corruption in journalism and notably in the newspaper Accente. It showed the applicants, 
apparently intoxicated, in a sauna in their underwear, with two of them kissing and touching 
one of the men and one of them performing an erotic dance. The faces of the men were 
covered in the video, whereas those of the applicants were not. The video was paused from 
time to time in order to allow the women to be recognized more easily. The applicants alleged 
in particular that the video had been secretly filmed by the police officers and used to try to 
blackmail them into not publishing an article on illegalities at the Moldovan Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. Indeed the video was send to the National Television Service only after the first 
two applicants had had the article published in their newspaper. 
 
The five applicants brought civil proceedings both against the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for 
arranging the secret filming and giving documents of a private nature to national television, 
and against National Television, for then broadcasting the images of a private nature. They 
requested compensation for a breach of their right to respect for their private and family life 
under Article 8 of the European Convention. In August 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice in 
Moldova gave a final ruling in which it dismissed the complaint against the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs concerning the secret filming on account of lack of evidence. It held, however, that the 
Ministry was responsible for handing documents of a private nature concerning Ms. Avram over 
to the National Television Service and that National Television was then responsible for the 
broadcasting of the sauna scene, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. The Supreme Court 
ordered the National Television Service to pay each applicant EUR 214 and the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs a further EUR 214 to Ms. Avram, these being the maximum amounts allowed 
under Article 7/1 of the Moldovan old Civil Code by way of compensation for damage to a 
person’s honour or dignity. 
 
Relying on Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life), the 
applicants complained that the domestic authorities had failed to properly investigate the 
secret filming in the sauna and that the compensation awarded to them for the broadcasting 
was not proportionate to the severity of the breach of their right to respect for their private 
lives. In its judgment, the European Court reiterates that the notion of “private life” within the 
meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept which includes, inter alia, the right to 
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establish and develop relationships with other people. It encompasses elements such as sexual 
life, the right to live privately and away from publicity and unwanted attention. The Court sees 
no reason to depart from the conclusion of the national courts, which acknowledged that there 
had been interference with the applicants’ right to privacy in respect of both the secret filming 
and the broadcasting of the video on television and the defamation. The Court furthermore 
made clear that a State that awards compensation for a breach of a Convention right cannot 
content itself with the fact that the amount granted represents the maximum under domestic 
law. The Court found that the amounts awarded by the Supreme Court of Justice to the 
applicants were too low to be considered proportionate with the gravity of interference with 
their right to respect for their private lives, taking into account that the broadcasting of the 
video on national television had dramatically affected the private, family and social lives of the 
applicants. There has, accordingly, been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. In terms of 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage the Court awarded sums between EUR 4,000 and 
6,000 to each of the applicants. The Court also awarded them jointly with a sum of EUR 1,500 
for costs and expenses. 
 
• Avram and Others v. Moldova, no. 41588/05, 5 July 2011.  
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In its first judgment of 2012 related to (journalistic) freedom of expression, the European Court 
of Human Rights dealt with an interesting application of the right of the media to report on 
criminal cases in an early stage of investigation. The judgment also focuses in a peculiar way 
on the notion of a “public figure”. The case concerns an article published by the Austrian 
newspaper Der Standard, reporting on the enormous speculation losses incurred by a regional 
bank, Hypo Alpe-Adria. The article reported on the criminal investigation into embezzlement 
that had been opened by the public prosecutor in respect of the senior management of the 
bank. It identified some of the persons involved, including Mr Rauscher, the head of the bank’s 
treasury. Mr Rauscher brought proceedings against the newspaper’s company for disclosing his 
identity in that article and, as a result, he was awarded EUR 5,000 in compensation. In its 
judgment the Vienna Court of Appeal found that Mr Rauscher’s interest in the protection of his 
identity and the presumption of innocence outweighed the newspaper’s interest in disclosing 
his name. 
 
The Strasbourg Court however, after being requested to evaluate the interference in Der 
Standard’s freedom of expression under the scope of Article 10 of the Convention, came to 
another conclusion in balancing the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression against Mr 
Rauscher’s right to protection of his identity. The European Court agreed with the finding by the 
Austrian courts that Mr Rauscher, as a senior employee of the bank in issue, was not a “public 
figure” and that the fact that his father had been a politician did not make him a public figure. 
The Strasbourg Court also agreed with the assessment that Mr Rauscher had not entered the 
public arena. However, the Court observed that the question of whether or not a person, whose 
interests have been violated by reporting in the media, is a public figure is only one element 
among others to be taken into account in answering the question whether the newspaper was 
entitled to disclose the name of that person. Another important factor that the Court has 
frequently stressed when it comes to weighing conflicting interests under Article 10 (freedom 
of expression) on the one hand and Article 8 (right to privacy) on the other hand is the 
contribution made by articles or photos in the press to a debate of general interest. The 
European Court emphasised that the article in Der Standard dealt with the fact that politics and 
banking are intertwined and reported on the opening of an investigation by the public 
prosecutor. In this connection the Court reiterated that there is little scope under Article 10 Â§2 
of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debates on questions of public 
interest. It accepted the Vienna Court of Appeal’s finding that the disclosure of a suspect’s 
identity may be particularly problematic at the early stage of criminal proceedings. However, as 
the article at issue was not a typical example of court reporting, but focused mainly on the 
political dimension of the banking scandal at hand, revealing the names of some persons 
involved, including senior managers of the bank, it was legitimate. The Court considered that, 
apart from reporting the fact that the public prosecutor had opened an investigation into the 
bank’s senior management on suspicion of embezzlement, the impugned litigious article did 
not deal with the conduct or contents of the investigation as such. Instead the focus was on the 
extent to which politics and banking are intertwined and on the political and economic 
responsibility for the bank’s enormous losses. In such a context, names, persons and personal 
relationships are clearly of considerable importance and it is difficult to see how the newspaper 
could have reported on these issues in a meaningful manner without mentioning the names of 
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all those involved, including Mr Rauscher. The Court therefore considered that the domestic 
courts had overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them with regard to 
restrictions on debates on subjects of public interest. It follows that the interference with the 
newspaper’s right to freedom of expression was not “necessary in a democratic society”. 
Consequently, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court awarded Standard Verlags GmbH EUR 7,600 for pecuniary damages and 
EUR 4,500 for costs and expenses. 
 
 Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 3), no. 34702/07, 10 January 2012.  
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In two judgments of 7 February 2012 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights has balanced the right to freedom of expression by the media (Article 10 of the 
Convention) with celebrities’ personality rights and their right of privacy (Article. 8 of the 
Convention). The overall conclusion is that media coverage including pictures of celebrities is 
acceptable when the media reporting concerns matters of public interest or at least to some 
degree contributes to a debate of general interest. In the case of Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 
2), the Court held unanimously that the publication of a picture of Princess Caroline of Monaco 
illustrating an article about the Principality of Monaco and the refusal by the German Courts to 
grant an injunction against it, did not amount to a violation of the right of privacy of the 
Princess. The European Court is of the opinion that the Princess, irrespective of the question to 
what extent she assumed official functions, is to be regarded as a public person. The article 
with the picture at issue did not solely serve entertainment purposes and there was nothing to 
indicate that the photo had been taken surreptitiously or by equivalent secret means such as to 
render its publication illegal. 
 
The judgment in the case Axel Springer AG v. Germany concerns the media coverage by the 
newspaper Bild of the arrest and conviction of a famous TV-actor (X), found in possession of 
drugs. X had played the part of Police Superintendent as the hero of a popular television series 
on German TV, reaching between 3,000,000 and 4,700,000 viewers per episode. X brought 
injunction proceedings against the publishing company of Bild because of the publication of 
two articles, one reporting that X was arrested for possession of cocaine and another, a year 
later, that he was convicted of the same offence. The German courts granted X’s request to 
prohibit any further publication of the two articles and the photos illustrating these articles. 
Although these injunctions were prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting the reputation of X, the Grand Chamber of the European Court is of the opinion that 
the interference by the German judicial authorities cannot be considered necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court noted that the arrest and conviction of X concerned public 
judicial facts of which the public has an interest in being informed. It is also emphasized that 
there was a close link between the popularity of the actor in question and his character as a TV-
actor, playing a police superintendent, whose mission was law enforcement and crime 
prevention. This element increased the public’s interest in being informed of X’s arrest for a 
criminal offence. The Court also observed that X was arrested in public, in a tent at the beer 
festival in Munich. According to the Court there were no sufficiently strong grounds for 
believing that Bild should preserve X’s anonymity, having regard to the nature of the offence 
committed by X, the degree to which X was well-known to the public, the circumstances of his 
arrest and the veracity of the information in question. Furthermore the articles in Bild did not 
reveal details about X’s private life, but mainly concerned the circumstances of and events 
following his arrest. They contained no disparaging expression or unsubstantiated allegation. 
The fact that the first article contained certain expressions which, to all intents and purposes, 
were designed to attract the public’s attention cannot in itself raise an issue, according to the 
Court. Finally the Court finds that the injunction against the articles in Bild was capable of 
having a chilling effect on the applicant company. In conclusion, the grounds advanced by the 
German authorities, although relevant, are not sufficient to establish that the interference 
complained of by Springer Verlag AG was necessary in a democratic society. Despite the margin 
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of appreciation enjoyed by Contracting States, the Court considers that there is no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between, on the one hand, the restrictions imposed by the 
national courts on Bild’s right to freedom of expression and, on the other hand, the legitimate 
aim pursued. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Germany 
is ordered to pay EUR 50,000 in respect of pecuniary damages and costs and expenses to 
Springer Verlag AG. 
 
Five judges dissented with the finding of a violation of Article 10, mainly arguing that the 
European Court should have respected a broader margin of appreciation for the German courts. 
According to the five dissenting judges it is not the task of the Strasbourg Court to act as a 
“fourth instance to repeat anew assessments duly performed by the domestic courts”. The 
majority of 12 judges of the Grand Chamber however found that the interference in Bild’s 
reporting by the German authorities amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention, especially taking into account 6 criteria of the media content: the contribution to a 
debate of general interest, the fact that the reporting concerned a public figure, the subject of 
the report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the method of obtaining the information 
and its veracity, the content, form and consequences of the media content and the severity of 
the sanction imposed. In essence the European Court found that the injunctions against Bild 
were capable of having a chilling effect on the applicant’s freedom of expression. 
 
 Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, 7 February 2012.  
 Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, ECHR 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Tuşalp v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 21 February 2012, the European Court of Human Rights has once again found an unjustified 
interference with the right to freedom of expression and press freedom by the Turkish 
authorities. The peculiarity this time is that the Prime Minister, Mr Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, 
himself lies at the centre of the violation of the European Convention by the Strasbourg Court. 
In the case Tuşalp v. Turkey the European Court was asked to consider whether two defamation 
actions taken by the Prime Minister of Turkey against a journalist for protection of his 
personality rights were compatible with Article 10 of the European Convention. The applicant 
was Erbil Tuşalp, a journalist and author of several books. He criticised in two articles, 
published in the newspaper Birgün, the alleged illegal conduct and corruption of high-ranking 
politicians, also including the Prime Minister in his commentary. The Prime Minister brought 
civil actions for compensation against the journalist and the publishing company before the 
Turkish courts on the ground that certain remarks in the articles constituted an attack on his 
personality rights. The Turkish courts considered that the remarks made in the articles indeed 
went beyond the limits of acceptable criticism and belittled the Prime Minister in the public 
and the political arena. According to the domestic courts, Tuşalp had published allegations of a 
kind that one cannot make about a Prime Minister, including the second article that had 
alleged that the Prime Minister had psychological problems and that he had a hostile attitude 
suggesting he was mentally ill. The journalist and publishing company were ordered to pay TRY 
10,000 (EUR 4,300) in compensation. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights however disagreed with the findings of the Turkish 
courts. The Court considered that the articles concerned comments and views on current 
events. Both articles focused on very important matters in a democratic society which the 
public had an interest in being informed about and fell within the scope of political debate. The 
Court also considered the balance between Tuşalp’s interest in conveying his views, and the 
Prime Minister’s interests in having his reputation protected and being protected against 
personal insult. The European Court considers that, even assuming that the language and 
expressions used in the two articles in question were provocative and inelegant and certain 
expressions could legitimately be classed as offensive, they were, however, mostly value 
judgments. These value judgments were based on particular facts, events or incidents which 
were already known to the general public, as some of the quotations compiled by Tuşalp for 
the purposes of the domestic proceedings demonstrate. They therefore had sufficient factual 
basis. As to the form of the expressions, the Court observes that the author chose to convey his 
strong criticisms, coloured by his own political opinions and perceptions, by using a satirical 
style. According to the Court offensive language may fall outside the protection of freedom of 
expression if it amounts to wanton denigration, for example where the sole intent of the 
offensive statement is to insult. But the use of vulgar phrases in itself is not decisive in the 
assessment of an offensive expression as it may well serve merely stylistic purposes. Style 
constitutes part of communication as a form of expression and is as such protected together 
with the content of the expression. However, in the instant case, the domestic courts, in their 
examination of the case, omitted to set the impugned remarks within the context and the form 
in which they were expressed. 
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The European Court is of the opinion that various strong remarks contained in the articles in 
question and particularly those highlighted by the domestic courts could not be construed as a 
gratuitous personal attack against the Prime Minister. In addition, the Court observes that there 
is nothing in the case file to indicate that the applicant’s articles have affected the Prime 
Minister’s political career or his professional and private life. The Court comes to the conclusion 
that the domestic courts failed to establish convincingly any pressing social need for putting 
the Prime Minister’s personality rights above the journalist’s rights and the general interest in 
promoting the freedom of the press where issues of public interest are concerned. The Court 
therefore considers that in making their decisions the Turkish courts overstepped their margin 
of appreciation and that they have interfered with the journalist’s freedom of expression in a 
disproportionate way. The amount of compensation which Tuşalp was ordered to pay, together 
with the publishing company, was significant and such sums could deter others from criticising 
public officials and limit the free flow of information and ideas. The Court concluded that the 
Turkish courts had failed to establish any “pressing social need” for putting the Prime Minister’s 
personality rights above the right to freedom of expression and the general interest in 
promoting press freedom. There had thus been a violation of Article 10. 
 
 Tuşalp v. Turkey, nos. 32131/08 and 41617/08, 21 February 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Aksu v. Turkey (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
For the facts of this case we refer to IRIS 2010-10/1 in which the Court’s Chamber judgment of 
27 July 2010 was reported. In essence Mr. Mustafa Aksu, who is of Roma/Gypsy origin, 
complained in Strasbourg that two publications financed or supported by the Ministry of 
Culture in Turkey, had offended him in his Roma identity, under Article 14 (the anti-
discrimination provision) in conjunction with Article 8 (right to privacy). The action of Mr. Aksu 
was directed against a book entitled “The Gypsies of Turkey” and a dictionary entitled “Turkish 
Dictionary for Pupils”, both containing insulting, denigrating or stereotyping statements about 
Roma. In its judgment of 27 July 2010 the European Court was not persuaded that the author of 
the book insulted Mr. Aksu's integrity or that the domestic authorities had failed to protect his 
rights. Regarding the dictionary, the Court observed that the definitions provided therein were 
prefaced with the comment that the terms were of a metaphorical nature. The European Court 
found no reason to depart from the domestic courts' findings that Mr. Aksu’s integrity was not 
harmed and that he had not been subjected to discriminatory treatment because of the 
expressions described in the dictionary. The Court, with the smallest majority, concluded that it 
could not be said that Mr. Aksu was discriminated against on account of his ethnic identity as a 
Roma or that there was a failure on the part of the Turkish authorities to take the necessary 
measures to secure respect for Mr. Aksu’ s private life (see also IRIS 2010-10/1). 
 
The Grand Chamber has now confirmed that Mr. Aksu’ s rights under the Convention have not 
been violated. The Grand Chamber decided not to examine the complaint under the anti-
discrimination provision. According to the Court “the case does not concern a difference in 
treatment, and in particular ethnic discrimination, as the applicant has not succeeded in 
producing prima facie evidence that the impugned publications had a discriminatory intent or 
effect. The case is therefore not comparable to other applications previously lodged by 
members of the Roma community”. The main issue in the present case is whether the 
impugned publications, which allegedly contained racial insults, constituted interference with 
Mr. Aksu’ s right to respect for his private life and, if so, whether this interference was 
compatible with the said right. The Court therefore examined the case under Article 8 of the 
Convention only, clarifying that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle and 
that it can embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity. The Court 
accepts that an individual’s ethnic identity must be regarded as another such element and that 
in particular, any negative stereotyping of a group, when it reaches a certain level, is capable of 
impacting on the group’s sense of identity and the feelings of self-worth and self-confidence of 
members of the group. It is in this sense that it can be seen as affecting the private life of 
members of the group. However, in applying the protection of privacy under Article 8 of the 
Convention, the Court emphasises that due regard should be given to the requirements of 
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the book the Court explains that the Turkish courts attached importance to the 
fact it had been written by an academic and that it was to be considered as an academic work. 
It is therefore consistent with the Court’s case-law to submit to careful scrutiny any restrictions 
on the freedom of academics to carry out research and to publish their findings. The Court 
explains why it is satisfied that in balancing the conflicting fundamental rights under Articles 8 
and 10 of the Convention, the Turkish courts made an assessment based on the principles 
Back to overview of case-law 
277 
 
resulting from the Court’s well-established case law. Although no violation of Article 8 was 
found, the Court nonetheless reiterated that the vulnerable position of Roma/Gypsies means 
that special consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle, both in 
the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases. Therefore it is 
clear that in a dictionary aimed at pupils, more diligence is required when giving the definitions 
of expressions which are part of daily language but which might be construed as humiliating or 
insulting. In the Court’s view, it would have been preferable to label such expressions as 
“pejorative” or “insulting”, rather than merely stating that they were metaphorical. According to 
the Court, States should promote critical thinking among pupils and equip them with the 
necessary skills to become aware of and react to stereotypes or intolerant elements contained 
in the material they use. The Court also emphasises that the authorities and Government 
should pursue their efforts to combat negative stereotyping of the Roma. Finally the Court 
considers that the domestic authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation and did 
not disregard their positive obligation to secure to Mr. Aksu effective respect for his private life. 
By 16 votes to one the Grand Chamber holds that there hasn’t been a violation of Article 8 the 
Convention. 
 
 Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, ECHR 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Vejdeland and others v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 9 February 2012 the European Court has ruled that Sweden did not violate the 
right to freedom of expression in a case about â€˜hate speech’. The criminal conviction of the 
applicants for distributing leaflets that contained anti-gay offensive statements was considered 
necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the rights of homosexuals. It is the first 
time that the Court applies the principles relating to freedom of expression and â€˜hate 
speech’ in the context of sexual orientation. 
 
In 2004 Mr Vejdeland, together with three other persons, went to an upper secondary school 
and distributed approximately a hundred leaflets by leaving them in or on the pupils’ lockers. 
The episode ended when the school’s principal intervened and made them leave the premises. 
The originator of the leaflets was an organisation called National Youth. Vejdeland and his 
companions were charged with agitation against a national or ethnic group (hets mot 
folkgrupp) because of the offensive and denigrating statements toward homosexuals. Vejdeland 
disputed that the text in the leaflets expressed hatred against homosexuals and he claimed 
that, in any event, he had not intended to express contempt for homosexuals as a group; the 
purpose had been to start a debate about the lack of objectivity in the education dispensed in 
Swedish schools. Vejdeland and his companions were convicted by the District Court, but the 
Court of Appeal rejected the charges on the ground that a conviction would amount to a 
violation of their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Swedish Supreme Court finally overruled this judgment and convicted 
Vejdeland and the others of agitation against a national or ethnic group. According to the 
Supreme Court the leaflets were formulated in a way that was offensive and disparaging for 
homosexuals as a group and in violation of the duty under Article 10 to avoid as far as possible 
statements that are unwarrantably offensive to others thus constituting an assault on their 
rights, and without contributing to any form of public debate which could help to further 
mutual understanding. The purpose of the relevant sections in the leaflets could have been 
achieved without statements that were offensive to homosexuals as a group. Vejdeland and his 
companions complained that the judgment of the Supreme Court constituted a violation of 
their freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court accepted Vejdeland’s argument that the leaflets had been distributed with 
the aim of starting a debate about the lack of objectivity of education in Swedish schools. But 
the Court also agrees with the Swedish Supreme Court that even if this is an acceptable 
purpose, regard must be paid to the wording of the leaflets. The Strasbourg Court observes 
that, according to the leaflets, homosexuality was “a deviant sexual proclivity” that had “a 
morally destructive effect on the substance of society”. The leaflets also alleged that 
homosexuality was one of the main reasons why HIV and AIDS had gained a foothold and that 
the “homosexual lobby” tried to play down paedophilia. In the Court’s opinion, although these 
statements did not directly recommend individuals to commit hateful acts, they are serious and 
prejudicial allegations. The Court reiterates that inciting to hatred does not necessarily entail a 
call for an act of violence, or other criminal acts. Indeed, attacks on persons committed by 
insulting, holding up to ridicule or slandering specific groups of the population can be 
sufficient for the authorities to favour combating racist speech in the face of freedom of 
expression exercised in an irresponsible manner. In this regard, the Court stresses that 
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discrimination based on sexual orientation is as serious as discrimination based on “race, origin 
or colour”. Furthermore, the leaflets were left in the lockers of young people who were at an 
impressionable and sensitive age and who had no possibility to decline to accept them. The 
European Court refers to the findings by the Supreme Court stressing that along with freedoms 
and rights people also have obligations and that one such obligation is, as far as possible, to 
avoid statements that are unwarrantably offensive to others, constituting an assault on their 
rights. The statements in the leaflets are considered unnecessarily offensive and the applicants 
had left the leaflets in or on the pupils’ lockers, thereby imposing them on the pupils. The 
European Court also notes that the applicants were not sentenced to imprisonment, although 
the crime of which they were convicted carries a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment. 
Instead, three of them were given suspended sentences combined with fines ranging from 
approximately EUR 200 to EUR 2,000, and the fourth applicant was sentenced to probation. The 
Court does not find these penalties excessive in the circumstances. The conviction of Vejdeland 
and the other applicants and the sentences imposed on them were not considered 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons given by the Swedish Supreme 
Court in justification of those measures were relevant and sufficient. The interference with the 
applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of expression could therefore reasonably be 
regarded by the Swedish authorities as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of 
the reputation and rights of others. These considerations were sufficient to enable the Court to 
conclude that the application did not reveal a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
Although the Court unanimously came to this conclusion, the concurring opinions of five of the 
seven judges indicate that there was still some hesitation on the argumentation why there was 
no violation of Article 10 and why the distribution and content of the leaflets amounted to a 
form of â€˜hate speech’ against homosexuals. 
 
 Vejdeland v. Sweden, no. 1813/07, 9 February 2012.  
 Fact sheet produced by the European Court of Human Rights on Hate Speech, February 
2012 [Editor’s note: link to updated version of fact sheet (June 2015)]. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Gillberg v. Sweden (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court has, more firmly than in its Chamber judgment of 2 
November 2010 (see IRIS 2011/1-1), confirmed that a Swedish professor, Mr. Gillberg, could not 
rely on his right to privacy under Article 8, nor on his (negative) right to freedom of expression 
and information under Article 10 of the Convention to justify his refusal to give access to a set 
of research materials belonging to Gothenburg University, on request of two other researchers, 
K and E. Mr. Gillberg was convicted of misuse of office. He was given a suspended sentence and 
a fine of the equivalent of EUR 4,000. In Strasbourg Mr. Gillberg complained that his criminal 
conviction breached his rights under Articles 8 and 10. 
 
As to the alleged breach of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court is of the opinion that the 
conviction of Mr. Gillberg did not affect his right to privacy. The Court confirmed that Article 8 
cannot be relied on in order to complain of a loss of reputation that is the foreseeable 
consequence of one’s own actions such as, for example, the commission of a criminal offence. 
As there was no indication that the impugned conviction had any repercussions on Mr. 
Gillberg’s professional activities that went beyond the foreseeable consequences of the 
criminal offence of which he was convicted, his rights under Article 8 had not been affected. 
 
Regarding the alleged breach of Article 10, the Court clarified that in the present case the 
applicant was not prevented from receiving and imparting information or in any other way 
prevented from exercising his “positive” right to freedom of expression. Indeed Mr. Gillberg 
argued that he had a “negative” right to refuse to make the disputed research materials 
available, and that consequently his conviction was in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
The Court is of the opinion that the finding that Mr. Gillberg would have a right under Article 
10 of the Convention to refuse to give access to the research materials in this case would not 
only run counter to the property rights of the University of Gothenburg, but “it would also 
impinge on K’s and E’s rights under Article 10, as granted by the Administrative Court of Appeal, 
to receive information in the form of access to the public documents concerned”. 
 
The Court also rejected the claim by Mr. Gillberg that he could invoke a right similar to that of 
journalists in having their sources protected under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court is of 
the opinion that Mr. Gillberg’s refusal to comply with the judgments of the Administrative Court 
of Appeal, by denying K and E access to the research materials, hindered the free exchange of 
opinions and ideas on the research in question, notably on the evidence and methods used by 
the researchers in reaching their conclusions, which constituted the main subject of K’s and E’s 
interest. In these circumstances the Court found that Mr. Gillberg’s situation could not be 
compared to that of journalists protecting their sources. On these grounds the Grand Chamber 
reached the conclusion that the rights of Mr. Gillberg under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention 
had not been affected and that these rights did not apply in the instant case. 
 
 Gillberg v. Sweden [GC], no. 41723/06, 3 April 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The case concerns the ineffectiveness of the enforcement of a court decision giving journalists 
the right of access to the premises of a local radio station where they worked (Radio M Plus). 
Access to their work premises had been obstructed by the representatives of the broadcasting 
company Tele M, situated in the same building. In a decision of 6 December 2002 the 
NeamÅ£ County Court ordered Tele M to grant Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan access to the Radio M Plus 
editorial office and held that the obstruction of their access by representatives of the Tele M 
company constituted an unlawful act that might be detrimental to the activities of the radio 
station of which they were the manager and editor respectively. Several attempts to have the 
court decision enforced failed, including a criminal complaint against the representatives of 
Tele M. Relying on Article 10 Frăsilă and Ms Ciocîrlan complained in Strasbourg that the 
authorities had failed to assist them in securing the enforcement of a final judicial decision 
ordering third parties to grant them access to the editorial office at the radio station where they 
worked as journalists. 
 
The Court emphasized that genuine, effective exercise of freedom of expression is a 
precondition of a functioning democracy. The right to freedom of expression does not depend 
merely on the State’s duty not to interfere but could require positive measures of protection, 
even in the sphere of relations between individuals. In determining whether the State had a 
positive obligation in that regard, the Court reiterated that it took into account the nature of 
the freedom of expression at stake, its capacity to contribute to public debate, the nature and 
scope of the restrictions imposed on freedom of expression, the existence of alternative means 
of exercising this freedom and the weight of the competing rights of others or the general 
public. 
 
Although in this case the authorities did not bear any direct responsibility for the restriction on 
the applicants’ freedom of expression, it was still necessary to determine whether or not the 
authorities had complied with any positive obligation they might have had to protect freedom 
of expression from interference by others. The Court observed that the case concerned the 
practice of a profession that played a crucial “watchdog” role in a democratic society, and that 
an essential element of freedom of expression, namely the means of exercising it, had 
therefore been at stake for Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan. The Court reiterated that the State was the 
ultimate guarantor of pluralism and that this role became even more crucial where the 
independence of the media was at risk as a result of outside pressure from those holding 
political and economic power, as it had been reported. As to whether the State had complied 
with its positive obligation, the Court observed that Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan had taken sufficient 
steps on their own initiative and made the necessary efforts to secure the enforcement of the 
court decision, but that the main legal means available to them for achieving this had proved 
inadequate and ineffective. Accordingly, the Court found that by refraining from taking the 
necessary measures to assist Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan in the enforcement of the court decision, the 
national authorities had deprived the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention of all useful 
effect. There had therefore been a violation of the right to freedom of expression. 
 
 Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan v. Romania, no. 25329/03, 10 May 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2009 Centro Europa 7 complained in Strasbourg that for a period of almost ten years the 
Italian Government had not allocated it any frequencies for analogue terrestrial television 
broadcasting, while the company had already obtained a licence for TV broadcasting in 1999. 
The company submitted that the failure to apply the broadcasting law of 1997, the refusal to 
enforce the Constitutional Court’s judgments imposing the effective allocation of frequencies 
for new private TV stations and the duopoly existing in the Italian television market (RAI and 
Mediaset) were in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. In this regard Centro Europa 7 
especially referred to the private broadcaster Mediaset - owned by the family of Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi - being treated preferentially and being the reason for the years-long 
postponing of making frequencies available to other broadcasting companies. 
 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights reiterates that a situation whereby 
a powerful economic or political group in society is permitted to obtain a position of 
dominance over the audiovisual media and thereby exercise pressure on broadcasters and 
eventually curtail their editorial freedom undermines the fundamental role of freedom of 
expression in a democratic society as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention, in particular 
where it serves to impart information and ideas of general interest, which the public is 
moreover entitled to receive. It also clarifies that in such a sensitive sector as the audiovisual 
media, in addition to its negative duty of non-interference the State has a positive obligation to 
put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework in order to guarantee 
effective pluralism. It recognises that the failure to allocate frequencies to Centro Europa 7 
deprived the licence it obtained in 1999 of all practical purpose since the activity it authorised 
was de facto impossible to carry out for nearly ten years, until June 2009. This substantial 
obstacle amounted to an interference with Centro Europa 7’s exercise of its right to impart 
information and ideas. According to the European Court this interference was not justified 
under the scope of Article 10§2 of the Convention as it was not ‘prescribed by law’. 
 
The Court indeed finds that the Italian legislative framework until 2009 lacked clarity and 
precision and did not enable Centro Europa 7 to foresee, with sufficient certainty, the point at 
which it might be allocated the frequencies and be able to start performing the activity for 
which it had been granted a licence in 1999, notwithstanding the successive findings of the 
Constitutional Court and the CJEU that the Italian law and practice was in breach of 
constitutional provisions and EU law. Furthermore the laws in question were couched in vague 
terms which did not define with sufficient precision and clarity the scope and duration of the 
transitional schemes for the allocation of frequencies. The Court also notes that the authorities 
did not observe the deadlines set in the licence, as resulting from Law no. 249/1997 and the 
judgments of the Constitutional Court, thereby frustrating Centro Europa 7’s expectations. The 
Italian Government has not shown that the company had effective means at its disposal to 
compel the authorities to abide by the law and the Constitutional Court’s judgments. 
Accordingly, it was not afforded sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness. For these reasons 
the Court considers that the legislative framework in Italy at the time did not satisfy the 
foreseeability requirement under the Convention and deprived the company of the measure of 
protection against arbitrariness required by the rule of law in a democratic society. This 
shortcoming resulted, among other things, in reduced competition in the audiovisual sector. It 
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therefore amounted to a failure by the State to comply with its positive obligation to put in 
place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to guarantee effective media 
pluralism. 
These findings were sufficient to conclude that there has been a violation of Centro Europa 7’s 
rights to the freedom to express and impart ideas and information under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court reached the same finding in relation to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (right 
of property) being violated, as the interference with the Centro Europa 7 company’s property 
rights did not have a sufficiently foreseeable legal basis either within the meaning of the 
Courts case-law. 
 
Centro Europa 7’s claim of EUR 10,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage was also 
awarded. The Court considered it appropriate to award this lump sum in compensation for the 
losses sustained and the loss of earnings resulting from the impossibility of making use of the 
licence by Centro Europa 7. In addition, the Court considered that the violations it had found of 
Article 10 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the instant case must have 
caused Centro Europa 7 “prolonged uncertainty in the conduct of its business and feelings of 
helplessness and frustration”. The Court also took into account that Centro Europa 7 already 
has been awarded compensation at domestic level, referring to the judgment of 20 January 
2009 of the Consiglio di Stato awarding the company the amount of EUR 1,041,418 in 
compensation. 
 
 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, ECHR 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicant association is the Swiss branch of the Raëlien Movement, an international 
association whose members believe life on earth was created by extraterrestrials. The 
association sought to conduct a poster campaign, but the local authorities refused permission 
on the grounds of public order and morals. The domestic courts upheld this decision, arguing 
that although the poster itself was not objectionable, because the Raëlien website address was 
included, one had to have regard to the documents and content published on that website. The 
courts held that the poster campaign could be banned on the basis that: (a) there was a link on 
the website to a company proposing cloning services; (b) the association advocated 
“geniocracy” i.e. government by those with a higher intelligence; and (c) there had been 
allegations of sexual offences against some members of the association. Mouvement raëlien 
made an application to the European Court arguing that the ban on its poster campaign was a 
violation of its right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention. In 
January 2011, the First Section of the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 10. 
In its judgment of 13 July 2012 the Grand Chamber has affirmed this finding, with a 9-8 vote. 
 
The Court reasoned that because the main aim of the poster and website was to merely draw 
people to the cause of the Raëlien Movement, the speech at issue was to be categorised as 
somewhere between commercial speech and proselytising speech. The Court takes the view 
that the type of speech in question is not political because the main aim of the website in 
question is to draw people to the cause of the applicant association and not to address matters 
of political debate in Switzerland. The Court clarifies that for this reason the management of 
public billboards in the context of poster campaigns that are not strictly political may vary from 
one State to another, or even from one region to another within the same State. The 
examination by the local authorities of the question whether a poster satisfies certain statutory 
requirements - for the defence of interests as varied as, for example, the protection of morals, 
road traffic safety or the preservation of the landscape - thus falls within the margin of 
appreciation afforded to States, as the authorities have a certain discretion in granting 
authorisation in this area. 
 
The Court takes the view that the national authorities were reasonably entitled to consider, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that it was indispensable to ban the 
campaign in question in order to protect health and morals, to protect the rights of others and 
to prevent crime. The judgment also comments on the controversial approach of banning the 
poster mainly on account of the content of the association’s website the poster referred to, 
while the association remained free to communicate via that same website, the website indeed 
itself not being prohibited, blocked or prosecuted for illegal content. In the Court’s view, 
however, such an approach is justified: to limit the scope of the impugned restriction to the 
display of posters in public places was a way of ensuring the minimum impairment of the 
applicant association’s rights. The Court reiterates that the authorities are required, when they 
decide to restrict fundamental rights, to choose the means that cause the least possible 
prejudice to the rights in question. In view of the fact that the applicant association is able to 
continue to disseminate its ideas through its website, and through other means at its disposal 
such as the distribution of leaflets in the street or in letter-boxes, the impugned measure 
cannot be said to be disproportionate. The majority of the Grand Chamber concluded that the 
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Swiss authorities did not overstep the broad margin of appreciation afforded to them in the 
present case, and the reasons given to justify their decisions were “relevant and sufficient” and 
met a “pressing social need”. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
 Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, ECHR 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. 
Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicant company, the Swiss Radio and Television Company (SSR) is a radio and television 
broadcaster based in Zurich. In 2004 it requested permission to have access to the Hindelbank 
Prison in order to prepare a television interview with A., a prisoner serving a sentence for 
murder. SSR wished to integrate this interview in the programme “Rundschau”, a weekly 
programme covering political and economic questions, in a feature concerning the trial of 
another person who had been accused of murder in the same case. SSR’s request was refused 
by the prison authorities who referred to the need to maintain peace, order and safety and to 
ensure equal treatment among prisoners. SSR complained about this refusal, on account of 
which it was unable to broadcast the planned interview in its “Rundschau” programme. SSR 
submitted that an interview with A., who had given her consent, was a matter of public interest 
given that even after her conviction, the case had continued to attract a great deal of media 
interest. But all appeals before the Swiss courts failed, as it was argued that the entitlement to 
film in prisons could endanger prisoner rehabilitation and violate the personality rights of 
prisoners. It was also argued that the organisation and supervision measures required for 
television filming exceeded what could reasonably be expected of the prison authorities. It was 
suggested that instead of filming in the prison, an audio recording or a simple interview could 
suffice, as images of the prisoner were not necessary for the purposes of a thematic report. 
Relying on Article 10, SSR complained in Strasbourg that it had not been granted permission to 
film an interview with a prisoner inside a prison. It argued that this refusal amounted to a 
violation of its right to freedom of expression and information. 
 
The European Court observed that in determining an issue of freedom of expression in the 
context of a very serious television broadcast devoted to a subject of particular public interest, 
the Swiss authorities had limited discretion to judge whether or not the ban on filming had met 
a “pressing social need”. While acknowledging that there had, at the outset, been grounds to 
justify the ban on filming - in particular with regard to the presumption of innocence of the 
person who was the subject of the programme and whose trial was imminent and the interests 
of the proper administration of justice - the Court observed that the grounds for the courts’ 
refusal had not been relevant or sufficient, either from the point of view of the other prisoners’ 
rights (privacy and rehabilitation) or from the point of view of maintaining order or security 
reasons. Furthermore, the Swiss courts had not examined the technical aspects submitted by 
SSR regarding the limited impact of the filming. As regards the duty of the authorities to 
protect A., the European Court noted that she had given her full and informed consent to the 
filming. The Court reiterated lastly, with regard to the alternatives to filming proposed by the 
Swiss authorities, that since Article 10 also protected the form by which ideas and information 
were conveyed, it was not for this Court, or for the national courts, to substitute their own 
views for those of the media as to what technique of reporting should be adopted by 
journalists. The telephone interview with A. broadcast by SSR in another programme had not in 
any way remedied the interference caused by the refusal to grant permission to film in prison. 
While reiterating that the national authorities in principle were better placed than the Court to 
make decisions concerning access by third parties to a prison, the Court emphasized that in 
matters of media reporting on issues of public interest, the margin of appreciation of the 
domestic authorities is reduced and any interference in this context must be convincingly 
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justified on pertinent and sufficient grounds. The Court concluded that the absolute ban 
imposed on SSR’s filming in the prison did not respond to this condition and had not met a 
“pressing social need”. For that reason, the majority of the Court, with a 5/2 decision (the 
German and the Swiss judge dissented), came to the conclusion that there has been a violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
 Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland, no. 34124/06, 21 June 
2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Ressiot and Others v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Once again the European Court has emphasised the importance of the protection of journalists’ 
sources, this time in a case concerning searches and seizures carried out at the French sporting 
daily L'Equipe, the weekly magazine Le Point and at the homes of some of their journalists. 
This judgment comes only a few months after the judgment of the European Court found a 
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention by the French authorities for disrespecting 
the protection of journalists’ sources (ECtHR 12 April 2012, Martin and Others v. France, Appl. 
Nr. 30002/08). 
 
The case Ressiot and Others v. France concerns investigations carried out at the premises of 
L’Equipe and Le Point and at the homes of five journalists accused of breaching the 
confidentiality of a judicial investigation. Both newspapers had published a series of articles 
about an ongoing investigation into alleged doping by the Cofidis cycle racing team in the Tour 
de France, an investigation carried out by the Drugs Squad. The French authorities wanted to 
identify the source of the leaks the journalists were obviously relying upon. Searches, seizures 
and telephone tapping were ordered. The five journalists requested that all the material seized 
and gathered during the searches at the newspapers’ offices and at their homes be declared 
null and void. While some of the investigative measures were considered null and void by the 
French courts, the seizure and placing under seal of certain materials were considered to be 
legitimate interferences, not violating the rights of the journalists. The five journalist lodged an 
application with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining that the investigations into 
their actions had been carried out in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In its judgment the Court reiterates the importance of the protection of journalistic sources as 
one of the cornerstones of freedom of the press. Without such protection, sources might be 
deterred from assisting the press in informing the public. As a result, the vital public-watchdog 
role of the press might be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and 
reliable information might be adversely affected. The Court accepts that the interference by the 
French authorities out of concern for the confidentiality of the investigation had been aimed at 
preventing the disclosure of confidential information, protecting the reputation of others, 
ensuring the proper conduct of the investigation and therefore protecting the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. According to the Court journalists cannot, in principle, be released 
from their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law. The Court, however, notes that when the 
searches were carried out and the telephone calls tapped, the sole aim had been to identify the 
source of the information published in the newspaper articles, while the right of journalists not 
to disclose their sources could not be considered a mere privilege to be granted or taken away 
depending on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources, but was part and parcel of the 
right to information. In this case there was no overriding social need to justify the interference 
with the journalists’ sources. The means used by the French authorities were not reasonably 
proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued having regard to the interest of a democratic 
society in ensuring and maintaining the freedom of the press. Hence the Court, unanimously, 
comes to the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
 Ressiot and Others v. France, no. 15054/07 and 15066/07, 28 June 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Szima v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicant in this case, Ms Judit Szima, was the chairperson of the Tettrekész Police Trade 
Union. She published a number of writings on the Trade Union’s website, which was effectively 
under her editorial control. In some of these writings she sharply criticized the police 
management, also referring to outstanding remunerations due to police staff, alleged nepotism 
and undue political influence in the force, as well as dubious qualifications of senior police 
staff. In 2010 Szima was convicted for instigation to insubordination. The Military Bench of the 
Budapest Court of Appeal confirmed her sentence as a fine and demotion. It held that the 
publication of the posted articles and statements on Tettrekész’s website had gone beyond 
Szima’s freedom of expression, given the particularities of the armed body to which she 
belonged. According to the Hungarian authorities, the views contained in the website articles 
constituted one-sided criticism whose truthfulness could and should not be proven. 
 
The Strasbourg Court confirms that the accusations by Szima of the senior police management 
of political bias and agenda, transgressions, unprofessionalism and nepotism were indeed 
capable of causing insubordination. The Court also observes that “it is true that Szima was 
barred from submitting evidence in the domestic proceedings - a matter of serious concern - 
however, in her attacks concerning the activities of police leadership, she failed to relate her 
offensive value judgments to facts”. The Court is of the opinion that Szima “has uttered, 
repeatedly, critical views about the manner in which police leaders managed the force, and 
accused them of disrespect of citizens and of serving political interests in general”, and that 
these views “overstepped the mandate of a trade union leader, because they are not at all 
related to the protection of labour-related interests of trade union members” (§ 31). In view of 
the margin of appreciation applicable, in order to maintain discipline by sanctioning accusatory 
opinions that undermine trust in, and the credibility of, the police leadership, the European 
Court accepts that there was a sufficient “pressing social need” to interfere with Szima’s 
freedom of expression. It also found that the relatively mild sanction imposed on the applicant 
- demotion and a fine - could not be regarded as disproportionate in the circumstances. By six 
votes to one, the Court concluded that there has been no violation of Article 10 read in the 
light of Article 11 of the Convention. 
 
The outcome of the case is somewhat surprising, as the Court firmly took as its starting point 
that “the members of a trade union must be able to express to their employer their demands by 
which they seek to improve the situation of workers in their company. A trade union that does 
not have the possibility of expressing its ideas freely in this connection would indeed be 
deprived of an essential means of action. Consequently, for the purpose of guaranteeing the 
meaningful and effective nature of trade union rights, the national authorities must ensure that 
disproportionate penalties do not dissuade trade union representatives from seeking to express 
and defend their members’ interests” (§ 28). 
 
As the sole dissent, the president of the Chamber, Judge Tulkens, vehemently disagreed with 
the reasoning of the Court. Tulkens refers to the finding by the Court’s majority that Szima’s 
critical remarks had overstepped the mandate of a trade union leader, because some of them 
were “not at all related to the protection of labour-related interests of trade union members”. 
Tulkens wonders whether the Court itself has not overstepped its mandate by casting this 
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judgment on the role of a trade union leader and on the “legitimate” scope of trade-union 
activities. In Tulkens’ view, the majority of the Court dismissed artificially the trade-union 
dimension of this case and, also neglected the importance of freedom of expression in a 
democratic society. 
 
• Szima v. Hungary, no. 29723/11, 9 October 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others 
v. the Netherlands 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
For the third time in a short period, the European Court of Human Rights has found that the 
Netherlands authorities have disrespected the right of journalists to protect their sources. This 
time the Court is of the opinion that the telephone tapping and surveillance of two journalists 
by the Netherlands security and intelligence services (AIVD) lacked a sufficient legal basis as 
the law did not provide safeguards appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against 
journalists with a view to discovering their sources. Also an order to surrender leaked 
documents belonging to the security and intelligence services is considered as a violation of 
the journalists’ rights as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The case concerns the actions taken by the domestic authorities against two journalists of the 
national daily newspaper De Telegraaf after having published articles about the Netherlands 
secret service AIVD, suggesting that highly secret information had been leaked to the criminal 
circuit, and more precisely to the drugs mafia. The journalists were ordered by the National 
Police International Investigation Department to surrender documents pertaining to the secret 
services’ activities. The two journalists had also been subject to telephone tapping and 
observation by AIVD agents. Their applications in court regarding these measures failed, at the 
level of the Regional Court in The Hague as well as at the level of the Supreme Court (Hoge 
Raad). It was emphasized that the AIVD investigation was intended to make an assessment of 
the leaked AIVD-files and, within that framework, it was considered necessary and 
proportionate to use special powers against the journalists in possession of the leaked files. 
Also the phone tapping was considered to meet the criteria of necessity, proportionality and 
subsidiarity. 
 
The European Court however disagrees with this approach by the Netherlands’ authorities. 
Referring to its earlier case law regarding the protection of journalists’ sources, the European 
Court reemphasized the necessity of the “ex ante” character of a review by a judge, a court or 
another independent body, as the police or a public prosecutor cannot be considered to be 
objective and impartial so as to make the necessary assessment of the various competing 
interests. The Court applies this approach also in the present case, as the use of special powers 
of surveillance and telephone tapping against the journalists appeared to have been authorised 
by the Minister of the Interior, or by an official of the AIVD, without prior review by an 
independent body with the power to prevent or terminate it. Therefore, the Court finds that the 
law did not provide safeguards appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against 
journalists with a view to discovering their sources. Regarding the second issue, the Court 
agrees that the order to surrender the leaked documents to the AIVD was prescribed by law, 
that the lawfulness of that order was assessed by a court and that it also pursued a legitimate 
aim. The Strasbourg Court however estimates the interference with the right of journalists to 
protect their sources in casu not necessary in a democratic society, as none of the reasons 
invoked by the AIVD are considered relevant and sufficient by the European Court. 
 
As a consequence of this judgment, the legal framework and the operational practices of many 
security and intelligence services in Europe will need to be modified, in order to guarantee the 
rights of journalists under Article 10 of the Convention. Without guarantees of an ex ante 
Back to overview of case-law 
294 
 
review by a judge or an independent body, surveillance or telephone tapping or other coercive 
measures against journalists by security and intelligence services are inevitably to be 
considered as breaches of the rights of journalists covered by Article 10. 
 
• Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 39315/06, 
22 November 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Nenkova-Lalova v. Bulgaria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a controversial judgment, with a 4/3 decision, the European Court of Human Rights 
dismissed the claim by a journalist, Ms. Nenkova-Lalova, regarding her dismissal from the 
Bulgarian public broadcaster BNR. The BNR journalist complained that her disciplinary 
dismissal, ostensibly on technical grounds regarding the way she had hosted one of her regular 
weekly radio shows, had in reality been a sanction for the way in which she had exposed 
corrupt practices during one of her radio shows. In that talk show unpleasant facts were 
revealed about the then ruling political party. However, as Nenkova-Lalova essentially had 
breached employment discipline within the meaning of the Bulgarian Labour Code and BNR 
regulations, the European Court agreed with the findings of the Sofia Court of Appeal and the 
Bulgarian Supreme Court that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court accepts that Nenkova-Lalova’s dismissal did amount to an interference 
with her rights under Article 10 of the Convention, but the dismissal was justified as it was 
prescribed by law, it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others and was 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The European Court is of the opinion that Nenkova-Lalova’s 
dismissal was based on her wilful disregard of an editorial decision concerning an issue of the 
internal organisation of the BNR, related to the presentation of a radio show and the journalists 
(not) participating in it. The Court observes that there had not been any limitations on the 
topics to be discussed during her show, or on the substantive content or manner of 
presentation of the information broadcast during the show. Therefore the Court cannot agree 
with the applicant that her dismissal was intended to prevent the dissemination of information 
of public interest: her capacity as a journalist “did not automatically entitle her to pursue, 
unchecked, a policy that ran counter to that outlined by her employer, to flout legitimate 
editorial decisions taken by the BNR’s management and intended to ensure balanced 
broadcasting on topics of public interest, or to have unlimited access to BNR’s air. There is 
nothing in the facts of the present case to suggest that the decisions of the BNR’s management 
in relation to the applicant’s show were taken under pressure from the outside or that the 
BNR’s management was subject to outside interferences”. The Court also comes to the 
conclusion that although it is true that a dismissal by way of disciplinary sanction is a severe 
measure, it cannot be overlooked that the facts showed that her employer could not trust her to 
perform her duties in good faith. Insisting that employment relations should be based on 
mutual trust applies even more when it comes to journalists employed by a public broadcasting 
organisation. In sum, the Court does not consider that Nenkova-Lalova has established that her 
dismissal was intended to stifle her freedom to express herself rather than enable the public 
broadcasting organisation by which she was employed - the BNR - to ensure the requisite 
discipline in its broadcasts, in line with its “duties and responsibilities” under Article 10 of the 
Convention. There has therefore been no violation of that provision. The three dissenting 
judges are of the opinion that the functioning of the BNR and especially the manner in which 
decisions relevant to the editorial choices of journalists hosting programmes were dealt with, 
did not offer the necessary safeguards for the rights, activities, performance and independence 
of the journalists in their relationship with the public employer. They also consider that the act 
attributed to Nenkova-Lalova taken within this context of a rather unclear division of 
responsibilities as concerns editorial choices within a given programme does not appear to 
have been so grave or so far-reaching in its effects as to have irrevocably breached the mutual 
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trust between employer and employee. The opinion that the Bulgarian authorities have violated 
Article 10 of the Convention however is not shared by the majority of the Court. Four of the 
seven judges indeed found that the dismissal of the BNR journalist did not amount to a breach 
of Article 10. 
 
• Nenkova-Lalova v. Bulgaria, no. 35745/05, 11 December 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has reinforced the right of individuals to access the 
internet in a judgment against wholesale blocking of online content. A Turkish PhD student 
named Ahmet Yildirim claimed before the European Court that he had faced “collateral 
censorship” when his Google-hosted website was shut down by the Turkish authorities as a 
result of a judgment by a criminal court order to block access to Google Sites in Turkey. The 
court injunction was promulgated in order to prevent further access to one particular website 
hosted by Google, which included content deemed offensive to the memory of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic. Due to this order Yildirim’s academically-focused 
website, which was unrelated to the website with the allegedly insulting content regarding the 
memory of Atatürk, was effectively blocked by the Turkish Telecommunications Directorate 
(TIB). According to TIB, blocking access to Google Sites was the only technical means of 
blocking the offending site, as its owner was living outside Turkey. Yildirim’s subsequent 
attempts to remedy the situation and to regain access to his website hosted by the Google Sites 
service were unsuccessful. 
 
The European Court is unanimously of the opinion that the decision taken and upheld by the 
Turkish authorities to block access to Google Sites amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, guaranteeing the freedom 
to express, receive and impart information and ideas 'regardless of frontiers'. The Court is of the 
opinion that the order, in the absence of a strict legal framework, was not prescribed by law. 
Although the order might have had a legitimate aim, as it was aimed at blocking a website 
allegedly insulting the memory of Atatürk, the order was not sufficiently based on a strict legal 
framework regulating the scope of a ban and affording the guarantee of judicial review to 
prevent possible abuses. The Court clarifies that a restriction on access to a source of 
information is only compatible with the Convention if a strict legal framework, containing such 
guarantees, is in place. The judgment further makes clear that the Turkish courts should have 
had regard to the fact that such a measure would render large amounts of information 
inaccessible, thus directly affecting the rights of internet users and having a significant 
collateral effect. It is also observed that the Turkish law had conferred extensive powers to an 
administrative body, the TIB, in the implementation of a blocking order originally issued in 
relation to a specified website. Moreover, there was no evidence that Google Sites had been 
informed that it was hosting content held to be illegal, or that it had refused to comply with an 
interim measure concerning a site that was the subject of pending criminal proceedings. 
Furthermore, the criminal court had not made any attempt to weigh up the various interests at 
stake, in particular by assessing whether it was necessary and proportionate to block all access 
to Google Sites. The European Court observes that the Turkish law obviously did not require the 
court to examine whether the wholesale blocking of Google was justified. Such a measure that 
renders large amounts of information on the internet inaccessible must be considered however 
to effect directly the rights of Internet users, having a significant collateral damage on their 
right of access to the Internet. As the effects of the measure have been arbitrary and the 
judicial review of the blocking of access to internet websites has been insufficient to prevent 
abuses, the interference with Mr. Yildirim’s rights amounts to a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention by the Turkish authorities. 
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With this judgment the European Court of Human Rights has explicitly reinforced the right of 
individuals to access the internet, as in its ruling against the wholesale blocking of online 
content, it asserted that the internet has now become one of the principal means of exercising 
the right to freedom of expression and information. 
 
• Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, ECHR 2012.  
• Fact sheet of December 2012 on the European Court’s case law on New Technologies  
[Editor’s note: link to updated version of fact sheet]. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ashby Donald and others v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
For the first time in a judgment on the merits, the European Court has clarified that a 
conviction based on copyright law for illegally reproducing or publicly communicating 
copyright-protected material can be regarded as an interference with the right of freedom of 
expression and information under Article 10 of the European Convention. Such interference 
must be in accordance with the three conditions enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 
10 of the Convention. Due to the important wide margin of appreciation available to the 
national authorities in this particular case, the impact of Article 10 however is very modest and 
minimal. 
 
All three applicants in this case are fashion photographers. They were convicted in France for 
copyright infringement following the publication of pictures on the Internet site Viewfinder. 
The photos were taken at fashion shows in Paris in 2003 and published without the permission 
of the fashion houses. The three fashion photographers were ordered by the Court of Appeal of 
Paris to pay fines of between EUR 3,000 and EUR 8,000 and an award of damages to the French 
design clothing Federation and five fashion houses, amounting in total to EUR 255,000. The 
photographers were also ordered to pay for the publication of the judgment of the Paris Court 
of Appeal in three professional newspapers or magazines. In its judgment of 5 February 2008 
the Supreme Court (Court de Cassation) dismissed the applicants’ argumentation based on 
Article 10 of the Convention and on Article 122-9° of the Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle 
(French Copyright Act). The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Court of Appeal had 
sufficiently justified its decision, as the applicants could not rely on an exception in French 
copyright law, allowing the reproduction, representation or public communication of works 
exclusively for news reporting and information purposes. 
 
In Strasbourg the applicants complained in particular of a breach of their rights under Article 
10 of the European Convention. The Court explicitly recognises the applicability of Article 10 in 
this case, considering the conviction of the applicants and the order to pay damages as an 
interference with their right to freedom of expression, which also includes the publication of 
pictures on the internet. The Court, however, is of the opinion that a wide margin of 
appreciation is to be given to the domestic authorities in this case, as the publication of the 
pictures of models at a fashion show and the fashion clothing shown on the catwalk in Paris 
was not related to an issue of general interest to society and concerned a kind of “commercial 
speech”. Furthermore, the member states are considered to be in a position to balance 
conflicting rights and interests, such as the right of freedom of expression under Article 10 of 
the Convention with the right of property (including intellectual property), as protected by 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention. 
 
The European Court agrees with the French Court’s finding that the applicants reproduced and 
represented the pictures without the authorisation of the copyright holders, hence infringing 
the rights of the intellectual property of others. The European Court refers to the reasoning by 
the Paris Court, emphasizing that it saw no reason to consider “that the national judge had 
overstepped his/her margin of appreciation by giving prevalence to the rights of fashion 
creators over the right to freedom of expression of the applicants”. The European Court does 
not find the fines and the award of damages disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, 
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arguing that the applicants gave no evidence that these sanctions had “financially strangled” 
them and referring to the guarantees of a fair trial not being under dispute in this matter. In 
these circumstances and taking into account the particularly important margin of appreciation 
of the national authorities, the Court concludes unanimously that there is no violation of Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
• Ashby Donald and Others v. France, no. 36769/08, 10 January 2013.   
 
IRIS 2013-3/1 
 
Back to overview of case-law 
301 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. 
Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Only a few weeks after the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in the case of Ashby Donald and others 
v. France (ECtHR 10 January 2013, see IRIS 2013-3/1), the Court has decided a new case of 
conflicting rights, opposing copyright as intellectual property right under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol and freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The case 
concerned the complaint by two of the co-founders of The Pirate Bay, that their conviction for 
complicity to commit crimes in violation of copyright law had breached their freedom of 
expression and information. During 2005 and 2006, Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi 
were involved in different aspects of one of the world’s largest file-sharing services on the 
Internet, the website The Pirate Bay (TPB). TPB made it possible for users to come into contact 
with each other through torrent files. The users could then, outside TPB’s computers, exchange 
digital material through file-sharing. In 2008 Nej and Sunde were charged with complicity to 
commit crimes in violation of the Swedish Copyright Act. Several companies in the 
entertainment business brought private claims within the criminal proceedings procedure 
against the defendants and demanded compensation for the illegal use of copyright-protected 
music, films and computer games. In 2010 Neij and Sunde were convicted and sentenced to 
prison sentences of ten and eight months respectively, and ordered to pay damages of 
approximately EUR 5 million. Neij and Sunde complained under Article 10 of the Convention 
that their right to receive and impart information had been violated when they were convicted 
for other persons’ use of TPB. They also alleged that they could not be held responsible for 
other people’s use of TPB, the initial purpose of which was merely to facilitate the exchange of 
data on the Internet. 
 
In its decision of 19 February 2013 the European Court affirmed that the applicants have put in 
place the means for others to impart and receive information within the meaning of Article 10 
of the Convention and that consequently the convictions of Neij and Sunde interfered with their 
right to freedom of expression. Such interference breaches Article 10 unless it was “prescribed 
by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10 § 2 and was 
“necessary in a democratic society” to attain such aim or aims. 
 
That the interference by the Swedish authorities was prescribed by law and pursued the 
legitimate aim of the protection of rights of others and prevention of crime, was not under 
discussion. Again the crucial question was whether this interference corresponded to a pressing 
social need, meeting the test of necessity in a democratic society. The Court argued that the 
Swedish authorities had a particularly wide margin of appreciation to decide on the matter - 
especially since the information at stake was not given the same level of protection as political 
expression and debate - and that their obligation to protect copyright under both the Copyright 
Act and the Convention had constituted weighty reasons for the restriction of the applicants’ 
freedom of expression. Due to the nature of the information at hand and the balancing interest 
of conflicting Convention rights, the wide margin of appreciation the national authorities could 
rely on in this case, was therefore particularly important. The Swedish courts advanced relevant 
and sufficient reasons to consider that the activities of Neij and Sunde within the commercially 
run TPB amounted to criminal conduct requiring appropriate punishment. In reaching this 
conclusion, the European Court had regard to the fact that the domestic courts found that Neij 
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and Sunde had not taken any action to remove the torrent files infringing copyright, despite 
having been urged to do so. Instead they had been indifferent to the fact that copyright-
protected works had been the subject of file-sharing activities via TPB. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the interference with the right to freedom of expression of Neij and Sunde had 
been necessary in a democratic society. It rejected the application under Article 10 of the 
Convention as manifestly ill-founded. 
 
• Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (dec.), no. 40397/12, ECHR 2013.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Eon v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a Chamber judgment of 14 March 2013 the European Court of Human Rights made clear that 
the French president should not be overprotected against insulting statements, especially when 
these statements, with a satirical undertone, have been uttered as part of a public or political 
debate. 
 
The case concerns the criminal conviction of Hervé Eon, a socialist and anti-GM activist living 
in Laval, for insulting the President of France, Mr. Sarkozy. In 2008, during a visit to Laval by 
the President of France, Eon waved a small placard reading “Casse toi pov’con” (“Get lost, you 
sad prick”), an allusion to a much publicised phrase that the President himself had uttered 
earlier that year at the International Agricultural Show in response to a farmer who had refused 
to shake his hand. The phrase had given rise to extensive comment and media coverage and 
had been widely circulated on the Internet and used as a slogan at demonstrations. Eon was 
immediately arrested by police and taken to the police station. He was prosecuted by the public 
prosecutor for insulting the president, an offence punishable under section 26 of the Freedom 
of the Press Act of 29 July 1881. The court of first instance of Laval found, in particular, that by 
repeating the phrase in question, Eon had clearly intended to cause offence to the head of 
State. Eon was fined EUR 30, a penalty that was suspended. The judgment was upheld by the 
court of appeal of Angers. Subsequently, an appeal to the Supreme Court (Court de Cassation) 
was dismissed. Eon lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, arguing 
that his conviction for insulting the President of France had infringed his freedom of 
expression. 
 
While accepting that the phrase in issue, taken literally, was offensive to the French President, 
the European Court considered that the showing of the placard with the slogan should be 
examined within the overall context of the case. The European Court emphasized the 
importance of free discussion of matters of public interest. The Court considered that Eon’s 
repetition of a phrase uttered earlier by the President had not targeted the latter’s private life 
or honour; nor had it simply amounted to a gratuitous personal attack against him. Instead, the 
Court took the view that Eon’s criticisms had been political in nature. There was therefore little 
scope under Article 10 for restrictions on freedom of expression in the political sphere. The 
Court reiterated that politicians inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close public 
scrutiny of their words and deeds and consequently had to display a greater degree of tolerance 
towards criticism directed at them. Furthermore, by echoing an abrupt phrase that had been 
used by the President himself and had attracted extensive media coverage and widespread 
public comment, much of it humorous in tone, Eon had chosen to adopt a satirical approach. 
Since satire was a form of expression and comment that naturally aimed to provoke and 
agitate, any interference with the right to such expression had to be examined with particular 
care. The European Court held that criminal penalties for an expression and conduct such as 
that displayed by Eon were likely to have a chilling effect on satirical contributions to 
discussion of matters of public interest, such discussion being fundamental to a democratic 
society. The criminal penalty imposed on Eon, although modest, had thus been 
disproportionate to the aim pursued and unnecessary in a democratic society. The European 
Court therefore found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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• Eon v. France, no. 26118/10, 14 March 2013. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Ten years after the finding by the European Court of a violation of Articles 8 (right to respect 
for private and family life) and 10 (freedom of expression and information) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights in the case Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg (25 February 2003, 
IRIS 2003/5-3), the Luxembourg authorities have again been found in breach of these Articles 
by issuing a search and seizure warrant disrespecting the protection of journalistic sources. 
 
In 2009 a judicial investigation was opened concerning an article in the newspaper Contacto, 
published by Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. The article described the situation of families who 
had lost the custody of their children. A social worker who was mentioned in the article and his 
employer, the central social welfare department, had lodged a complaint with the Attorney 
General, alleging defamation of the social worker in question and also of the judicial and social 
welfare system in Luxembourg in general. An investigating judge issued a search and seizure 
warrant of the offices of the publishing house in order to identify the author of the article at 
issue. A few days later, police officers presented themselves at the premises of the newspaper, 
with the search warrant. The journalist who had written the article (his name was partly 
mentioned under the article), was formally identified and he handed over a copy of the 
newspaper, a notebook and various documents used in preparing the article. During the search 
one of the police officers also introduced a USB-stick in the computer of the journalist, 
eventually copying files from that computer. A short time later the applicant company and the 
journalist applied to the District Court to have the warrant set aside and the search and seizure 
operation declared null and void, but this claim was rejected. Later the Court of Appeal upheld 
the warrant. 
 
Relying on Article 8, Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. alleged that the search of the newspaper had 
infringed the inviolability of its “home” and had been disproportionate. Relying on Article 10 it 
argued that the measure in question had consisted of an attempt to identify the journalist’s 
sources and had had an intimidating effect. With regard to Article 8 of the Convention, the 
European Court is of the opinion that the investigating judge could have opted for a less 
intrusive measure than a search in order to confirm the identity of the article’s author, as it was 
rather obvious which journalist of Contacto had written the article at issue. As the search and 
seizure operation was not necessary and had not been reasonably proportionate to the 
legitimate aims pursued, the European Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of 
the Convention. The Strasbourg Court also considered that the warrant in question had given 
the police officers access to information that the journalist had not intended for publication 
and that would have made it possible to identify his sources. The purpose of the warrant had 
been to search for “and seize any documents or items, irrespective of form or medium, 
connected with the alleged offences”. Being formulated in such broad terms, the warrant had 
conferred extensive powers on the investigating officers. The search and seizure operation had 
been disproportionate in so far as it had enabled the police officers to identify the journalist’s 
sources and the warrant itself had not been sufficiently limited in scope to avoid the possibility 
of such abuse. Since the sole purpose of the search had been to ascertain the identity of the 
journalist who had written the article, a more narrowly-worded warrant would have sufficed. 
The European Court therefore also found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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• Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, no. 26419/10, 18 April 2013.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court held, by nine votes to eight, that the UK’s ban on 
political advertising on television did not violate Article 10 of the Convention. The majority 
opinion in this controversial judgment reflects a somewhat particular approach compared to 
the Court’s previous case law on political advertising, such as in VgT Vereinigung gegen 
Tierfabriken v. Switzerland (see IRIS 2001-7/2 and IRIS 2009-10/2). Essentially the judgment in 
the case of Animal Defenders International v. UK accepts that a total ban on political 
advertising on television, characterized by a broad definition of the term “political”, with no 
temporal limitations and no room for exceptions, is in accordance with the right to freedom of 
political expression. The dissenting opinions attached to the judgment argued for a radically 
different approach, but their arguments could not convince the majority of the Grand Chamber. 
 
The applicant in this case is an NGO (Animal Defenders International, “ADI”) campaigning 
against the use of animals in commerce, science and leisure, seeking to achieve changes in law 
and public policy and to influence public and parliamentary opinion to that end. In 2005, ADI 
began a campaign directed against the keeping and exhibition of primates in zoos and circuses 
and their use in television advertising. As part of the campaign, it wished to screen a TV 
advertisement with images of a girl in chains in an animal cage followed by a chimpanzee in 
the same position. It submitted the advert to the Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre (“the 
BACC”), for a review of its compliance with relevant laws and codes. The BACC refused to clear 
the advert, drawing attention to the political nature of ADI’s objectives, referring to section 
321(2) of the Communications Act 2003, which prohibits advertisements “directed towards a 
political end”. The refusal to broadcast the advert was confirmed by the High Court and later 
reached the House of Lords, which held that the ban on political advertising and its application 
in this case did not violate Article 10 of the European Convention. ADI subsequently submitted 
an application to the European Court, arguing that the refusal of their advert breached Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
In the first part of its reasoning, the Court emphasizes that both ADI and the UK authorities had 
the same objective of maintaining a free and pluralist debate on matters of public interest, and 
more generally, of contributing to the democratic process as a legitimate aim. The Court 
weighed in the balance, on the one hand, ADI’s right to impart information and ideas of general 
interest which the public is entitled to receive, with, on the other hand, the authorities’ desire 
to protect the democratic debate and process from distortion by powerful financial groups with 
advantageous access to influential media. 
 
The Court had three main considerations in making its assessment: the legislative process by 
which the ban had been adopted and any review by the judicial authorities; the impact of the 
ban and any steps that might have been taken to moderate its effect; and, what happens in 
other countries, particularly those where the Convention applies. As far as the process was 
concerned, account was taken of the fact that the complex regulatory regime governing 
political broadcasting in the United Kingdom had been subjected to exacting and pertinent 
reviews and validated by both parliamentary and judicial bodies. The Court also referred to the 
influential, immediate and powerful impact of the broadcast media, while there is no evidence 
that the development of the internet and social media in recent years in the United Kingdom 
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has shifted this influence to the extent that the need for a ban specifically on broadcast media 
should be undermined, internet and social media not having “the same synchronicity or impact 
as broadcasted information”. The Court also noticed that the ban was relaxed in a controlled 
fashion for political parties - the bodies most centrally part of the democratic process - by 
providing them with free party political, party election and referendum campaign broadcasts. 
The European Court agreed with the UK authorities that allowing a less restrictive prohibition 
could give rise to abuse and arbitrariness, such as wealthy bodies with agendas being fronted 
by social advocacy groups created for that precise purpose or creating a large number of similar 
interest groups, thereby accumulating advertising time. Given the complex regulatory 
background, this form of control could lead to uncertainty, litigation, expense and delay. 
 
As to the impact of the ban, the Court noted that the ban only applied to advertising and that 
ADI had access to alternative media, both radio and television and also non-broadcast, such as 
print media, the internet and social media, demonstrations, posters and flyers. Finally, because 
there is no European consensus on how to regulate paid political advertising in broadcasting, 
this broadens the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the UK authorities in this case. 
Accordingly, the majority of the Court considers the reasons adduced by the authorities, to 
justify the prohibition of ADI’s advertisement to be relevant and sufficient. The prohibition 
cannot therefore be considered to amount to a disproportionate interference with ADI’s right to 
freedom of expression. Hence there is no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, ECHR 2013 
(extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Meltex Ltd v. Armenia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 17 June 2008, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment in the case of 
Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia (see IRIS 2008-8/1). The Court held that there had been a 
breach of Article 10 of the Convention as the refusal by the Armenian National Radio and 
Television Commission (NTRC) to allocate a broadcasting license to Meltex, amounted to an 
interference with Meltex’ freedom to impart information and ideas that did not meet the 
Convention requirement of lawfulness. The Court noted, in particular, that a procedure that did 
not require a licensing body to justify or motivate its decisions did not provide adequate 
protection against arbitrary interference by a public authority with the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression. In 2009 Meltex complained in Strasbourg that the Armenian authorities 
had failed to enforce the Court’s judgment of 17 June 2008. In particular, relying on the Court’s 
Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland 
(no. 2) (see IRIS 2009-10/2), Meltex claimed that the refusal of the Court of Cassation in 
Armenia to reopen its case constituted a fresh violation of its freedom of expression under 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In its decision of 21 May 2013, the European Court of Human Rights reiterates that a judgment 
in which the Court finds a breach of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on the respondent 
State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just 
satisfaction. The State must also take the appropriate general or individual measures required 
to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects of 
that violation. Subject to monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, the respondent State 
however remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligations 
under the Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in 
the Court’s judgment. The European Court itself does not have jurisdiction to verify whether a 
State has complied with the obligations imposed on it by one of the Court’s judgments. The 
situation is different however when it concerns a new interference or a new issue. A “new issue” 
can result from the continuation of the violation that formed the basis of the Court’s initial 
decision, but the determination of the existence of a “new issue” very much depends on the 
specific circumstances of a given case. In Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia, the Committee 
of Ministers ended its supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgment of 17 June 2008, 
after the refusal by the Court of Cassation to reopen the proceedings. Although the Committee 
of Ministers had been informed that the Court of Cassation had dismissed the application to 
reopen the proceedings, in its resolution the Committee of Ministers declared itself satisfied 
with the individual and general measures taken by the Republic of Armenia to execute the 
Court’s judgment. That being so, the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to examine Meltex’ 
complaint as it did not contain a new issue and therefore the application is incompatible 
ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. The Court rejected the application under 
Article 10 of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded. 
 
• Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia (dec.), no. 45199/09, ECHR 2013.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In its judgment of 25 June 2013, the European Court of Human Rights has recognised more 
explicitly than ever before the right of access to documents held by public authorities, based on 
Article 10 of the Convention (right to freedom of expression and information). The judgment 
also emphasised the importance of NGOs acting in the public interest. 
 
The case concerns an NGO, known as Youth Initiative for Human Rights, that is monitoring the 
implementation of transitional laws in Serbia with a view to ensuring respect for human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. The applicant NGO requested the intelligence agency of Serbia 
to provide it with some factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance 
measures used by that agency in 2005. The agency at first refused the request, relying on the 
statutory provision applicable to secret information. After an order by the Information 
Commissioner that the information at issue should be disclosed under the Serbian Freedom of 
Information Act 2004, the intelligence agency notified the applicant NGO that it did not hold 
the requested information. Youth Initiative for Human Rights complained in Strasbourg about 
the refusal to have access to the requested information held by the intelligence agency, 
notwithstanding a final and binding decision of the Information Commissioner in its favour. 
 
The European Court is of the opinion that as Youth Initiative for Human Rights was obviously 
involved in the legitimate gathering of information of public interest with the intention of 
imparting that information to the public and thereby contributing to the public debate, there 
has been an interference with its right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of 
the Convention. The Court recalls that the notion of “freedom to receive information” embraces 
a right of access to information. Although this freedom may be subject to restrictions that can 
justify certain interferences, the Court emphasises that such restrictions ought to be in 
accordance with domestic law. The Court is of the opinion that the refusal to provide access to 
public documents did not meet the criterion as being prescribed by law. It refers to the fact that 
the intelligence agency indeed informed the applicant NGO that it did not hold the information 
requested, but for the Court it is obvious that this “response is unpersuasive in view of the 
nature of that information (the number of people subjected to electronic surveillance by that 
agency in 2005) and the agency’s initial response”. The Court comes to the conclusion that the 
“obstinate reluctance of the intelligence agency of Serbia to comply with the order of the 
Information Commissioner” was in defiance of domestic law and tantamount to arbitrariness, 
and that accordingly there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. It is interesting 
to note that the Court reiterates in robust terms that an NGO can play a role as important as 
that of the press in a democratic society: “when a non-governmental organisation is involved in 
matters of public interest, such as the present applicant, it is exercising a role as a public 
watchdog of similar importance to that of the press”. Finally, as a measure under Article 46 of 
the Convention, the Court ordered the Serbian State to ensure, within three months from the 
date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, 
the intelligence agency of Serbia to provide the applicant NGO with the information requested. 
 
• Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, no. 48135/06, 25 June 2013.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Nagla v. Latvia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Once again the European Court of Human Rights has found a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention in a case of protection of journalistic sources. The Court is of the opinion that the 
Latvian investigating authorities failed to adequately protect the sources of a journalist of the 
national television broadcaster Latvijas televīzija  (LTV), Ms Nagla. The journalist’s home was 
searched and data storage devices were seized following a broadcast she had aired informing 
the public of an information leak from the State Revenue Service (Valsts ieņēmumu dienests - 
VID) database. Almost three months after the broadcast of the programme on LTV, Ms Nagla’s 
home was searched, and a laptop, an external hard drive, a memory card, and four flash drives 
were seized with the aim of collecting information concerning the data leaks at VID. The search 
warrant was drawn up by the investigator and authorised by a public prosecutor. Relying on 
Article 10 of the European Convention, Ms Nagla complained that the search of her home 
meant that she had been compelled to disclose information that had enabled a journalistic 
source to be identified, violating her right to receive and impart information. 
 
According to the Court the concept of journalistic “source” refers to “any person who provides 
information to a journalist”, while “information identifying a source” includes, as insofar as they 
are likely to lead to the identification of a source, both “the factual circumstances of acquiring 
information from a source by a journalist” and “the unpublished content of the information 
provided by a source to a journalist”. While recognising the importance of securing evidence in 
criminal proceedings, the Court emphasises that a chilling effect will arise wherever journalists 
are seen to assist in the identification of anonymous sources. The Court confirms that a search 
conducted with a view to identifying a journalist’s source is a more drastic measure than an 
order to divulge the source’s identity, and it considers that it is even more so in the 
circumstances of the present case, where the search warrant was drafted in such vague terms 
as to allow the seizure of “any information” pertaining to the crime under investigation 
allegedly committed by the journalist’s source, irrespective of whether or not his identity had 
already been known to the investigating authorities. The Court reiterates that limitations on the 
confidentiality of journalistic sources call for the most careful scrutiny by the Court. It also 
emphasises that any search involving the seizure of data storage devices such as laptops, 
external hard drives, memory cards and flash drives belonging to a journalist raises a question 
of the journalist’s freedom of expression including source protection and that the access to the 
information contained therein must be protected by sufficient and adequate safeguards against 
abuse. The scarce motivation of the domestic authorities as to the perishable nature of 
evidence linked to cybercrimes in general, cannot be considered sufficient in the present case, 
given the investigating authorities’ delay in carrying out the search and the lack of any 
indication of impending destruction of evidence. The Court finds that the investigating judge 
failed to establish that the interests of the investigation in securing evidence were sufficient to 
override the public interest in the protection of the journalist’s freedom of expression, 
including source protection. Because of the lack of relevant and sufficient reasons, the 
interference with Ms Nagla’s freedom to impart and receive information did not correspond to a 
“pressing social need”, hence there was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Nagla v. Latvia, no. 73469/10, 16 July 2013.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has recently clarified the application of freedom 
of expression when conflicting with personality rights in the environment of online news media 
and digital archives. The case concerns the complaint by two lawyers that a newspaper article 
damaging to their reputation - which the Polish courts, in previous libel proceedings, had found 
to be based on insufficient information and in breach of their rights - remained accessible to 
the public on the newspaper’s website. They complained that the Polish authorities, by refusing 
to order that the online version of the news article should be removed from the newspaper’s 
website archive, breached their rights to respect for their private life and reputation as 
protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In its judgment, the Court emphasises the potential impact of online media, stating that the 
Internet is “an information and communication tool particularly distinct from the printed media, 
especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit information”. The Court stresses the 
substantial contribution made by Internet archives to preserving and making available news 
and information and it reiterates that news archives “constitute an important source for 
education and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and 
are generally free. While the primary function of the press in a democracy is to act as a ‘public 
watchdog’, archives have a valuable secondary role in maintaining and making available to the 
public archives containing news which has previously been reported”. According to the Court 
the internet “is not and potentially never be subject to the same regulations and control” as the 
traditional media. The Court, however, also recognises that “the risk of harm posed by content 
and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by 
the press”. Therefore it accepts that the policies governing reproduction of material from the 
printed media and the Internet may differ, taking also into consideration technology’s specific 
features in order to secure the protection and promotion of the rights and freedoms at issue. 
 
Turning to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court is of the opinion that the 
newspaper was not obliged to completely remove from its Internet archive the article at issue, 
as was requested by the two lawyers. The Court firmly states “that it is not the role of judicial 
authorities to engage in rewriting history by ordering the removal from the public domain of all 
traces of publications which have in the past been found, by final judicial decisions, to amount 
to unjustified attacks on individual reputations” and it also refers to the legitimate interest of 
the public to have access to the public Internet archives of the press, as being protected under 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court is of the view that the alleged violations of rights 
protected under Article 8 of the Convention should be redressed by more adequate remedies 
available under domestic law and it refers to the observation by the Warsaw Court of Appeal in 
the present case, that it would have been desirable to add a comment to the article on the 
website informing the public of the outcome of the civil proceedings in the earlier libel case 
regarding the printed version of the article. The Court observes that in the proceedings at the 
domestic level the applicants did not submit a specific request for the information to be 
rectified by means of the addition of a reference to the earlier judgments in their favour. It 
follows from the Court’s judgment that a rectification or a reference to the judgment in the 
libel case about the printed version of the article at issue, would have been a pertinent and 
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sufficient interference with the rights of the newspaper in order to secure in its online archives 
the effective protection of the applicants’ rights. Hence, the Court accepts that the Polish 
authorities complied with their obligation to strike a balance between the rights guaranteed by 
Article 10 and Article 8 of the Convention. The requested limitation on freedom of expression 
for the sake of the applicants’ reputation in the circumstances of the present case would have 
been disproportionate under Article 10 of the Convention. Therefore the Court comes to the 
conclusion that there has been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
• Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, no. 33846/07, 16 July 2013.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Von Hannover no. 3 v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a new judgment regarding a complaint by 
Princess Caroline von Hannover that the German courts had not sufficiently protected her right 
to privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, by giving too much weight to the right 
of the press as guaranteed by Article 5 of the German Constitution and Article 10 of the 
European Convention (see earlier also Von Hannover no. 1 v. Germany, IRIS 2004-8/2 and Von 
Hannover no. 2 v. Germany, IRIS 2012-3/1). This time the Princess of Monaco lodged an appeal 
in Strasbourg relating to the refusal by the German courts to grant an injunction prohibiting any 
further publication of a photograph of her and her husband. The photograph that was the 
subject of the litigation was published in the magazine 7 Tage in 2002. It was taken without 
the Princess’ knowledge while on holiday and it illustrated an article about the trend among 
the very wealthy towards letting out their holiday homes. With reasoning similar to that of Von 
Hannover no. 2, the European Court could not find a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court refers to its judgments in Axel Springer AG v. Germany and Von Hannover 
no. 2 v. Germany (see IRIS 2012-3/1) in which it set forth the relevant criteria for balancing the 
right to respect for private life (Article 8) against the right to freedom of expression (Article 10). 
These were: contribution to a debate of general interest; how well-known the person 
concerned was; the subject of the report; the prior conduct of the person concerned; the 
content, form and consequences of the publication; and, in the case of photographs, the 
circumstances in which they were taken. The Court refers to the findings by the German courts 
that, while the photograph in question had not contributed to a debate of general interest, the 
article with the litigious picture, however, reported on the current trend among celebrities 
towards letting out their holiday homes, which constituted an event of general interest. The 
article did not contain particular information concerning the private life of the Princess, as it 
focused on practical aspects relating to the Von Hannover’s villa and its letting. The Court also 
referred to the fact that the Princess and her husband were to be regarded as public figures 
who could not claim protection of their private lives in the same way as individuals unknown to 
the public. The European Court concluded that the German courts had not failed to comply with 
their positive obligations to protect the right of privacy in its confrontation with the freedom of 
press. Therefore there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
•    Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 3), no. 8772/10, 19 September 2013.    
 
IRIS 2013-10 
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European Court of Human Rights: Belpietro v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a new judgment against Italy for interfering 
with the freedom of expression and public statements related to the “war” between judges, 
prosecutors and the police in the context of combating the Mafia (see also Perna v. Italy (GC), 
see IRIS 2003-8/2). The judgment reflects a tension between the freedom of parliamentary 
speech on the one hand, and the restrictions and obligations on the media reproducing or 
publishing statements by politicians covered by their parliamentary immunity on the other 
hand (see also Cordova no.1 and no.2 v. Italy, see IRIS 2003-7/2). 
 
The applicant in this case is Maurizio Belpietro, who at the relevant time was editor of the 
national daily newspaper Il Giornale. In court in Strasbourg he complained about his conviction 
for defamation after publishing an article by an Italian Senator, R.I. The article by the Senator 
was a robust opinion piece analysing the lack of results in combating the Mafia in Palermo. The 
Senator more particularly criticised the Italian judiciary and especially accused some members 
of the public prosecutors’ office in Palermo of using political strategies in their fight against the 
Mafia. Two prosecutors, Guido Lo Forte and Giancarlo Gaselli considered some of the 
allegations in the Senator’s article as damaging to their professional and personal reputations. 
They lodged a complaint for defamation against Senator R.I. and Belpietro. Regarding the 
liability of the editor of Il Giornale, the prosecutors relied on Article 57 of the Criminal Code, 
making the editor or assistant editor of a newspaper responsible for lack of control when 
publishing defamatory statements without a sufficient factual basis.  
 
Separate proceedings were brought against Senator R.I. which ended in 2007 with a finding 
that there was no case to answer, on the grounds that the Senator had expressed his views in 
his capacity as a member of the Senate, and was thus shielded by his parliamentary immunity 
based on Article 68§1 of the Italian Constitution. The Senate accepted that the statements 
published by Senator R.I. were related to the exercise of his parliamentary functions. Belpietro 
however was sentenced to a suspended term of four months’ imprisonment and he was ordered 
to pay substantial sums to each of the civil parties, adding to a total amount of EUR 110,000. 
The Court of Appeal of Milan considered some of the allegations against the members of the 
judiciary as defamatory of Lo Forte and Caselli. 
 
Belpietro made an application to the Strasbourg Court, alleging that his conviction for 
defamation had amounted to a violation of his freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 
of the Convention. After reiterating extensively the general principles of its relevant case law 
on the issue, including the balance that has to be found between the prosecutors’ right to his 
reputation based on Article 8 and the newspaper editor’s right to freedom of expression based 
on Article 10, the European Court is of the opinion that the Italian authorities did not breach 
Article 10 in finding Belpietro liable for publishing the defamatory article of Senator R.I. 
Although the Court recognises that the article concerned an issue of importance to society that 
the public had the right to be informed about, it emphasises that some of the allegations 
against Lo Forte and Caselli were very serious, without sufficient objective basis. Furthermore, 
the Court refers to the obligation of an editor of a newspaper to control what is published, in 
order to prevent the publication of defamatory articles in particular. This duty does not 
disappear when it concerns an article written by a member of parliament, as otherwise, 
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according to the Court, this would amount to an absolute freedom of the press to publish any 
statement of members of parliament in the exercise of their parliamentary mandate, regardless 
of its defamatory or insulting character. The Court also refers to the fact that Senator R.I. had 
already been convicted in the past for defamation of public officials and to the fact that the 
newspaper had given a prominent place to the Senator’s article in the newspaper. However, as 
the Court considers the sanction of imprisonment and the high award of damages as 
disproportionate to the aim pursued, it comes to the conclusion that solely for that reason the 
interference by the Italian authorities amounted to a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
The Court especially draws attention to the fact that a sentence of imprisonment (even if 
suspended) can have a significant chilling effect and that the conviction was essentially 
because of not having executed sufficient control before publishing a defamatory article. 
Therefore there were no exceptional circumstances justifying such a severe sanction. A 
unanimous Court concludes that Italy has violated Article 10 of the Convention, awarding 
Belpietro just satisfaction in terms of EUR 10,000 non-pecuniary damage and EUR 5,000 for 
costs and expenses. 
 
•   Belpietro v. Italy, no. 43612/10, 24 September 2013. 
 
IRIS 2013-10/1  
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European Court of Human Rights: Ricci v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In its judgment in the case of Ricci v. Italy the European Court of Human Rights found that the 
suspended prison sentence of a TV presenter for disclosing confidential images violated Article 
10 of the Convention. The Court is of the opinion that the nature and severity of the prison 
sentence constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of 
expression. The Court’s judgment confirms that prison sentences for defamation of public 
persons or for making confidential information public, in principle amount to a breach of Article 
10 of the Convention (see also ECtHR (GC) 17 December 2004, Cumpănă and Mazăre v. 
Romania, IRIS 2005-2/4 and ECtHR 24 September 2013, Belpietro v. Italy, IRIS 2013-10/1). 
 
The case of Ricci v. Italy concerns a broadcast of the satirical television programme Striscia la 
notizia on Canale 5, of which Antonio Ricci is the producer and presenter. The programme 
contained intercepted images of a row between a writer and Gianni Vattimo, a philosopher, 
during the recording of a programme to be broadcast on RAI. Because Vattimo had not signed a 
document allowing it to be broadcast on RAI, the pieces of footage used were considered as 
confidential internal data. However Ricci had obtained access to the footage and he integrated 
them into a programme on Canale 5, meant to illustrate that the nature of television aimed at 
creating entertainment rather than informing the public. The RAI lodged a criminal complaint 
for fraudulent interception and disclosure of confidential communications by Ricci, in breach of 
Article 617 quater of the Criminal Code. Vattimo also joined the proceedings as a civil party. 
Ricci was ordered to pay the RAI and Vattimo damages and he was given a suspended prison 
sentence of four months and five days. However, the Court of Cassation declared the offence 
time-barred and quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment without remitting it. It upheld the 
order that Ricci was to compensate the civil parties and to pay RAI’s legal costs. The civil courts 
later ordered Ricci to pay EUR 30,000 damages to Vattimo. 
 
Although the European Court agrees with the Italian judicial authorities that Ricci’s programme 
had breached Article 617 quater of the Criminal Code, it clarifies that the protection of the 
confidentiality of communications in a data-transmission system had to be balanced against 
the exercise of freedom of expression. As in many other recent cases, the Court applies a 
balancing test between the right to privacy protected by Article 8 of the Convention (protection 
of confidential communication and reputation rights) and the right to freedom of expression 
guaranteed by Article 10. This balancing test leaves a broad margin of appreciation to national 
authorities, but nevertheless a set of criteria needs to be taken into consideration. The Court 
accepted Ricci’s argument that the broadcast footage concerned a subject of general interest, 
namely the denunciation of the “real nature” of television in modern society. However other 
means were available to Ricci to broadcast this message, without involving any breach of the 
confidentiality of communications. According to the Court the programme was also aimed at 
ridiculing and stigmatising some individuals. Furthermore Ricci, as a media professional, could 
not have been unaware that disclosing the footage amounted to a breach of the confidentiality 
of RAI’s communications. Accordingly, Ricci had not acted in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism. Therefore his conviction had not constituted, in itself, a violation of Article 10. 
Because of the nature and severity of the sanctions imposed on Ricci, however, the Court is of 
the opinion that the interference by the Italian authorities was disproportionate, referring to 
Ricci’s sentence of imprisonment for four months and five days. Even though it had been a 
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suspended sentence, which was later annulled by the Court of Cassation, that conviction must 
have had a significant chilling effect, while there were no exceptional circumstances justifying 
recourse to such a harsh sanction. Consequently, on account of the nature and quantum of the 
sentence imposed on Ricci, the Court comes to the conclusion that the interference with his 
right to freedom of expression was not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. The Court 
for that reason finds a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Ricci v. Italy, no. 30210/06, 8 October 2013. 
 
IRIS 2014-1/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Delfi AS v. Estonia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 10 October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights found that one of Estonia’s largest 
news portals on the Internet, Delfi, is not exempt from liability for grossly insulting remarks in 
its readers’ online comments. The news portal was found liable for violating the personality 
rights of the plaintiff (a captain of industry), although it had expeditiously removed the grossly 
offending comments posted on its website as soon as it had been informed of their insulting 
character. The European Court, in a unanimous decision, found no violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
 
The European Court accepted the Estonian authorities’ approach that Delfi’s news portal is to 
be considered as a publisher, rather than as an internet service provider (ISP). The consequence 
is that, as a publisher, Delfi could not rely on the specific provisions of the Directive 
2001/31/EC on Electronic Commerce (Art. 14-15) and the Estonian Information Society Services 
Act (Sections 10-11) exempting internet service providers, including host-providers, from 
liability in cases where they expeditiously remove or disable access to content emanating from 
third parties, as soon as they obtain knowledge or become aware of the illegal nature of the 
information. The E-Commerce Directive and the Estonian Act also guarantee that no general 
obligation to monitor should be imposed on the internet service providers, nor a general 
obligation to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity. The general principle is 
indeed that expeditious removal upon (notified) knowledge of illegal content exempts the ISP 
from liability. The reason why Delfi could not rely on the ISP liability exemption is that the 
news portal had integrated the readers’ comments into its news portal and that it had invited 
the users to post comments, having also an economic interest in exploiting its news platform 
with the integrated comment environment. Because Delfi was considered a provider of content 
services, rather than a provider of technical services, it should have effectively prevented 
clearly unlawful comments from being published. The European Court did not challenge this 
finding by the Estonian courts, restricting its supervisory role to ascertaining whether the 
effects of the non-treating of Delfi as an ISP were compatible with Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The Court found that the interference with Delfi’s right to freedom of expression was prescribed 
by law and was necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights of others. This finding 
was based on a set of arguments. The Court considered that Delfi should have anticipated that 
the users’ comments could go beyond the boundaries of acceptable criticism and that therefore 
it should have taken steps in order to avoid being held liable for an infringement of other 
persons’ reputations. Next, the Court is of the opinion that the word-based technical filter that 
was installed to delete vulgarities, threats or obscene expressions, was shown to be 
insufficient. Also the notice-and-take-down facility according to which anyone, by simply 
clicking on a button designed for that purpose, could notify inappropriate comments to the 
administrators of the portal, had not prevented the grossly insulting comments from being 
published on the platform. The Court is of the opinion that Delfi exercised a substantial degree 
of control over the comments published on its portal, although it did not make as much use of 
this possibility as it could have done. As Delfi allowed comments by non-registered users, and 
as it would appear disproportionate to put the onus of identifying authors of the offensive 
comments on the injured person, the Court is of the opinion that Delfi must be considered to 
have assumed a certain degree of responsibility for these comments and that it should have 
prevented defamatory or insulting statements from being made public. The Court refers to the 
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danger that information once made public on the internet will remain and circulate forever. 
Finally the Court noted that Delfi was ordered to pay EUR 320 in non-pecuniary damages, being 
by no means a disproportionate sanction for a professional media platform such as Delfi. Based 
on these elements and “in particular the insulting and threatening nature of the comments” the 
Court came to the conclusion that the Estonian courts’ finding that Delfi was liable for the 
defamatory comments posted by readers on its Internet news portal was a justified and 
proportionate interference with Delfi’s right to freedom of expression. 
 
• Delfi AS v. Estonia, no. 64569/09, 10 October 2013. 
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 16 
June 2015. 
 
IRIS 2014-1/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ristamäki and Korvola v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2008 Juha Arvo Mikael Ristamäki and Ari Jukka Korvola were convicted of defamation. 
Ristamäki is an editor working in the news service of a national Finnish broadcaster, while 
Korvola was his direct superior at the time. The reason for the conviction of the two journalists 
was the broadcast of a current affairs programme criticising the lack of co-operation between 
the authorities concerning a specific investigation into economic crime. It was revealed that the 
tax authorities had refused the request of the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct a tax 
inspection of the functioning of two companies. Reference was made in that connection to K.U., 
a well-known Finnish businessman who, at the time, was standing trial for economic offences. 
The public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against Ristamäki and Korvola. He 
maintained that Ristamäki, by editing the programme, and Korvola by allowing its broadcast, 
had intentionally made false insinuations about K.U. such that their conduct had been 
conducive to causing suffering to the latter, subjecting him to contempt and causing him 
damage. The Helsinki District Court convicted Ristamäki and Korvola of defamation pursuant to 
Chapter 24, section 9, subsection 1, point 1, of the Penal Code. They were sentenced to 30 day-
fines each, amounting to approximately EUR 2,000 and they were ordered to pay K.U. EUR 
1,800 for suffering and EUR 1,500 in legal costs. The Court of Appeal and later the Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeals by the journalists. 
 
The European Court disagrees with the findings of the Finnish courts. The Court refers to its 
reasoning in Axel Springer AG and Von Hannover no. 2 (see IRIS 2012-3/1) and to the relevant 
criteria to be applied when balancing the protection of one’s reputation (Article 8) with the 
freedom of expression (Article 10). The Court emphasises that the TV programme was clearly 
aimed at disclosing a malfunctioning of the administration in two specific cases that both 
involved influential persons. Both of these persons, including K.U., were mentioned in the 
programme rather as examples, as the major part of the programme focused on the tax 
authorities. The unsuccessful criminal investigation of economic crime, and the unwillingness 
of the tax authorities to contribute to this investigation, was a matter of legitimate public 
interest. The facts set out in the programme at issue were not in dispute and they were 
presented in an objective manner, in a non-provocative style and without exaggeration. There 
is no evidence, or indeed any allegation, of factual misrepresentation or bad faith on the part of 
the journalists. Neither are there any indications that details of the programme or the 
photograph of K.U. were obtained by subterfuge or other illicit means: the programme was 
based on information given by the police authorities and K.U.’s photograph was taken at a 
public event. From the point of view of the general public’s right to receive information about 
matters of public interest, and thus from the standpoint of the media, there were justified 
grounds for reporting the matter to the public. The Court observes that the domestic courts did 
not, in their analysis, attach any importance to the journalists’ right to freedom of expression, 
nor did they balance it in any considered way against K.U.’s right to reputation. It is not clear in 
the reasoning of the domestic courts what pressing social need in the present case justified 
protecting K.U.’s rights over the rights of the journalists. In the Court’s opinion the reasons 
relied on by the domestic courts, although relevant, were not sufficient to show that the 
interference complained of was “necessary in a democratic society”. Having regard to all the 
factors of the case, and notwithstanding the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this 
area, the Court considers that the Finnish courts failed to strike a fair balance between the 
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competing interests at stake. There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Ristamäki and Korvola v. Finland, no. 66456/09, 29 October 2013. 
 
IRIS 2014-1/3 
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European Court of Human Rights: Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines wirtschaftlich gesunden land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. 
Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a new judgment on the right of access to public documents, the Strasbourg Court has further 
clarified and expanded the scope of the application of Article 10 of the Convention. The 
applicant in this case is an NGO, the Austrian association for the preservation, strengthening 
and creation of an economically sound agricultural and forestry land ownership (OVESSG). In 
2005 the association twice requested the Tyrol Real Property Transaction Commission, which is 
responsible for approving agricultural and forest land transactions, to provide OVESSG with the 
decisions the Commission had issued over a certain period of time, eventually in an 
anonymised form. OVESSG indicated that it would reimburse the resulting costs. However, the 
association’s requests were refused on the ground that they did not fall within the scope of the 
Tyrol Access to Information Act. Moreover, even if the request did fall within its scope, pursuant 
to the Act an authority did not have the duty to provide the requested information if doing so 
would require so much resources that its functioning would be affected and would jeopardise 
the fulfilment of the Commission’s other tasks. The association’s complaints to the 
Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court were rejected. OVESSG then complained in 
Strasbourg that its right to receive information, guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, had 
been violated. 
 
The Court considers that the refusal to give OVESSG access to the requested documents 
amounted to an interference with its rights under Article 10, as the association was involved in 
the legitimate gathering of information of public interest with the aim of contributing to public 
debate. As it was accepted that the refusal was prescribed by law, based on the Tyrol Access to 
Information Act, and that it pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others, 
the Court had next to decide whether the refusal to grant access to the documents was 
justified, which means, in the terms of Article 10§ 2,being necessary in a democratic society. 
The Court refers to the development in its case law regarding Article 10 and access to 
information. It recalls that it has held that the right to receive information cannot be construed 
as imposing on a State positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own 
motion. However, the Court noted that it had recently advanced towards a broader 
interpretation of the notion of the freedom to receive information and thereby towards the 
recognition of a right of access to information. The Court also refers to its case-law stating that 
the most careful scrutiny was called for when authorities enjoying an information monopoly 
interfered with the exercise of the function of a social watchdog (see Társaság a 
Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, (IRIS 2009-7/1) and Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 
(IRIS 2013-8/1)). 
 
The Court finds that the Tyrol Real Property Transaction Commission had not given sufficient 
reasons to justify its refusal to grant OVESSG access to the requested documents. The European 
Court observes that in contrast with similar authorities in other regions in Austria, the Tyrol 
regional authority had chosen not to publish its decisions and thus, by its own choice, held an 
information monopoly. The unconditional refusal by the Tyrol Real Property Transaction 
Commission thus made it impossible for OVESSG to carry out its research in respect of one of 
the nine Austrian Länder, namely Tyrol, and to participate in a meaningful manner in the 
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legislative process concerning amendments to real property transaction law in Tyrol. The Court 
therefore concludes that the interference with the applicant association’s right to freedom of 
expression and information cannot be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic 
society. In a 6-1 vote it found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, no. 39534/07, 28 
November 2013. 
 
IRIS 2014-2/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Perinçek v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 17 December 2013, the European Court of Human Rights ruled by five votes to two, that 
Switzerland violated the right to freedom of expression by convicting Doğu Perinçek, chairman 
of the Turkish Workers’ Party, of publicly denying the existence of the genocide against the 
Armenian people. On several occasions, Perinçek had described the Armenian genocide as “an 
international lie”. The Swiss Courts found Perinçek guilty of racial discrimination within the 
meaning of Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code. This Article punishes inter alia the denial, 
gross minimisation or attempt at justification of a genocide or crimes against humanity, 
publicly expressed with the aim of lowering or discriminating against a person or a group of 
persons by reference to race, ethnic background or religion in a way that affects the human 
dignity of the person or group of persons concerned. According to the Swiss Courts, the 
Armenian genocide, like the Jewish genocide, was a proven historical fact, recognised by the 
Swiss Parliament, while Perinçek’s motives in denying this historical fact were of a racist 
tendency and did not contribute to the historical debate. Relying on Article 10 of the European 
Convention, Perinçek complained before the Strasbourg Court that the Swiss authorities had 
breached his right to freedom of expression. 
 
First the European Court found that Perinçek had not committed an abuse of his rights within 
the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention. The Court underlined that the free exercise of the 
right to openly discuss questions of a sensitive and controversial nature was one of the 
fundamental aspects of freedom of expression and distinguished a tolerant and pluralistic 
democratic society from a totalitarian or dictatorial regime. The Court emphasized that the limit 
beyond which comments may engage Article 17 lay in the question of whether the aim of the 
speech was to incite hatred or violence, aiming at the destruction of the rights of others. The 
rejection of the legal characterisation as “genocide” of the events of 1915 was not such as to 
incite hatred against the Armenian people. 
 
Next, from the perspective of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court agreed with the Swiss 
courts that Perinçek could not have been unaware that by describing the Armenian genocide as 
an “international lie”, he was exposing himself, being on Swiss territory, to a criminal sanction 
“prescribed by law”. The Court also found that the aim of the application of Article 261bis of 
the Swiss Criminal Code was to protect the rights of others, namely the honour of the relatives 
of victims of the atrocities perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people 
from 1915 onwards. 
 
The crucial question was whether the prosecution and conviction of Perinçek was “necessary in 
a democratic society”. The Court was of the opinion that the discussion about the Armenian 
“genocide” was of great interest to the general public and that Perinçek had engaged in speech 
of a historical, legal and political nature which was part of a heated debate. Accordingly, this 
limited the margin of appreciation of the Swiss authorities in deciding whether the interference 
with Perinçek’s freedom of expression was justified and necessary in a democratic society. 
Essential for the Court is that it is still very difficult to identify a general consensus about the 
qualification of the Armenian “genocide”. Only about 20 States out of the 190 in the world have 
officially recognised the Armenian genocide. Furthermore the notion of “genocide” is a 
precisely defined and narrow legal concept, difficult to substantiate. Historical research is by 
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definition open to discussion and a matter of debate, without necessarily giving rise to final 
conclusions or to the assertion of objective and absolute truths. In this connection, the Court 
clearly distinguished the present case from those concerning the negation of the crimes of the 
Holocaust, committed by the Nazi regime. The Court therefore took the view that Switzerland 
had failed to show how there was a social need in that country to punish an individual for racial 
discrimination on the basis of declarations challenging the legal characterisation as “genocide” 
of acts perpetrated on the territory of the former Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the following 
years. The European Court also referred to the General Comment nr. 34 of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee on Article 19 ICCPR, opposing “general prohibitions on expression of 
historical views”. According to the UN HRC “laws that penalise the promulgation of specific 
views about past events, so called “memory-laws”, must be reviewed to ensure they violate 
neither freedom of opinion nor expression”. 
 
In conclusion, the Court expressed its doubt that Perinçek’s conviction had been dictated by a 
“pressing social need”. It pointed out that it had to ensure that the sanction did not constitute a 
kind of censorship that would lead people to refrain from expressing criticism as part of a 
debate of general interest, because such a sanction might dissuade persons from contributing 
to the public discussion of questions that are of interest for the life of the community. The 
Court found that the grounds given by the national authorities in order to justify Perinçek’s 
conviction were insufficient and that the domestic authorities had overstepped their narrow 
margin of appreciation in this case in respect of a matter of debate of undeniable public 
interest. The Court considered the criminal conviction of Perinçek, for denial that the atrocities 
perpetrated against the Armenian people in 1915 and following years constituted genocide, 
was unjustified. Accordingly there has been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Perinçek v. Switzerland, no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013. 
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 2 June 2014, which returned its 
judgment on 15 October 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicants in this case are Lars Lillo-Stenberg and Andrine Sæther, respectively a well-
known musician and an actress in Norway, who complained about press invasion of their 
privacy during their wedding on 20 August 2005. The wedding took place outdoors on an islet 
in the Oslo fjord that was accessible to the public. Without the couple’s consent, the weekly 
magazine Se og Hør subsequently published a two-page article about the wedding 
accompanied by six photographs. The pictures were obtained by hiding and using a strong 
telephoto lens from a distance of approximately 250 metres. The pictures showed the bride, her 
father and bridesmaids arriving at the islet in a small rowing boat, the bride being brought to 
the groom by her father and the bride and groom returning to the mainland on foot by crossing 
the lake on stepping stones. The couple brought compensation proceedings against the 
magazine and won at the first two instances, but finally the Supreme Court found against the 
couple, by three votes to two. It considered that they had married in a place that was accessible 
to the public, easily visible and at a popular holiday location. Furthermore the article was 
neither offensive nor negative. Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 
Lars Lillo-Stenberg and Andrine Sæther complained that their right to respect for private life 
had been breached by the Supreme Court’s judgment. 
 
The European Court starts from the premise that the present case requires an examination of 
the fair balance that has to be struck between the applicants’ right to the protection of their 
private life under Article 8 of the Convention and the publisher’s right to freedom of expression 
as guaranteed by Article 10. The Court confirms “that a person’s image constitutes one of the 
chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person’s unique characteristics and 
distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to the protection of one’s image is thus 
one of the essential components of personal development. It mainly presupposes the 
individual’s right to control the use of that image, including the right to refuse publication 
thereof” and that “even where a person is known to the general public, he or she may rely on a 
“legitimate expectation” of protection of and respect for his or her private life”. The Court again 
applies a number of criteria it considers relevant where the right of freedom of expression is 
being balanced against the right to respect for private life. The relevant criteria are: (i) 
contribution to a debate of general interest; (ii) how well known is the person concerned and 
what is the subject of the report?; (iii) prior conduct of the person concerned; (iv) method of 
obtaining the information and its veracity/circumstances in which the photographs were taken; 
and (v) content, form and consequences of the publication. In the opinion of the European 
Court, both the majority and the minority of the Norwegian Supreme Court had carefully 
balanced the right of freedom of expression with the right to respect for private life, and had 
explicitly taken into account the criteria set out in the Court’s case law that existed at the 
relevant time (notably Von Hannover (no. 2) and Axel Springer AG, see IRIS 2012-3/1). The 
Court considered that there was an element of general interest in the article about the 
applicants’ wedding and that the article did not contain any elements that could damage their 
reputations. Since the wedding took place in an area that was accessible to the public, easily 
visible, and a popular holiday location, it was likely to attract the attention of third parties. 
Being well-known public figures in Norway, these circumstances certainly lowered their 
legitimate expectation of privacy, while on the other hand no pictures were published of the 
private marriage ceremony itself. Although the Court considers that “opinions may differ on the 
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outcome of a judgment”, it sees no sufficient, strong reasons to substitute its view for that of 
the majority of the Norwegian Supreme Court. Having regard to the margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by the national courts when balancing competing interests, the Court concludes that 
the Supreme Court did not fail to comply with its obligations under Article 8 of the Convention. 
The interference with the right of privacy of the applicants was sufficiently justified by the right 
to freedom of expression of the magazine Se og Hør. 
 
• Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway, no. 13258/09, 16 January 2014. 
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Tierbefreier E.V. is an association based in Germany that militates in favour animal rights. A 
court decision prevented the association from disseminating film footage, which was secretly 
taken by a journalist on the premises of a company performing experiments on animals for the 
pharmaceutical industry (C. company). The journalist used his footage to produce documentary 
films of different lengths, critically commenting on the way in which laboratory animals were 
treated. His films, or extracts from them, were shown on different TV channels. Largely based 
on the journalist’s footage, Tierbefreier produced a film of about 20 minutes, with the title 
“Poisoning for profit” and made it available on its website. The film contained the accusation 
that the legal regulations on the treatment of animals were being disregarded by C. company 
and closed with the statement that medicines were not being made safer by poisoning 
monkeys. On the request of C. company, relying on its personality rights, which encompassed 
the right not to be spied upon by the use of hidden cameras, Tierbefreier was ordered by a 
court injunction to desist from publicly showing the film footage taken by the journalist on the 
C. company’s premises or to make it otherwise available to third persons. According to the 
German courts Tierbefreier could not rely on its right to freedom of expression, as the manner 
in which it had presented the footage did not respect the rules of the intellectual battle of 
ideas. Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Tierbefreier lodged 
an appeal before the Strasbourg Court, complaining that the injunction had violated its right to 
freedom of expression. The association further relied on Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) in conjunction with Article 10, complaining that it had been discriminated 
against in comparison with the journalist and other animal rights activists who had merely 
been prohibited from disseminating specific films, but had been allowed to continue the 
publication of the footage in other contexts. 
 
The European Court endorses the assessment that the injunction interfered with Tierbefreier’s 
right to freedom of expression. But as it was prescribed by law, pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting the C. company’s reputation and was considered “necessary in a democratic society”, 
the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court observed that the 
domestic courts carefully examined whether a decision to grant the injunction in question 
would violate the applicant association’s right to freedom of expression, fully acknowledging 
the impact of the right to freedom of expression in a debate on matters of public interest. The 
Court points out that there was no evidence however that the accusations made in the film 
“Poisoning for profit”, according to which the C. company systematically flouted the law, were 
correct. Furthermore, Tierbefreier had employed unfair means when militating against the C. 
company’s activities and they could be expected to continue to do so if allowed to make further 
use of the footage. The Court also referred to the German courts’ findings that the further 
dissemination of the footage would seriously violate the C. company’s rights, especially since 
the footage had been produced by a former employee of the C. company, who had abused his 
professional status in order to secretly produce film material within that company’s private 
premises. The Court finally notes that the interference at issue did not concern any criminal 
sanctions, but a civil injunction preventing Tierbefreier from disseminating specified footage. It 
referred to the fact that Tierbefreier remained fully entitled to express its criticism on animal 
experiments in other, even one-sided ways. The Court considers that the German courts struck 
a fair balance between Tierbefreier’s right to freedom of expression and the C. company’s 
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interests in protecting its reputation. Hence, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention taken separately. As the German courts also gave relevant reasons for treating 
Tierbefreier differently from the other animal rights activists and the journalist with regard to 
the extent of the civil injunction, the European Court accordingly also finds that there has been 
no violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Tierbefreier e.V. v. Germany, no. 45192/09, 16 January 2014. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Pentikäinen v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 4 February 2014, the European Court found that a Finnish press 
photographer’s conviction for disobeying the police while covering a demonstration did not 
breach his freedom of expression. The applicant, Mr Pentikäinen, is a photographer and 
journalist for the weekly magazine Suomen Kuvalehti. He was sent by his employer to take 
photographs of a large demonstration in Helsinki. At a certain point, the police decided to 
interrupt the demonstration which had turned violent. It was announced over loudspeakers that 
the demonstration was over and that the crowd should leave the scene. After further escalation 
of violence, the police considered that the event had turned into a riot and decided to seal off 
the demonstration area. When leaving, the demonstrators were asked to show ID and their 
belongings were checked. However, a core group of around 20 people remained in the 
demonstration area, including Mr Pentikäinen, who assumed the order to leave the area only 
applied to the demonstrators and not to him, doing his work as a journalist. He also tried to 
make clear to the police that he was a representative of the media, referring to his press badge. 
A short time later the police arrested the demonstrators, including Mr Pentikäinen. He was 
detained for more than 17 hours and short time later the public prosecutor brought charges 
against him. The Finnish courts found the journalist guilty of disobeying the police, but they did 
not impose any penalty on him, holding that his offence was excusable. 
 
In Strasbourg Mr Pentikäinen complained that his rights under Article 10 (freedom of 
expression) had been violated by his arrest and conviction, as he had been prevented from 
doing his job as a journalist. The European Court recognised that Mr Pentikäinen, as a 
newspaper photographer and journalist, had been confronted with an interference in his right 
to freedom of expression. However, as the interference was prescribed by law, pursued several 
legitimate aims (the protection of public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime) and 
was to be considered necessary in a democratic society, there was no violation of his right 
under Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court especially referred to the fact that Mr 
Pentikäinen had not been prevented from taking photos of the demonstration and that no 
equipment or photos had been confiscated. There was no doubt that the demonstration had 
been a matter of legitimate public interest, justifying media reporting on it, and Mr Pentikäinen 
was not prevented from doing so. His arrest was a consequence of his decision to ignore the 
police orders to leave the area, while there was also a separate secure area which had been 
reserved for the press. It was also doubtful whether Mr Pentikäinen had made it sufficiently 
clear to the police when being arrested that he was a journalist. Furthermore, although Mr 
Pentikäinen was found guilty of disobeying the police, no penalty had been imposed on him 
and no entry of his conviction had been made on his criminal record. The Court also considered 
that the fact that the applicant was a journalist did not give him a greater right to stay at the 
scene than the other people and that the conduct sanctioned by the criminal conviction was 
not his journalistic activity as such, but his refusal to comply with a police order at the very end 
of the demonstration, when the latter was judged by the police to have become a riot. The 
European Court concluded therefore, by five votes to two, that the Finnish courts had struck a 
fair balance between the competing interests at stake and accordingly came to the conclusion 
that there had been no violation of Article 10. 
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According to the separate dissenting opinion of two judges it has not been substantiated why it 
was necessary in a democratic society to equate a professional journalist, operating within 
recognised professional limits in covering the demonstration, with any of the people taking 
part in the demonstration and to impose drastic criminal restraints on him. The dissenting 
judges criticised sharply the imposition of restrictions on a journalist’s freedom of expression 
through his arrest, detention, prosecution and conviction for a criminal offence simply because 
he had the courage to do his duty in furtherance of the public interest. According to the 
dissenting judges, the case reveals a one-sided attitude on the part of the Finnish authorities, 
one likely to create a “chilling effect” on press freedom. 
 
• Pentikäinen v. Finland, no. 11882/10, 4 February 2014. 
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 2 June 2014, which returned its 
judgment on 20 October 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In eight judgments of 25 March 2014 the European Court of Human Rights has once more 
found gross violations of the right to freedom of expression and information in Turkey. Each of 
the judgments concerns the criminal conviction for publishing declarations from an illegal 
armed organisation. The applicant in all of the eight cases is Hasan Bayar, the editor-in-chief of 
the Ülkede Özgür Gündem, a daily newspaper based in Istanbul. In 2004 the newspaper 
published a series of statements and articles expressing, in various ways, the positions of the 
PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), as well as statements by its leaders. It also published 
appeals from prisoners to the Turkish Government to negotiate with Mr Öcalan, the PKK leader. 
Other articles described events linked to Mr Öcalan’s incarceration. Some of the statements 
from the PKK or Congra-Gel or PJA, a branch of the PKK, concerned the political situation of the 
Kurds, the role of women in society and appeals for democratisation and peace. One article, 
reproducing declarations of the leader of Congra-Gel, protested against the visit of the Turkish 
Prime Minister to Iran. After the publication of each article, the public prosecutor charged Mr 
Bayar and the owner of the newspaper with spreading propaganda via the press, and publishing 
material from an illegal armed organisation. On each occasion Mr Bayar and the owner of the 
newspaper were convicted in application of the anti-terrorism act nr. 3713 and they were 
ordered to pay a fine. Mr Bayar appealed to the Court of Cassation against each of these 
decisions, arguing that his rights as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention had 
been violated. However, all Mr Bayer’s appeals were declared inadmissible. 
 
The Strasbourg Court is of the opinion that Mr Bayer’s right under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) 
was violated, as the Court of Cassation had wrongfully declared his appeals inadmissible. The 
European Court also found that Mr Bayer’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 was 
violated, as the Court saw no pertinent reason to justify Mr Bayer’s conviction. The Court said 
that it was aware of the difficulties the fight against terrorism was confronted with, but it 
emphasised at the same time the importance of the right to freedom of expression, by notifying 
that the impugned articles did not encourage violence, armed resistance or insurrection and did 
not constitute hate speech. According to the Court this was crucial, and it could not find any 
pertinent and sufficient reasons to justify any of the interferences with the editor-in-chief’s 
right to freedom of expression. Unanimously, the Court awarded Mr Bayer - in all the cases 
taken together - the total sum of EUR 6,133 (pecuniary damage), EUR 10,400 (non-pecuniary 
damage), and EUR 4,000 (costs and expenses). 
 
• Bayar v. Turkey (nos. 1-8), nos. 39690/06, 40559/06, 48815/06, 2512/07, 55197/07, 
55199/07, 55201/07, 55202/07, 25 March 2014. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Brosa v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has delivered an interesting judgment on the right to 
freedom of political expression, during pre-election time. The applicant, Mr Ulrich Brosa 
alleged that a court injunction in Germany, prohibiting him from distributing a leaflet that he 
had drawn up on the occasion of mayoral elections, had violated his right to freedom of 
expression. The injunction at issue prohibited Brosa from distributing a leaflet in which he 
called not to vote for a candidate, F.G. for the office of local mayor, who allegedly provided 
cover for a neo-Nazi organisation, Berger-88. The injunction also prevented Brosa from making 
other assertions of fact or allegations that might depict F.G. as a supporter of neo-Nazi 
organisations. Any contravention was punishable by a fine of up to EUR 250,000 or by 
imprisonment of up to six months. The German courts found that to claim that someone was 
supporting a neo-Nazi organisation amounted to an infringement of that individual’s honour 
and social reputation and to his personality rights, while Brosa had failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to support his allegation against F.G. In Strasbourg, Brosa complained that the 
injunction had breached his right to freedom of expression, as provided for in Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
Examining the particular circumstances of the case, the Court refers to the following elements 
to be taken into account: (1) the position of the applicant, (2) the position of the plaintiff in the 
domestic proceedings, (3) the subject-matter of the publication and finally (4) the classification 
of the contested statement by the domestic courts. 
 
As to the position of Brosa, the Court notes that he is a private individual, participating however 
in a public discussion on the political orientation of an association. F.G. was an elected town 
councillor who was running for the office of mayor at the time in question. This status of F.G. as 
a politician made the limits of acceptable criticism wider than as regards a private individual. 
The subject-matter of the publication concerned a leaflet asking citizens not to vote for F.G. as 
mayor, primarily on the basis of his attitude vis-à-vis an association having an extremist right-
wing orientation. Brosa’s leaflet, disseminated in the run-up to the mayoral elections was 
therefore of a political nature on a question of public interest at the material time and location, 
leaving little scope for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of public 
interest. As regards the qualification of the impugned statement by the domestic courts, the 
Court considers it to consist of two elements: firstly, the allegation that the association Berger-
88 was a neo-Nazi organisation that, moreover, was particularly dangerous; and, secondly, the 
allegation that F.G. had “covered” for the organisation. The Court admits that, in substance, the 
reference to the neo-Nazi background and the dangerous character of Berger-88 was not 
devoid of factual basis, while the Court also reminds us of the fact that the association was 
monitored by the German Intelligence Services on suspicion of extremist tendencies. The 
European Court holds the opinion that that the German courts in this case required a 
disproportionately high degree of factual proof to be established. It also considers that the 
statement that F.G. has covered the neo-Nazi organisation at issue was part of an ongoing 
debate. The Court finds that this statement had a sufficient factual basis, referring to F.G.’s 
public statements, emphasizing that the association had no extreme right-wing tendencies and 
calling Brosa’s statements “false allegations”. According to the Court, Brosa’s leaflet did not 
exceed the acceptable limits of criticism. Therefore the Court comes to the conclusion that the 
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German courts failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests and to establish a 
“pressing social need” for putting the protection of the personality rights of F.G. above Brosa’s 
right to freedom of expression, even in the context of a civil injunction rather than criminal 
charges or monetary compensation claims. Under these circumstances, the Court considers that 
the domestic courts overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to them and that the 
interference was disproportionate to the aim pursued and not “necessary in a democratic 
society”. There has been, accordingly, a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court 
held that Germany was to pay Mr Brosa EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 
2,683 euros in respect of costs and expenses. 
 
• Brosa v. Germany, no. 5709/09, 17 April 2014. 
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Can a title of a newspaper article that could be interpreted as damaging the reputation of a 
public person justify a criminal conviction of the journalist who wrote the article, while the 
article itself is written in good faith and does not contain any factual errors or defamatory 
allegations? That is the question the European Court needed to answer in a recent case against 
Finland. The applicant in this case is Tiina Johanna Salumäki, a journalist working for the 
newspaper Ilta-Sanomat. Ms Salumäki published an article concerning the investigation into a 
homicide (of P.O.). The front page of the newspaper carried a headline asking whether the 
victim of the homicide had connections with K.U., a well-known Finnish businessman. A 
photograph of K.U. appeared on the same page. Next to the article was a separate column 
mentioning K.U.’s previous conviction for economic crimes. The Helsinki District Court 
convicted the journalist, Salumäki, and the newspaper’s editor-in-chief at the time, H.S., of 
defaming K.U. as the title of their article insinuated that K.U. had been involved in the killing, 
even though it was made clear in the text of the article itself that the homicide suspect had no 
connections with K.U. Along with H.S., Salumäki was ordered to pay damages and costs to K.U. 
This judgment was subsequently upheld on appeal and the Supreme Court finally refused leave 
to appeal. Salumäki complained that her conviction had amounted to a violation of Article 10 
(freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. She argued that the 
information presented in the article was correct and that the title of the article only connected 
K.U. to the victim and did not insinuate that K.U. had connections with the perpetrator, or that 
he was involved in the homicide. 
 
The Court explains that it had to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance 
when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention that may come into conflict with 
each other in certain cases, namely, on the one hand, the freedom of expression protected by 
Article 10 and, on the other, the right to respect for private life, including the right of 
reputation, enshrined in Article 8. The Court applies the criteria developed by the Grand 
Chamber in Axel Springer Verlag and Von Hannover (no. 2) (IRIS 2012/3-1) in order to find out 
whether the domestic authorities indeed struck a fair balance between the rights protected by 
Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. First the Court emphasises that the criminal investigation 
into a homicide was clearly a matter of legitimate public interest, having regard in particular to 
the serious nature of the crime: “From the point of view of the general public’s right to receive 
information about matters of public interest, and thus from the standpoint of the press, there 
were justified grounds for reporting the matter to the public”. The Court also recognised that 
“the article was based on information given by the authorities and K.U.’s photograph had been 
taken at a public event”, while “the facts set out in the article in issue were not in dispute even 
before the domestic courts. There is no evidence, or indeed any allegation, of factual errors, 
misrepresentation or bad faith on the part of the applicant”. Nevertheless the decisive factor in 
this case was that, according to the domestic courts, the title created a connection between 
K.U. and the homicide, implying that he was involved in it. Even though it was specifically 
stated in the text of the article that the homicide suspect had no connections with K.U., this 
information only appeared towards the end of the article. The Court was of the opinion that 
Salumäki must have considered it probable that her article contained a false insinuation and 
that this false insinuation was capable of causing suffering to K.U. The Court also refers in this 
context to the principle of presumption of innocence under Article 6 §2 of the Convention and 
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emphasises that this principle may be relevant also in the context of Article 10, in situations in 
which nothing is clearly stated but only insinuated. The Court therefore concluded that what 
the journalist had written was defamatory, as it implied that K.U. was somehow responsible for 
P.O.’s murder. According to the Court, “it amounted to stating, by innuendo, a fact that was 
highly damaging to the reputation of K.U.” and at no time did Salumäki attempt to prove the 
truth of the insinuated fact, nor did she plead that the insinuation was a fair comment based on 
relevant facts. Having regard to all the foregoing factors, including the margin of appreciation 
afforded to the State in this area, the Court considered that the domestic courts struck a fair 
balance between the competing interests at stake. There has therefore been no violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Salumäki v. Finland, no. 23605/09, 29 April 2014. 
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The European Court’s judgment in the case of Taranenko v. Russia illustrates how Article 10, in 
conjunction with Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association), also protects collective 
action, expressive conduct and distribution of leaflets as a form of protected speech. The case 
concerns the detention and conviction of Ms Taranenko, a participant in a protest against the 
politics of President Putin in 2004. The protesters had occupied the reception area of the 
President’s Administration building in Moscow and locked themselves in an office. They waved 
placards with “Putin, resign!” («Путин, уйди!») and distributed leaflets with a printed address to 
the President that listed ten ways in which he had failed to uphold the Russian Constitution, 
and a call for his resignation. One of the protesters, Ms Taranenko, complained in Strasbourg 
about the way the Russian authorities have treated, detained, prosecuted and convicted her for 
participating in this protest action, claiming that her right to freedom of expression and her 
right of peaceful assembly had been violated. 
 
The Court reiterated that “the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a 
democratic society and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of 
such a society. Thus, it should not be interpreted restrictively”. The Court also emphasised that 
any measures interfering with freedom of assembly and expression “other than in cases of 
incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles do a disservice to democracy and 
often even endanger it”. The Court noted that the issues of freedom of expression and freedom 
of peaceful assembly are closely linked in the present case: “Indeed, the protection of personal 
opinions, secured by Article 10 of the Convention, is one of the objectives of freedom of 
peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention”. The European Court 
underlined that the protest, although involving some disturbance of public order, had been 
largely non-violent and had not caused any bodily injuries. The participants in the protest 
action came to the President’s Administration building to meet officials, hand over a petition 
criticising the President’s policies, distribute leaflets and talk to journalists. The aim of the 
protesters in Moscow was indeed to obtain media-exposure, in which they effectively 
succeeded. The disturbance that followed was not part of their initial plan but a reaction to the 
guards’ attempts to stop them from entering the building. In this context, the Court had to 
examine with particular scrutiny the prison sentence as a sanction imposed by the national 
authorities for non-violent conduct. The Court found in particular that while a sanction for Ms 
Taranenko’s actions might have been warranted by the demands of public order, her detention 
pending trial of almost one year and the suspended prison sentence of three years imposed on 
her had to have had a deterring effect on protesters. The Court considered the pre-trial 
detention and the prison sentence as an “unusually severe sanction” having a chilling effect on 
Ms Taranenko and other persons taking part in protest actions. The Court referred to the 
“exceptional seriousness of the sanctions” as being disproportionate and therefore concluded 
that the interference had not been necessary in a democratic society for the purposes of Article 
10. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 10 interpreted in the light of Article 11 of 
the Convention. 
 
• Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554/05, 15 May 2014. 
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The European Court of Human Rights has again reiterated that collecting information and 
guaranteeing access to documents held by public authorities is a crucial right for journalists in 
order to be able to report on matters of public interest, helping to implement the right of the 
public to be properly informed on such matters. In the case of Ioan Romeo Roşiianu, a presenter 
of a regional television programme, the Court came to the conclusion that the Romanian 
authorities had violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights by refusing 
access to documents of a public nature, which he had requested at Baia Mare, a city in the 
north of Romania. The Court’s judgment clarifies that efficient enforcement mechanisms are 
necessary in order to make the right of access to public documents under Article 10 practical 
and effective. 
 
In his capacity as a journalist, Roşiianu had contacted the Baia Mare municipal authorities, 
requesting disclosure of several documents, as part of his investigation into how public funds 
were used by the city administration. His requests were based on the provisions of Law no. 
544/2001 on freedom of public information. As the reply from the mayor did not contain the 
requested information, Roşiianu applied to the administrative court. In three separate decisions, 
the Cluj Court of Appeal ordered the mayor to disclose most of the requested information. The 
Court of Appeal noted that, under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Law no. 544/2001 on freedom of public information, Roşiianu was entitled to obtain the 
information in question, which he intended to use in his professional activity. The letters sent 
by the mayor of Baia Mare did not represent adequate responses to those requests. The Cluj 
Court of Appeal ordered the mayor to pay the applicant EUR 700 in respect of non-pecuniary 
damages, and held that his refusal to disclose the requested information amounted to a denial 
of the right to receive and impart information, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European 
Convention. Mr Roşiianu applied for enforcement of the decisions, but the mayor refused to 
comply. The decisions delivered by the Cluj Court of Appeal remained unenforced. 
 
Roşiianu complained about the failure to execute the judicial decisions, relying on Article 6 §1 
(right to a fair hearing). Relying on Article 10, he alleged that the failure to execute the 
decisions of the Cluj Court of Appeal amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of 
expression. 
 
With regard to the complaint under Article 6 §1 of the Convention, it is observed that the mayor 
had suggested that Roşiianu should come in person to the town hall to obtain several thousand 
photocopied pages, which would have included having to pay for the reproduction costs, but 
that the domestic courts had concluded that such an invitation could not possibly be 
considered as an execution of a judicial decision ordering the disclosure of information of a 
public nature. The European Court found that the non-enforcement of the final judicial 
decisions ordering disclosure to Mr Roşiianu of public information had deprived Roşiianu of 
effective access to a court, which amounted to a violation of Article 6 §1 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the complaint under Article 10, the Court noted that Roşiianu was involved in 
the legitimate gathering of information on a matter of public importance, namely the activities 
of the Baia Mare municipal administration. The Court reiterated that in view of the interest 
Back to overview of case-law 
342 
 
protected by Article 10, the law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions that may become a form of 
indirect censorship should the authorities create obstacles to the gathering of information. 
Gathering information is indeed an essential preparatory step in journalism and is an inherent, 
protected part of press freedom. Given that the journalist’s intention had been to communicate 
the information in question to the public and thereby to contribute to the public debate on 
good public governance, his right to impart information had clearly been impaired. The Court 
found that there had not been adequate execution of the judicial decisions in question. It also 
observed that the complexity of the requested information and the considerable work required 
in order to select or compile the requested documents had been referred to solely to explain 
the impossibility of providing that information rapidly, but could not be a sufficient or pertinent 
argument to refuse access to the requested documents. The Court concluded that the Romanian 
authorities had adduced no argument showing that the interference in Roşiianu’s right had 
been prescribed by law, or that it pursued one or several legitimate aims, hence finding a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court held that Romania was to pay the applicant 
EUR 4,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 4,748 in respect of costs and expenses. 
 
• Roşiianu v. Romania, no. 27329/06, 24 June 2014. 
 
IRIS 2014-8/4 
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European Court of Human Rights: Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 2) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 10 July 2014, the European Court found that the publication by the daily 
newspaper Bild of suspicions concerning the former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, was 
covered by journalistic freedom. In Strasbourg, the publisher of Bild, Axel Springer AG, had 
lodged a complaint arguing that the German courts had interfered with the right to freedom of 
expression and critical press reporting in a way that violated Article 10 of the Convention.  
 
An article in Bild had repeated a series of suspicions and doubts on the part of Mr Thiele – the 
deputy president of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (FDP) parliamentary group – with regard to 
Schröder’s appointment as chairman of the supervisory board of the German-Russian 
consortium Konsortium Nordeuropäische Gaspipeline (NEGP). Thiele had insinuated that Mr 
Schröder had resigned from his political functions because he had been offered a lucrative post 
in the consortium headed by the Russian company Gazprom. In this regard, references were 
made to an agreement on construction of a pipeline that was signed in April 2005, in the 
presence of Mr Schröder and the Russian President Vladimir Putin. Having complained to the 
German courts, Mr Schröder obtained an order banning further publication of the passage, 
which reported Mr Thiele’s comments and insinuations of corruption. 
 
The European Court sharply disagrees with the reasoning and findings of the German courts. 
The Court refers to the relevant criteria it has taken into consideration in earlier cases (see Von 
Hannover v. Germany (No. 2) and Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 1), (see IRIS 2012-3/1) when 
dealing with the conflicting rights of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 and the 
right to protection of one’s reputation under Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to 
private life.  
 
First the Court notes that the article in Bild did not recount details of Mr Schröder’s private life 
with the aim of satisfying public curiosity, but related to Mr Schröder’s conduct in the exercise 
of his term of office as Federal Chancellor and his controversial appointment to a German-
Russian gas consortium shortly after he ceased to hold office as Chancellor. Furthermore, there 
were sufficient facts, which could justify suspicions with regard to Mr Schröder’s conduct. Such 
suspicions amounted to the expression of a value judgment, without concrete allegations of 
Schröder having committed criminal offences. The Court also observes that Mr Thiele’s 
questions were not the only comments to be reproduced in the Bild article, but supplemented a 
series of statements made by different political figures from various political parties.  
 
As well as this, the Court could not subscribe to the German court’s opinion that the article in 
Bild should have also contained elements in favour of the former Chancellor. The former 
Chancellor had a duty to show a much greater degree of tolerance than a private citizen. In the 
political arena, freedom of expression is of the utmost importance and the press has a vital role 
as public “watchdog”. The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of 
statements made by another person would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to 
discussions of matters of public interest. The Court also considers that a newspaper cannot be 
required to systematically verify the merits of every comment made by one politician about 
another, when such comments are made in the context of a current political debate. As to the 
severity of the measure imposed, the Court notes that although only a civil-law ban on further 
Back to overview of case-law 
344 
 
publication of the impugned passage in the Bild article had been imposed, it nonetheless 
considers that this prohibition could have had a chilling effect on the newspaper’s freedom of 
expression. 
 
The Court concludes unanimously that Bild has not exceeded the limits of journalistic freedom 
in publishing the disputed passage. The German courts have not convincingly established the 
existence of any pressing social need for placing the protection of Mr Schröder’s reputation 
above the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting 
this freedom where issues of public interest were concerned. There had therefore been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Axel Springer AG v. Germany (no. 2), no. 48311/10, 10 July 2014. 
 
IRIS 2014-9/3 
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European Court of Human Rights: Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In an unexpected judgment, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of the right 
to respect for private life, as it considered that the confiscation of computers containing illegal 
software was not “in accordance with the law”, as required by Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Rumen Trifonov Prezhdarov and Anna Aleksandrovna 
Prezhdarova had started a business in their garage renting computers to clients, without having 
the necessary software licence for reproduction and distribution of the software and games that 
were installed on the computers. After a complaint by a manager of a company that distributed 
computer games, the district prosecutor ordered a police inquiry. Three weeks later the police 
inspected the applicants’ computer club and found that five computers contained computer 
games. Prezhdarov was invited to present documents, such as purchase invoices or any other 
evidence of his title to the games. As he failed to do so, the police seized the computers. 
Several requests to return the computers, due to the fact that they contained personal data, 
were dismissed. During the further criminal proceedings and trial, the computers remained 
confiscated. Prezhdarov was convicted for illegally distributing computer games and for 
illegally reproducing computer programmes and films. He was sentenced to one year and six 
months’ imprisonment, suspended for three years, and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of 
BGN 4,000.The confiscated computers were not returned after sentencing. 
 
Prezhdarov and Prezhdarova, relying on Article 8 ECHR, complained that the search in their 
garage and the seizure of five computers had not been conducted in accordance with the law. 
They argued, in particular, that private documents contained in the seized computers, which 
were unrelated to the criminal proceedings against the first applicant, had been caught up in 
the search-and-seizure operation. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights emphasised that, in the context of search and seizure, the 
domestic law must provide for sufficient safeguards against arbitrary interference with Article 8 
ECHR. The Court accepted that Bulgarian law allowed the police to conduct an immediate 
search-and-seizure operation outside the criminal proceedings if that was the only possibility of 
collecting and securing evidence. The Court, however, expressed its doubts of whether the 
circumstances in the present case were really pressing, given that the prosecutor ordered the 
said operation three weeks before it was conducted. Therefore, the authorities had enough time 
to collect more information regarding the alleged criminal conduct, to open criminal 
proceedings, and to submit a prior request to the Court. 
 
Furthermore, the Court considered that the absence of a prior judicial warrant was not 
counterbalanced by the availability of a retrospective and effective judicial review. The 
Bulgarian court that approved the measure did not consider the scope of the operation, and did 
not make a distinction between information that was necessary for the investigation, and 
information that was not relevant. The European Court of Human Rights accepted that, as a 
matter of principle, the retention of the computers for the duration of the criminal proceedings 
pursued the legitimate aim of securing physical evidence in an ongoing criminal investigation. 
However, it was of the opinion that the lack of any consideration of the relevance of the seized 
information for the investigation, and of the applicants’ complaint regarding the personal 
character of some of the information stored on the computers, rendered the judicial review 
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formalistic and deprived the applicants of sufficient safeguards against abuse. Therefore, the 
Court considered that even assuming that there existed a general legal basis in Bulgarian law 
for the impugned measure, the applicants in the present case were not offered sufficient 
guarantees for their right to respect for their private life before or after the search-and-seizure 
operation. In these circumstances, the Court found that the interference with the applicants’ 
right to respect for their private life was not “in accordance with the law” as required by Article 
8 § 2 of the Convention and hence violated Article 8 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court 
did not need to examine whether the impugned measure had a legitimate aim and was 
proportionate. 
 
One judge, Faris Vehabović, dissented, arguing that as Prezhdarov was sentenced for illegal use 
of software, it appeared that through his request for return of the confiscated computers 
(together with software installed on them), he was in fact seeking to regain possession of 
intellectual property acquired by committing a criminal act. In any democratic country, 
according to judge Vehabović, it would be unprecedented that property acquired as a result of a 
criminal act be returned to a convicted person, even if that property contained personal data, in 
order to satisfy the requirements of Article 8 under the concepts of “home” or “private life”. But 
this argument could not persuade the majority of the Court that found a violation of Article 8. 
 
• Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, no. 8429/05, 30 September 2014. 
 
IRIS 2014-10/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Matúz v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In its judgment in the case of Matúz v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed 
the importance of whistleblower protection, in this case for a journalist who alarmed public 
opinion regarding censorship within the public broadcasting organisation in Hungary. The case 
concerned the dismissal of a television journalist, Gábor Matúz, working for the State television 
company Magyar Televízió Zrt., after having revealed several instances of alleged censorship by 
one of his superiors. 
 
Matúz first contacted the television company’s president and sent a letter to its board, 
informing them that the cultural director’s conduct in modifying and cutting certain programme 
content amounted to censorship. A short time later, an article appeared in the online version of 
a Hungarian daily newspaper, containing similar allegations and inviting the board to end 
censorship in the television company. A few months later, Matúz published a book containing 
detailed documentary evidence of censorship exercised in the State television company. 
Subsequently, Matúz was dismissed with immediate effect. Matúz challenged his dismissal in 
court, but he remained unsuccessful in his legal action in Hungary. After exhausting all national 
remedies, he lodged a complaint in Strasbourg, arguing a violation of his rights under Article 10 
of the Convention. He submitted that he had the right and obligation to inform the public about 
alleged censorship at the national television company. The Hungarian government argued that 
by publishing the impugned book without prior authorisation and by revealing confidential 
information in that book, Matúz had breached his duties, leading to his summary - and justified 
- dismissal. 
 
The European Court accepted that the legitimate aim pursued by the impugned measure was 
the prevention of the disclosure of confidential information, as well as “the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Once 
more, the central question was whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic 
society”. The Court referred to its standard case law on freedom of expression and journalistic 
reporting on matters of public interest and also observed that the present case bears a certain 
resemblance to the cases of Fuentes Bobo v. Spain (see IRIS 2000-4/1) and Wojtas-Kaleta v. 
Poland (see IRIS 2009-9/1), in which it found violations of Article 10 in respect of journalists 
who had publicly criticised the public television broadcaster’s management. 
 
The relevant criteria regarding the balancing of the right to freedom of expression of a person 
bound by professional confidentiality against the right of employers to manage their staff have 
been laid down in the Court’s case-law since its Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Guja v. 
Moldova (§§74-78) (see IRIS 2008-6/1). These criteria are: (a) public interest involved in the 
disclosed information; (b) authenticity of the information disclosed; (c) the damage, if any, 
suffered by the authority as a result of the disclosure in question; (d) the motive behind the 
actions of the reporting employee; (e) whether, in the light of the duty of discretion owed by an 
employee toward his or her employer, the information was made public as a last resort, 
following disclosure to a superior or other competent body; and (f) the severity of the sanction 
imposed. The Court emphasised that the content of the book essentially concerned a matter of 
public interest and it confirmed that it was not in dispute that the documents published by 
Matúz were authentic and that his comments had a factual basis. The Court also noted that the 
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journalist had included the confidential documents in the book with no other intention than to 
corroborate his arguments on censorship and that there was no appearance of any gratuitous 
personal attack either (par. 46). Furthermore, the decision to make the impugned information 
and documents public was based on the lack of any response following his complaint to the 
president of the television company and letters to the board. Hence the Court was “satisfied 
that the publication of the book took place only after the applicant had felt prevented from 
remedying the perceived interference with his journalistic work within the television company 
itself - that is, for want of any effective alternative channel” (par. 47). The Court also noted that 
“a rather severe sanction was imposed on the applicant”, namely the termination of his 
employment with immediate effect (par. 48). 
 
The Court was of the opinion that the approach by the Hungarian judicial authorities neglected 
to sufficiently apply the right of freedom of expression. The Court concluded that the 
interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was not “necessary in a 
democratic society”. Accordingly, the Court unanimously found that there has been a violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Matúz v. Hungary, no. 73571/10, 21 October 2014. 
 
IRIS 2015-1/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Urechean and Pavlicenco v. Moldova 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a case against Moldova, the European Court of Human Rights has decided that blanket 
immunity in defamation proceedings in order to guarantee the free speech rights of a president, 
violates the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court has examined many cases 
concerning limitations on the right of access to court in defamation cases by operation of 
parliamentary immunity (see e.g. [A. the United Kingdom] IRIS 2003-3/2, [Cordova v. Italy (Nos. 
1 & 2)] IRIS 2003-7/2 and [Belpietro v. Italy] IRIS 2013-10/1), but this was the first occasion on 
which the Court had to address immunity from a civil libel suit which benefits a president and a 
head of State. 
 
The applicants, Mr Urechean and Mrs Pavlicenco, were opposition politicians at the time. In two 
television programmes, the Moldovan president had been interviewed by journalists on various 
topics such as the economy, justice, foreign relations and elections. In the interviews the 
president stated, among other things, that Mr Urechean, as the mayor of Chişinău, had created 
“a very powerful mafia-style system of corruption” and that Mrs Pavlicenco “came straight from 
the KGB”. Both politicians brought libel suits against the president, but the Moldovan courts 
held that the president enjoyed immunity and could not be held liable for opinions which he 
expressed in the exercise of his mandate. Before the European Court of Human Rights, the 
applicants contended that the refusal of the domestic courts to examine the merits of their 
libel actions constituted a violation of their right of access to court under Article 6, paragraph 1, 
of the Convention. 
 
It was undisputed that there was a limitation of the applicants’ right of access to a court as a 
result of the domestic courts’ refusal to examine the merits of their libel actions against the 
president. The parties also agreed that the limitation of that right was prescribed by law and 
pursued a legitimate aim. The question for the Court was whether a fair balance had been 
struck between the competing interests involved, namely between the public’s interest in 
protecting the president’s freedom of speech in the exercise of his functions and the applicants’ 
interest in having access to a court and obtaining a reasoned answer to their complaints. 
 
The Court found that, in the circumstances of the case, such a fair balance had not been struck. 
Although a head of State’s task is not, unlike that of a member of Parliament, to be actively 
involved in public or political debates, the Court considered that it should be acceptable in a 
democratic society for States to afford some functional immunity to their heads of State in 
order to protect their free speech in the exercise of their functions and to maintain the 
separation of powers in the State. Nevertheless, such immunity, being an exception from the 
general rule of civil responsibility, should be regulated and interpreted in a clear and restrictive 
manner. In particular, the Court was of the opinion that the Moldovan courts had not addressed 
the question of whether the then-president of Moldova had made the statements about the 
applicants in the exercise of his mandate. Nor did the relevant constitutional provision define 
the limits of presidential immunity in libel actions. The Court furthermore observed that the 
immunity afforded to the president was perpetual and absolute and could not be lifted. The 
Court considered that conferring such blanket immunity on the head of State in the application 
of the rule of immunity was to be avoided. 
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The lack of alternative means of redress was another issue considered by the Court, as the 
Government submitted that the applicants, being politicians, should have resorted to the media 
to express their points of view on the President’s allegations about them. The Court however 
considered relevant its findings in Manole and Others v. Moldova (see IRIS 2009-10/1), which 
provided that at the material time there were only two television channels with national 
coverage in Moldova, one of which was involved in the present case and refused to offer 
airtime to one of the applicants, the other being State television. In view of that and of the 
findings in Manole and others concerning the administrative practice of censorship on State 
television, the Court was not persuaded that the applicants had at their disposal an effective 
means of countering the accusations made against them by the head of State during the 
television interviews at issue. 
 
The Court concluded, by four votes to three, that the manner in which the immunity rule was 
applied in the instant case constituted a disproportionate restriction on the applicants’ right of 
access to a court and hence violated Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention. According to the 
dissenting judges, the Moldovan courts had sufficiently established that the president’s 
statements fell within the exercise of his mandate. They also contended that the findings in 
Manole and others concerning the practice of censorship on State television were totally 
irrelevant to the instant case. According to the dissenters, the applicants could have relied on 
their right of reply or on other national legislation providing for a number of alternative means 
of redress in cases of defamation of honour, dignity and professional reputation. Furthermore, 
in their capacity as politicians the applicants fell within the category of persons open to close 
scrutiny of their acts, not only by the press, but also - and above all - by bodies representing 
the public interest, the risk of some uncompensated damage to reputation being, as a 
consequence, inevitable. On this basis, the dissenters found no violation of Article 6, paragraph 
1. 
 
• Urechean and Pavlicenco v. the Republic of Moldova, nos. 27756/05 and 41219/07, 2 
December 2014. 
 
IRIS 2015-2/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a case related to a violent attack on a journalist, the European Court reiterated that the 
States have positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to create a 
favourable environment for participation in public debate by all the persons concerned, 
enabling them to express their opinions and ideas without fear. Because of failures to carry out 
an effective investigation, the European Court found that the criminal investigation of a 
journalist’s claim of ill-treatment was ineffective and that accordingly there has been a 
violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) of the 
Convention under its procedural limb. 
 
In 2007, Uzeyir Jafarov had been the victim of a violent attack by two men, only a few hours 
after publishing an article in a newspaper in which he accused a senior military officer of 
corruption and illegal activities. The journalist was hit several times with a hard blunt object 
and he was also punched by his aggressors. The attack took place just in front of the 
newspaper’s office. Having heard the journalist’s screams, his colleagues came out of the office 
and the assailants left the scene of the incident by car. The journalist however recognised one 
of his two assailants: this person (N.R.) was a police officer from the Yasamal District Police 
Office. Also, other journalists could confirm that they had seen N.R. standing outside the 
newspaper’s office on the day of the attack. Although formally a criminal investigation was 
started in connection with the attack on the journalist, no further steps were taken in order to 
identify the perpetrators. In a newspaper interview the Minister of Internal Affairs was 
questioned about the attack on Uzeyir Jafarov. In that interview the Minister stated that the 
journalist had staged the attack on himself. The same day, the journalist lodged a complaint 
with the Prosecutor General, complaining of the police authorities’ failure to conduct an 
effective investigation. But this action had no further result. 
 
Relying on Article 3 of the European Convention, the journalist complained that State agents 
had been behind the attack on him and that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an 
effective investigation in respect of his ill-treatment. In particular, the journalist pointed out 
that the investigator had failed to order an official identity parade including the police officer 
N.R. who had been one of his aggressors, to question his colleagues from the newspaper as 
witnesses and to obtain video recordings from security cameras situated in the vicinity of the 
scene of the incident. The European Court found numerous shortcomings in the investigation 
carried out by the domestic authorities. The Court inter alia referred to the fact that the 
journalist’s complaint was examined by the police office where the officer who had allegedly 
committed the offence was based. In the Court’s view, an investigation by the police into an 
allegation of misconduct by one of its own officers could not be independent in these 
circumstances. The Court also noted that, despite explicit requests by the journalist, the 
domestic authorities failed to take all steps reasonably available to them to secure the 
evidence concerning the attack. The Court further considered that the public statement by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs showed that during the investigation the domestic authorities were 
more concerned with proving the lack of involvement of a State agent in the attack on the 
journalist than with discovering the truth about the circumstances of that attack. In particular, 
it does not appear that adequate steps were taken to investigate the possibility that the attack 
could have been linked to Uzeyir Jafarov’s work as a journalist. On the contrary, it appears that 
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the responsible authorities had already discarded that possibility in the early stages of the 
investigation and with insufficient reason. These elements were sufficient to enable the Court 
to conclude that the investigation of the journalist’s claim of ill-treatment was ineffective. 
There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb. 
 
According to the European Court, it was not possible however to establish that the journalist 
had been subjected to the use of force by a State agent or that a State agent had been behind 
the attack on the journalist with the aim of interfering with his journalistic work. The Court 
considered that the present case should also be distinguished from other cases, where the 
domestic authorities ‒ which were aware of a series of violent actions against a newspaper and 
persons associated with it ‒ did not take any action to protect the newspaper and its 
journalists. In the present case, by contrast, neither the journalist nor the newspaper had been 
subjected to violent actions before. Moreover, the journalist had not lodged any request for 
protection with the domestic authorities before the attack on him. The Court emphasised that 
its inability to reach any conclusions as to whether there has, in substance, been treatment 
prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, derived to a large extent from the failure of the 
domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation at the relevant time. However, the 
Court could not establish a substantive violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the 
attack on the journalist. 
 
Finally the Court’s task was also to establish whether or not the journalist’s right to freedom of 
expression had been violated on account of the domestic authorities’ failure to conduct an 
effective investigation into the attack on him. The Court noted that the journalist’s allegations 
in this respect arise out of the same facts as those already examined under Article 3 of the 
Convention and found to be a violation of Article 3. Having regard to those findings, the Court 
considered that the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention did not raise a separate issue 
and that therefore it was not necessary to examine the complaint again under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan is ordered to pay the journalist a 
sum of EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 4,400 in respect of costs and 
expenses. 
 
• Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 54204/08, 29 January 2015. 
 
IRIS 2015-3/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Bohlen and Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In two cases related to humorous cigarette advertisements, the European Court of Human 
Rights found that there had been no reason for the domestic authorities to interfere with the 
freedom of commercial speech in order to protect the right of reputation and the right to their 
own names of two public persons referred to in the advertisements, without their consent. The 
European Court found, in particular, that the German Federal Court of Justice had struck a fair 
balance between freedom of expression (Article 10) and the right to privacy (Article 8). 
 
The first applicant, Dieter Bohlen, is a well-known musician and artistic producer in Germany, 
while the second applicant, Ernst August, is the husband of Princess Caroline of Monaco. In 
2000, the company British American Tobacco (Germany) used in an advertisement campaign 
the first names and references to events associated with Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Von Hannover, 
who both sought injunctions prohibiting the distribution of the advertisements. The cigarette 
manufacturer immediately stopped the advertisement campaign, but refused to pay the sums 
the applicants claimed in compensation for the use of their first names. The Hamburg Regional 
Court and the Court of Appeal upheld the claims and awarded the applicants EUR 100 000 and 
EUR 35 000 respectively. However, the Federal Court of Justice quashed the Court of Appeal 
judgments and held that, despite their commercial nature, the advertisements in question were 
apt to help shape public opinion and had not exploited the applicants’ good name or contained 
anything degrading. On this basis, it dismissed the applicants’ claims seeking financial 
compensation. Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Von Hannover lodged applications with the European Court 
of Human Rights, complaining that the ruling of the Federal Court of Justice had breached their 
right to privacy and their right to their own names, protected by Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The European Court reiterated the relevant criteria laid down in its case-law for assessing the 
manner in which the domestic courts had balanced the right to respect for private life against 
the right to freedom of expression: the contribution to a debate of general interest, the extent 
to which the person in question was in the public eye, the subject of the report, the prior 
conduct of the person concerned and the content, form and impact of the publication. The 
Court gave the opinion that the advertisements were able to contribute to a debate of general 
interest to some degree, as they dealt in a satirical manner with events that had been the 
subject of public debate. It also considered that the applicants were sufficiently well-known to 
be unable to claim the same degree of protection of their private lives as persons who were 
unknown to the public at large or have not been in the public eye before. Furthermore, the 
image of and references to the applicants in the advertisements had not been degrading, while 
they obviously had a humorous character. The Court agreed with the finding by the German 
Federal Court of Justice that, in this case, priority was to be given to the right to freedom of 
expression of the tobacco company and that the dismissal of the applicants’ claim for financial 
compensation was justified, as they already had obtained the suspension of the distribution of 
the advertisements at issue. Hence a fair balance had been struck between freedom of 
expression and the right to respect for private life. The European Court found therefore, by six 
votes to one, that in both cases there had been no violation of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
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• Bohlen v. Germany, no. 53495/09, 19 February 2015. 
• Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany, no. 53649/09, 19 February 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a case concerning the conviction of four journalists for having recorded and broadcast an 
interview using hidden cameras, the European Court of Human Rights found, by six votes to 
one, that the Swiss authorities had violated the journalists’ rights protected under Article 10 on 
freedom of expression of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court emphasised 
that the use of hidden cameras by the journalists was aimed at providing public information on 
a subject of general interest, whereby the person filmed was targeted not in any personal 
capacity, but as a professional broker. The Court found that the interference with the private 
life of the broker had not been serious enough to override the public interest in information on 
denouncing malpractice in the field of insurance brokerage (on the use of hidden cameras, see 
also Tierbefreier E.V. v. Germany, IRIS 2014-3/2). 
 
In 2003, the Swiss German-language television channel SF DRS prepared a documentary on 
sales of life insurance products, against a background of public discontent with the practices 
used by insurance brokers. One of the SF DRS journalists presented herself as a customer while 
meeting with an insurance broker. Two hidden cameras were placed in the room in which the 
meeting took place. At the end of the meeting the journalist revealed that the conversation had 
been in reality an interview that had been filmed for journalistic purpose. The broker tried to 
obtain an injunction against the programme, but that request was dismissed. A short time later, 
sequences from the recording were broadcast on television, with the broker’s face and voice 
disguised. After a complaint by the broker, a prosecution was started against the journalists 
involved in the making and editing of the programme, on charges of illegal recording of a 
conversation by others. Although acknowledging the major public interest in securing 
information on practices in the field of insurance, the journalists were convicted for recording 
and communicating a conversation by others without authorisation. The journalists complained 
before the European Court of Human Rights that their sentence to a payment of between four 
to 12 day-fines amounted to a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of 
expression as protected under Article 10. 
 
The Court reiterated its case law on attacks on the personal reputations of public figures and 
the six criteria which it has established in its Grand Chamber judgment of 7 February 2012 in 
the case of Axel Springer AG v. Germany (see IRIS 2012-3/1), weighing freedom of expression 
against the right to private life: (1) contributing to a debate of general interest, (2) ascertaining 
how well-known the person being reported on is and the subject of the report/documentary, (3) 
that person’s prior conduct, (4) the method of obtaining the information and its veracity, (5) the 
content, form and repercussions of the journalistic output, and (6) the penalty imposed. The 
Court applied those criteria to the present case, while taking into consideration that the broker 
was not a well-known public figure. The Court noted that the documentary in question had not 
been geared towards criticising the broker personally, but rather towards denouncing specific 
commercial practices and the inadequate protection of consumers’ rights in the sector of 
insurance brokers. Hence the report concerned an issue of interesting public debate, while 
Article 10 protects journalists in relation to such reporting under the proviso that they are 
acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis, while providing “reliable and precise” 
information in accordance with the ethics of journalism. The Court noted that the veracity of 
the facts as presented by the journalists had indeed never been contested and that it was not 
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established that the journalists had deliberately acted in breach of the ethics of journalism. The 
recording on the other hand had been broadcast in the form of a report which was particularly 
negative in so far as the broker was concerned, using audiovisual media, which are often 
considered to have a more immediate and powerful effect than the written press. However, a 
decisive factor was that the journalists had disguised the broker’s face and voice and that the 
interview had not taken place on his usual business premises. Therefore the Court held that the 
interference with the private life of the broker had not been serious enough to override the 
public’s interest in receiving information on the alleged malpractice in the field of insurance 
brokerage. Despite the relative leniency of the penalties of 12 day-fines and four day-fines 
respectively, the criminal sentence by the Swiss court had been liable to discourage the media 
from expressing criticism, even though the journalists had not been prevented from 
broadcasting their documentary. The Court therefore concluded that there had been a violation 
of Article 10. 
 
• Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland, no. 21830/09, ECHR 2015. 
 
IRIS 2015-4/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Morice v. France (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The Grand Chamber has overruled an earlier finding of non-violation of the right to freedom of 
expression of a lawyer (Chamber, Fifth Section, 11 July 2013). With an extensively elaborated 
reasoning, the Grand Chamber unanimously came to the conclusion that the applicant lawyer’s 
conviction for the defamation of two investigative judges violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
It found that the lawyer, Morice, had expressed value judgments in the newspaper Le Monde 
with a sufficient factual basis and that his remarks concerning a matter of public interest had 
not exceeded the limits of the right to freedom of expression. 
 
The judgment refers to the specific status of lawyers that gives them a central position in the 
administration of justice as intermediaries between the public and the courts. As a result, 
lawyers play a key role in ensuring that the courts, whose mission is fundamental in a State 
based on the rule of law, enjoy public confidence. This, however, does not exclude lawyers 
from the right to freedom of expression, in particular to comment in public on the 
administration of justice, provided that their criticism does not overstep certain bounds. Those 
bounds lie in the usual restrictions on the conduct of members of the Bar, with their particular 
reference to “dignity”, “honour” and “integrity” and to “respect for … the fair administration of 
justice”. 
 
The judgment analyses more concretely (a) the applicant’s status as a lawyer, (b) the 
contribution to a debate on a matter of public interest, (c) the nature of the impugned remarks, 
(d) the specific circumstances of the case and (e) the sanctions imposed. As regards (a) the 
applicant’s status as a lawyer, the Court reiterated its case-law to the effect that a distinction 
had to be drawn depending on whether the lawyer was speaking inside or outside the 
courtroom. Remarks made in the courtroom remained there and thus warrant a high degree of 
tolerance to criticism, especially since the lawyer’s freedom of expression may raise questions 
as to his client’s right to a fair trial: the principle of fairness thus also militates in favour of a 
free and even forceful exchange of argument between the parties. In the present case however 
the Court stated that it did not see how Morice’s statements could have directly contributed to 
his task of defending his client. The Court also took the view that lawyers cannot be equated 
with journalists. It stated that their respective positions and roles in society are intrinsically 
different. Regarding (b) the contribution to a debate on a matter of public interest, the Court 
took the view that the impugned remarks published in Le Monde concerned a high-profile case 
that created discussion about the functioning of the judiciary. As such, a context of a debate on 
a matter of public interest calls for a high level of protection of freedom of expression, while 
only a particularly narrow margin of appreciation is left to the domestic authorities, leading to 
a strict scrutiny by the European Court as to whether the interference at issue can be justified 
as being necessary in a democratic society. As regard (c) on the nature of the impugned 
remarks, the Court was of the opinion that they were more value judgments than pure 
statements of fact, reflecting mainly an overall assessment of the conduct of the investigating 
judges in the course of the investigation. Furthermore, the remarks had a sufficient factual 
basis and could not be regarded as misleading or as a gratuitous attack on the reputation or the 
integrity of the two investigative judges. With regard to (d) and the specific circumstances of 
the case, the Grand Chamber reiterated that lawyers cannot be held responsible for everything 
appearing in an interview published by the press or for actions by the press. Furthermore, the 
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Grand Chamber stated its opinion that Morice’s statements could not be reduced to the mere 
expression of personal animosity, as their aim was to reveal shortcomings in the justice system. 
According to the Court, “a lawyer should be able to draw the public’s attention to potential 
shortcomings in the justice system; the judiciary may benefit from constructive criticism”. The 
Grand Chamber also considered that respect for the authority of the judiciary cannot justify an 
unlimited restriction on the right to freedom of expression. Although the defence of a client by 
his lawyer must be conducted not in the media, but in the courts of competent jurisdiction, 
involving the use of any available remedies, the Grand Chamber accepted that there might be 
“very specific circumstances” justifying a lawyer making public statements in the media, such as 
in the case at issue. The Court found that Morice’s statements were not capable of undermining 
the proper conduct of the judicial proceedings and that his conviction could not serve to 
maintain the authority of the judiciary. Finally, with regard to (e) on the imposed sanction, the 
Court referred to its findings on many occasions that interference with freedom of expression 
may have a chilling effect on the exercise of that freedom, especially in cases of criminal 
defamation. In view of the foregoing, the Grand Chamber reached the conclusion, unanimously, 
that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, 23 April 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland (no. 3) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Once again, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has rejected a finding by national 
courts that journalistic reporting about a criminal case had overstepped the limits of freedom of 
expression. The Court emphasised the role of the media in a democratic society in informing 
the general public of serious criminal proceedings and it referred again to the notion of 
“responsible journalism”. The Court found unanimously that the interference with the 
journalist’s rights had violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
The applicant in this case was Ms. Erla Hlynsdóttir. She was a journalist, working for the 
newspaper DV. In 2007, the newspaper DV published an article on the ongoing criminal 
proceedings against Mr. A and his co-accused, Mr. B, before the Reykjavík District Court. A 
picture of Mr. A was published on the front page of the newspaper showing him walking into 
the courtroom. There was a large headline under the photograph which read “Scared cocaine 
smugglers” and underneath it was written that both the accused were afraid of retaliation by 
their accomplices and had therefore refused to identify them. Mr. A´s name also appeared on 
the front page. Both on the front page and in the newspaper’s article written by Erla Hlynsdóttir 
it was mentioned that Mr. A and his co-accused could expect prison sentences. Reference was 
made to the indictment by the Director of Public Prosecutions requesting a punishment of 
seven to eight years´ imprisonment in respect of Mr. A, for importing nearly 3.8 kilograms of 
cocaine, intended for sale, together with an unknown accomplice. A punishment of three to 
four years was requested in respect of Mr. B, who was charged in the case with removing the 
alleged drugs from a vehicle, in cooperation with Mr. A. After being acquitted by the Icelandic 
courts, Mr. A lodged defamation proceedings against Mr. SME, the editor of DV at the time, and 
the journalist who wrote the article, Erla Hlynsdóttir. The Supreme Court declared null and void 
the words “cocaine smugglers” on the front page and the statement referring to the removal of 
drugs in a vehicle. Both Erla Hlynsdóttir and the editor were ordered to pay approximately EUR 
575 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and about EUR 290 for the costs of publishing 
the judgment. 
 
The ECtHR first reiterated that the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is called for 
when, as in the present case, the measures taken or sanctions imposed by the national 
authority are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates over matters of 
legitimate public concern. In the Court’s view, a journalist’s good faith should be assessed on 
the basis of the knowledge and information which was available to him or her at the time of 
writing the item(s) in question. Thus, it is not decisive for the purpose of the present case that 
Mr. A was later acquitted of the charges brought against him by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions. Although the ECtHR fully agreed with the Icelandic Supreme Court that it is for 
the courts and not the media to determine whether an accused is guilty of an offence, it also 
recognised the right of the media to report on ongoing court cases on the basis of available and 
correct information, such as an indictment by the public prosecutor and information gathered at 
the public hearing. The Court was of the opinion that the rendering of an indictment in a media 
coverage after it has been read out at a trial hearing is a kind of situation where there may be 
special grounds for dispensing the press from its ordinary obligation to verify factual 
statements that are defamatory of private individuals. With regard the labelling on the front 
page of the accused as “cocaine smugglers”, the ECtHR emphasised that was not the applicant 
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journalist, but to the editor who was deemed to have defamed Mr. A thereby. The journalist 
cannot be found responsible and liable for this statement in the newspaper and therefore the 
interference with her right to freedom of expression in this manner cannot be justified. The 
European Court came to the conclusion that the respondent State failed to sufficiently show 
that Erla Hlynsdóttir acted in bad faith or otherwise inconsistently with the diligence expected 
of a responsible journalist reporting on a matter of public interest. Therefore, there has been a 
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court reiterated 
though that, in assessing the relevance and sufficiency of the national courts’ findings, the 
Court, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, must take into account the extent to 
which the domestic courts balanced the conflicting rights implicated in the case, in the light of 
the Court’s established case-law in this area. As the European Court found that the reasoning of 
the national courts demonstrated a lack of sufficient engagement with the general principles of 
the Court under Article 10 of the ECHR, it disagreed with the domestic courts’ finding that the 
interference with the applicant’s rights could be justified as being necessary in a democratic 
society. The judgment shows once again how diligent and responsible journalism reporting on 
issues of public interest receives a very high level of protection by the ECtHR and that in such 
cases, notwithstanding its references to the subsidiarity principle, the Court applies a strict 
scrutiny over the findings and arguments by the domestic courts. 
 
• Erla Hlynsdottir v. Iceland (no. 3), no. 54145/10, 2 June 2015. 
 
IRIS 2015-7/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Delfi AS v. Estonia (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 16 June 2015, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered 
the long-awaited final judgment in the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, deciding on the liability of an 
online news portal for the offensive comments posted by its readers below one of its online 
news articles. It was the first case in which the European Court has been called upon to 
examine, from the perspective of the right to freedom of expression, a complaint about liability 
for user-generated comments on an internet news portal. By a Chamber judgment of 10 
October 2013, the ECtHR had first unanimously held that there had been no violation of the 
right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (see IRIS 2014-1/2). The Court confirmed the findings by the domestic courts 
that the Delfi news platform was to be considered a provider of content services, rather than a 
provider of technical services, and that therefore it should have effectively prevented clearly 
unlawful comments from being published. The fact that Delfi had immediately removed 
insulting content after having received notice of it did not suffice to exempt Delfi from liability. 
The reason why Delfi could not rely on the limited liability regime for internet service providers 
(ISPs) of Article 12 to 15 of the Directive 2001/31/EC on Electronic Commerce (no liability in 
case of expeditious removal after obtaining actual knowledge of illegal content and no duty of 
pre-monitoring) was, according to the Estonian courts, that the news portal had integrated the 
readers’ comments into its news portal, it had some control over the incoming or posted 
comments and it had invited the users to post comments, while it also had an economic 
interest in exploiting its news platform through the integrated comment environment. The 
European Court did not challenge this finding by the Estonian courts, restricting its supervisory 
role to ascertaining whether the effects of refusing to treat Delfi as an ISP were compatible 
with Article 10 of the Convention. The Chamber’s judgment however did not become final as, 
on 17 February 2014, the panel of five judges, in application of Article 43 of the Convention, 
decided to refer the case to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR (see IRIS 2014-4/1). 
 
The Grand Chamber has now confirmed the non-finding of a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention, on very similar, but not identical grounds as those given in the Chamber’s 
judgment. The Grand Chamber started by considering that the case concerns the “duties and 
responsibilities” of Internet news portals, under Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention, when 
they provide for economic purposes a platform for user-generated comments on previously 
published content and some users - whether identified or anonymous - engage in clearly 
unlawful speech, which infringes the personality rights of others and amounts to hate speech 
and incitement to violence against them. The Grand Chamber is of the opinion that the 
Estonian courts’ finding of liability against Delfi was a justified and proportionate restriction on 
the portal’s freedom of expression. The Court agreed that the Information Society Services Act 
transposing the E-Commerce Directive into Estonian law, including the provisions on the 
limited liability of ISPs, did not apply to the present case, since the latter related to activities of 
a merely technical, automatic and passive nature, while Delfi’s activities reflected those of a 
media publisher running an internet news portal. Delfi’s involvement in making public the 
comments on its news articles on its news portal went beyond that of a passive, purely 
technical service provider. The Grand Chamber was of the opinion that the interference by the 
Estonian authorities in Delfi’s freedom of expression was sufficiently foreseeable and 
sufficiently precisely prescribed by law and was justified by the legitimate aim of protecting the 
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reputation and rights of others. While the Court acknowledged that important benefits can be 
derived from the Internet in the exercise of freedom of expression, it was also mindful that 
liability for defamatory or other types of unlawful speech must, in principle, be retained as an 
effective remedy for violations of personality rights. 
 
The Court emphasised that the case concerned a large professionally managed Internet news 
portal run on a commercial basis, which published news articles of its own and invited its 
readers to comment on them. The Grand Chamber agreed with the Chamber’s finding that Delfi 
must be considered to have exercised a substantial degree of control over the comments 
published on its portal. It noted that Delfi cannot be said to have wholly neglected its duty to 
avoid causing harm to third parties, but that the automatic word-based filter used by Delfi 
failed to filter out odious hate speech and speech inciting violence posted by readers and thus 
limited its ability to expeditiously remove the offending comments. The Court recalled that the 
majority of the words and expressions in question did not include sophisticated metaphors or 
contain hidden meanings or subtle threats: they were manifest expressions of hatred and 
blatant threats to the physical integrity of the insulted person. Thus, even if the automatic 
word-based filter may have been useful in some instances, the facts of the present case 
demonstrate that it was insufficient for detecting comments that can be qualified as “hate 
speech” and do not constitute protected speech under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court 
noted that, as a consequence of this failure of the filtering mechanism, such clearly unlawful 
comments remained online for six weeks. The Court considered that a large news portal’s 
obligation to take effective measures to limit the dissemination of hate speech and speech 
inciting violence - the issue in the present case - can by no means be equated to “private 
censorship”. The Grand Chamber attached weight to the consideration that the ability of a 
potential victim of hate speech to continuously monitor the Internet is more limited than the 
ability of a large commercial Internet news portal to prevent or rapidly remove such comments. 
By way of conclusion, the Grand Chamber took the view that the steps taken by Delfi to remove 
the offensive comments had been insufficient. Furthermore, the compensation of EUR 320 that 
Delfi had been obliged to pay for non-pecuniary damages was not to be considered as an 
excessive interference with the right to freedom of expression of the applicant media company. 
Therefore, the Grand Chamber found that the domestic courts’ imposition of liability on Delfi 
was based on relevant and sufficient grounds and that this measure did not constitute a 
disproportionate restriction on Delfi’s right to freedom of expression. By fifteen votes to two, 
the Grand Chamber held there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
It is important to draw attention to one of the Grand Chamber’s considerations that the Delfi 
case does not affect “other fora on the Internet” where third-party comments can be 
disseminated, for example Internet discussion fora or bulletin boards where users can freely set 
out their ideas on any topic without the discussion being channelled by any input from the 
forum’s manager. The Grand Chamber’s finding is also not applicable to a social media platform 
where the platform provider does not offer any content and where the content provider may be 
a private person running the website or a blog as a hobby. The Court indeed emphasised very 
strongly that the case concerned a professionally managed Internet news portal, run on a 
commercial basis. 
 
The Grand Chamber also made clear that the impugned comments in the present case mainly 
constituted hate speech and speech that directly advocated acts of violence. Hence, the 
establishment of their unlawful nature did not require any linguistic or legal analysis by Delfi, 
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since the remarks were on their face manifestly unlawful. According to the Grand Chamber its 
judgment is not to be understood as imposing a form of “private censorship”. 
 
• Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, 16 June 2015. 
 
IRIS 2015-7/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
After proceedings at national level over eight years, and after a preliminary ruling by the EU 
Court of Justice on 16 December 2008 (Case C-73/07), the European Court of Human Rights has 
delivered a judgment in a highly interesting case of conflicting rights between the right of 
privacy and the right to freedom of expression, in the domain of protection of personal data 
and data journalism. The Court comes to the conclusion that a prohibition issued by the Finnish 
Data Protection Board that prohibited two media companies (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy) from publishing personal data in the manner and to the extent Satamedia had 
published these data before, is to be considered as a legitimate interference in the applicants’ 
right to freedom of expression and information. More precisely the Finnish authorities forbade 
Satamedia from collecting, saving and processing to a large extent taxation data, with the 
result that an essential part of the information published in the applicant’s magazine Veropörssi 
could no longer be published and an SMS-service was discontinued. The European Court agrees 
with the Finnish authorities that the applicants could not rely on the exception of journalistic 
activities as the publication of the large amount of taxation data by Satamedia was not justified 
by a public interest. The Court accepts the approach of the Finnish Supreme Administrative 
Court that it was necessary to interpret Satamedia’s freedom of expression strictly in order to 
protect the right of privacy of Finnish citizens. 
 
The European Court recognises however the general subject-matter which was at the heart of 
the publication in question, namely the taxation data about natural persons’ taxable income 
and assets, while such data are a matter of public record in Finland, available to everyone. The 
Court agrees that as such this taxation information was a matter of public interest. The Court 
also emphasises that such data are public in Finland, in accordance with the Act on the Public 
Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information, and that there was no suggestion that 
Satamedia had obtained the taxation data by subterfuge or other illicit means. The Court 
equally observes that the accuracy and reliability of the published information was not in 
dispute. According to the European Court the only problematic issue was the extent of the 
published information by Satamedia, as the Veropörssi magazine had published in 2002 
taxation data on 1.2 million persons. According to the domestic authorities the publishing of 
taxation information to such an extent could not be considered as journalism, but as processing 
of personal data which Satamedia had no right to do. The Court’s judgment also contains a 
reference to the preliminary ruling of the EU Court of Justice of 16 December 2008, which 
found that the activities of Satamedia related to data from documents which were in the public 
domain under Finnish legislation, could be classified as “journalistic activities”, if their object 
was to disclose to the public information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which 
was used to transmit it.  
 
Leaving a broad margin of appreciation, the European Court of Human Rights accepts the 
finding by the Finnish authorities that the publication of personal data by Satamedia could not 
be regarded as journalistic activity, in particular because that derogation for journalistic 
purpose in the Personal Data Act (see also Article 9 of Protection of Personal Data Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995) was to be interpreted strictly. The European Court is of the 
opinion that the Finnish judicial authorities have attached sufficient importance to Satamedia’s 
right to freedom of expression, while also taking into consideration the right to respect for 
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private life of those tax-payers whose taxation information had been published. The Court finds 
that the restrictions on the exercise of Satamedia’s freedom of expression were established 
convincingly by the Supreme Administrative Court, in line with the Court’s case-law. In such 
circumstances the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its own view for that of the 
domestic courts. 
 
The Court finally notes that Satamedia was not prohibited generally from publishing the 
taxation information about private persons, but only to a certain extent. The fact that the 
prohibition issued lead to the discontinuation of Veropörssi magazine and Satamedia’s SMS-
service was, according to the Court, not a direct consequence of the interference by the Finnish 
authorities, but an economic decision made by Satamedia itself. The Court also takes into 
account that the prohibition laid down by the domestic authorities was not a criminal sanction, 
but an administrative one, and thereby a less severe sanction than a criminal one. Having 
regard to all the foregoing factors, and taking into account the margin of appreciation afforded 
to the State in this area, the Court considers that the domestic courts struck a fair balance 
between the competing interests at stake. Therefore there has been no violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention.  Only one judge dissented, emphasising that the majority’s approach does not 
follow the established case-law of the Court finding a violation of Article 10 in cases where 
national authorities have taken measures to protect publicly available and known information 
on matters of public interest from disclosure. The dissenting opinion also states that no 
negative effect or harm was identified as having been inflicted upon any individual, nor had 
society been otherwise imperilled through the publication of the taxation data at issue. It states 
further that “regrettably, the majority agreed with the respondent state that the applicant 
companies’ activities did not fall within the exception for the purposes of journalism in the 
Personal Data Act” and that this can lead to an interpretation “that journalists are so limited in 
processing data that the entire journalistic activity becomes futile (..), particularly in the light of 
the dynamic and evolving character of media”. 
 
Apart from rejecting the applicants’ arguments with regard their right to freedom of expression 
and information under Article 10 of the Convention, the Court also rejected Satamedia’s claim 
that Article 14 of the Convention was violated. Satamedia had argued that they had been 
discriminated against vis-à-vis other newspapers which had been able to continue publishing 
the taxation information in question. According to the European Court, Satamedia could not be 
compared with other newspapers publishing taxation data as the quantity published by them 
was clearly greater than elsewhere. Therefore Satamedia’s situation was not sufficiently similar 
to the situation of other newspapers, and hence there was no discrimination in the terms of 
Article 14. Indeed, in order for an issue to arise under Article 14 there must be a difference in 
treatment in relevantly similar situations, the latter not being the case in this context. The 
Court found this part of the application manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible. 
 
The Court did find however a violation of Article 6 § 1 (fair trial) of the Convention in this case, 
as the length of the proceedings at domestic level (six years and six months) was excessive and 
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement, even taking into account the complexity of 
the case. 
 
• Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, no. 931/13, 21 July 2015.  
• Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) in Case C-73-07 
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, 16 December 2008. 
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Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 14 December 2015, which 
returned its judgment on 27 June 2017. 
 
IRIS 2015-8/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
An interesting judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recently became final, 
in which the Court confirmed the right of journalists to express severe criticism in strong 
wording on matters of public interest. The judgment clarifies that this right is also protected 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) when the criticism 
relates to journalistic reporting by other media, and focuses in casu on a journalist who 
produced two TV documentaries broadcast by the Finnish public service broadcaster. 
 
In this case, the journalist, Mikko Veli Niskasaari, and the media company Otavamedia Oy, were 
found liable for defamation of a journalist who had been criticised for having manipulated a 
documentary. The criticism had been uttered in Seura magazine, and on two internet discussion 
forums, calling the journalists of the Finnish public service broadcaster who produced two 
documentaries on forest protection “liars”. According to Niskasaari, some figures and data in the 
documentary were fabricated, and one of the journalists who made the documentary was “lying 
cold-bloodedly and intentionally”. Niskasaari was convicted in Finland because there was no 
evidence that the journalist had disseminated wrong or misleading information in the 
documentaries in question. As a consequence, Niskasaari had not had strong reason or probable 
cause to hold his own accusations to be true, and to call the journalist a liar. Niskasaari was 
convicted under criminal law and was ordered to pay a fine (EUR 240) and damages (EUR 2000) 
to the complainant journalist. The media company was ordered, together with Niskasaari, to 
pay EUR 4000 in damages to the complainant, as well as the latter’s costs and expenses of EUR 
25500. The criminal conviction and civil damages were based on Chapter 24, section 9, of the 
Penal Code (defamation) and Chapter 5, section 6, of the Tort Liability Act (dissemination of 
information that violates private life or reputation). 
 
According to the ECtHR, there is no doubt that the measures against Niskasaari and Otavamedia 
Oy were prescribed by law, fulfilling the requirements of precision and clarity, and were 
pursuing the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others. The Court, 
however, finds unanimously that the Finnish authorities have violated the right to freedom of 
expression of the applicant journalist and media company, as the interference with their rights 
under Article 10 of the European Convention is not considered necessary in a democratic 
society. According to the Court’s case law a number of criteria are relevant when examining the 
necessity of an interference with the right to freedom of expression in the interests of the 
“protection of the reputation or rights of others”, namely (i) contribution to a debate of general 
interest; (ii) how well-known the person concerned is and what the subject of the report is; (iii) 
prior conduct of the person concerned; (iv) method of obtaining the information and its 
veracity; (v) content, form and consequences of the publication; and (vi) severity of the sanction 
imposed. 
 
In the case at issue, the ECtHR is of the opinion that it was not clear from the reasoning in the 
judgments of the domestic courts what “pressing social need” was taken to justify protecting 
the TV-journalist’s right to reputation over the freedom of expression of Niskasaari and 
Otavamedia Oy, particularly as it concerned a debate between two professional journalists 
discussing the limits of critical and investigative journalism. The European Court considers that 
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journalists who use strong expressions and pursue so-called investigative journalism in a TV-
documentary could be expected to tolerate even severe criticism of their activities. It 
emphasises that it is relevant for the judicial balancing exercise, that the complainant TV-
journalist, while entitled to benefit from the protection afforded to every individual’s reputation 
by Article 8, was himself an investigative journalist involved in making TV documentaries on 
controversial issues for a public broadcasting company. Hence the journalist was engaged in an 
activity very much in the public domain in a manner and in circumstances “where he could 
himself expect to be the subject of robust scrutiny, comment and criticism regarding his 
professional conduct”. The Court is of the opinion that the Court of Appeal did not pay 
sufficient attention to this “journalistic” hue of the case. The ECtHR also points out that Seura 
magazine provided the reporters who had made the TV-documentaries in question, including 
the complainant, with an opportunity to reply to the first applicant’s criticism. In response to 
this reply, the magazine subsequently published a page-long counter-reply by Niskasaari. The 
Court notes that different statistical information existed as far as the conserved forest area in 
Finland was concerned and that it could not therefore be said that the figures given by the 
complainant TV-journalist were fabricated. However, the domestic courts did not, as required 
by Article 10 of the ECHR, proceed to a sufficient evaluation of the actual impact of Niskasaari’s 
right to freedom of expression on the outcome of the case. In particular, the Appeal Court did 
not balance his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention, on 
the basis of the relevant criteria, in any considered way against the complainant’s conflicting 
right to reputation, under Article 8 of the Convention. Nor is it clear whether, according to the 
Appeal Court, the resultant interference with Niskasaari’s freedom of expression was 
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The European Court regards the amount of 
compensation (EUR 4000) as substantial, given that the maximum compensation afforded to 
victims of serious violence varies between EUR 3000 and EUR 5000. Having regard to all the 
foregoing factors, and notwithstanding the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this 
area, the Court considers that the domestic courts failed to undertake an assessment capable of 
striking a fair balance between the competing interests at stake under Articles 8 and 10 of the 
European Convention. Therefore the ECtHR concludes that the reasons relied upon by the 
domestic courts, although relevant, were not sufficient to show that the interference 
complained of was “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, the Finnish authorities 
were found to have violated Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v. Finland, no. 32297/10, 23 June 2015. 
 
IRIS 2015-10/1 
  
Back to overview of case-law 
369 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Perinçek v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media (VRM) and of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
(ECPMF) 
 
On 17 December 2013 the Second Section of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled by 
five votes to two that Switzerland violated the right to freedom of expression by convicting 
Doğu Perinçek, chairman of the Turkish Workers’ Party, for publicly denying the existence of the 
genocide against the Armenian people (IRIS 2014-2/1 and IRIS 2014-7/2). After referral, on 15 
October 2015 the Grand Chamber confirmed by ten votes to seven the finding of a violation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In several public speeches, 
Perinçek had described the Armenian genocide as “an international lie”. The Swiss courts found 
that Perinçek’s denial that the Ottoman Empire had perpetrated the crime of genocide against 
the Armenian people in 1915 and the following years, was in breach with Article 261bis § 4 of 
the Swiss Criminal Code. This article punishes inter alia the denial, gross minimisation or 
attempt of justification of a genocide or crimes against humanity. According to the Swiss courts, 
the Armenian genocide, like the Jewish genocide, is a proven historical fact. Relying on Article 
10 ECHR, Perinçek complained before the European Court that his criminal conviction and 
punishment for having publicly stated that there had not been an Armenian genocide had 
breached his right to freedom of expression. 
 
The Grand Chamber, in a 128-page judgment, is of the opinion that the Swiss authorities only 
had a limited margin of appreciation to interfere with the right to freedom of expression, and it 
takes a set of criteria into consideration when assessing whether Perinçek’s conviction can be 
considered as “necessary in a democratic society”. Therefore the Court looks at the nature of 
Perinçek’s statements; the context in which they were interfered with; the extent to which they 
affected the Armenians’ rights; whether there is a consensus among the High Contracting 
Parties on the need to resort to criminal law sanctions in respect of such statements; the 
existence of any international law rules bearing on this issue; the method employed by the 
Swiss courts to justify the applicant’s conviction; and the severity of the interference. 
 
The European Court considers Perinçek’s statements as a part of a heated debate of public 
concern, touching upon a long standing controversy, not only in Armenia and Turkey, but also 
in the international arena. His statements were certainly virulent, but were not to be perceived 
as a form of incitement to hatred, violence or intolerance. The Grand Chamber emphasises that 
it is “aware of the immense importance attached by the Armenian community to the question 
whether the tragic events of 1915 and the following years are to be regarded as genocide, and 
of that community’s acute sensitivity to any statements bearing on that point. However, it 
cannot accept that the applicant’s statements at issue in this case were so wounding to the 
dignity of the Armenians who suffered and perished in these events and to the dignity and 
identity of their descendants as to require criminal law measures in Switzerland”. 
 
After analysing the relevant criteria and case-specific elements, and after balancing the 
conflicting rights at issue (freedom of expression under Article 10 versus the right of reputation 
and (ethnic) dignity under Article 8), the majority of the Grand Chamber concludes that 
Perinçek’s right to freedom of expression has been violated by the Swiss authorities. The Grand 
Chamber summarises its finding as follows: “Taking into account all the elements analysed 
above - that the applicant’s statements bore on a matter of public interest and did not amount 
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to a call for hatred or intolerance, that the context in which they were made was not marked by 
heightened tensions or special historical overtones in Switzerland, that the statements cannot 
be regarded as affecting the dignity of the members of the Armenian community to the point of 
requiring a criminal law response in Switzerland, that there is no international law obligation 
for Switzerland to criminalise such statements, that the Swiss courts appear to have censured 
the applicant for voicing an opinion that diverged from the established ones in Switzerland, 
and that the interference took the serious form of a criminal conviction - the Court concludes 
that it was not necessary, in a democratic society, to subject the applicant to a criminal penalty 
in order to protect the rights of the Armenian community at stake in the present case”. On these 
grounds, ten of the 17 judges come to the conclusion that the Swiss authorities have breached 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Grand Chamber majority also confirms that Article 17 (abuse 
clause) can only be applied on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases, where it is 
“immediately clear” that freedom of expression is employed for ends manifestly contrary to the 
values of the Convention. As the decisive issue whether Perinçek had effectively sought to stir 
up hatred or violence and was aiming at the destruction of the rights under the Convention was 
not “immediately clear” and overlapped with the question whether the interference with his 
right to freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society, the Grand Chamber 
decided that the question whether Article 17 was applicable had to be joined with the 
examination of the merits of the case under Article 10 of the Convention. As the Court found 
that there has been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention, there were no grounds to apply 
Article 17 of the Convention. 
 
Seven judges however, including the president of the Court, argued that the conviction of 
Perinçek in Switzerland did not amount to a breach of his right to freedom of expression. Four 
of them also argued that Article 17 (abuse clause) should have been applied in this case. The 
dissenting judges emphasise “that the massacres and deportations suffered by the Armenian 
people constituted genocide is self-evident. The Armenian genocide is a clearly established 
fact. To deny it is to deny the obvious”, immediately admitting however that this is not the 
(relevant) question in the case at issue. According to the dissenting judges the real issue at 
stake is “whether it is possible for a State, without overstepping its margin of appreciation, to 
make it a criminal offence to insult the memory of a people that has suffered genocide”. They 
confirm that, in their view, this is indeed possible. 
 Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, ECHR 2015 (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Pentikäinen v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media (VRM) and of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
(ECPMF) 
 
On 20 October 2015 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
confirmed that the interference with a press photographer’s right to freedom of expression and 
newsgathering as a result of disobeying a police order to leave the scene of a demonstration 
that had turned into a riot, can be said to have been “necessary in a democratic society” within 
the meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Grand 
Chamber comes to the same conclusion as the earlier judgment of the Fourth Section finding 
that the arrest, detention, prosecution and conviction of the journalist did not violate Article 10 
ECHR (see IRIS 2014-4/2 and IRIS 2014-7/2). 
 
The applicant, Markus Pentikäinen, is a photographer and journalist for the weekly magazine 
Suomen Kuvalehti. He was sent by his employer to take photographs of a large demonstration 
against the Asia-Europe meeting in Helsinki, and to conduct an extensive report on the 
demonstration for the paper version of the magazine and also to publish it online immediately, 
once the demonstration had ended. At a certain moment, the police decided to interrupt the 
demonstration, which had turned violent, and to seal off the demonstration area. It was 
announced over loudspeakers that the demonstration was stopped and that the crowd should 
leave the scene. The police continued to order the crowd to disperse, stating that any person 
who did not leave would be apprehended. 
 
Hundreds of people then left voluntarily via several exit routes established by the police. When 
leaving, they were asked to show their identity cards and their belongings were checked. At one 
point, a police officer told Pentikäinen personally that he had one last chance to leave the 
scene. Pentikäinen told the police officer that he was reporting for Suomen Kuvalehti and that 
he was going to follow the event to its end. After the situation inside the cordon had already 
been peaceful for an hour with around only 20 demonstrators left, the police apprehended the 
protesters that had not left the scene yet, including Pentikäinen. He told the apprehending 
officer that he was a journalist and he presented his press card, which the police officer later 
confirmed. In addition, at the police station, the police were aware that Pentikäinen was a 
member of the press. He was detained for about 18 hours and later the public prosecutor 
brought charges against him. The Finnish courts found the journalist guilty of disobeying the 
police, but they did not impose any penalty on him, holding that his offence was excusable. 
Apart from the acceptance that the impugned measures were prescribed by law, the Grand 
Chamber also considers them necessary in a democratic society, as pertinently and sufficiently 
motivated by the Finnish authorities. In general terms the Court is of the opinion that “a 
journalist cannot claim an exclusive immunity from criminal liability for the sole reason that, 
unlike other individuals exercising the right to freedom of expression, the offence in question 
was committed during the performance of his or her journalistic functions”. According to the 
Grand Chamber “the present case does not concern the prohibition of a publication (public 
disclosure of certain information) or any sanctions imposed in respect of a publication. What is 
at stake in the present case are measures taken against a journalist who failed to comply with 
police orders while taking photos in order to report on a demonstration that had turned violent” 
(§ 93). The Grand Chamber also endorses the argument of the Finnish Government, stating that 
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“the fact that the applicant was a journalist did not entitle him to preferential or different 
treatment in comparison to the other people left at the scene”. 
 
The judgment refers to the obligation of a journalist to behave in a “responsible” way, which 
includes obeying lawful orders by the police: “Against the background of this conflict of 
interests, it has to be emphasised that the concept of responsible journalism requires that 
whenever a journalist - as well as his or her employer - has to make a choice between the two 
duties and if he or she makes this choice to the detriment of the duty to abide by ordinary 
criminal law, such journalist has to be aware that he or she assumes the risk of being subject to 
legal sanctions, including those of a criminal character, by not obeying the lawful orders of, 
inter alia, the police”.The Grand Chamber agrees with the Finnish authorities that the impugned 
measures taken against Pentikäinen were necessary and proportionate for the protection of 
public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime. That includes not only his 
apprehension, but also the near 18-hour detention, the prosecution, and finally the criminal 
conviction for having disobeyed the police. 
 
The majority of the Grand Chamber, by thirteen votes to four, comes to the conclusion that 
there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court recalls that it “clearly 
transpires from the case file that the authorities did not deliberately prevent or hinder the 
media from covering the demonstration in an attempt to conceal from the public gaze the 
actions of the police with respect to the demonstration in general or to individual protesters (..). 
Indeed, the applicant was not prevented from carrying out his work as a journalist either during 
or after the demonstration”. It also stresses that “this conclusion must be seen on the basis of 
the particular circumstances of the instant case, due regard being had to the need to avoid any 
impairment of the media’s “watch-dog” role”. The dissenting judges consider the reasoning and 
finding by the majority of the Grand Chamber “a missed opportunity”, neglecting the rights of 
journalists to observe public demonstrations effectively and unimpeded, so long as they do not 
take a direct and active part in hostilities. The four dissenters emphasise “the fundamental role 
of the press in obtaining and disseminating to the public information on all aspects of 
governmental activity”. In a statement of 12 November 2015 published on the Council of 
Europe’s Platform to promote the protection of journalism and the safety of journalists, the EFJ, 
the IFJ, Index on Censorship and Article 19 call on Finland and other Council of Europe member 
states to adopt a clear legal framework for the treatment of journalists during protests, in order 
to ensure the right balance between press freedom and public order during protests and 
demonstrations. 
 
• Pentikäinen v. Finland [GC], no. 11882/10, ECHR 2015. 
• EFJ, IFJ, Article 19, Index, “Finland: Unclear Legal Framework for Guaranteeing Journalists’ 
Rights Covering Protests” 12 November 2015 [Ed.: via the Council of Europe Platform to 
promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists]. 
 
IRIS 2016-1/2 
  
Back to overview of case-law 
373 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media (VRM) and of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
(ECPMF) 
 
The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France 
elaborates on the appropriate standards for privacy and media coverage on issues related to the 
private life of public persons (see also IRIS 2014-3/1). In 2005, the French magazine Paris 
Match was ordered to pay EUR 50,000 in damages and to publish a statement detailing the 
judgment of the Versailles Court of Appeal finding a breach of privacy, because of an article 
which caused damage to Albert II of Monaco. The impugned article in Paris Match contained an 
interview with the former lover of Albert Grimaldi, Ms Coste, who claimed that Albert Grimaldi, 
who had become the reigning prince of Monaco, was the father of her son. In particular, the 
interview described the circumstances in which Ms Coste had met the Prince, their intimate 
relationship, their feelings, and the manner in which the Prince had reacted to the news of Ms 
Coste’s pregnancy and had behaved towards the child at his birth and afterwards. Ms Conte also 
revealed that she was living in the Prince’s Paris apartment and that she received an allowance 
from him, being the mother of his illegitimate child. The article was illustrated by several 
photographs showing the Prince with the child in his arms and with Ms Coste. Considering that 
the publication of the article in Paris Match interfered with his right to private life and to 
protection of his own image, the Prince had brought proceedings against Paris Match, seeking 
damages from the publishing company and an order to publish the court’s ruling. The French 
Court of Cassation confirmed the finding of the invasion of Albert Grimaldi’s privacy, inter alia 
on the grounds that “every person, whatever his rank, birth, fortune or present or future 
functions, is entitled to respect for his private life”. 
 
The publication director, Ms Couderc, and the publishing company, of the weekly magazine 
Paris Match lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against 
France, complaining about an unjustified interference with their right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Fifth Section of the 
ECtHR, in a judgment of 12 June 2014, held, by four votes to three, that there had been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Chamber judgment, however, did not become 
final. On request of the French Government, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber. In its 
judgment of 10 November 2015, the Grand Chamber confirms the finding of a violation of 
Article 10 ECHR. The Court refers to the relevant criteria applied in other cases in which the 
rights under Article 8 and 10 needed to be balanced. These criteria are: 1. contribution to a 
debate of public interest and the subject of the news report; 2. the degree of notoriety of the 
person affected; 3. the prior conduct of the person concerned; 4. the content, form and 
consequences of the publication; 5. the circumstances in which the photographs were taken, 
the way in which the information was obtained and its veracity; and 6. the gravity of the 
penalty imposed on the journalists or publishers. 
 
In relation to the first aspect, the Court finds that the birth of the Prince’s illegitimate son could 
not come solely within the private sphere of Albert Grimaldi, as the disclosure of the Prince’s 
fatherhood could be understood as constituting information on a question of public interest, as 
at the material time the child’s birth was not without possible dynastic and financial 
implications. According to the Court, the impugned information also had a political dimension. 
It further emphasises “that the press’s contribution to a debate of public interest cannot be 
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limited merely to current events or pre-existing debates. Admittedly, the press is a vector for 
disseminating debates on matters of public interest, but it also has the role of revealing and 
bringing to the public’s attention information capable of eliciting such interest and of giving 
rise to such a debate within society”. 
 
The Grand Chamber is particularly critical of the domestic courts’ failure to weigh up the 
Prince’s right to privacy with that of his son and the child’s mother. Ms Coste had willingly 
given the interview and revealed certain details of her private affair with the Prince. The 
resulting disputed article had made clear that her son’s right to public recognition by his father 
was of utmost importance to her, and was a key reason for her decision to publicise the issue. 
Hence, Ms Coste “was certainly not bound to silence” and the Prince’s private life was not the 
sole subject of the article. It also concerned the private life of Ms Coste and her son, her 
pregnancy, her own feelings, the birth of her son, a health problem suffered by the child and 
their life together. The Court emphasises “that the combination of elements relating to Ms 
Coste’s private life and to that of the Prince had to be taken into account in assessing the 
protection due to him”. 
 
The Court also refers to the fairness of the means used to obtain the information and reproduce 
it for the public, and the respect shown for the person who is the subject of the news report: Ms 
Coste herself contacted Paris Match, the veracity of the information is not disputed and the 
pictures which illustrate the interview were handed over voluntarily by Ms Coste to Paris 
Match. In addition, the photographs taken with the Prince were not taken without his 
knowledge and were taken in public places, raising no particular issues. The magazine 
furthermore cannot be criticised for enhancing the article and striving to present it attractively, 
provided that this does not distort or deform the information published and is not such as to 
mislead the reader. With regard to the photographs illustrating the article which show the 
Prince holding the child, the Court reiterates that Article 10 ECHR leaves it for journalists to 
decide whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such documents to ensure credibility. While 
there is no doubt that these photographs fell within the realm of the Prince’s private life and 
that he had not consented to their publication, their link with the impugned article however 
was not tenuous, artificial or arbitrary, and their publication could be justified by the fact that 
they added credibility to the account of events. The pictures were neither defamatory, 
depreciatory or pejorative for the Prince’s image. 
 
The Court finally reiterates that in the context of assessing proportionality, “any undue 
restriction on freedom of expression effectively entails a risk of obstructing or paralysing future 
media coverage of similar questions”, while the order to pay EUR 50,000 in damages and to 
publish a statement detailing the judgment cannot be considered as insignificant penalties. 
 
The Court concluded that the arguments for the protection of the Prince’s private life and his 
right to his own image, although relevant, cannot be regarded as sufficient to justify the 
interference at issue. The French courts did not give due consideration to the principles and 
criteria as laid down by the Court’s case-law for balancing the right to respect for private life 
and the right to freedom of expression. They thus exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded 
to them and failed to strike a reasonable balance of proportionality between the measures 
restricting Paris Match’s right to freedom of expression, and the legitimate aim pursued. The 
Court therefore, unanimously, concludes that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
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 Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], no. 40454/07, ECHR 2015 (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Cengiz and others v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media (VRM) and of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom 
(ECPMF) 
 
On 1 December 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered a judgment 
dealing with a blocking order in Turkey of the popular video-sharing website YouTube. The 
Court found that the blocking of access to YouTube amounted to a violation of the right to 
receive and impart information under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR). The Court observed that YouTube, as an Internet platform, enabled information on 
political and social matters to be broadcast and citizen journalism to emerge. The Court found 
that there was no provision in the Turkish law allowing domestic courts to impose the blanket 
blocking order of YouTube at issue. 
 
Pursuant to a law regulating Internet publications and combating Internet offences, in May 
2008 the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance ordered the blocking of access to YouTube on 
the ground that the website contained some ten videos which it was claimed were insulting to 
the memory of Atatürk. Arguing that this restriction interfered with their right to freedom to 
receive or impart information and ideas, Serkan Cengiz, Yaman Akdeniz and Kerem Altıparmak 
challenged the decision and requested, in their capacity as users, that the measure be lifted. 
They also alleged that the measure had an impact on their professional academic activities, as 
all three occupied academic positions in different universities, where they teach law. The 
Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance rejected their request on the ground that the blocking 
order had been imposed in accordance with the law and that the applicants did not have 
standing to challenge the blocking order. In total the YouTube website was blocked for a period 
of two and a half years. On 30 October 2010, the blocking order was lifted by the public 
prosecutor’s office following a request from the company owning copyright of the videos in 
question. 
 
The three law professors lodged an application before the Strasbourg Court, mainly relying on 
Article 10 ECHR. As active users, they complained about the impact of the blocking order on 
their right to freedom to receive and impart information and ideas. Relying on Article 46 
(concerning the binding force and execution of judgments), they also requested that the Court 
indicate to the Turkish Government which general measures could be taken to put an end to 
the situation complained about. 
 
The Court first considered it necessary to determine whether the applicants had victim status as 
required by the Convention. It noted that although the applicants were not directly affected by 
the blocking order, they had actively used YouTube for professional purposes, particularly 
downloading or accessing videos used in their academic work. It also observed that YouTube 
was an important source of communication and that the blocking order precluded access to 
specific information which it was not possible to access by other means. Moreover, the platform 
permitted the emergence of citizen journalism which could impart political information not 
conveyed by traditional media. The Court accordingly accepted that in the present case 
YouTube had been an important means by which Cengiz, Akdeniz and Altıparmak could 
exercise their right to receive and impart information or ideas and that they could legitimately 
claim to have been affected by the blocking order even though they had not been directly 
targeted by it. In the Court’s view, the blocking order at issue could be regarded as an 
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interference by a public authority with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. 
The Court went on to observe that the blocking order had been imposed under Section 8(1) of 
Law no. 5651, while in its judgment in the case of Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey (see IRIS 2013-2/1) 
concerning a blocking order of Google Sites, it had already found that this law did not authorise 
the blocking of access to an entire Internet site on account of one element of its content. Under 
Section 8(1), a blocking order could only be imposed on a specific publication, hence there was 
no legislative provision allowing the Turkish judicial authorities to impose a blanket blocking 
order on access to YouTube. Therefore the interference with the applicants’ rights had not 
satisfied the condition of lawfulness required by Article 10 § 2 ECHR. The European Court also 
found that Cengiz, Akdeniz and Altıparmak had not enjoyed a sufficient degree of protection. 
Finally the Court did not consider it necessary to rule on Article 46 of the Convention, as it 
observed that Law no. 5651 has been amended and now allowed, under certain conditions, 
blocking orders to be imposed on an entire website. However, as the new Act was not of 
concrete application in the present case, the Court did not consider it necessary to elaborate 
and rule on this aspect of the case. 
 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, ECHR 2015 (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Görmüş a.o. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has once more confirmed the strong protection 
that is to be given to journalists’ sources, in a case also related to the disclosure of confidential 
information and the protection of whistle-blowers. The Court is of the opinion that the Turkish 
authorities have violated the right to freedom of expression of journalists, reporting on 
important matters related to the armed forces. 
 
The magazine Nokta published an article based on documents classified “confidential” by the 
Chief of Staff of the armed forces in Turkey. It revealed a system for classifying publishing 
companies and journalists according to whether they were “favourable” or “hostile” to the 
armed forces, so that specific journalists could be excluded from covering activities organised 
by the army. Following a complaint by the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, the Military Court 
ordered a search of all the magazine’s premises, demanding electronic and paper copies of the 
files stored on all private and professional computers. The Military Court considered the search 
and seizure lawful, as these measures had only been intended to elucidate the circumstances 
surrounding the disclosure of a document classified as “secret”, and not to identify those 
responsible for the leak of the confidential information. The Military Court also pointed out that 
the Criminal Code made it an offence to procure, use, possess or publish information whose 
disclosure was prohibited for the purposes of protecting State security, and that journalists 
were not exempted from criminal liability in that connection. The director of the magazine, the 
editors and some journalists lodged an application with the Strasbourg Court complaining of a 
violation of their right to freedom of expression and information (Article 10 ECHR). 
 
The European Court held that the article published by Nokta, on the basis of “confidential” 
military documents, was capable of contributing to public debate. It emphasised the need to 
protect journalistic sources, including when those sources are State officials highlighting 
unsatisfactory practices in their workplace. It considered the seizure, retrieval and storage by 
the authorities of all of the magazine’s computer data, with a view to identifying the public-
sector whistle-blowers, as a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of 
expression and information. The action taken by the authorities had undermined the protection 
of sources to a greater extent than an order requiring them to reveal the identity of the sources, 
since the indiscriminate retrieval of all the data had revealed information that was 
unconnected to the acts in issue. The Court also held that the impugned interference by the 
Turkish authorities could risk deterring potential sources from assisting the press in informing 
the public of matters involving the armed forces, including when they concerned a public 
interest. In the Court’s view, this intervention was likely not only to have very negative 
repercussions on the relationships of the journalists in question with their sources, but could 
also have a serious and chilling effect on other journalists or other whistle-blowers who were 
State officials, and could discourage them from reporting any misconduct or controversial acts 
by public authorities. 
 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the reasons for which the contested documents had been 
classified as confidential were not justified, as the government had not shown that there had 
been a detrimental impact as a result of their disclosure. Thus, the Court considered that the 
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contested article had been highly pertinent in the debate on discrimination against the media 
by State bodies, especially as the style used in the article and the time of its publication had 
not raised any difficulty that was such as to damage the interests of the State. The Court is also 
of the opinion that the journalists of Nokta had acted in accordance with professional ethics, 
and that they had had no intention other than to inform the public of a topic of general 
interest. The Court unanimously concluded that the Turkish authorities have violated Article 10 
of the ECHR, holding that the interference with the journalists’ right to freedom of expression, 
did not meet a pressing social need, had not been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued 
and that, in consequence, it had not been necessary in a democratic society. 
 Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, no. 49085/07, 19 January 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Kalda v. Estonia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
For the first time the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated that denying a 
prisoner access to the Internet may amount to a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). In Estonia, Mr Kalda, who is serving a life sentence in 
prison, requested from the governor of the prison access to the online version of the State 
Gazette, to the decisions of the Supreme Court and administrative courts, and to the HUDOC 
database of the ECtHR. The governor refused this request, and so did the Administrative Court 
and the Tallinn Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court, however, decided that the refusal of the 
prison administration to grant detainees access to the rulings of the administrative courts and 
of the ECtHR interfered with their right to freely obtain information disseminated for public 
use, and considered the refusal unlawful. Some time later, Mr Kalda made a new application, 
requesting to be granted access to the Internet sites www.coe.ee of the Council of Europe 
Information Office in Tallinn, www.oiguskantsler.ee, the website of the Chancellor of Justice 
and www.riigikogu.ee, the website of the Estonian Parliament. He argued that he was involved 
in a number of legal disputes with the prison administration and that he needed access to 
those Internet sites in order to be able to defend his rights in court. Again Mr Kalda’s request 
was refused. The Supreme Court this time concluded that the prohibition of detainees’ access 
to the three Internet sites at issue was justified by the need to achieve the aims of 
imprisonment and in particular the need to secure public safety. Mr Kalda lodged an 
application with the ECtHR, complaining that the Estonian authorities’ refusal to grant him 
access to certain websites violated his right to receive information “without interference by 
public authority”, in breach of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
In its judgment of 19 January 2016, the European Court reiterated that the right to receive 
information basically prohibits a government from preventing a person from receiving 
information that others wished or were willing to impart. It also emphasises that in the light of 
its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the 
Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the 
dissemination of information in general. However, as imprisonment inevitably involves a 
number of restrictions on prisoners’ communications with the outside world, including on their 
ability to receive information, the Court considered that Article 10 of the Convention cannot be 
interpreted as imposing a general obligation to provide access to the Internet, or to specific 
Internet sites, for prisoners. Nevertheless, since access to certain sites containing legal 
information is granted under Estonian law, the restriction of access to other sites that also 
contain legal information constitutes an interference with the right to receive information. 
Therefore the Court needed to examine whether this interference met the conditions of Article 
10 paragraph 2 of the Convention. As there was no discussion that the interference with Mr 
Kalda’s right to receive information was prescribed by the Imprisonment Act and pursued the 
legitimate aims of the protection of the rights of others and the prevention of disorder and 
crime, the ultimate question was whether the refusal to grant access to the websites at issue 
was necessary in a democratic society. 
 
The Court noted that the websites to which Mr Kalda wished to have access predominantly 
contained legal information and information related to fundamental rights, including the rights 
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of prisoners. It considers that the accessibility of such information promotes public awareness 
and respect for human rights and gives weight to Mr Kalda’s argument that the Estonian courts 
used such information and that he needed access to it for the protection of his rights in the 
court proceedings. The Court drew attention to the fact that in a number of Council of Europe 
and other international instruments, the public-service value of the Internet and its importance 
for the enjoyment of a range of human rights has been recognised. By referring to the 2003 
Declaration on freedom of communication on the Internet of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe (see IRIS 2003-7/3) and to the 2011 report to the Human Rights Council 
(A/HRC/17/27) of the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (see also IRIS 2011-8/2), the Court 
held that Internet access has increasingly been understood as a right, and that calls have been 
made to develop effective policies to attain universal access to the Internet and to overcome 
the “digital divide”. The Court considered that these developments reflect the important role 
the Internet plays in people’s everyday lives, as an increasing amount of services and 
information is only available on the Internet. 
 
Finally the Court notes that under the Imprisonment Act, prisoners in Estonia have been 
granted limited access to the Internet via computers specially adapted for that purpose and 
under the supervision of the prison authorities. Thus, arrangements necessary for the use of the 
Internet by prisoners have in any event been made and the related costs have been borne by 
the authorities. While the security and economic considerations cited by the domestic 
authorities may be considered relevant, the Court noted that the domestic courts undertook no 
detailed analysis as to the security risks allegedly emerging from the access to the three 
additional websites in question, also having regard to the fact that these were websites of State 
authorities and of an international organisation. The Court also considered that the Estonian 
authorities have failed to convincingly demonstrate that giving Mr Kalda access to three 
additional websites would have caused any noteworthy additional costs. In these 
circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that sufficient reasons have been put forward in the 
present case to justify the interference with Mr Kalda’s right to receive information. The Court 
concluded, by six votes to one, that the interference with Mr Kalda’s right to receive 
information, in the specific circumstances of the present case, could not be regarded as having 
been necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly it found a violation of Article 10 of the 
ECHR. 
 
In his dissenting opinion, the Danish judge Kjølbro found that there is no violation of Article 10 
and that Mr Kalda’s application should have been dismissed. He also argues that the question 
of prisoners’ right to access to the Internet is a novel issue in the Court’s case law and that 
given the general importance of prisoners’ access to the Internet, as well as the practical and 
financial implications of granting prisoners access to the Internet, the question should not have 
been decided by a Chamber, but by the Grand Chamber. In the meantime, the Estonian 
Government has announced a request for a referral to the Grand Chamber in this case. 
 Kalda v. Estonia, no. 17429/10, 19 January 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: de Carolis and France Télévisions v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has confirmed the robust Article 10 protection for 
investigative journalism expressed in a television documentary, holding that a conviction for 
defamation of a Saudi Arabian prince violated the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed 
by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
In 2006, Prince Turki Al Faisal brought defamation proceedings against France Télévisions, 
Patrick de Carolis as its director, and a journalist, after the broadcasting on the TV channel 
France 3 of a documentary entitled “11 September 2001: the prosecution case”. The 
documentary investigated why there had still been no trial five years after the events of 11 
September. It focused on the complaints lodged by families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks in 
the US and the proceedings against persons suspected of having helped or funded al-Qaeda. 
The documentary highlighted the claimants’ concerns that the trial might be jeopardised by the 
economic links between the US and Saudi Arabia. Mr de Carolis and the journalist who made 
the documentary were found guilty of public defamation against the Prince and the Court 
declared France 3 civilly liable for the damage caused. In essence the French courts found that 
the journalist should have demonstrated prudence and objectivity, because she had referred to 
extremely serious accusations against Prince Turki Al Faisal, accusations that had not yet been 
examined by a court of law. 
 
Before the ECtHR, France 3 and its director complained of a violation of their right to freedom 
of expression. The European Court undertook a detailed examination of the content of the 
documentary and of the way in which the subject was dealt with, in particular the excerpts 
accusing Prince Turki Al Faisal of having assisted and financed the Taliban as head of the 
intelligence service in Saudi Arabia. The Court reached the conclusion that the allegations in 
the documentary had a sufficient factual basis, and that the documentary was balanced and did 
not contravene the standards of responsible journalism. As regards the sanctions, the fine to 
which Mr de Carolis had been sentenced and the civil liability finding against France 3 were 
considered a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression. The Court 
is of the opinion that a moderate criminal sanction, combined with civil damages, does not take 
away the risk of a chilling effect that a criminal conviction may have on the right to freedom of 
expression. As the interference by the French authorities was not necessary in a democratic 
society, the Court unanimously came to the conclusion that Article 10 has been violated. The 
French government is ordered to pay the applicants EUR 11,500 in respect of pecuniary 
damages, and EUR 30,000 in respect of costs and expenses. 
 De Carolis and France Télévisions v. France, no. 29313/10, 21 January 2016. 
 
IRIS 2016-4/4 
  
Back to overview of case-law 
383 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. 
Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
On 2 February 2016 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that a self-regulatory 
body (Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete, MTE) and an Internet news portal (Index.hu Zrt) 
were not liable for the offensive comments posted by their readers on their respective websites. 
Anonymous users of MTE and Index.hu had posted vulgar and offensive online comments 
criticising the misleading business practices of a real estate website. The European Court found 
that by holding MTE and Index.hu liable for the comments, the Hungarian courts have violated 
the right to freedom of expression. The present judgment is the first in which the principles set 
forth in the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Delfi AS v. Estonia were tested (see IRIS 2015-7/1). 
 
The case started in Hungary in 2010, when a real estate company brought a civil action 
claiming an infringement of its personality rights, on the basis that its right to a good 
reputation had been violated by readers’ comments posted on MTE and Index.hu. The operators 
of the websites immediately removed the allegedly offending comments from their websites. In 
the subsequent proceedings the domestic courts found that the comments at issue were 
insulting and went beyond the acceptable limits of freedom of expression. They rejected the 
applicants’ argument that they were only intermediaries and that their sole obligation was to 
remove certain content in the event of a complaint. As the comments attracted the applicability 
of the Hungarian Civil Code rules on personality rights, and since the comments were injurious 
for the plaintiff, the operators of the websites bore objective liability for their publication. As 
the applicants were not intermediaries, they could not invoke the limited liability of hosting 
service providers, as provided in the Directive 2000/31/EC on Electronic Commerce. Therefore 
the applicants were held liable for the offensive comments on their websites and they were 
ordered to pay the court fees, including the costs of the plaintiff’s legal representation. No 
award for non-pecuniary damages was imposed. 
 
MTE and Index.hu complained that the rulings of the Hungarian courts establishing objective 
liability on Internet websites for the contents of users’ comments amounts to a violation of 
freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). As a consequence, liability for comments could only be avoided either by pre-
moderation or by disabling commenting altogether: both solutions would work against the very 
essence of free expression on the Internet by having an undue chilling effect. They argued that 
the application of the “notice and take down” rule, as a characteristic of the limited liability for 
internet hosting providers, was the adequate way of enforcing the protection of reputation of 
others. 
 
Referring to Delfi AS v. Estonia, the European Court takes as its starting point that the 
provisions of the Hungarian Civil Code made it foreseeable for a media publisher running a 
large Internet news portal for economic purposes (Index.hu) and for a self-regulatory body of 
Internet content providers (MTE), that they could, in principle, be held liable under domestic 
law for unlawful comments of third-parties. Thus, the Court considers that the applicants were 
able to assess the risks related to their activities and that they must have been able to foresee, 
to a reasonable degree, the consequences which these could entail. It therefore concludes that 
Back to overview of case-law 
384 
 
the interference in issue was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of the second paragraph 
of Article 10. The decisive question remained whether there was a need for an interference 
with freedom of expression in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of 
others”. By referring to its Grand Chamber’s judgment in Delfi AS again, the Court confirms that 
Internet news portals, in principle, must assume duties and responsibilities. However, because 
of the particular nature of the Internet, these duties and responsibilities may differ to some 
degree from those of a traditional publisher, notably as regards third-party content. The Court 
is of the opinion that the present case was different from Delfi AS: though offensive and vulgar, 
the incriminated comments did not constitute clearly unlawful speech; and they certainly did 
not amount to hate speech or incitement to violence, as they did in Delfi AS. Next the Court 
applied the relevant criteria developed in its established case-law for the assessment of 
whether the interference in situations not involving hate speech or calls to violence is 
proportionate. These criteria are: (1) the context and content of the impugned comments; (2) 
the liability of the authors of the comments; (3) the measures taken by the website operators 
and the conduct of the injured party; (4) the consequences of the comments for the injured 
party; and (5) the consequences for the applicants. 
 
The Court considers that the Hungarian courts, when deciding on the notion of liability in the 
applicants’ case, had not carried out a proper balancing exercise between the competing rights 
involved, namely between the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and the real estate 
website’s right to respect for its commercial reputation. Notably, the Hungarian authorities 
accepted at face value that the comments had been unlawful as being injurious to the 
reputation of the real estate websites. The European Court however is of the opinion that the 
comments were related to a matter of public interest, being posted in the context of a dispute 
over the business policy of the real estate company perceived as being harmful to a number of 
clients. It also observes that the expressions used in the comments, albeit belonging to a low 
register of style, are common in communication on many Internet portals - a consideration that 
reduces the impact that can be attributed to those expressions. 
 
Apart from that, the conduct of the applicants in providing a platform for third-parties to 
exercise their freedom of expression by posting comments is to be considered as a journalistic 
activity of a particular nature. Interferences with such activities, including the dissemination of 
statements made by other persons, may seriously hamper the contribution of the press to 
discussion of matters of public interest, and should not be envisaged unless there are 
particularly strong reasons for doing so. The Court continues to state that the applicants took 
certain measures to prevent defamatory comments on their portals or to remove them. Both 
applicants had a disclaimer in their general terms and conditions and had a notice-and-take-
down system in place, whereby anybody could indicate unlawful comments to the service 
provider so that they could be removed. Holding the applicants liable merely for allowing 
unfiltered comments breaching the law would require excessive and impracticable forethought 
capable of undermining freedom of the right to impart information on the Internet. 
 
The Court also emphasises that there is a difference between the commercial reputational 
interests of a company and the reputation of an individual concerning his or her social status. 
Furthermore there were already ongoing inquiries into the plaintiff company’s business 
conduct. Consequently the Court is not convinced that the comments in question were capable 
of making any additional and significant impact on the attitude of the consumers concerned. 
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The Court is of the view that the decisive question when assessing the consequence for the 
applicants is not the absence of damages payable, but the manner in which Internet portals can 
be held liable for third-party comments. Such liability may have foreseeable negative 
consequences for the comment environment of an Internet portal, for example by impelling it 
to close the commenting space altogether. For the Court, these consequences may have, 
directly or indirectly, a chilling effect on the freedom of expression on the Internet, this being 
particularly detrimental for a non-commercial website such as MTE. The Court is of the opinion 
that the Hungarian courts paid no heed to what was at stake for the applicants as protagonists 
of the free electronic media, as they did not embark on any assessment of how the application 
of civil-law liability to a news portal operator would affect freedom of expression on the 
Internet. Indeed, when allocating liability in the case, those courts did not perform any 
balancing analysis between this interest and that of the plaintiff at all. 
 
Finally, the Court refers once more to Delfi AS, in which it found that if accompanied by 
effective procedures allowing for rapid response, the notice-and-take-down-system could 
function in many cases as an appropriate tool for balancing the rights and interests of all those 
involved. The Court sees no reason to hold that such a system could not have provided a viable 
avenue to protect the commercial reputation of the plaintiff. It is true that, in cases where 
third-party user comments take the form of hate speech and direct threats to the physical 
integrity of individuals, the rights and interests of others and of the society as a whole might 
entitle Contracting States to impose liability on Internet news portals if they failed to take 
measures to remove clearly unlawful comments without delay, even without notice from the 
alleged victim or from third parties. As the present case did not involve such utterances, the 
European Court comes to the conclusion that the rigid stance of the Hungarian courts reflects a 
notion of liability which effectively precludes the balancing between the competing rights 
according to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case law. All these considerations are 
sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, no. 22947/13, 2 
February 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Arlewin v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
On 1 March 2016 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found Sweden in breach of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) because it had denied access to court to a 
person who wanted to bring defamation proceedings in Sweden arising out of the content of a 
trans-border television programme service (TV3), suggesting that they resort to the jurisdiction 
of the United Kingdom. The European Court is of the opinion that requiring a Swedish national 
to bring defamation proceedings in the UK courts following an alleged defamatory TV 
programme broadcasted by the London-based company Viasat Broadcasting UK, but targeting 
mostly, if not exclusively, a Swedish audience, was not reasonable and violated Article 6 
paragraph 1 of the Convention, which guarantees access to a court. 
 
The programme in question had been broadcast live in Sweden and had accused Mr Arlewin, 
the applicant, of organised crime in the media and advertising sectors. Mr Arlewin brought a 
private prosecution for gross defamation against X. X was the anchorman of the television 
show and the CEO of Strix Television AB, the company that produced the TV3 programme. The 
Swedish courts subsequently found it did not have jurisdiction to examine Mr Arlewin’s 
complaint, finding that the UK-based company under jurisdiction of the UK authorities, which 
broadcasted the TV3 programme, was responsible for its content. Mr Arlewin appealed to the 
Supreme Court, alleging that the Swedish courts’ position ran contrary to EU law. He also 
requested that a question concerning the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation No. 
44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a 
preliminary ruling. According to him, the regulation entitled a person claiming non-contractual 
damages to bring actions in the territory where the harm had actually occurred, namely in 
Sweden, in his case. The Supreme Court rejected Mr Arlewin’s referral request, and refused 
leave to appeal in the case. Finally in Strasbourg, Mr Arlewin complained that the Swedish 
courts refused to examine the defamation case brought by him against X on the merits, and 
thereby failed to provide him with an effective remedy to protect his reputation. The Swedish 
Government argued that in application of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU, 
Viasat Broadcasting UK was a company established in the UK and that the editorial decisions 
about their audiovisual media service were taken in the UK. Therefore the UK, through its 
Office of Communication (“Ofcom”), had supervisory jurisdiction over TV3’s broadcasts. 
 
According to the Strasbourg Court, the jurisdiction over broadcasters vested in one State under 
the AVMS Directive did not have general application, extending to matters not regulated 
therein. It also referred to Article 28 of the Directive, addressing the situation where a person’s 
reputation and good name have been damaged by incorrect facts presented in a programme. 
This provision however only discusses a right of reply or equivalent remedies, and does not 
deal with defamation proceedings and an appurtenant claim for damages. The European Court 
was thus not convinced that the AVMS Directive determines, even for the purposes of EU law, 
the country of jurisdiction in which an individual brings a defamation claim and wishes to sue a 
journalist or a broadcasting company for damages. Rather, jurisdiction under EU law is 
regulated by the Brussels I Regulation No. 44/2001. According to Articles 2 and 5 of the 
Regulation, both the UK and Sweden appear to have jurisdiction over the present matter: X is 
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domiciled in Sweden whereas Viasat Broadcasting UK is registered and established in the UK, 
and the harmful event could be argued to have occurred in either country, as the television 
programme was broadcast from the UK and the alleged injury to the applicant’s reputation and 
privacy manifested itself in Sweden. The CJEU has earlier had the occasion to interpret and 
apply Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation No. 44/2001, allowing courts assuming 
jurisdiction in a member State, not only in the place where the defendant has his residence, but 
also in the “place where the harmful event occurred” or where the centre of the alleged victim’s 
interests is based. Hence three options were available to hear an action for damages caused by 
the publication of a defamatory newspaper article or an Internet publication, according to EU 
law (CJEU in eDate Advertising and Martinez (Joined Cases C-509/09 and C‑161/10)) (see IRIS 
2012/1: Extra). According to the European Court it may be assumed that the same would apply 
to a broadcast via satellite. 
 
While leaving open the question of whether a binding provision of EU law could justify the 
Swedish position, the ECtHR found that the Swedish Government had not shown that Swedish 
jurisdiction was barred in the case due to the existence of such a provision. Rather, jurisdiction 
was excluded by virtue of the relevant provisions of domestic law. The European Court found in 
particular that the programme and its broadcast were, for all intents and purposes, entirely 
Swedish and that the alleged harm to Mr Arlewin had occurred in Sweden. In those 
circumstances, the Swedish State had an obligation under Article 6 paragraph 1 ECHR to 
provide Mr Arlewin with an effective access to court. However, Mr Arlewin had been put in a 
situation in which he could not hold anyone responsible under Swedish law for his allegation of 
defamation. Requiring him to take proceedings in the UK courts could not be said to have been 
a reasonable, effective and practical alternative for him. In the European Court’s view, the 
limitations on Mr Arlewin’s right of access to court had therefore been too far-reaching and 
could not, in his particular case, be considered proportionate. 
The Court is unanimous in finding a violation of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention and 
ordered Sweden to pay Mr Arlewin EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 
20,000 in respect of costs and expenses. 
 Arlewin v. Sweden, no. 22302/10, 1 March 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Sousa Goucha v. Portugal 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
In finding that there had been no violation of the right to privacy and the right to reputation, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) upheld a high level of freedom of expression in a 
case concerning a joke in a TV-programme about the sexual orientation of a television celebrity 
in Portugal. For the ECtHR it was important that the domestic courts, in dismissing the 
defamation complaint by Mr Sousa Goucha, took into account the context in which the joke had 
been made, and referred to the playful and irreverent style of the television comedy show and 
its usual humour. It also noted that Mr Sousa Goucha, as a well-known television host, is a 
public figure, who had earlier publicly declared his homosexuality. 
 
Mr Sousa Goucha lodged a criminal complaint for defamation and insult against the television 
company (RTP), the production company, the television presenter, and the directors of 
programming and content, following the joke made during the broadcast of a late-night 
comedy show on television. Mr Sousa Goucha alleged that the joke, which had included him in 
a list of best female television hosts, damaged his reputation as it had conflated his gender 
with his sexual orientation. The Portuguese courts, however, dismissed his claim for damages 
as ill founded. They considered that for a reasonable person, the joke would not be perceived 
as defamatory because it referred to aspects of Mr Sousa Goucha’s characteristics, behaviour, 
and way of expressing himself, which could be seen as feminine. 
 
Relying on Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), Mr Sousa Goucha 
submitted an application to the ECtHR, alleging that the domestic courts had discriminated 
against him because of his sexuality, which he had made public. According to the ECtHR, the 
case also deserved an analysis from the perspective of Article 8 of the Convention, as the right 
of reputation is protected under that provision, while the concept of “private life” also covers 
the moral integrity of a person and can therefore embrace multiple aspects of a person’s 
identity, such as gender identity and sexual orientation. The Court stated that sexual 
orientation is a profound element of a person’s identity, and that gender and sexual orientation 
are two distinctive and intimate characteristics. However, the Court reiterated that in order for 
Article 8 to be triggered, the attack on personal honour and reputation must have a certain 
level of seriousness and such a manner as to cause prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right 
to respect for private life. The main issue in the present case was whether a fair balance had 
been achieved between Mr Sousa Goucha’s right to protection of his reputation, which is an 
element of his “private life” under Article 8, and the other parties’ right to freedom of 
expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
It is in this balancing exercise that the Court first noted that Mr Sousa Goucha is a well-known 
television host in Portugal and thus a “public figure”. The Court then recalled that it had been 
required on numerous occasions to consider disputes involving humour and satire, and 
reiterated that satire is a form of artistic expression and social commentary and, by its inherent 
features of exaggeration and distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate. 
Accordingly, any interference with an artist’s right to such expression must be examined with 
particular care. Additionally, the Court also referred to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) in the case of Deckmyn v. Vandersteen (IRIS 2014-9/5), 
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acknowledging that a particularly wide margin of appreciation should be given to parody in the 
context of freedom of expression. It must also be noted, however, that the joke was not made 
in the context of a debate of public interest and, as such, no matters of public interest were at 
stake. On the other hand, the Court considered that the joke would not be perceived as 
defamation by a reasonable person, and it referred to Mr Sousa Goucha’s characteristics, his 
behaviour, and way of expressing himself. Also of particular importance is the playful and 
irreverent style of the television comedy show and its usual humour. The Court considered that 
the domestic courts had convincingly established the need for placing the protection of 
freedom of expression above Mr Sousa Goucha’s right to protection of reputation. The Court 
noted that they also took into account the lack of intent to attack the applicant’s reputation and 
assessed the way in which a reasonable spectator of the comedy show in question would have 
perceived the impugned joke, as opposed to merely considering what the applicant felt or 
thought towards the joke. A limitation on freedom of expression for the sake of the applicant’s 
reputation would therefore have been disproportionate under Article 10 of the Convention. The 
Court concluded that the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the television 
show’s freedom of expression under Article 10 and Mr Sousa Goucha’s right to have his 
reputation respected under Article 8. In sum, the Court found no reason to substitute its view 
for that of the domestic courts. 
 
With regard to the complaint under Article 14 ECHR (discrimination), the Court was of the 
opinion that the refusal to prosecute the TV-broadcaster and persons responsible for the 
impugned TV-programme for defamation was not due to because he was homosexual. Rather, 
the Court stated that it was due to the weight given to freedom of expression in the 
circumstances of the case, and the lack of intention to attack the Mr Sousa Gaucho’s honour. 
The Court stated that although the relevant passages were “debatable” and “could have been 
avoided”, they did not have discriminatory intent. Consequently, in the absence of any firm 
evidence, it was not possible to speculate whether his sexual orientation had any bearing on 
the domestic courts’ decisions. Therefore, the Court stated that it cannot be said that the Mr 
Sousa Goucha was discriminated against on the grounds of his sexual orientation, and 
accordingly, there had been no violation of Article 14 read together with Article 8. 
 Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, no. 70434/12, 22 March 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Pinto Coelho v. Portugal (No. 2) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
In a judgment of 22 March 2016 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that 
Portugal has violated a journalist’s right to report about the hearing in a criminal case. The 
ECtHR emphasised that the domestic court hearing was public and that the criminal conviction 
of the journalist for having broadcast unauthorised recordings of the statements of witnesses 
during the hearing was not necessary in a democratic society. Therefore the journalist’s 
conviction amounted to a breach of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR). 
 
The applicant in this case was Sofia Pinto Coelho, a TV-journalist and legal affairs 
correspondent. She was convicted for having broadcast in news report excerpts that included 
sound recordings from a court hearing, obtained without permission from the judge. The case 
on which Pinto Coelho had reported concerned the criminal conviction of an 18-year-old man 
for aggravated theft of a mobile phone. In her TV-report Ms Pinto Coelho argued that the 
defendant should have been acquitted, alleging a judicial error. She included in her report 
shots of the courtroom, extracts of sub-titled sound recordings, and the questioning of 
prosecution and defence witnesses, in which their voices and those of the three judges were 
digitally altered. The excerpts were followed by Ms Pinto Coelho’s commentary, in which she 
tried to demonstrate that the victims had not recognised the defendant during the trial, 
supporting the defendant’s claim  that he had been at work at the time of the incident. 
 
A short time later the president of the domestic court, who had presided over the case, lodged a 
complaint against Ms Pinto Coelho. No permission had been given to broadcast extracts of the 
recordings of the court hearing, and the failure to obtain such authorisation breached Article 
348 of the Criminal Code. After being convicted of non-compliance with a legal order and 
ordered to pay a fine of EUR 1,500, and after exhausting all national remedies, Ms Pinto Coelho 
submitted an application to the ECtHR in Strasbourg, alleging a breach of her right as a 
journalist to freedom of expression and information, under Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
In essence, in this case the ECtHR had to balance the right of the journalist to inform the public 
and the public’s right to receive information against the right of those who testified to respect 
for their private lives and against the interest of maintaining the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary. The Court reiterated that in principle journalists must obey the law, which 
includes when reporting on a criminal case of public interest. The Court stated that although 
Ms Pinto Coelho had not obtained the recordings of the hearing in an illicit way, as a journalist 
she must have been aware that the unauthorised broadcasting of the recordings violated Article 
348 of the Criminal Code. The Court took into consideration, however, the fact that when the 
news report was broadcast the case had already been decided, and hence there was no 
indication that the broadcast of the audio extracts could have negatively influenced the proper 
administration of justice. Furthermore, the hearing was public and none of the witnesses whose 
evidence had been broadcast had filed any complaint. The Court also considered it relevant to 
emphasise that the witnesses’ voices were distorted, which reduced the interest invoked by the 
Portuguese judicial authorities referring to the right to have the witnesses’ and judges’ voices 
protected under the right of privacy. The Court reiterated that Article 10 also protects the mode 
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of expression of ideas and information, and that it is not for judges to substitute their own 
views for those of the press as to how a story should be presented. According to the ECtHR the 
domestic authorities had not sufficiently justified the criminal sanction imposed, despite the 
fact that it might have a chilling effect on journalistic reporting on matters of public interest. 
By six votes to one, the Court found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court held 
that the finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary 
damage sustained by Ms Pinto Coelho. It further awarded her EUR 1,500 in respect of pecuniary 
damage and EUR 4,623.84 in respect of costs and expenses. 
 Pinto Coelho v. Portugal (no. 2), no. 48718/11, 22 March 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Bédat v. Switzerland (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
In a judgment of 29 March 2016, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Bédat v. Switzerland found that a criminal conviction of a journalist, Arnaud Bédat, 
for having published documents covered by investigative secrecy in a criminal case is no 
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The Grand 
Chamber is of the opinion that the Swiss authorities acted within their margin of appreciation 
and that recourse to criminal proceedings and the penalty imposed on the journalist did not 
amount to a disproportionate interference in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. 
 
The article published by Bédat in the weekly magazine L’Illustré concerned ‘M.B.’ and the 
criminal proceedings against him for having driven his car into pedestrians. The incident, in 
which three people died and eight others were injured, had caused great public outcry and 
controversy in Switzerland. The article contained a personal description of M.B., a summary of 
the questions put by the police officers and the investigating judge, and M.B.’s replies. It also 
contained the information that M.B. had been charged with premeditated murder and, in the 
alternative, with murder, and it was mentioned that M.B. appeared to show no remorse. The 
article was accompanied by several photographs of letters which M.B. had sent to the 
investigating judge. Criminal proceedings were brought against the journalist on the initiative 
of the public prosecutor for having published secret documents, in breach of Article 293 of the 
Swiss Criminal Code. It emerged from the investigation that one of the parties claiming 
damages in the proceedings against M.B. had photocopied the case file and lost one of the 
copies in a shopping centre. An unknown person had then brought the copy to the offices of the 
magazine which had published the impugned article. Bédat was found guilty of making public a 
series of documents which were at that stage to be considered protected as part of the secrecy 
of the criminal investigation, and he was ordered to pay a fine of 4,000 Swiss Francs (EUR 
2,667). Bédat lodged a complaint before the ECtHR, arguing that this conviction had resulted in 
a violation of his right to freedom of expression. 
 
On 1 July 2014 the Second Section of the ECtHR found that the article reported on an important 
case and that although the interference was prescribed by law and pursued legitimate aims, it 
considered that the sanction did not respond to a pressing social need, not being sufficiently 
motivated and being disproportionate. Therefore, the majority of the Court, by four votes to 
three, found that the criminal fine imposed on the journalist breached Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
While the Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber that the interference was prescribed by law 
and pursued legitimate aims, namely of preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and protecting the 
reputation and the rights of others, the majority of the Grand Chamber, with 15 votes to two, 
comes to another conclusion on whether the fine imposed on the journalist was necessary in a 
democratic society. The Grand Chamber reiterates that the protection afforded to journalists by 
Article 10 of the ECHR “is subject to the proviso that they act in good faith in order to provide 
accurate and reliable information in accordance with the tenets of responsible journalism. The 
concept of responsible journalism, as a professional activity which enjoys the protection of 
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Article 10 of the ECHR, is not confined to the contents of information which is collected and/or 
disseminated by journalistic means (..); the concept of responsible journalism also embraces the 
lawfulness of the conduct of a journalist, and the fact that a journalist has breached the law is a 
relevant, albeit not decisive, consideration when determining whether he or she has acted 
responsibly”. The Grand Chamber clarifies that it must adjudicate on a conflict between two 
rights which enjoy equal protection under the Convention, and the Court must weigh up the 
competing interests. Reference is made to cases where the right to privacy (Article 8) and the 
right to freedom of expression (Article 10) are conflicting (see IRIS 2012-3/1) and the Court 
considers that an analogous reasoning must be applied in weighing up the rights secured under 
Article 10 and Article 6 paragraph 1 respectively. In such an approach to balancing rights, that 
the Court considers that where the national authorities have assessed the interests at stake in 
compliance with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, strong reasons are required if it 
is to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts. 
 
The Grand Chamber takes into consideration six criteria as part of its balancing test: 
 
(i) How the applicant came into possession of the information at issue: although Bédat had not 
obtained the information by unlawful means, as a professional journalist he must have been 
aware of the confidential nature of the information which he was planning to publish. It was 
not disputed that the publication of the information in question fell within the scope of Article 
293 of the Swiss Criminal Code. 
 
(ii) Content of the impugned article: the Court qualifies the impugned article about M.B. as 
portraying “a highly negative picture of him, adopting an almost mocking tone”. The article had 
“a sensationalist tone”, and it formulated a series of questions which the judicial authorities 
were called upon to answer, at both the investigation and the trial stages. 
 
(iii) Contribution of the impugned article to a public-interest debate: according to the Court, the 
journalist failed to demonstrate how publishing records of interviews, statements by the 
accused’s wife and doctor, and letters sent by the accused to the investigating judge concerning 
banal aspects of his everyday life in detention, could have contributed to any public debate on 
the ongoing investigation. 
 
(iv)  Influence of the impugned article on the criminal proceedings: according to the Court it is 
“undeniable that the publication of an article slanted in that way at a time when the 
investigation was still ongoing entailed an inherent risk of influencing the course of 
proceedings in one way or another, whether in relation to the work of the investigating judge, 
the decisions of the accused’s representatives, the positions of the parties claiming damages, or 
the objectivity of the trial court, irrespective of its composition”. The Court agrees with the 
findings by the Swiss Courts that the records of interviews and the accused’s correspondence 
had been discussed in the public sphere before the conclusion of the investigation, before the 
trial and out of context, in a manner liable to influence the decisions taken by the investigating 
judge and the trial court. 
 
(v)  Infringement of the accused’s private life: the Court agrees that the criminal proceedings 
brought against Bédat conformed with the positive obligation incumbent on Switzerland under 
Article 8 to protect the accused’s private life. It also notes that when the impugned article was 
published the accused was in prison, and therefore in a situation of vulnerability. 
 
Back to overview of case-law 
394 
 
(vi)  Proportionality of the penalty imposed: the Court considers that the recourse to criminal 
proceedings and the penalty imposed on Bédat did not amount to disproportionate interference 
in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. The penalty was imposed for breaching 
the secrecy of a criminal investigation, and its purpose was to protect the proper functioning of 
the justice system and the rights of the accused to a fair trial and to respect for his private life. 
Therefore the Court states that such a penalty could not be considered liable to have a 
deterrent effect on the exercise of freedom of expression by Bédat or any other journalist 
wishing to inform the public about ongoing criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court sees 
no strong reason to substitute its own view for that of the domestic courts. Furthermore, having 
regard to the margin of appreciation available to States and to the fact that the balancing the 
various competing interests was properly conducted by the Swiss Federal Court, the Grand 
Chamber concludes that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
Two judges strongly dissented, Judges López Guerra and Yudkivska, the latter expressing the 
view that “(t)his Court had always regarded the press as the servant of an effective judicial 
system, granting little scope for restrictions on freedom of expression in such matters as the 
public interest in the proper administration of justice. … the present judgment constitutes a 
regrettable departure from this long-established position”. 
 
• Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, ECHR 2016. 
• A.B. v. Switzerland, no. 56925/08, 1 July 2014. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Diamant Salihu and others v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that journalists who 
commit (minor) offences during newsgathering activities cannot invoke robust protection based 
on their rights to freedom of expression and information, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Journalists of the Swedish newspaper 
Expressen had undertaken to demonstrate the easy availability of illegal firearms by purchasing 
one. The Swedish courts were of the opinion that the editor and the journalists could not be 
exempted from criminal liability as they had wilfully breached the Swedish Weapons Act. In a 
unanimous decision, the ECtHR confirmed the necessity of the journalists’ criminal conviction. 
It declared the application for alleged breach of the right of journalistic newsgathering under 
Article 10 of the Convention manifestly ill founded. 
 
In 2010, a series of shootings took place in southern Sweden, prompting lively public debate 
and calls for more stringent firearms control. Thomas Mattsson, Andreas Johansson and 
Diamant Salihu, the editor-in-chief, news editor and a journalist at the tabloid newspaper 
Expressen, decided to prepare a news story on the easy availability of illegal firearms. They 
successfully contacted several people who claimed that they could sell them a gun. Salihu 
bought one, while a photographer of Expressen was present during the transfer, with Johansson 
listening in via a mobile telephone for safety reasons. On arrival in their hotel, they called the 
police, photographed the weapon and put it in the hotel room’s security box, until the police 
collected it half an hour later. The next day Expressen published an article portraying the 
events, including a large photograph of the firearm and a description of the contact leading up 
to its purchase. 
 
Shortly after, the public prosecutor decided to press charges against the journalists, and all 
three were convicted for (incitement to) a weapons offence. The District Court and later the 
Court of Appeals found that the journalists had shown clear intent to commit punishable 
actions, and could not rely on the protection of Article 10 of the ECHR in this case. The 
journalists were not on trial for publishing an article, but for actions taken before the 
publishing. Furthermore, their actions appeared to be premeditated risk-taking to create 
sensational news, while it had not been necessary for the journalists to complete the purchase 
of the firearm and to subsequently transport it in order to fulfil their journalistic mission. Their 
aim - to investigate whether illegal weapons were easily accessible in Sweden - had already 
been achieved when Salihu received the offer to buy the firearm. 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the journalists’ conviction, removing the suspended sentences, but 
increasing the level of the criminal fines from 30 to 80 day fines, which amounted, in total, to 
approximately EUR 8,400 for Mattsson, EUR 5,700 for Johansson and EUR 4,400 for Salihu. The 
Supreme Court emphasised the strong societal interest in controlling the handling of weapons, 
although it also recognised the journalistic purpose behind the purchase of the firearm. 
According to the Supreme Court, the question of whether it was easy to buy weapons could, 
however, have been illustrated by other means, and the weight of the journalistic interest was 
not sufficient to justify completion of the purchase of the firearm. With regard to the 
proportionality of the sanction, the Supreme Court noted that the conviction was not for the 
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actual publication of the article, and that the sentences imposed were below those normally 
prescribed for the crime, in view of the journalistic context and the precautions the journalists 
had taken after obtaining the weapon. The Expressen journalists subsequently lodged an 
application before the European Court of Human Rights, complaining that their conviction was 
unlawful (constituting a breach of Article 7 ECHR) and violated their rights as journalists 
guaranteed under Article 10 ECHR. 
 
In its decision of 10 May 2016, the ECtHR dismissed the double complaint. With regard to the 
alleged violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court finds that the journalists’ 
convictions were lawful and pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of public safety and 
prevention of disorder and crime. Regarding the decisive question of whether the interference 
was “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court refers to the fundamental principles 
concerning this issue, elaborated in some of its Grand Chamber judgments such as in Stoll v. 
Switzerland (see IRIS 2008-3/2) and recently in Bédat v. Switzerland (see IRIS 2016-5/1). 
Referring to its Grand Chamber judgment in Pentikäinen v. Finland (see IRIS 2016-1/2), it 
reiterated, “notwithstanding the vital role played by the media in a democratic society, 
journalists cannot, in principle, be released from their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on 
the basis that, as journalists, Article 10 affords them a cast-iron defence. In other words, a 
journalist cannot claim an exclusive immunity from criminal liability for the sole reason that, 
unlike other individuals exercising the right to freedom of expression, the offence in question 
was committed during the performance of his or her journalistic functions”. 
 
Turning to the facts, the ECtHR endorsed the main arguments developed by the domestic 
courts: the journalists wilfully infringed ordinary criminal law, they could have illustrated the 
easy availability of firearms in other ways, and the weight of the journalistic interest did not 
justify actually purchasing the firearm. The ECtHR furthermore observes that the question of 
the applicants’ rights under Article 10 ECHR had been the subject of arguments, including 
during hearings, before all three domestic instances. The domestic courts had stressed the 
importance of journalists’ role in society and made a balanced evaluation of all interests at 
stake. Taking into account the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this area, and 
explicitly referring to the principle of subsidiarity, the ECtHR found that the reasons relied upon 
by the domestic courts were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 10 ECHR, and 
that they struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. The conclusion is that 
the domestic courts were entitled to decide that the interference complained of was “necessary 
in a democratic society”. The application was thus considered manifestly ill founded and 
therefore inadmissible. 
 Diamant Salihu and others v. Sweden (dec.), no. 33628/15, 10 May 2016.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. Ukraine 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
In a judgment of 2 June 2016 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that Ukraine 
had violated the right to freedom of expression by convicting a media company of the 
defamation of a political public figure. Although the impugned article had a highly sarcastic 
and offensive tone, the Court confirmed that journalistic freedom covers possible recourse to a 
degree of exaggeration, or even provocation, especially in the context of a public debate and 
discussions in the media on important features of political life. 
 
The case concerns defamation proceedings brought in 2007 against the editorial company 
(Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform - IER) of one of the nationwide newspapers in Ukraine, the 
Evening News. At the time, the newspaper was closely associated with Yuliya Tymoshenko, a 
political leader in Ukraine and the then major rival of Prime Minister Mr Victor Yanukovych’s. In 
May 2007, the newspaper published an article critical of Ms Ganna German, one of the main 
spokespeople for Mr Yanukovych. Ms German was also elected as a Member of Parliament on 
the list of the Party of Regions, led by Mr Yanukovych. At the material time she frequently 
presented the views of both her party and Mr Yanukovych on various television and radio 
programmes and debates. The article in the Evening News especially criticised the way Ms 
German, in an interview on the BBC, had commented on the institutional and political crisis in 
Ukraine, defending Mr Yanukovych’s and the Party of Regions’ policy. The article also suggested 
that Ms German had become a Member of Parliament for the sole purpose of obtaining a flat in 
Kyiv. 
 
In July 2007, Ms German brought a defamation claim against IER and the author of the article. 
The Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court found that some of the statements in the article constituted 
statements of fact that had not been verified or proved by either of the defendants, and were 
negative about and insulting to Ms German. Therefore, IER was ordered to retract the 
information about the acquisition by Ms German of the flat in Kyiv, by publishing the operative 
part of its judgment. IER was also ordered to pay the plaintiff UAH 1,700, approximately EUR 
300, in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. After exhaustion of all remedies at the 
domestic level, IER lodged an application with the ECtHR, complaining of a violation of its right 
to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
The Ukraine Government agreed that the judgments of the domestic courts had constituted an 
interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression. However, it considered that 
the interference had been prescribed by law, being based on the relevant provisions of the Civil 
Code and the Information Act, and it had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the 
reputation or rights of others. The Government also referred to the ECtHR’s decision in Vitrenko 
and Others v. Ukraine (no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008), which, according to the government, 
supported the principle that even during an election campaign an individual could not be 
subjected to unfair accusations by his opponent. Therefore, the interference was to be 
considered necessary in a democratic society. The government also submitted that the 
interference had been proportionate and had not put an undue burden on the applicant 
company’s right to freedom of political comment. 
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In a unanimous decision the ECtHR disagreed with both the findings by the Ukrainian courts 
and the government’s arguments as to the necessity of the disputed interference with IER’s 
right to freedom of expression. 
 
The ECtHR reiterated that Article 10 (2) of the ECHR allows little scope for restrictions on 
political speech or debate on matters of public interest. The Court stated that whilst a politician 
is certainly entitled to have his reputation protected, even when he is not acting in his private 
capacity, in such cases the requirements of that protection have to be balanced with the 
interests of the open discussion of political issues. The Court also recalled that satire is a form 
of artistic expression and social commentary and, by its inherent features of exaggeration and 
distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate. The Court observed that at the 
relevant time the struggle between Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yanukovych and their allies 
was an important feature of Ukrainian political life. The impugned article constituted the 
sarcastic reaction of the Evening News’ journalist to Ms German’s participation in a BBC radio 
programme, during which she had commented on the popularity of her party. The Court 
considered that the subject matter of the impugned article, namely the author’s speculation as 
to Ms German’s motives for making her statements and supporting the Party of Regions, was of 
significant public interest. 
 
In contrast with the findings by the domestic courts, the ECtHR was of the opinion that the 
statements concerning the acquisition of the flat were value judgments, having a sufficient 
factual basis. In this perspective the Court observed that the impugned statements were not 
particularly serious in tone. They were also not particularly damaging in substance, given that 
the author did not accuse Ms German of specific illegal or immoral conduct, even though he 
ascribed to her less than admirable motives. Read in the context of a highly-charged political 
debate, and in the context of the article as a whole, the expressions found untrue by the 
domestic courts were supposed to illustrate the author’s opinion that Ms German’s expression 
of her political opinions was insincere and guided by considerations of material gain. The Court 
furthermore referred to the “highly sarcastic language” of the article, reaffirming that Article 10 
also protects information and ideas that offend, shock, or disturb. In addition, the Court statetd 
that the extension of journalistic freedom to protect recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or 
even provocation, is an important principle, established in the Court’s case law. According to 
the ECtHR, the domestic courts failed to explain why they considered that the impugned 
statements, satirical in tone as they were, went beyond the permissible level of exaggeration or 
provocation, given the impugned article’s contribution to a debate of public interest and its 
subject’s role as a prominent politician and the essential role played by the press in a 
democratic society. The domestic courts focussed on the a person’s right to protection of their 
reputation, without sufficiently considering the right to freedom of expression of the applicant 
media company. Furthermore, while the sanction imposed on the applicant company was 
relatively modest, it nevertheless had symbolic value and could still have a chilling effect on 
the applicant company and other participants in the public debate. For all these reasons, the 
Court was not convinced that the balancing exercise had been undertaken by the national 
authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down in its case law. It thus concluded that the 
necessity of the interference with the media company’s exercise  of freedom of expression had 
not been demonstrated, and that, accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 10 of the 
ECHR. 
 
 Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. Ukraine, no. 61561/08, 2 June 2016. 
• Vitrenko and Others v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Brambilla and others v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
The legality and acceptability of some controversial practices by journalists was at the heart of 
a recent case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The case concerns the 
conviction of three journalists in Italy who intercepted radio communications between police 
officers (carabinieri) in order to arrive quickly at crime scenes and report on them for their local 
online newspaper. Stressing the notion of responsible journalism and noting that the decisions 
of the domestic courts had been duly reasoned and had focused primarily on the need to 
protect national security and prevent crime and disorder, the Court confirms the duty of 
journalists to comply with domestic law, which prohibits the interception by any persons of 
communications not addressed to them, including those of law-enforcement agencies. The 
Court also notes that the penalties ordered by the domestic courts, consisting of the seizure of 
the radio equipment and the imposition of suspended custodial sentences, were not 
disproportionate. It emphasises that the newspaper and the journalists have not been 
prevented or prohibited from bringing news items to the attention of the public. 
 
The applicants in this case were Mr Brambilla, the director of a local online newspaper, and Mr 
De Salvo and Mr Alfano, both journalists working for that newspaper. While using radio 
equipment to intercept the frequencies used by the police, they gained access to 
communications about a police patrol on its way to a location where weapons were being 
stored illegally. Mr De Salvo and Mr Alfano went to the scene immediately, but they were 
stopped and searched by the police on their arrival. The police found equipment in their car 
capable of intercepting radio communications between law-enforcement officers. A short time 
later, in the offices of Mr De Salvo and Mr Alfano, more items capable of intercepting police 
communications were seized. Subsequent criminal proceedings were instituted against the 
director of the newspaper and the two journalists, and all three were convicted, with suspended 
custodial sentences imposed. The Milan Court of Appeal, and finally the Court of Cassation, 
found that the communications had been confidential and that their interception was 
punishable under the Criminal Code, taking the view that the right to press freedom could not 
take precedence in a case concerning the illegal interception of communications between law-
enforcement officers. 
 
Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the director of the 
newspaper and the two journalists complained about the search of their vehicle and their 
offices, the seizure of their radio equipment and their conviction. They argued that these 
actions and convictions amounted to a violation of their right to freedom of expression and 
information. 
 
The European Court agrees with the domestic courts that the newspaper and the journalists 
have not been prohibited from bringing the news items to the public’s attention, as their 
convictions were based solely on the possession and use of radio equipment to intercept 
communications between law-enforcement officers. The ECtHR reiterated that the notion of 
responsible journalism required that, where journalists acted to the detriment of the duty to 
abide by ordinary criminal law, they had to be aware that they risked being subjected to legal 
sanctions, including those of a criminal character. It noted that in seeking to obtain information 
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for publication in a local newspaper, the journalists and the director of the newspaper had 
routinely intercepted police communications. This contravened the domestic criminal law, 
which in general terms prohibited the interception by any persons of conversations not 
addressed to them, including conversations between law-enforcement officers. The Court 
observed that the penalties imposed on the applicants consisted of the seizure of their radio 
equipment and the imposition of custodial sentences of one year and three months in the case 
of the two journalists and six months in the case of the director of the newspaper. However, as 
these sentences had been suspended, the penalties the ECtHR found that it were not 
disproportionate and that the Italian courts had made an appropriate distinction between the 
journalists’ duty to comply with domestic law and the pursuit of their journalistic activity, which 
had not been otherwise restricted. Accordingly, the ECtHR held that there had been no 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
This is the third time in 2016 that the ECtHR has found no infringement of journalists’ rights in 
cases related to illegal preparatory acts of newsgathering. The case of Boris Erdtmann v. 
Germany (Application no. 56328/10, 5 January 2016) concerned the conviction of a journalist for 
carrying a weapon on board an aeroplane. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in 
New York, Mr Erdtmann researched the effectiveness of security checks at German airports and 
made a short television documentary about his investigation and findings, filmed with a hidden 
camera. The ECtHR found that the criminal conviction of the journalist was pertinent and 
necessary in a democratic society and that there was no appearance of a violation of the 
journalist’s rights under Article 10 ECHR. Also in the case of Salihu and others v. Sweden (see 
IRIS 2016-8/1) the ECtHR held that the journalists’ convictions for illegally purchasing a firearm 
were lawful and necessary, while they pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of public 
safety and prevention of disorder and crime. In each of these cases however, the domestic 
courts, by deciding on the nature and severity of the criminal sanction, took into consideration 
the pursuit of journalistic activity, which had not been otherwise restricted. The interferences 
with the journalists’ right to freedom of expression and information in each of these cases 
finally resulted in only lenient sentences or convictions for the journalists, while without the 
journalistic context more severe sanctions could have been imposed. In such circumstances, the 
ECtHR was satisfied that the interferences with the journalists’ right to freedom of expression 
and information at issue do not discourage the press from investigating a certain topic or 
expressing an opinion on topics of public debate. 
 
 Brambilla and Others v. Italy, no. 22567/09, 23 June 2016. 
• Boris Erdtmann v. Germany (dec.), no. 56328/10, 5 January 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Jon Gaunt v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
 
A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) clarifies that journalistic 
freedom of expression does not encompass the right to insult and offend an interviewee during 
a radio interview, including a politician. It also confirms the competence of a media regulatory 
body to interfere with a journalist’s or a radio station’s freedom of expression in a proportionate 
way. In the case at issue Ofcom, the independent regulator and competition authority for the 
United Kingdom communications industries, had launched an investigation into a radio 
interview about which it received a series of complaints. Ofcom concluded that the broadcast 
had breached the Broadcasting Code, as it had amounted to gratuitous and offensive insult 
without contextual content or justification. No sanction or penalty was imposed either on the 
radio station or the journalist, other than the publication of the decision by Ofcom. 
 
The case concerns an interview on Talksport, a speech-based radio station on which Jon Gaunt 
presented a programme which covered a broad range of news issues, often with a combative 
and hard-hitting interview style. In 2008 Gaunt conducted a live interview with M.S., the 
Cabinet Member for Children’s Services for Redbridge London Borough Council. The interview 
concerned the Council’s proposal to ban smokers from becoming foster parents on the ground 
that passive smoking could harm foster children. Gaunt showed a specific interest in the issue, 
as he spent some of his childhood in the care system himself. In a newspaper column he had 
expressed his appreciation for his foster mother who lavished love and care, although she 
“smoked like a chimney”. The first part of the interview was reasonably controlled, giving M.S. 
the opportunity to explain his Council’s policy. The rest of the interview, however, degenerated 
into a shouting match from the point when Gaunt first called M.S. “a Nazi”, an insult that was 
repeated several times. The journalist also called the interviewee an “ignorant pig”, while the 
whole interview style became gratuitously offensive and could be described as a rant. Within 
ten minutes of the end of the interview, Gaunt apologised to the listeners, accepting that he did 
not “hold it together”, that he had been “unprofessional”, and that he had “lost the rag”. One 
hour after the end of the broadcast, he made a further apology for having called M.S. a Nazi. 
The same day Gaunt was suspended from his programme and a short time later Talksport 
terminated his contract without notice. 
 
Following the broadcast, Ofcom received 53 complaints about Gaunt’s conduct during the 
interview. In a response to Ofcom, Talksport stated that it regretted what had happened and 
accepted that the interview “fell way below the acceptable broadcasting standards which it 
expected and demanded”. It regretted that Gaunt’s language had been offensive, and that the 
manner in which the interview was conducted had been indefensible. Subsequently Ofcom 
concluded that the broadcast had breached Rules 2.1 and 2.3 of the Broadcasting Code as it fell 
short of the generally accepted standards applied to broadcast content and included offensive 
material which was not justified by the context. In reaching this conclusion, Ofcom took into 
account the extremely aggressive tone of the interview style and the seriousness which the 
broadcaster attached to the incident, as demonstrated by its prompt investigation and dismissal 
of the journalist, as well as Gaunt’s two on-air apologies. Gaunt applied for a judicial review of 
Ofcom’s decision on the ground that it disproportionately interfered with his freedom of 
expression and infringed his rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
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Rights. After the national courts dismissed Gaunt’s complaint (see IRIS 2010-8/30), he lodged 
an application before the ECtHR. 
 
Although the ECtHR would not exclude the possibility that Ofcom’s finding was at least capable 
of interfering with the journalist’s freedom of expression (while Ofcom’s finding was only 
directed to Talksport), it finds Gaunt’s complaint manifestly ill-founded and therefore 
inadmissible. The Court found that the interference with Gaunt’s freedom of expression was 
prescribed by law and was justified and proportionate. The ECtHR agrees that the national 
authorities have weighed up the interests at stake in compliance with the criteria laid down in 
the Court’s case-law. In assessing Gaunt’s Article 10 complaint, the national courts took 
properly into account that the interview was with a politician and involved political speech on 
a matter of general public interest, before concluding that his freedom of expression did not 
extend to what had amounted to gratuitous, offensive insult and abuse without contextual 
content or justification; “hectoring” and “bullying”; and a “particularly aggressive assault on 
M.S. and his opinions”. The ECtHR reiterates that a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation, 
is permitted, while it has repeatedly held that this does not extend to “manifestly insulting 
language” or a “gratuitous personal attack”. In the Court’s view, the content of the interview 
with M.S. certainly came close to being a “gratuitous personal attack” without any appreciable 
contribution to the subject being discussed. In deciding what is capable of offending a 
broadcast audience, weight must be given both to the opinion of the domestic courts and, to an 
even greater extent, to that of a specialist regulator of broadcast standards - such as Ofcom - 
which has considerable experience of balancing the parameters of potentially offensive content 
with the fluctuating expectations of contemporary radio audiences. Hence, the ECtHR shows 
reluctance to substitute its view on whether or not the interview amounted to a “gratuitous 
personal insult” for that of the specialist regulator, which has been confirmed by the domestic 
courts at two levels of jurisdiction. The Court is of the opinion that the publication of the 
Ofcom finding was proportionate to the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others. 
There has been accordingly no violation of Gaunt’s right to freedom of expression under Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
 Jon Gaunt v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 26448/12, 6 September 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
On 8 November 2016, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
delivered a landmark judgment on the right of access to public documents. It found that the 
Hungarian authorities’ refusal to provide the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Magyar Helsinki 
Bizottság (MHB), with information relating to the work of ex officio defence counsels was in 
breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees 
the right to freedom of expression. The Court noted that the information requested from the 
police by MHB was necessary for it to complete the study on the functioning of the public 
defenders’ system MHB was conducting in its capacity as a non-governmental human-rights 
organisation, with a view to contributing to discussion on an issue of obvious public interest. In 
the Court’s view, by denying MHB access to the requested information the Hungarian 
authorities had impaired the NGO’s exercise of its freedom to receive and impart information, in 
a manner striking at the very substance of its Article 10 rights. The Grand Chamber’s judgment 
is a victory for journalists, bloggers, academics, and NGOs, who rely on access to public 
documents in order to conduct investigations as part of their role as “public watchdogs”. 
Article 10 ECHR stipulates that “everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers (…)”. This article does not mention a 
right of access to public documents, nor a right to seek information. Neither is there a self-
standing right of access to State-held information under the ECHR, nor a corresponding 
obligation for public authorities to disclose such information. Nonetheless, since 2009 the 
Court in its case law recognises that such a right or obligation may be instrumental and 
necessary for effective protection of the rights under Article 10 (see Társaság a 
Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary (IRIS 2009-7/1), Kenedi v. Hungary (IRIS 2009-7:Extra), Gillberg 
v. Sweden (IRIS 2011-1/1 and 2012-6/1), Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia 
(IRIS 2013-8/1), Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung eines 
Wirtschaftlich gesunden land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. Austria (IRIS 2014-
2/2) and Roşiianu v. Romania (IRIS 2014-8/4)). Apart from these developments in its case law, 
the Court also referred to national and international sources of law recognising a right of 
access to public documents. This lead the Court to consider a right of access to information as a 
crucial instrument for the exercise of the right to receive and impart information as guaranteed 
by Article 10 of the Convention: “For the Court, in circumstances where access to information is 
instrumental for the exercise of the applicant’s right to receive and impart information, its 
denial may constitute an interference with that right. The principle of securing Convention 
rights in a practical and effective manner requires an applicant in such a situation to be able to 
rely on the protection of Article 10 of the Convention”. The Court further concentrated on the 
role of civil society and participatory democracy, and emphasised that access to public 
documents by the press and NGOs can contribute to “transparency on the manner of conduct of 
public affairs and on matters of interest for society as a whole and thereby allows participation 
in public governance”. It considers “that civil society makes an important contribution to the 
discussion of public affairs”, and that “the manner in which public watchdogs carry out their 
activities may have a significant impact on the proper functioning of a democratic society. It is 
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in the interest of democratic society to enable the press to exercise its vital role of “public 
watchdog” in imparting information on matters of public concern … just as it is to enable NGOs 
scrutinising the State to do the same thing. Given that accurate information is a tool of their 
trade, it will often be necessary for persons and organisations exercising watchdog functions to 
gain access to information in order to perform their role of reporting on matters of public 
interest. Obstacles created in order to hinder access to information may result in those working 
in the media or related fields no longer being able to assume their “watchdog” role effectively, 
and their ability to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected”. 
Before Article 10 can come into play, however, the information requested should not only be 
instrumental for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression: the information to which 
access is sought must also meet a “public-interest test” for the disclosure to be considered 
necessary under Article 10. In addition, whether the person seeking access to the information in 
question does so with a view to informing the public in the capacity of a public “watchdog” and 
whether the information requested is “ready and available” are also an “important 
consideration” for the Court. 
After finding that the denial to give MHB access to the requested information was an 
interference with MHB’s rights under Article 10, the Court explained why this amounted to a 
violation of Article 10. First, it considered that the information requested by MHB was 
“necessary” for it to exercise its right to freedom of expression. Second, the Court does not find 
that the privacy rights of the public defenders would have been negatively affected had the 
MHB’s request for information been granted. Although the information request by MHB 
concerned personal data, it did not involve information outside the public domain. According to 
the Court the relevant Hungarian law, as interpreted by the domestic courts, excluded any 
meaningful assessment of MHB’s freedom-of-expression rights under Article 10. Therefore the 
Court considered that the arguments advanced by the Hungarian Government, although 
relevant, were not sufficient to show that the interference complained of was “necessary in a 
democratic society”. By 15 votes to two the Grand Chamber comes to the conclusion that there 
has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
• Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, ECHR 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Kaos GL v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The case of Kaos GL v. Turkey is an example of a case whose findings breach Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the right to freedom of expression of a 
particular kind. The case concerns the seizure of all the copies of a magazine published by Kaos 
GL, a cultural research and solidarity association for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
people (“LGBT”). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the aim of protecting 
public morals relied upon by the Turkish authorities had been insufficient to justify the prior-
censorship of the LGBT-magazine for more than five years. The judgment also shows the 
European Court’s willingness to extend the protection of Article 10 ECHR to sexually explicit 
expression, while demonstrating the need for proportionate interferences with the right to 
freedom of expression in the light of the protection of minors against sexually explicit content. 
In 2006, the Criminal Court of First Instance of Ankara, at the request of the Chief Prosecutor, 
ordered the seizure of the 375 copies of issue 28 of the magazine Kaos GL with a view to 
launching criminal investigations. The issue in question contained articles and interviews on 
pornography related to homosexuality, illustrated with explicit images. The Criminal Court 
considered that the content of some of the articles and some of the images published were 
contrary to the principle of protection of public morals. An appeal against this decision was 
dismissed, while the president and editor-in-chief of Kaos GL magazine, Mr Güner, was 
subsequently charged with publishing obscene images via the press, an offence punishable 
under Article 226 § 2 of the Turkish Penal Code. In particular, a painting reproduced in the 
magazine, which showed a sexual act between two men whose sexual organs were visible, was 
considered obscene and pornographic. In 2007, however, the Ankara Criminal Court acquitted 
Mr Güner of the charge against him. It held that not all the factors constituting the offence 
were present. It also ordered the return of all the copies of the magazine seized, although the 
execution of this order was not implemented by the Turkish authorities. In 2012, the Court of 
Cassation upheld the judgment of the Ankara Criminal Court. In the meantime, relying on its 
right to freedom of expression, Kaos GL lodged an application before the ECtHR, complaining 
of the seizure and continued confiscation of its issue 28 and the criminal proceedings brought 
against Mr Güner. 
While the European Court decided that Kaos GL’s complaint about the criminal proceedings 
against Mr Güner was inadmissible ratione personae, it substantially evaluated whether the 
seizure and confiscation of the magazine amounted to a justified interference with the 
magazine’s right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. While there was no 
doubt that the seizure of all copies of the magazine was prescribed by law and pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting morals, the European Court considered that the reasons given by 
the domestic court were not convincing with regard to the necessity and the proportionate 
character of their seizure and confiscation. According to the Court, there was nothing in the 
decision of the Criminal Court to seize the magazines to suggest that the judge had examined 
in detail the compatibility of the magazine’s content with the principle of protection of public 
morals. Nor did the Criminal Court’s decision to dismiss the appeal against the seizure decision 
set out any further relevant details or reasoning. The European Court accordingly considered 
that the protection of public morals argument, advanced in such a broad, unreasoned manner, 
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had been insufficient to justify the decision to seize and confiscate all the copies of issue 28 of 
Kaos GL for over five years. Based on its own analysis of the impugned publication, having 
regard to the content of the articles and referring to the explicit nature of some of the images 
in the magazine at issue, the Court expressed the opinion that issue 28 of Kaos GL could be 
considered as a publication specifically aimed at a certain social category. Despite its 
intellectual and artistic characteristics, some of the content could indeed be considered as 
possibly offending the sensitivities of a non-warned public. The Court accepted that the 
measures taken to prevent access by specific groups of individuals - including minors - to this 
publication might have met a pressing social need. However, it emphasised that the domestic 
authorities had not attempted to implement a less harsh preventive measure than the seizure 
of all the copies of the magazine, for example by prohibiting its sale to persons under the age 
of 18 or requiring special packaging with a warning for minors. Even if the issue seized, 
accompanied by a warning for persons under the age of 18, could have been distributed after 
the return of the confiscated copies, that is to say after the Court of Cassation judgment of 29 
February 2012, the Court held that the confiscation of the copies of the magazine and the delay 
of five years and seven months in distributing the publication could not be considered as 
proportionate to the aim pursued. The Court therefore held that the seizure of all the copies of 
issue 28 of the magazine Kaos GL amounted to a disproportionate interference with the 
exercise of Kaos GL’s right to freedom of expression and had not been “necessary in a 
democratic society”. The Court is unanimous in finding that therefore there has been a violation 
of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Kaos GL v. Turkey, no. 4982/07, 22 November 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Terentyev v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
In one of its first judgments in 2017 related to the right to freedom of expression, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found a violation of a blogger’s right under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The blogger, Mr Terentyev, a musician and jazz 
critic, had been convicted in Russia for defamation after he had published an article on his 
personal website about a local jazz festival which was scathingly critical of the festival and its 
president, Mr Y. Mr Terentyev used various corruptions of the festival president’s surname to 
mock his professional competence. The jazz festival was described as being “a shoddy piece of 
work” and Mr Y.’s performance “crappy”. Mr Y. sued the blogger for defamation, arguing that the 
article had been insulting and harmful to his reputation. The Syktyvkar Town Court found the 
applicant liable in defamation, stating that “[u]sing a distorted form of the plaintiff’s 
patronymic and last name … breaches the plaintiff’s right to his own name and to his good 
name, which is unacceptable under the law”. The Town Court also considered that the 
defamatory extracts undermined the honour and dignity of the plaintiff, while Mr Terentyev did 
not submit any evidence to the court showing that the impugned statements were true. The 
Town Court awarded Mr Y. 5,000 Russian roubles (about EUR 80) in damages and ordered Mr 
Terentyev to publish a retraction on his website. The Supreme Court of the Komi Republic 
dismissed his appeal. It endorsed the findings of the lower court in a summary judgment, 
holding that Article 10 of the Convention had not been breached because “the defendant 
published statements on the Internet which undermined the honour and dignity of the plaintiff 
as a person, pedagogue and musician and which contained negative information about him”. 
Mr Terentyev lodged a complaint with the ECtHR, arguing that his conviction for defamation 
amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
Convention. As this “interference” with Mr Terentyev’s right to freedom of expression was 
“prescribed by law” under Article 152 of the Russian Civil Code and pursued the legitimate aim 
of the protection of the rights of others - namely the reputation of Mr Y. - what remained to be 
established was whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The 
European Court refers to its standard approach, according to which it may be required to 
ascertain whether the domestic authorities have struck a fair balance when protecting two 
values guaranteed by the Convention - namely freedom of expression, as protected by Article 
10, and the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR, including the 
right to reputation. In a balancing exercise between those two rights the European Court leaves 
a certain margin of appreciation to the national authorities of the defending state, while the 
Court would require strong reasons for substituting its view for that of the domestic courts. 
However the domestic courts are required to carefully examine the context of the dispute, the 
nature of the impugned remarks and the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, as 
elaborated in the 2012 Grand Chamber judgment in Axel Springer AG v. Germany (see 
IRIS 2012-3/1). In the present case, the ECtHR observes that the judgments of the domestic 
courts offer no insight into the context of the dispute: they did not discuss whether the article 
had contributed to a debate on a matter of public interest or whether it had been a form of 
artistic criticism, and did not explain why Mr Y.’s reputation had to be afforded greater 
protection on account of his being “a person, pedagogue and musician”. The judgments at the 
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domestic level were also remarkably laconic and contained nothing that would help the 
European Court to grasp the rationale behind the interference. The domestic courts made no 
genuine attempt to distinguish between statements of fact and value judgments; rather, they 
reprinted the impugned extracts of the article in their entirety, without subjecting them to 
meaningful scrutiny. Faced with this failure to give relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the 
interference, the ECtHR finds that the domestic courts cannot be said to have “applied 
standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10” or to have 
“based themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts”. Therefore the European 
Court concludes unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. The 
Russian state is ordered to pay Mr Terentyev EUR 144 in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 
2,500 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 
• Terentyev v. Russia, no. 25147/09, 26 January 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Selmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
On 9 February 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered an important 
judgment, condemning the forcible removal of journalists from the national parliament gallery 
where they were reporting on a parliamentary debate in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. During the debate a group of opposition members of parliament (MPs) had started 
creating a disturbance in the parliamentary chamber, and had been ejected by security officers. 
The applicants, all accredited journalists, had refused to leave the gallery but were finally 
forcibly removed by security officers. The journalists brought proceedings before the 
Constitutional Court to complain about the incident, and contested the fact that there was no 
oral hearing in order to challenge the facts as disputed between them and the government. 
They submitted that the parliamentary debate, and the related events regarding the approval of 
the State budget, had been of particular public interest, and that the intervention of the 
parliament security officers had been neither “lawful” nor “necessary in a democratic society”. 
The Constitutional Court dismissed the journalists’ complaint, emphasising that in the 
circumstances of the case at issue, the Parliament security service was entitled to move the 
journalists to a safer place, where they would not be in danger. Such an assessment should not 
be viewed as conflicting with the journalists’ right to attend parliamentary proceedings and 
report on events they witnessed. In fact, the journalists published their reports in the evening 
editions of their newspapers, which implies that there was no violation of their freedom of 
expression. 
The journalists lodged an application with the ECtHR, complaining about their forcible removal 
from the parliament gallery from where they had been reporting. In its judgment, the ECtHR 
agreed with the government that the removal of the journalists was “prescribed by law” and 
pursued the “legitimate aim” of ensuring public safety and the prevention of disorder. The 
ECtHR however was of the opinion that the government had failed to establish that the 
removal of the journalists was “necessary in a democratic society”. In particular, there was no 
indication that there had been any danger from the protests which had taken place outside the 
parliament building on the day of the incident, either from the journalists themselves (who had 
neither contributed to nor participated in the disturbance in the chamber), or from the MPs who 
had been at the origin of the disorder. Nor was the ECtHR convinced that the journalists had 
effectively been able to view the ongoing removal of the MPs, a matter which had been of 
legitimate public concern. In its reasoning the ECtHR referred to the crucial role of the media in 
providing information on the authorities’ handling of public demonstrations and the 
containment of disorder, such as in the present case. It reiterated that the “watchdog” role of 
the media assumes particular importance in such contexts, since their presence is a guarantee 
that the authorities can be held to account for their conduct vis-à-vis the demonstrators and 
the public at large when it comes to the policing of large gatherings, including the methods 
used to control or disperse protesters or to preserve public order. Any attempt to remove 
journalists from the scene of demonstrations must therefore be subject to strict scrutiny, 
especially “when journalists exercise their right to impart information to the public about the 
behaviour of elected representatives in Parliament and about the manner in which authorities 
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handle disorder that occurs during Parliamentary sessions”. According to the ECtHR, it was not 
presented with any evidence that the disturbance in the chamber had been violent or that 
anyone, in the chamber or elsewhere, had sustained an injury as a result of that disturbance. 
The journalists’ removal, on the other hand, entailed immediate adverse effects that 
instantaneously prevented them from obtaining first-hand and direct knowledge based on their 
personal experience of the events unfolding in the chamber. The Court found that these are 
important elements in the exercise of the applicants’ journalistic functions, of which the public 
should not have been deprived in the circumstances of the present case. Against this 
background, the ECtHR considered that the government failed to establish convincingly that 
the journalists’ removal from the gallery was necessary in a democratic society, and came to 
the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR),. It also found a breach of Article 6 of the ECHR, as the journalists were 
refused an oral hearing before the Constitutional Court, without being provided any reasons for 
this refusal. 
• Selmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 67259/14, 9 February 
2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Rubio Dosamantes v. Spain 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, once again, clarified that media freedom and 
entertainment news must respect the right of privacy of individuals, including when 
commenting on the private life of media celebrities. The case of Rubio Dosamantes v. Spain 
deals with an application by the Mexican pop singer whose artist name is Paulina Rubio, 
complaining that her reputation and private life had been harmed by remarks in various 
Spanish TV programmes. The ECtHR held that the dismissal of Dosamantes’ claims by the 
Spanish courts was a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The fact that the singer was well known to the public and that rumours about her private life 
and sexuality had been widely circulated, including on the Internet, did not justify the 
broadcast of interviews about her relationships and sexuality, merely repeating such rumours. 
The ECtHR found that Ms. Rubio’s fame as a singer did not mean that her activities or conduct 
in her private life should be regarded as necessarily falling within the public interest. 
In 2005 Ms. Rubio’s former manager gave interviews on three television programmes 
concerning various aspects of the singer’s private life. Ms. Rubio brought a civil action, seeking 
protection of her right to honour and to privacy, against her former manager and various 
television presenters and staff members, television production companies, and television 
stations. The first-instance court, and later the court of appeal, dismissed Ms. Rubio’s claims. 
They found that the comments concerning the drug use of Ms. Rubio’s boyfriend, R.B., had 
related solely to the state of their relationship and had not alleged that Ms. Rubio had incited 
him directly to take drugs. As to the references to Ms. Rubio’s sexual orientation, the Spanish 
courts considered that they had not impugned her honour, as homosexuality should no longer 
be considered dishonourable. Furthermore Ms. Rubio herself had tacitly consented to the 
debate on the subject. Lastly, the Spanish courts found that the remarks concerning Ms. Rubio’s 
alleged ill-treatment of R.B. were likewise not damaging to her reputation. Further appeals 
were declared inadmissible by the Supreme Court, and finally also by the Constitutional Court. 
In her complaint lodged with the ECtHR, Ms. Rubio alleged that the remarks made about her 
during the disputed TV programmes had impugned her honour and breached her right to 
respect for her private life, as protected by Article 8 of the Convention. As in former cases dealt 
with by the ECtHR (see IRIS 2012-3/1 and IRIS 2016-1/3), the question was whether a fair 
balance had been struck by the national courts between the right to respect for private life, 
including her right to reputation, and the right of the opposing party to freedom of expression. 
The ECtHR refers to the relevant criteria applied in other cases in this balancing, and focuses 
on (1) the contribution to a debate of public interest and the degree of notoriety of Ms. Rubio; 
(2) the prior conduct of Ms. Rubio; and (3) the content, form, and consequences of the 
comments uttered in the TV programmes at issue. 
The ECtHR observed that the domestic courts had based their decisions merely on the fact that 
Ms. Rubio was famous, while emphasising that a public figure well known as a singer also has a 
right of privacy with regard to activities or conduct in his or her private life. According to the 
ECtHR, the TV programmes in question, based as they were on strictly private aspects of Ms. 
Rubio’s life, did not have any public interest that could legitimise the disclosure of the 
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information, in spite of her fame, as the public had no legitimate interest in knowing certain 
intimate details about her private life. Even assuming that there had been a public interest, in 
parallel to the commercial interest of the television channels in broadcasting the programmes, 
the ECtHR found that those interests were outweighed by a person’s individual right to the 
effective protection of his or her privacy. Next the ECtHR found that the fact that Ms. Rubio had 
earlier benefitted from extensive media attention did not authorise the TV channels to 
broadcast unchecked and unlimited comments about her private life. It reiterated that certain 
events of private and family life were given particularly careful protection under Article 8 of the 
Convention, and that therefore journalists and media had to show prudence and precaution 
when discussing them. The Spanish courts had therefore had a duty to assess the TV 
programmes in question, in order to distinguish between, and to weigh in the balance, those 
matters which were intimately part of Ms. Rubio’s private life and those which might have had 
a legitimate public interest. The ECtHR however observed that the national courts had not 
carefully weighed those rights and interests in the balance, but had merely taken the view that 
the comments in question had not impugned Ms. Rubio’s honour. They had not examined the 
criteria to be taken into account in order to make a fair assessment of the balance between the 
right to respect for freedom of expression and the right to respect for a person’s private life. 
Having regard to the margin of appreciation afforded to the domestic authorities when it came 
to weighing up the various interests, the ECtHR found unanimously that they had failed in their 
positive obligations to ensure the protection of Ms. Rubio’s privacy. There had therefore been a 
violation of Article 8 (see also IRIS 2016-6/1). 
• Rubio Dosamantes v. Spain, no. 20996/10, 21 February 2017. 
IRIS 2017-4/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
In Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has further 
developed its case law regarding freedom of expression and press freedom during election 
periods. The case concerns the application of a specific provision in Russian electoral law 
restricting the freedom of media reporting at election time. The Court’s judgment deals with 
the applicant’s conviction for an administrative offence for publishing critical articles about a 
politician during the 2007 parliamentary election campaign in Russia. 
The applicant is a non-governmental organisation that publishes Orlovskaya Iskra, a newspaper 
in the Orel Region, a region south-west of Moscow. The Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation and the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia were listed as the Orlovskaya Iskra’s 
founders. This information was specified on the front page of the newspaper. During the 2007 
parliamentary election campaign the newspaper published two articles criticising the then 
governor of the Orel Region, who stood as first candidate on the regional list of the United 
Russia political party. The Communist Party was one of the main opposition parties at those 
elections. The articles contained accusations of corrupt and controversial practices and focused 
on the fact that the governor had closed down a publicly-owned newspaper. The Working 
Group on Informational Disputes of the regional Electoral Committee examined both articles 
and concluded that the articles contained elements of electoral campaigning, because they 
were critically focused on one candidate. It found that the articles had not been paid for by the 
official campaign fund of any political party participating in the election campaign, as was 
required by the Russian Electoral Rights Act. For that reason Orlovskaya Iskra was found guilty 
of an administrative offence and fined. It complained under Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) about the classification of the material it published as 
“election campaigning” and the fine imposed for failure to indicate who had commissioned the 
publication of this material. Joint submissions as third-party interventions in support of 
Orlovskaya Iskra were produced by the Media Legal Defence Initiative and the Mass Media 
Defence Centre. 
The ECtHR accepted that the applicable provisions of the Russian Electoral Rights Act were 
aimed at transparency of elections, including campaign finances, as well as at enforcing the 
voters’ right to impartial, truthful and balanced information via mass media outlets. The Court 
found however that the application of the Electoral Rights Act impinged upon Orlovskaya 
Iskra’s freedom to impart information and ideas during the election period, and that the 
interference with its freedom of expression was not shown to achieve, in a proportionate 
manner, the aim of running fair elections. 
The ECtHR reiterated that free elections, as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the 
EHCR, and freedom of expression, together form the bedrock of any democratic system. The 
two rights are inter-related and operate to reinforce each other, freedom of expression being 
one of the “conditions” necessary to ensure free elections. For this reason, it is particularly 
important in the period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are 
permitted to circulate freely. According to the ECtHR in the case at issue there was little scope 
for restrictions, especially on account of the strong interest of a democratic society in the press 
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exercising its vital role as a public watchdog. The content of the publications was part of the 
normal journalistic coverage of a political debate in the print media. The ECtHR stated that it 
saw no reason to consider that any candidates or political parties were at the origin of the 
impugned articles and it considered that that the publication of the articles constituted a fully-
fledged exercise of Orlovskaya Iskra’s freedom of expression, namely the choice to publish the 
articles, thus imparting information to the readers and potential voters. According to the ECtHR 
it has not been convincingly demonstrated, and there was certainly no sufficient basis for 
upholding the Government’s argument, that the print media should be subjected to rigorous 
requirements of impartiality, neutrality and equality of treatment during an election period. The 
ECtHR recognised however that in certain circumstances the rights under Article 10 ECHR and 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 may conflict and it may be considered necessary, in the period 
preceding or during an election, to place certain restrictions on freedom of expression, of a type 
which would not usually be acceptable, in order to secure the “free expression of the opinion of 
the people in the choice of the legislature”. It also considers that unfavourable publications 
before Election Day can indeed damage one’s reputation. However the focus of the domestic 
legislation was not on the falsity or truth of the content or its defamatory nature. In the opinion 
of the ECtHR the “public watchdog” role of the press, also at election time, is not limited to 
using the press as a medium of communication, for instance by way of political advertising, but 
also encompasses an independent exercise of freedom of the press by mass media outlets such 
as newspapers on the basis of free editorial choice aimed at imparting information and ideas on 
subjects of public interest. In particular, discussion of the candidates and their programmes 
contributes to the public’s right to receive information and strengthens voters’ ability to make 
informed choices between candidates for office. In addition, the ECtHR stated that any damage 
caused to reputation could be addressed, possibly before Election Day, by way of other 
appropriate procedures. 
The ECtHR concluded that, in view of the regulatory framework, Orlovskaya Iskra was restricted 
in its freedom to impart information and ideas. By subjecting the expression of comments to 
the regulation of “campaigning” and by prosecuting the applicant with reference to this 
regulation, there was an interference with Orlovskaya Iskra’s editorial choice to publish a text 
taking a critical stance and to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. The 
Court affirmed that no sufficiently compelling reasons had been shown to justify the 
prosecution and conviction of Orlovskaya Iskra for its publications at election time. Therefore 
the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, no. 42911/08, 21 February 2017. 
IRIS 2017-6/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Rolf Anders Daniel Pihl v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The decision in Rolf Anders Daniel Pihl v. Sweden deals with a complaint about an alleged 
breach of the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), because the Swedish authorities had refused to hold the 
operator of a website liable for a defamatory blog post and an anonymous online comment. 
Again, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) applies a crucial distinction between 
illegal hate speech and defamation, limiting the liability of the operator of the blog when it 
(only) concerns defamation, and not incitement to violence. The blog post at issue had 
wrongfully accused Mr. Pihl of being involved in a Nazi political party. The day after publication 
of the post, an anonymous person posted a comment calling Pihl “a real hash-junkie”. The blog, 
which was run by a small non-profit association, allowed comments to be posted without being 
checked before publication. The commentators were considered responsible for their own 
statements, and therefore they were requested to “display good manners and obey the law”. 
Nine days later Pihl posted a comment on the blog in reply to the blog post and comment 
about him, stating that both allegations were false and requesting their immediate removal. 
The following day the blog post and the comment were removed and a new post was added on 
the blog by the association - stating that the earlier post had been wrong and based on 
inaccurate information - and it apologised for the mistake. However, Pihl sued the association 
and claimed symbolic damages of SEK 1, approximately EUR 0.10. He submitted that the post 
and the comment constituted defamation, and that the association was responsible for the fact 
that the blog and the comment had remained on the website for nine days. The Swedish courts 
however rejected Pihl’s claim. They agreed that the comment constituted defamation, but 
found no legal grounds on which to hold the association responsible for failing to remove the 
blog post and comment sooner than it had done. Pihl complained before the ECtHR that his 
right to privacy and reputation under Article 8 ECHR had been breached. 
First the Court considered that the comment, although offensive, certainly did not amount to 
hate speech or incitement to violence, and accepted the national courts’ finding that the 
comments at issue constituted defamation and, consequently, fell within the scope of Article 8. 
Next, the Court referred to its case law in Delfi AS v. Estonia (see IRIS 2015-7/1) and Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary (see IRIS 2016-3/2), and 
summarised the aspects that are relevant for the concrete assessment of the interference in 
question: “the context of the comments, the measures applied by the company in order to 
prevent or remove defamatory comments, the liability of the actual authors of the comments as 
an alternative to the intermediary’s liability, and the consequences of the domestic proceedings 
for the company”. As regards the context of the comment, the Court noted that the underlying 
blog post accused Pihl, incorrectly, of being involved in a Nazi political party, but also that the 
post and the subsequent comment were promptly removed and an apology published when 
Pihl notified the association of the inaccurate allegations about him. The Court attached 
particular importance to the fact that the association is a small non-profit association, and 
observed that it was also unlikely that the blog post and the comment at issue would be widely 
read. It considered that “expecting the association to assume that some unfiltered comments 
might be in breach of the law would amount to requiring excessive and impractical forethought 
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capable of undermining the right to impart information via internet”. As regards the measures 
taken by the association to prevent or remove defamatory comments, the Court noted that it 
was clearly stated on the blog that the association did not check such comments before they 
were published and that commentators were responsible for their own statements. The Court 
also referred to its earlier case law in which it held that “liability for third-party comments may 
have negative consequences on the comment-related environment of an internet portal and 
thus a chilling effect on freedom of expression via internet. This effect could be particularly 
detrimental for a non-commercial website”. Turning to the liability of the originator of the 
comment, the Court observed that Pihl obtained the IP-address of the computer used to submit 
the comment, but that there were no indications that he took any further measures to try to 
obtain the identity of the author of the comment. Lastly the Court noted that Pihl’s case was 
considered on its merits by two judicial instances at the domestic level before the Supreme 
Court refused leave to appeal. The Court further observed that the scope of responsibility of 
those running blogs is regulated by domestic law and that, had the comment been of a 
different and more severe nature, the association could have been found responsible for not 
removing it sooner, e.g. if it had concerned child pornography or incitement to rebellion or 
violence. In its overall conclusion the ECtHR again emphasised the fact that the comment, 
although offensive, did not amount to hate speech or incitement to violence and was posted on 
a small blog run by a non-profit association, which removed it the day after the applicant’s 
request and nine days after it had been posted. In view of this, the Court finds that the 
domestic courts acted within their margin of appreciation and struck a fair balance between 
Pihl’s rights under Article 8 and the association’s opposing right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10 ECHR. Therefore the Court found the application to be manifestly ill-founded. 
• Rolf Anders Daniel PIHL v. Sweden (dec.), no. 74742/14, 7 February 2017. 
IRIS 2017-5/3 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ólafsson v. Iceland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Iceland has breached the right to 
freedom of expression of the editor of a web-based media site, by holding him liable for 
defamation. The applicant in this case is Mr. Ólafsson, editor of the web-based media site 
Pressan. He published articles alleging that a political candidate (‘A.’) had sexually abused 
children. The allegations were based on statements made by relatives of ‘A.’ who had declared 
that he had sexually abused them when they were children. These allegations were also 
forwarded to the police and the child protection services, but for an unknown reason, the police 
had not instigated an investigation. 
The Supreme Court of Iceland held Mr. Ólafsson liable for defamation, because statements in 
the articles had indeed insinuated that ‘A.’ was guilty of having abused children. Whilst the 
Supreme Court accepted that candidates for public service had to endure a certain amount of 
public scrutiny, it held that this could not justify the accusations of criminality against ‘A.’ in the 
media, particularly because A. had not been found guilty of the alleged conduct and had not 
been under criminal or other investigation for it. The Supreme Court also held that Mr. 
Ólafsson, as an editor, had a supervisory obligation which entailed that he should conduct his 
editorial duties in such a way that the published material would not harm anyone by being 
defamatory. Mr. Ólafsson was ordered to pay, under the Tort Act, EUR 1,600 for non-pecuniary 
damages, and compensation for ‘A.’’s legal costs of EUR 6,500. Under Article 241 of the Penal 
Code the statements at issue published on Pressan were declared null and void. 
Mr. Ólafsson complained to the ECtHR of a violation of his right to freedom of expression as 
guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR 
found that it has been adequately established that Mr. Ólafsson’s liability was prescribed by 
domestic law within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR, and that the interference 
complained of pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others. The ECtHR however found the arguments for the interference with Mr. Ólafsson’s right 
to freedom of expression as an editor insufficiently convincing. In doing so the ECtHR referred 
to the standards and principles that the ECtHR has developed when considering disputes 
requiring an examination of the fair balancing of the right to respect for private life under 
Article 8 and the right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR recalled that in order for Article 8 
to come into play, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness 
and its manner must cause prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private 
life. The criteria which are relevant when balancing the right to freedom of expression against 
the right to respect for private life are: (1) the extent to which the impugned statement 
contributes to a debate of general interest; (2) how well known the person concerned is and 
what the subject of the report is; (3) his or her prior conduct; (4) the method of obtaining the 
information and its veracity; (5) the content, form, and consequences of the publication and (6) 
the severity of the sanction imposed. 
The ECtHR confirmed that the general public had a legitimate interest in being informed about 
‘A.’’s running for general election and of such serious matters as child abuse. It also considers 
that, by running for office in general elections, ‘A.’ must be considered to have inevitably and 
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knowingly entered the public domain and laid himself open to closer scrutiny of his acts. The 
limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider than in a case of a private individual. Next 
the ECtHR referred to the obligation for journalists to rely on a sufficiently accurate and 
reliable factual basis which can be considered proportionate to the nature and degree of their 
allegations, such that the more serious the allegations, the more solid the factual basis has to 
be. The ECtHR accepted that the journalist tried to establish the credibility and the truth of the 
allegations by interviewing several relevant persons, and that the impugned articles offered ‘A.’ 
an opportunity to comment on the allegations. The Court reiterated that a general requirement 
for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a 
quotation that might insult, or provoke others, or damage their reputation, is not reconcilable 
with the press’s role of providing information on current events, opinions, and ideas and that 
“punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another 
person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of 
matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong 
reasons for doing so”. The ECtHR was of the opinion that Mr. Ólafsson acted in good faith and 
made sure that the article was written in compliance with ordinary journalistic obligations to 
verify a factual allegation. 
Although the ECtHR agreed that the allegations were of such nature and gravity as to be 
capable of causing harm to ‘A.’’s honour and reputation, it emphasised that the disputed 
statements did not originate from Mr. Ólafsson himself nor from the journalist who wrote the 
articles, but from the alleged victims. Insofar as Mr. Ólafsson’s conviction may have been in the 
legitimate interest of protecting ‘A.’ from the impugned defamatory allegations made by the 
alleged victims, that interest was, in the Court’s view, largely preserved by the possibility 
available to him under Icelandic law to bring defamation proceedings against the persons who 
made the claims. The ECtHR regarded it as significant that ‘A.’ opted to institute proceedings 
against Mr. Ólafsson only. ‘A.’ had indeed chosen not to sue the persons making the claims, and 
that might have prevented Mr. Ólafsson from establishing that he had acted in good faith and 
had ascertained the truth of the allegations. With regard the proportionate character of the 
order by the Iceland Supreme Court to pay compensation and costs, the ECtHR considered that 
what matters is the very fact of judgment being made against the person concerned, even 
where such a ruling is solely civil in nature. It emphasised that any undue restriction on 
freedom of expression effectively entails a risk of obstructing or paralysing future media 
coverage of similar questions. 
The ECtHR concluded that the Supreme Court had failed to strike a reasonable balance 
between the measures restricting Mr. Ólafsson’s freedom of expression, and the legitimate aim 
of protecting the reputation of others. The ECtHR held, unanimously, that there had been a 
breach of Mr. Ólafsson’s freedom of expression and that the Icelandic judicial authorities had 
violated Article 10 ECHR. 
• Ólafsson v. Iceland, no. 58493/13, 16 March 2017. 
IRIS 2017-6/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Milisavljević v. Serbia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has recently found that the Republic of Serbia 
has acted in breach of the right to freedom of expression by convicting a journalist for insult of 
a well-known human rights activist. The ECtHR emphasises that criminal prosecution for insult 
of public figures is likely to deter journalists from contributing to the public discussion of issues 
affecting the life of the community. More than 10 years after the journalist lodged an 
application with the Court, the ECtHR came unanimously to the conclusion that the Serbian 
authorities’ reaction to the journalist’s article was disproportionate to the legitimate aim of 
protecting the reputation of others, and was therefore not necessary in a democratic society, 
within the meaning of Article 10 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The applicant is Ljiljana Milisavljević, who was a journalist employed at Politika, a major 
Serbian daily newspaper. In September 2003, Milisavljević wrote an article in Politika about 
Nataša Kandić, a Serbian human rights activist primarily known for her activities in 
investigating crimes committed during the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Kandić 
also advocated for full cooperation of the Yugoslav, and later Serbian authorities with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a highly controversial issue at 
that time in Serbia. A few weeks after the publication of the article Kandić started a private 
prosecution against Milisavljević. She claimed that the article had been written with the intent 
of belittling her in the eyes of the public, to present her as a traitor to Serbian interests and as 
a “paid servant of foreign interests and a prostitute who sells herself for money”. 
The First Municipal Court in Belgrade found that Milisavljević had indeed insulted Kandić by 
writing that “she has been called a witch and a prostitute”. The court established that although 
the impugned phrase had been previously published in another article by another author in a 
different magazine, Milisavljević had not put it in quotation marks which meant that she agreed 
with it, thus expressing her opinion, with the intention of insulting Kandić. In view of no 
aggravating circumstances and a number of mitigating ones, no prison sentence or fines were 
imposed: the court only gave Milisavljević a judicial warning. This judgment was confirmed by 
the court of appeal, while in separate proceedings Milisavljević was ordered to pay Kandić 
approximately EUR 386 in respect of costs and expenses. 
In 2006, Milisavljević lodged a complaint with the ECtHR, arguing that her right to freedom of 
expression as a journalist had been violated by the conviction for criminal insult. She also 
submitted that she had been later discharged from Politika and that her conviction appeared to 
have been the cause thereof, while her conviction also represented a threat and warning to all 
Serbian journalists. In determining whether the interference with the journalist’s freedom of 
expression was necessary in a democratic society in the terms of Article 10 (2) ECHR, the Court 
applied the relevant considerations of (a) whether the article contributed to a debate of general 
interest; (b) how well known the person concerned was and what the subject was of the report; 
(c) the conduct of the person concerned prior to publication of the article; (d) the method of 
obtaining the information and its veracity; (e) the content, form, and consequences of the 
publication; and (f) the severity of the sanction imposed. When examining the necessity of an 
interference in a democratic society in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or 
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rights of others”, the ECtHR has to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance 
between the competing rights and values. 
While there was no doubt that the article was published in the context of a debate on matters 
of public interest, the ECtHR further observed that the applicant is a journalist and in that 
capacity her task was to write an article about Kandić, a well-known human rights activist and 
undeniably a public figure. The crucial question was to determine what the impact was of the 
allegation that Kandić had been called “a witch and a prostitute”. The ECtHR considered that 
the impugned words are offensive, but that it is clear from the formulation of the sentence that 
this is how Kandić was perceived by others, not by Milisavljević herself. It reiterated that a 
general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the 
content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not 
reconcilable with the press’s role of providing information on current events, opinions, and 
ideas. 
According to the ECtHR, the domestic courts also failed to make any balancing exercise 
whatsoever between Kandić’s reputation and Milisavljević’s freedom of expression, also 
referring to the latter’s “duty, as a journalist, to impart information of general interest”. The 
Serbian courts made no reference to the overall context of the text and the circumstances 
under which it was written, as their findings were rather limited to the fact that the impugned 
words were not put in quotation marks. In the ECtHR’s view this amounted to a “terse and 
undeveloped reasoning” at the domestic level, which is in itself problematic “as it rendered any 
defence raised by the applicant devoid of any practical effect”. The ECtHR found that the 
impugned article offered both positive and negative views about Kandić, and it considered that 
the impugned words could not be understood as a gratuitous personal attack on, or insult to, 
Kandić. The article did not refer to her private or family life, but showed how she was perceived 
professionally, as a human rights activist and a public figure. That being so, the ECtHR 
considered that she inevitably and knowingly exposed herself to public scrutiny, and should 
therefore have displayed a greater degree of tolerance than an ordinary private individual. 
With regard the proportionality of the interference, the ECtHR disagreed with the Serbian 
Government’s argument that the journalist’s sentence was lenient: what matters was not that 
Milisavljević was “only” issued a judicial warning, but that she was convicted for an insult at all. 
The ECtHR emphasised that “irrespective of the severity of the penalty which is liable to be 
imposed, a recourse to the criminal prosecution of journalists for purported insults, with the 
attendant risk of a criminal conviction and a criminal penalty, for criticising a public figure in a 
manner which can be regarded as personally insulting, is likely to deter journalists from 
contributing to the public discussion of issues affecting the life of the community”. On the basis 
of all these considerations, the ECtHR concluded that there has been a violation of Article 10 
ECHR. 
• Milisavljević v. Serbia, no. 50123/06, 4 April 2017. 
IRIS 2017-7/2 
  
Back to overview of case-law 
422 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Huseynova v. Azerbaijan 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and 
Media Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recently dealt with a case that illustrates the 
dramatic situation of violence against journalists in some countries and the often remaining 
impunity for crimes against journalists (see IRIS 2017-3/3 and IRIS 2016-5/3). It also shows the 
difficulties the victims or their families can be confronted with in invoking the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Elmar Huseynov was a prominent independent journalist in Azerbaijan and the editor-in-chief 
of the weekly magazine Monitor. Various civil and criminal proceedings had been brought 
against him for the publication of critical articles about the President of Azerbaijan and 
members of his family, and about members of the parliament, government and other state 
officials. Moreover, copies of the magazine had been confiscated on several occasions and the 
domestic authorities sometimes prevented its publication. After having received threats 
because of his critical articles, and in particular shortly after having been told by a public 
official to stop writing about the President and his family, on 2 March 2005, Mr Huseynov was 
shot dead in his apartment building as he returned home from work. Huseynov’s murder 
received widespread local and international media coverage and was unanimously condemned 
by various politicians, international organisations, and local and international NGOs. Criminal 
investigations were instituted immediately after the murder and numerous investigative actions 
were taken, but 12 years later the criminal proceedings were still ongoing and the perpetrators 
of the crime had not yet been prosecuted. Before the ECtHR, Ms Rushaniya Saidovna Huseynova 
alleged that her husband had been murdered by Azerbaijani State agents and that the 
authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation, and hence breached Article 2 (the 
right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). She further alleged that the 
killing of her husband had constituted a breach of the right to freedom of expression (Article 10 
ECHR), as he had been targeted on account of his journalistic activity. 
With regard to the merits of the complaint and the alleged violation of Article 2 ECHR, the 
ECtHR observes that Ms Huseynova made allegations about the involvement of state agents or 
the state in general in the murder of her husband, because of his journalistic activity. The 
ECtHR however considered that there was no evidence for these allegations. The Court next 
referred to the duty of the state not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of 
life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. 
This involves a primary duty for the state to secure the right to life by putting in place effective 
criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by 
law enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression, and punishment of breaches of 
such provisions. It also extends, in appropriate circumstances, to a positive obligation on the 
authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual or individuals 
whose lives are at risk. However, for a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that 
the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of a particular individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a 
third party, and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, 
judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. The ECtHR points out that Mr 
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Huseynov had never applied to the domestic authorities for protection or informed them of any 
danger or threat to his life and it further observes that the law enforcement authorities had not 
been aware of any danger to his life, nor had they held any information which might give rise 
to such a possibility. The ECtHR concluded that it had no evidence indicating that the domestic 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate 
risk to the life of Mr Huseynov and failed to protect his right to life. Accordingly, there has been 
no violation of the substantive limb of Article 2 ECHR. 
As to the procedural limb of Article 2 ECHR, with regard the alleged failure to carry out an 
effective investigation, the ECtHR did find a violation. The ECtHR referred to a number of 
shortcomings in the criminal investigation carried out by the domestic authorities. The ECtHR is 
of the opinion that the Azerbaijani authorities did not effectively examine the possibility of 
prosecuting the alleged perpetrators of the murder in Georgia by transferring the criminal case 
there, after the investigation had identified two suspects who were on the territory of the State 
of Georgia, which refused to extradite them. The ECtHR also noted that even though Ms 
Huseynova was granted victim status in the investigation, she has been constantly denied 
access to the case file during the investigation, and she only obtained copies of some 
documents from the case file for the first time when the Government submitted its observations 
to the ECtHR. That situation deprived her of the opportunity to safeguard her legitimate 
interests and prevented any scrutiny of the investigation by the public. The ECtHR furthermore 
considered that the criminal investigation was not carried out promptly, taking into account its 
overall length of over 12 years. Finally, it was apparent that the murder of Mr Huseynov could 
have a “chilling effect” on the work of other journalists in Azerbaijan. According to the ECtHR it 
does not appear that adequate steps were taken during the investigation to inquire sufficiently 
into the motives behind the killing of Mr Huseynov and to investigate the possibility that the 
attack could have been linked to his work as a journalist. On the basis of these findings the 
ECtHR concludes that the domestic authorities failed to carry out an adequate and effective 
investigation into the circumstances surrounding the killing of Ms Huseynova’s husband. It 
accordingly held that there had been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 ECHR. 
With regard to the complaint under Article 10, the ECtHR noted that the allegations arise out of 
the same facts as those already examined under Article 2. Having regard to its finding of a 
violation of Article 2 under its procedural limb because of the ineffectiveness of the 
investigation into the killing of Ms Huseynova’s husband, the ECtHR considers that it is not 
necessary to examine the complaint under Article 10 ECtHR separately. 
• Huseynova v. Azerbaijan, no. 10653/10, 13 April 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Herbert Haupt v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case against Austria, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) decided that a satirical 
report aired during a comedy show on television that allegedly tarnished the reputation of a 
high-ranking and controversial politician had not violated the politician’s right to private life, as 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR is of 
the opinion that the Austrian courts struck a fair balance between the competing interests in 
the case, in finding that the broadcaster’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR 
had outweighed the politician’s right to private life under Article 8 ECHR. 
The applicant in this case is Mr Herbert Haupt, who was the Chairperson of the Austrian 
Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ) from 2002 to 2004; in 2003 he was 
Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Government. In September 2013 a comedy show was aired on 
the television channel ATV+ called “The Worst of the Week” (Das Letzte der Woche). One of the 
reports concerned the fact that Mr Haupt, then the Vice-Chancellor of Austria, had become 
“godfather” to a baby hippopotamus at Vienna Zoo, as part of a fundraising incentive designed 
to encourage people to become sponsors of the zoo. The report contained blatant mockery and 
satirical comments, mentioning, inter alia, that there were many similarities between Mr Haupt, 
as the leader of the FPÖ, and his godchild, the baby hippopotamus, as both were usually 
surrounded by a lot of brown rats. Mr Haupt lodged a claim for compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage under section 6 of the Media Act (Mediengesetz), in conjunction with Article 115 of the 
Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), against ATV Privat TV GmbH & Co KG (hereinafter “ATV”), the 
owner of ATV+, alleging that he had been insulted by the expression “brown rats”. In a first set 
of proceedings the Austrian courts ruled in favour of Mr Haupt, ordering ATV to pay him 
compensation of EUR 2,000, as the statement about the brown rats had amounted to 
defamation under Article 111 of the Criminal Code. After the Supreme Court annulled the 
Vienna Regional Court’s and the Vienna Court of Appeal’s judgments, it allowed the 
extraordinary reopening of the proceedings against ATV. In the reopened proceedings the 
Austrian courts dismissed Mr Haupt’s claim for compensation and also ordered him to bear the 
costs in respect of the proceedings incurred by the opposing party. As regards the alleged 
defamatory statement and its examination of evidence, the Regional Court listed a number of 
extreme right-wing or neo-Nazi statements made by high-ranking politicians belonging to the 
Freedom Party, while it found that Mr Haupt had not publicly dissociated himself from these 
statements. The impugned remark made during the broadcast about brown rats did not concern 
Mr Haupt’s private and personal sphere but rather his professional, public position as a 
politician. The Court of Appeal confirmed the findings by the Regional Court, including the 
observation that the statement about the brown rats had constituted political criticism of the 
attitude and statements of FPÖ politicians. Before the ECtHR Mr Haupt complained that there 
had been a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR because the Austrian courts had failed to strike a 
fair balance between freedom of expression and his interest in protecting his reputation. His 
interest in the protection of his reputation should have outweighed ATV’s interest in 
disseminating on its television channel a statement which was of a lurid and degrading nature. 
Firstly, the ECtHR reiterates that according to its case-law the right to reputation is an 
independent right guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR, as part of the right to respect for 
private life, which the State has a positive obligation to protect. In order for Article 8 to come 
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into play, however, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness 
and be carried out in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect 
for private life. The ECtHR refers to its earlier case law in which it identified the relevant 
principles which must guide its assessment within the context of balancing Article 8 and 10 as 
competing rights. The relevant criteria thus defined are: contribution to a debate of public 
interest, the degree of notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, the prior 
conduct of the person concerned, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and, 
where appropriate, the circumstances in which the statement was made. The ECtHR also 
considers that, notwithstanding the fact that the Mr Haupt claims a violation of Article 8 ECHR, 
it is the task of the ECtHR to determine whether the principles inherent in Article 10 ECHR were 
properly applied by the Austrian courts when examining Mr Haupt’s actions. Next the ECtHR 
emphasises that the most careful scrutiny under Article 10 ECHR is required where measures or 
sanctions imposed on the press are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in 
debates on matters of legitimate public concern. Furthermore, the limits of acceptable criticism 
are drawn more widely as regards a politician than they are as regards a private individual. 
Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his 
every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently 
display a greater degree of tolerance. The ECtHR reiterates that satire is a form of artistic 
expression and social commentary and, by its inherent features of exaggeration and distortion 
of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate. Accordingly, any interference with an artist’s or 
social commentator’s right to such expression must be examined with particular care. 
The ECtHR considers important, inter alia, the fact that Mr Haupt was a well-known politician 
and that he thus has to display a greater degree of tolerance in the face of such provocation in 
a satirical television programme. Furthermore, the ECtHR finds that the report dealt with an 
issue of legitimate public concern - namely, statements made by high-ranking members of the 
FPÖ which were criticised in the media as expressing extremist right-wing positions and the 
question of whether Mr Haupt (in his position as Chairperson of that party) had distanced 
himself sufficiently from such statements. The ECtHR is also satisfied that there was a sufficient 
factual basis for the reference to the brown rats around the FPÖ, having regard to the detailed 
findings reached by the Regional Court in which it quoted various problematic statements 
made by politicians of the FPÖ. For these reasons, the ECtHR is satisfied that the judgment of 
the Vienna Regional Court, as upheld by the Vienna Court of Appeal, struck a fair balance 
between the competing interests in the present case. Consequently, the ECtHR concludes 
unanimously that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 8 ECHR. Therefore the 
complaint by Mr Haupt is rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 
and 4 ECHR, and consequently Mr Haupt’s application is declared inadmissible. 
• Herbert Haupt v. Austria (dec.), no. 55537/10, 2 May 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Fouad Belkacem v. Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case concerning religious extremism on the Internet, the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) confirmed that defending “Sharia law” while calling for violence to establish it could 
be regarded as “hate speech”. The Court held that, in accordance with Article 17 (prohibition of 
abuse of rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), the discourse at issue 
did not fall under the protection of Article 10 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to 
freedom of expression. 
The case concerns the conviction of Mr Belkacem, the leader and spokesperson of the 
organisation “Sharia4Belgium” (which was dissolved in 2012) for incitement to discrimination, 
hatred and violence on account of remarks he made in YouTube videos concerning non-Muslim 
groups and Sharia law. Mr Belkacem was prosecuted for various offences under Belgium’s Anti-
Discrimination Law of 10 May 2007 and for online harassment with discriminatory intent. In the 
videos in question Mr Belkacem called on viewers, among other things, to overpower non-
Muslims, “teach them a lesson” and to fight them. He also advocated jihad and Sharia law. In 
2013 the Antwerp Court of Appeal sentenced Mr Belkacem to a suspended term of one year and 
six months’ imprisonment and to a fine of EUR 550. The Antwerp court specified that the 
offence of public incitement to discrimination, violence and hatred was undoubtedly 
intentional, explicit, firm and repeated. The Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal lodged by 
Mr Belkacem. It found that Mr Belkacem had not simply expressed his views, but had 
unquestionably incited others to engage in discrimination on the basis of faith and 
discrimination, segregation, hatred or violence towards non-Muslims, and had done so 
knowingly and therefore intentionally. 
Relying on Article 10 ECHR, Mr Belkacem argued before the ECtHR that he had never intended 
to incite others to hatred, violence or discrimination but had simply sought to propagate his 
ideas and opinions. He maintained that his remarks had merely been a manifestation of his 
freedom of expression and religion and had not constituted a threat to public order. 
The ECtHR reiterates that, while its case-law enshrines the overriding and essential nature of 
freedom of expression in a democratic society, it also lays down its limits by excluding certain 
statements from the protection of Article 10. The ECtHR notes that Mr Belkacem published a 
series of videos on the YouTube platform in which he called on viewers to overpower non-
Muslims, teach them a lesson and fight them. The ECtHR is in no doubt as to the markedly 
hateful nature of Mr Belkacem’s views, and agrees with the domestic courts’ finding that Mr 
Belkacem, through his recordings and video messages on the Internet, had sought to stir up 
hatred, discrimination and violence towards all non-Muslims. In the Court’s view, such a 
general and vehement attack is incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace and 
non-discrimination underlying the Convention. With particular reference to Mr Belkacem’s 
remarks concerning Sharia law, the Court reiterates that it has ruled that the fact of defending 
Sharia law while calling for violence to establish it could be regarded as “hate speech”, and that 
each Contracting State was entitled to oppose political movements based on religious 
fundamentalism. The ECtHR also observes that the Belgian legislation, as applied in the present 
case, appeared to be in conformity with the relevant provisions and recommendations of the 
Council of Europe and the European Union aimed at combating incitement to hatred, 
discrimination and violence. Lastly, the ECtHR considers that Mr Belkacem had attempted to 
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deflect Article 10 of the Convention from its real purpose by using his right to freedom of 
expression for ends which were manifestly contrary to the spirit of the Convention. Although 
reiterating that the abuse clause of Article 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in 
extreme cases, the ECtHR finds it applicable in the case at issue. Accordingly, it holds that, in 
accordance with Article 17 of the ECHR, Mr Belkacem could not claim the protection of Article 
10 of the ECHR. The ECtHR decides that the application is therefore incompatible ratione 
materiae with the provisions of the ECHR (Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4) and is inadmissible. 
• Fouad Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), no. 34367/14, 20 July 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ghiulfer Predescu v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in a case against Romania, has confirmed the 
strong protection of the right to freedom of expression to be guaranteed to statements by 
journalists made within the context of a lively debate in a television show on a matter of public 
interest. 
Ms Predescu, an investigative journalist, complained of a violation of her right to freedom of 
expression. She appeared on a television show on a national television channel together with 
the Mayor of Constanţa, R.M., to discuss certain violent incidents that had taken place in 
Mamaia, a seaside resort on the outskirts of Constanţa. During the broadcast, Ms Predescu had 
made allegations that the Mayor was personally connected to a vendetta between violent rival 
clans operating in the area. The Mayor had lodged a civil complaint against her for defamation, 
essentially arguing that Ms Predescu’s allegations about specific facts had not been previously 
verified, nor ever proved to be true. He had further argued that by associating his name and 
image with that of criminal groups or clans, the journalist had seriously harmed his reputation 
as a public person and a locally elected official. After the case went to appeal, the Mayor’s 
claim was ultimately successful and Ms Predescu was ordered to pay RON 50,000 
(approximately EUR 10,000) in damages, plus costs, and to publish at her own expense the 
judgment against her in two newspapers. 
The question before the ECtHR was whether the domestic authorities had struck a fair balance 
between the protection of freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 10, and the protection 
of the reputation of those against whom allegations are made, a right which, as an aspect of 
private life, is protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Firstly, the ECtHR reiterated that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR for 
restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest, and that the limits of 
acceptable criticism are therefore wider with regard to a civil servant or a politician acting in 
his public capacity than in relation to a private individual. Journalistic freedom also covers 
possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation, while the safeguard 
afforded by Article 10 of the ECHR to journalists in relation to the reporting of issues of general 
interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith in order to provide accurate 
and reliable information, in accordance with the ethics of journalism. 
Focusing on the concrete elements of the case, the ECtHR observed that the impugned 
television show had been an attempt to debate publicly the question of the possible 
implication of R.M. - the Mayor of the city of Constanţa and a local businessman - in violent 
incidents in which a large group of armed persons had wrecked several hotels in Mamaia, 
including a hotel belonging to a company in which R.M. was a shareholder. It stressed that the 
role of the press certainly entails a duty to alert the public when it has learned of presumed 
misappropriation on the part of local elected representatives and public officials. The ECtHR 
also noted that the format of the television show was designed to encourage an exchange of 
views or even an argument, in such a way that the opinions expressed would counterbalance 
each other and the debate hold the viewers’ attention. The show had been broadcast live on 
television, so Ms Predescu had had only a limited possibility to reformulate, refine or retract 
any statements before they were made public. Furthermore, the statements expressed by Ms 
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Predescu had had a sufficient factual basis, as they had been based on information which was 
already known to the general public - namely articles and journalistic investigative material 
that had been previously published about R.M. 
In contrast with the judgment by the domestic appeal court that found Ms Predescu liable for 
defamation, the ECtHR was of the opinion that there was nothing in the case to suggest that 
the journalist’s allegations had been made otherwise than in good faith and in pursuit of the 
legitimate aim of debating a matter of public interest. Finally the ECtHR noted that the amount 
that Ms Predescu had been ordered to pay had been extremely high and was capable of having 
a “chilling”, dissuasive effect on her freedom of expression. The sanction imposed on the 
journalist had also lacked appropriate justification and the standards applied by the domestic 
courts had failed to ensure a fair balance between the relevant rights and related interests. 
Accordingly, the interference complained of was not “necessary in a democratic society” within 
the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR; therefore the ECtHR found that there has been a 
violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Ghiulfer Predescu v. Romania, no. 29751/09, 27 June 2017. 
IRIS 2017-8/2 
  
Back to overview of case-law 
430 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
Following the Chamber judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) two years 
ago (see IRIS 2015-8/1), the Grand Chamber has also come to the conclusion that the right to 
freedom of expression and information was not violated in Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland. By fifteen votes to two the Grand Chamber found that a prohibition 
issued by the Finnish Data Protection Board that had prevented two media companies from 
publishing personal taxation data in the manner and to the extent that they had published 
these data before was to be considered as a legal, legitimate and necessary interference with 
the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and information. The ECtHR approved the 
approach of the Finnish authorities, who had rejected the applicants’ reliance on the exception 
provided in respect of journalistic activities by the law which protects personal data. 
The ECtHR observed that at the heart of the present case lay the question of whether a correct 
balance had been struck between the right to freedom of expression and press freedom under 
Article 10 of the ECHR, on the one hand, and the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR, 
on the other hand (both rights must be accorded equal respect). In addition, the ECtHR referred 
to a set of principles that are (i) related to press freedom, including “the gathering of 
information (as) an essential preparatory step in journalism and an inherent, protected part of 
press freedom” and (ii) related to privacy protection, emphasising that “the fact that information 
is already in the public domain will not necessarily remove the protection of Article 8 of the 
Convention”. The ECtHR was of the opinion that the interference at issue was one that was 
prescribed by law and that had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or 
rights of others. The question however remains whether the interference at issue was necessary 
in a democratic society. The relevant criteria in such a case are: a contribution to a debate of 
public interest, the degree of notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, 
the prior conduct of the person concerned, the content, form and consequences of the 
publication, the way in which the information was obtained (and its veracity), and the gravity of 
the penalty imposed on the journalists or publishers. 
The ECtHR pointed out that the derogation of journalistic purposes (which is indeed provided 
by the Finnish Personal Data Act) “is intended to allow journalists to access, collect and process 
data in order to ensure that they are able to perform their journalistic activities, themselves 
recognised as essential in a democratic society”, while the right of access to public documents 
does not by itself justify the dissemination en masse of such “raw data in unaltered form 
without any analytical input”. The ECtHR was not persuaded that the publication of taxation 
data in the manner and to the extent undertaken by the applicant companies contributed to a 
debate of public interest, or that its principal purpose was to do so. Rather, considered that the 
dissemination of the data at issue might have enabled curious members of the public to 
categorise named individuals, who are not public figures, and that this could be regarded “as a 
manifestation of the public’s thirst for information about the private life of others and, as such, 
a form of sensationalism, even voyeurism”. Because the impugned publication cannot be 
regarded as contributing to a debate of public interest, nor as a form of political speech, it 
cannot enjoy the traditionally privileged position of such speech, which calls for strict scrutiny 
by the ECtHR of interferences with press freedom, and allows little scope for restrictions under 
Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR. The vast majority of the Grand Chamber agreed with the findings at 
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the domestic level “that the publication of the taxation data in the manner and to the extent 
described did not contribute to a debate of public interest and that the applicants could not in 
substance claim that it had been done solely for a journalistic purpose, within the meaning of 
domestic and EU law”. This led the ECtHR to the conclusion that the Finnish authorities had 
acted within their “margin of appreciation” in striking a fair balance between the competing 
interests at stake. Therefore, the ECtHR found that there had been no violation of Article 10 
ECHR. 
The Grand Chamber on the other hand confirmed the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of 
the ECHR (right to a fair trial), as the length of the proceedings at the domestic level (six years 
and six months) had been excessive and had failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement, 
even taking into account the complexity of the case. 
• Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, ECHR 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Halldórsson v. Iceland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case against Iceland, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) stated that a journalist 
responsible for a TV news item causing prejudice to an identifiable public person must give 
relevant evidence that he or she has been acting in good faith as pertains to the accuracy of the 
allegations in the news item. The ECtHR also made clear that a journalist cannot shield behind 
his right to protect his sources where he cannot produce evidence of serious accusations 
uttered in a news item, tarnishing a person’s reputation as protected under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
The applicant is a journalist working for the newsroom of the Icelandic National Broadcasting 
Service (RUV). RUV broadcasted a series of news reports about a loan transaction of about EUR 
20 million between an Icelandic company and a shelf company in Panama. It was reported that 
three Icelandic businessmen (A, B and C) had planned the Panama deal in advance in order to 
send the money to Panama and then back into their own company again. Pictures of A, B and C 
were shown on the screen with the text “under investigation”, accompanied by the message 
that the authorities were investigating the case and the role of A, B and C. In another news 
item, pictures of A, B and C were shown above a world map, with a pile of money being visually 
transferred to the pictures of the men, mentioning that the money went back in “the pockets of 
the threesome”. An article summarising the content of the broadcasted news items was also 
published on RUV’s website. After the news broadcast, A issued a press release denying any link 
with the alleged suspect transaction. The online news article was promptly updated to include 
the press release. 
A few weeks later, A lodged defamation proceedings against Svavar Halldórsson, the RUV 
journalist who produced the news items. He requested that the reference to his name and the 
word “threesome” in the news report and on the website be declared null and void. The 
Supreme Court, overturning the judgment by the District Court which found for the journalist, 
ordered Halldórsson to pay approximately EUR 2,600 to A in compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage, and about EUR 8,800 for A’s legal costs before the domestic courts. The mentioning of 
A’s name and the word “threesome” were declared null and void. Before the ECtHR, Halldórsson 
maintained that the statements in the news items had not affected A’s reputation to a sufficient 
degree, and that therefore A could not invoke the protection of Article 8 ECHR. He also argued 
that the statements were not defamatory and that there was nothing presented in the news 
item to the effect that A had been guilty of a financial crime or other actions punishable by law. 
In evaluating whether the interference with Halldórsson’s freedom of expression was justified 
as being necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR first clarifies that a person’s reputation, 
even if that person is being criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part of his or her 
personal identity and psychological integrity and therefore falls within the scope of his or her 
“private life”. The attack on personal honour and reputation must however attain a certain level 
of gravity and in a manner causing prejudice to the personal enjoyment of the right to respect 
for private life in order for Article 8 ECHR to come into play. In line with the findings by the 
domestic courts, the ECtHR confirms that the news items indeed contained a serious accusation 
of a factual nature concerning unlawful and criminal acts; therefore the ECtHR is of the opinion 
that the dispute requires an examination of the fair balance to be struck between the right to 
respect for private life and the right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR refers to the criteria 
Back to overview of case-law 
433 
 
which are relevant when balancing these rights, such as the contribution to a debate of general 
interest; how well known the person concerned is and what the subject of the report is; his or 
her prior conduct; the method of obtaining the information and its veracity; the content, form 
and consequences of the publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed. 
The ECtHR agrees that A was to be considered a public person and that the subject matter of 
the disputed news items was an issue of public interest; however, it confirms the findings by 
the Icelandic Supreme Court that Halldórsson had not been acting in good faith, as he had not 
presented any documents supporting the legitimacy of the statements, for which he had to bear 
the burden. Halldórsson had also omitted to seek information from A while preparing the news 
item. The ECtHR reiterates that the safeguard afforded by Article 10 ECHR to journalists in 
relation to reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the condition that they are 
acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and that they provide “reliable and 
precise” information in accordance with the ethics of journalism. It finds that there were no 
special grounds to dispense the journalist from his ordinary obligation to verify factual 
statements that are defamatory of private individuals, and it observed that there was no 
confirmation that A had been charged, indicted, or was on trial or had been convicted of a 
crime. 
Next, the ECtHR dismisses Halldórsson’s arguments referring to the right to protect his sources 
and to keep his sources and the documentation behind the news items confidential. The ECtHR 
confirms that the protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom, without which sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the 
public on matters of public concern. In the present case, however, the journalist was at no 
stage required to disclose the identity of his sources. The ECtHR clarifies that “a mere reference 
to protection of sources cannot exempt a journalist from the obligation to prove the veracity of 
or have sufficient factual basis for serious accusations of a factual nature, an obligation that 
can be met without necessarily having to reveal the sources in question”. 
Finally, the ECtHR does not find the financial compensation and payment of the costs of the 
domestic proceedings excessive or to be of such a kind as to have a “chilling effect” on the 
exercise of media freedom. The ECtHR also considers the potential impact of the medium an 
important factor in the consideration of the proportionality of an interference. In this respect, 
the ECtHR reiterates “that the audio-visual media have a more immediate and powerful effect 
than the print media”. Because the Icelandic Supreme Court balanced the right of freedom of 
expression with the right to respect for private life, and took into account the criteria set out in 
the ECtHR’s case law, it acted within the margin of appreciation afforded to it and struck a 
reasonable balance between the measures imposed, restricting the right to freedom of 
expression. Therefore, the ECtHR concludes, unanimously, that there has been no violation of 
Halldórsson’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. 
• Halldórsson v. Iceland, no. 44322/13, 4 July 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Axel Springer SE and RTL Television GmbH v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case against Germany, two media companies - Axel Springer SE, a publishing house, and 
RTL, a broadcasting company - complained about a restriction on publishing pictures of the 
accused (S.) in a brutal murder case. S. was charged with killing his parents, dismembering their 
bodies, burning some of the parts, flushing others down the toilet and disposing of the rest by 
putting them in barrels. S. had already confessed to the police, while a psychiatric expert 
opinion ordered for the trial had concluded that S. was suffering from a schizoid personality 
disorder at the time when he had committed the offence. Prior to the start of the court 
hearings, the presiding judge informed the photojournalists orally that the face of S. would 
have to be made unidentifiable “in the usual manner” before any images of him were published. 
Axel Springer and RTL protested against the order, and a week later, a written order was issued 
confirming that the only media representatives who were permitted to take photographs and 
make video recordings of S. were those who had previously registered with the court and given 
an assurance that prior to the publication or forwarding of the material, the face of S. would be 
disguised by a technical process (for example by pixelization) so that it would only be possible 
to use the images in such a form. Journalists would be barred from further reporting on the case 
if they failed to comply with the order. The order stressed the importance of the presumption of 
innocence, finding that reporting on S. in a way which identified him could have a “pillory 
effect”; moreover, the wording of the order noted that S. had never been in the public eye and 
had expressly requested that his identity be concealed. According to the presiding judge, in this 
case the personality rights of S. clearly outweighed the public interest in being informed of his 
identity and physical appearance. 
After exhausting all national legal channels to have the order suspended, Axel Springer and 
RTL lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), complaining that 
the judicial order banning the publication of images by which S. could be identified had 
violated their right to freedom of expression, as provided in Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The ECtHR starts by referring to its earlier case law, balancing the right to freedom of 
expression against the right to respect for private life, and to the criteria that have to be taken 
into account in such cases. It clarifies that the criteria thus defined are not exhaustive and 
should be transposed and adapted in the light of the specific circumstances of the case, in 
particular where the presumption of innocence under Article 6 paragraph 2 ECHR comes into 
play. The Court identifies the following relevant criteria in the context of balancing competing 
rights: the contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree to which the person affected 
is known, the influence of the publication of the photographs on the criminal proceedings, the 
circumstances in which the photographs were taken, the content, form and consequences of 
the publication, and the severity of the sanction imposed. 
The ECtHR acknowledges that the crime at issue was brutal, but had been committed within a 
family following a private dispute and in a domestic setting. It agrees with the domestic court’s 
assessment that there was only a limited degree of public interest in the case. The judicial 
order at issue did not restrict the content of reporting but rather concerned the publication of 
images by which S. could be identified. The ECtHR does not consider that information on S.’s 
physical appearance could have contributed significantly to the debate on the case, in 
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particular as S. was undoubtedly not a public figure, but an ordinary person who was the 
subject of criminal proceedings. The ECtHR dismisses the argument that S. no longer benefitted 
from the presumption of innocence, as he had confessed to the murder: a confession in itself 
does not remove the protection of the presumption of innocence, and as S. suffered from a 
schizoid personality disorder, the criminal court had to review carefully the confession in order 
to satisfy itself that it was accurate and reliable. The Court also refers to the fact that images of 
an accused person taken in a court room may show the person in a state of great distress and 
possibly in a situation of reduced self-control. The ECtHR finds that under the circumstances in 
question there was a strong need to protect S.’s privacy, given that S. had never sought to 
contact the media nor make any public comments. Furthermore, the ECtHR refers to the 
harmful effect which the disclosure of information enabling the identification of suspects, 
accused or convicted persons or other parties to criminal proceedings may have on these 
persons, and to the negative implications this might have on the later social rehabilitation of 
convicted persons. It was also in the interest of safeguarding due process not to increase the 
psychological pressure on S. - particularly in view of his personality disorder. Finally, the ECtHR 
notes that the judicial order did not constitute a particularly severe restriction on reporting: the 
taking of images as such was not prohibited, the order banned merely the publication of 
images from which S. could be identified, and any other reporting on the proceedings was not 
restricted. Thus, the presiding judge chose the least restrictive of several possible measures in 
order to safeguard due process and protect S.’s privacy. Therefore, the ECtHR does not consider 
that the order had a “chilling effect” on the media companies, contrary to their rights under 
Article 10 ECHR. 
The ECtHR recognises the careful balancing act carried out by the presiding judge, clearly 
addressing the conflict between opposing interests and carefully weighing the relevant aspects 
of the case. The ECtHR unanimously concludes that the interference with the media companies’ 
right to freedom of expression was “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, there has 
been no violation of their right to freedom of expression and information, as guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the ECHR. 
• Axel Springer SE and RTL Television GmbH v. Germany, no. 51405/12, 21 September 2017. 
IRIS 2017-10/2 
  
Back to overview of case-law 
436 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Becker v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
A recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) emphasises once more the 
importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom. The ECtHR emphasises 
that a journalist’s protection under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) cannot automatically be removed by virtue of a source’s own conduct, and that the 
principle of protecting a source applies even when that source’s identity is known. 
The case concerns a journalist, Cecilie Langum Becker, working for DN.no, a Norwegian 
Internet-based newspaper. Ms Becker was ordered to give evidence in a criminal case brought 
against one of her sources, Mr X, who was accused of market manipulation. Mr X had confirmed 
to the police that he had been Ms Becker’s source for an article she had written about the 
allegedly difficult situation being faced by the Norwegian Oil Company (DNO). The price of 
DNO stock decreased by 4.1% on the first trading day after the publication of Ms Becker’s 
article. Mr X was subsequently charged with using Ms Becker to manipulate the financial 
market. Ms Becker refused to testify against Mr X, and the courts therefore ordered her to 
testify about her contacts with him, finding that there was no source to protect as he had 
already come forward. They also considered that her evidence might significantly assist the 
courts in elucidating the case. Mr X was, however, convicted as charged before the final 
decision on Ms Becker’s duty to give evidence had been made. Relying on Article 125 of the 
Norwegian Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 10 of the ECHR, Ms Becker argued that she 
was under no obligation to give evidence and she refused at any stage of the proceedings to 
answer questions about possible contact between her and Mr X and other sources. On account 
of her refusal to comply, the High Court ordered Ms Becker to pay a fine of approximately EUR 
3,700 for the offence of impeding the good order of court proceedings, failing which she would 
be liable to ten days’ imprisonment. A short time later Ms Becker lodged an application with 
the ECtHR, alleging that she had been compelled to give evidence that would have enabled 
one or more journalistic sources to be identified, in violation of her right under Article 10 of the 
ECHR to receive and impart information. It took the ECtHR more than five years to decide on 
the case, but finally, with a unanimous vote, the Fifth Section of the ECtHR on 5 October 2017 
found that Norway violated Ms Becker’s right to protect her sources. 
The ECtHR builds on its earlier case law in which it has developed the principles governing the 
protection of journalistic sources, such as in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (see IRIS 1996-
4/4) and in Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands (see IRIS 2010-10/2), reiterating that “the 
Court has always subjected the safeguards for respect of freedom of expression in cases under 
Article 10 of the Convention to special scrutiny. Having regard to the importance of the 
protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society, an interference 
cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding 
requirement in the public interest.” The Court reiterated that in Nagla v. Latvia (see IRIS 2013-
8/2) it found that the fact that a source’s identity had been known to the investigating 
authorities prior to a search at the premises of a journalist did not remove the journalist’s 
protection under Article 10 of the ECHR and it emphasises that a journalist’s protection under 
Article 10 cannot automatically be removed by virtue of a source’s own conduct. The ECtHR 
furthermore holds that protection afforded to journalists when it comes to their right to keep 
their sources confidential is “two‑fold, relating not only to the journalist, but also and in 
Back to overview of case-law 
437 
 
particular to the source who volunteers to assist the press in informing the public about 
matters of public interest”, while in Voskuil v. the Netherlands (see IRIS 2008-4/2) the ECtHR 
found that the potential significance in criminal proceedings of the information sought from a 
journalist was insufficient under Article 10 of the ECHR as a reason to justify compelling him to 
disclose his source or sources. It also emphasised that a “chilling effect” will arise wherever 
journalists are seen to assist in the identification of anonymous sources. 
The ECtHR went on to rule that the possible effects of the order were of such a nature that the 
general principles developed with respect to orders to disclose a source were applicable to the 
case, and that Ms Becker’s refusal to disclose her source or sources did not at any point in time 
hinder the investigation of the case or the proceedings against Mr X. On the contrary, there was 
no indication that Ms Becker’s refusal to give evidence attracted any concerns on the part of the 
Norwegian courts as regards the case or the evidence against Mr X. It also bore in mind that Ms 
Becker’s journalistic methods had never been called into question and that she had not been 
accused of any illegal activity. Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic 
sources for press freedom, the ECtHR finds that the reasons adduced in favour of compelling Ms 
Becker to testify on her contact with Mr X, though relevant, were insufficient. Accordingly, the 
ECtHR is not convinced that the impugned order was justified by an “overriding requirement in 
the public interest” and, hence, necessary in a democratic society. The ECtHR accordingly 
concludes that there has been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Becker v. Norway, no. 21272/12, ECHR 2017. 
IRIS 2017-10/3 
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Appendix I: List and summaries of cases reported on in IRIS, but not included in the main selection (cases that were struck off the list/in which 
friendly settlements were reached). 
 Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
1 Telesystem Tirol v. Austria  19281/91 09/06
/1997 
FS Public policy, prohibition of commercial 
broadcasting  
Full text 377 
2 Altan v. Turkey  32985/96 14/05
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, positive obligations, political 
expression, incitement to hatred or hostility 
Full text 378 
3 Ali Erol v. Turkey 35076/97 20/06
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, propaganda, terrorism, hate 
speech, incitement to hatred or hostility based on 
race or religion 
Full text 379 
4 Özler v. Turkey 25753/94 11/07
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, propaganda, terrorism, hate 
speech, incitement to hatred or hostility based on 
race or religion 
Full text 379 
5 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 5)  26976/95, 
28305/95 
and 
28307/95 
16/07
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, propaganda, terrorism, hate 
speech, incitement to hatred or hostility based on 
race or religion 
Full text 379 
6 Freiheitliche Landesgruppe 
Burgerland v. Austria  
34320/96 18/07
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, insulting caricature, satire, 
artistic expression 
Full text 379 
7 Mehmet Bayrak v. Turkey 27307/95 03/09
/2002 
FS Positive obligation, separatist propaganda, 
terrorism 
Full text 381 
8 Zarakolu v. Turkey (Nos. 1-
3)  
37059/97, 
37061/97 
and 
37062/97 
02/10
/2003 
FS Political expression, separatist propaganda, 
terrorism 
Full text 382 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision Struck Out of the List 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision applied to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1991, 
relying on Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. As a local cable TV network (Gemeinschaftsantennenanlage - in the USA 
referred to as cable TV system), it complained that, pursuant to Austrian law, it had been refused 
permission to distribute its own TV programmes ("active broadcasting") and was only authorised to 
receive already existing broadcast programmes and retransmit them to the subscribers of the local 
network ("passive broadcasting"). 
 
The refusal to grant the right to distribute its own programmes was based on the general 
broadcasting monopoly in favour of the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation. The Commission, in its 
report of 18 October 1995, considered that arguments similar to those in the case of 
Informationsverein Lentia vs. Austria (ECourtHR, 24 November 1993, vol. 276), led to the 
conclusion that the restriction on the freedom to impart information by prohibiting private 
broadcasting, as this was based on the Austrian Broadcasting monopoly, was not necessary in a 
democratic society and hence was in breach of Article 10, par. 2 of the Convention. The Telesystem 
Tirol Kabeltelevision case then was referred to the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
In the meantime however, the Austrian Constitutional Court in two judgments (Constitutional 
Court, 27 September 1995 (see IRIS 1996-6: 8) and 8 October 1996 (see IRIS 1997-2: 5) declared 
that the prohibition of "active broadcasting" by local TV networks and the prohibition of 
commercial advertising by private broadcasters is in breach of Article 10 of the European 
Convention, under reference also to the European Court's judgment of 24 November 1993 in the 
case of Informationsverein Lentia . The European Court now in its judgement of 9 June 1997 took 
formal note of a friendly settlement of the matter between the Austrian government and the 
applicant. The Court follows the request by the applicant to strike the case out of the list, since 
active broadcasting and the dissemination of commercial advertising by local TV networks are now 
legally permissible in Austria. The Court is of the opinion that there is no reason of public policy to 
continue the litigation. The Austrian broadcasting law finally seems to be in accordance now with 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in as far as the Monopoly of the Public 
Broadcasting Organisation Case come to an end. 
 
• Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision v. Austria (friendly settlement), 9 June 1997, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1997-III. 
 
IRIS 1997-7/5 
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European Court of Human Rights: Friendly Settlement in Altan v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Since 1998, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion that there has been a 
violation of freedom of (political) expression in Turkey in more than 15 cases. All of these cases 
concerned the criminal convictions of journalists, editors, publishers, writers, lawyers, politicians or 
human rights activists for infringement of Articles 159 or 312 of the Criminal Code or of Articles 6-
8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, nr. 3712. In all of these cases, the applicants were convicted 
in Turkey for inciting the people to hatred and hostility based on distinctions of race or religion, or 
for undermining territorial integrity and the unity of the nation. The Strasbourg Court, however, 
considered these convictions to be violations of Article 10 of the European Convention, as they 
failed to give due recognition to the importance of freedom of critical and political speech in a 
democratic society (see IRIS 1999-8: 4, IRIS 2000-4: 2, IRIS 2000-7: 2, IRIS 2000-8: 2, IRIS 2000-10: 
3and IRIS 2002-3: 2). On several occasions, the Committee of Ministers has requested the Turkish 
authorities to bring their legislation and jurisprudence into conformity with the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 
In a judgment of 14 May 2002, the Court has now enacted a friendly settlement between a Turkish 
applicant and the Turkish Government in a case in which freedom of political expression was also 
at stake. Ahmet Hüsrev Altan, who is a writer and journalist for the national daily, Milliyet, was 
given a suspended sentence of one year and eight months' imprisonment and a fine of TRL 
500,000 by the National Security Court in 1995, for incitement to hatred and hostility on the basis 
of a distinction based on membership of a race or a religion. Relying on Article 10, he complained 
in Strasbourg of an infringement of his right to freedom of expression. The Turkish authorities have 
now recognised that steps have to be taken at the domestic level in order to guarantee freedom of 
expression according to Article 10 of the Convention. Before the Court, the Turkish Government 
made the following statement: "The Court's rulings against Turkey in cases involving prosecutions 
under Article 312 of the Penal Code or under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
clearly show that Turkish law and practice urgently need to be brought into line with the 
Convention's requirements under Article 10 of the Convention. This is also reflected in the 
interference underlying the facts of the present case. The Government undertake to this end to 
implement all necessary reform of domestic law and practice in this area, as already outlined in the 
National Programme of 24 March 2001." 
 
Referring to this commitment, the Court has decided to strike out the case following the friendly 
settlement in which the applicant is to be paid EUR 4,573.47 for any pecuniary damages and for 
costs and expenses incurred. 
 
• Altan v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 32985/96, ECHR 2002-III.  
 
IRIS 2002-7/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Four Friendly Settlements in Cases on Freedom of Expression 
(Turkey and Austria) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
After the finding by the European Court of Human Rights of several violations of freedom of 
expression in Turkey, it seems that the Turkish Government has now become aware of the fact that 
some restrictions and penalties can manifestly no longer be tolerated from the perspective of 
Article 10 of the Convention. Shortly after the adoption of a friendly settlement in the case of Altan 
v. Turkey on 14 May 2002 (see IRIS 2002-7: 2-3), the Court again took note of the agreements 
reached between the parties in three different cases against Turkey. 
 
In each of these cases, the Turkish Government promised that steps would be taken in order to 
guarantee the right to freedom of expression and information, including the offer to pay an amount 
of damages to the applicants. Before the Court, the Turkish Government made the following 
statement: "The Court's rulings against Turkey in cases involving prosecutions under Article 312 of 
the Criminal Code and under Article 8 para. 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act show that Turkish 
law and practice urgently need to be brought into line with the Convention's requirements under 
Article 10 of the Convention. This is also reflected in the interference underlying the facts of the 
present case. The Government undertake to this end to implement all necessary reform of domestic 
law and practice in this area, as already outlined in the National Programme of 24 March 2001. The 
Government refer also to the individual measures set out in Interim Resolution adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 23 July 2001 (ResDH (2001) 106), which they 
will apply to the circumstances of cases such as the instant one". While this statement was made in 
the Özler case, the essence of the statements delivered by the Turkish Government in the other 
cases was the same. 
 
All applicants had been found guilty some years ago of dissemination of propaganda against the 
indivisibility of the State (Prevention of Terrorism Act) or incitement to hatred and hostility arising 
from a distinction based on race or religion (Article 312 of the Criminal Code). Ali Erol (a journalist), 
Sürek (a lawyer and publisher) and Özler (a human rights activist) had criticised the policy of the 
Turkish authorities on the Kurdish Question in newspapers or in public speeches. Each of them had 
initiated an application against Turkey, complaining, inter alia, of a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
Referring to the commitments undertaken by the Turkish Government in each case and recognising 
that the friendly settlements are based on respect for human rights as defined by the European 
Convention, the Court has accordingly struck these cases out of the list. 
 
Another friendly settlement was reached in the case of Freiheitliche Landesgruppe Burgenland v. 
Austria on 18 July 2002. In this case, the applicant (a periodical) had been convicted because of an 
insulting caricature under Section 115 of the Austrian Criminal Code. In order to reach a friendly 
settlement before the Court, the Austrian Government has promised to pay the applicant a sum of 
money as compensation in respect of any possible claims relating to the present application, 
including an amount for costs and expenses incurred both in the domestic proceedings and in the 
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Convention proceedings. The applicant waives any further claims against Austria relating to the 
application concerned. Referring to the agreement reached between the parties and satisfied that 
the settlement is based on respect for human rights as defined by the Convention, the Court struck 
the case out of the list. 
 
• Ali Erol v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 35076/97, 20 June 2002.  
• Özler v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 25753/94, 11 July 2002.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 5) (friendly settlement), nos. 26976/95, 28305/95 and 28307/95, 16 July 
2002.  
• Freiheitliche Landesgruppe Burgenland v. Austria, no. 34320/96, 18 July 2002.  
 
IRIS 2002-9/4 
Back to overview of case-law 
444 
 
European Court of Human Rights: Another Friendly Settlement in Freedom of Expression Case 
(Turkey) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Once again, the Turkish Government has recognised that an interference by the Turkish authorities 
with freedom of political expression could not be legitimised from the perspective of Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. After reaching a friendly settlement in the cases of 
Altan v. Turkey on 14 May 2002 (see IRIS 2002-7: 2); Ali Erol v. Turkey on 20 June 2002; Özler v. 
Turkey on 11 July 2002 and Sürek (no. 5) v. Turkey on 16 July 2002 (see IRIS 2002-9: 3), the Court 
again took note of an agreement that has been reached between the Turkish Government and a 
Turkish citizen who had applied to the European Court of Human Rights because of an alleged 
breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The applicant, Mehmet Bayrak, had been convicted in 1994 and 1995 by the Ankara National 
Security Court of disseminating separatist propaganda on account of three books with Kurdish 
themes written or published by him. After the seizure of the books, Bayrak was sentenced to a total 
of two years' imprisonment and fined a total of TRL 250 million. The content of the books was 
considered a crime under Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 
 
The case has been struck out of the Court's list following a friendly settlement, after the Turkish 
Government promised that steps would be taken to guarantee freedom of expression and 
information, including the offer to pay an amount of damages to the applicant. The Turkish 
Government made the following statement: "The judgments against Turkey given by the Court in 
cases concerning prosecutions under Article 312 of the Criminal Code or the provisions of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act clearly show that Turkish law and practice must as a matter of urgency 
be brought into conformity with the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention. That is further 
evidenced by the interference complained of in the instant case. The Government accordingly 
undertakes to make all the necessary changes to domestic law and practice in this field, as set out 
in the National Programme of 24 March 2001. The Government further refers to the individual 
measures mentioned in the Interim Resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe on 23 July 2001 (ResDH(2001)106), which it will implement in circumstances 
such as those of the instant case." 
 
• Mehmet Bayrak v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 27307/95, 3 September 2002.  
 
IRIS 2002-10/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Friendly Settlements in Freedom of Expression Cases (Turkey) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In three cases involving Turkey concerning freedom of expression, an agreement was reached 
between the applicant's widower, Mr. Zarakolu, and the Turkish Government. All three cases 
concern the seizures of several books because of separatist propaganda. The Court, in its 
judgments of 2 October 2003, took notice of the friendly settlements, referring to the declaration 
from the Turkish Government in which it is recognised that the (former) Court's rulings against 
Turkey in cases involving prosecutions under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
relating to freedom of expression, and also the facts underlying the present cases, "show that 
Turkish law and practice urgently need to be brought into line with the Convention's requirements 
under Article 10 of the Convention". In all three cases the Court took note of the agreement 
reached between the parties. The Court expresses its satisfaction that the settlement is based on 
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols. It is ordered that the cases 
be struck out of the list. 
 
It is to be emphasised that recent modifications in Turkish law, as part of the 6 and 7 reform 
packages of July and August 2003 (see IRIS 2003-9: 15), are significant steps forward with a view 
to ensuring compliance with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
abrogation of Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the amendments to Articles 159 and 
312 of the Criminal Code are of particular relevance in this context. Also, a comprehensive reform 
of the Turkish Press Law is announced and will be discussed in Parliament in December 2003. 
 
• Zarakolu v. Turkey (nos. 1-3) (friendly settlement), nos. 37059/97, 37061/97 and 37062/97, 2 
October 2003.  
 
IRIS 2004-1/5 
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Appendix II: Overview of cases in alphabetical order. 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
151 A. v. Norway 28070/06 09/04
/2009 
V 8 Crime reporting, defamation, presumption 
of innocence, privacy, margin of 
appreciation, moral and psychological 
integrity, protection of minors 
Full text 203 
89 A. v. the United Kingdom 35373/97 17/12
/2002 
NV 6, 
8, 13, 
14 
Political expression, right of access, 
defamation, discrimination, privacy 
 
Full text 112 
100 Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey 42435/98 09/03
/2004 
V Political expression, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, social, ethnic and regional 
differences 
Full text 127 
19 Ahmed & others v. the 
United Kingdom 
22954/93 02/09
/1998 
NV Impart information, political expression, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 57 
201 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey 3111/10 18/12
/2012 
V Internet, defamation, blocking of Google 
Sites, disproportionate measure, 
prescribed by law 
Full text 283 
170 Akdas v. Turkey 41056/04 16/02
/2010 
V Artistic expression, obscene or immoral 
information, fiction, 
exaggeration, humorous, duties and 
responsibilities, protection of morals  
Full text 230 
58 Akkoç v. Turkey 22947/93 
and 
22948/93 
10/10
/2000 
NV Interview, disciplinary sanction, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence, armed 
resistance or an uprising 
Full text 81 
173 Aksu v. Turkey 4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
27/07
/2010 
NV 14, 
8, >GC 
Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation, racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy 
Full text 236 
190 Aksu v. Turkey [Grand 
Chamber] 
4149/04 
and 
15/03
/2012 
NV 8 Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation, racial 
Full text 264 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
41029/04 discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy  
162 Alfantakis v. Greece 49330/0 11/02
/2010 
V Television interview, defamation, insult, 
reputation, live broadcasting, facts or 
value judgments 
Full text 224 
50 Andreas Wabl v. Austria  24773/94 21/03
/2000 
NV Political expression, defamation, Nazism, 
offensive information 
Full text 73 
172 Andreescu v. Romania 19452/02 08/06
/2010 
V 10, 
6 
Access, defamation, insult, reputation, 
facts or value judgments, public debate, 
good faith 
Full text 234 
206 Animal Defenders 
International v. the 
United Kingdom [Grand 
Chamber] 
48876/08 22/04
/2013 
NV Public debate, ban on political advertising, 
NGO, powerful financial groups, access, 
influential media, alternative media, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 293 
248 Arlewin v. Sweden 
 
22302/10 01/03
/2016 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, transfrontier 
television programme service, jurisdiction, 
EU law, right of access to court 
Full text 370 
27 Arslan v. Turkey 23462/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 65 
202 Ashby Donald & Others v. 
France 
36769/08 10/01
/2013 
NV Intellectual property, unauthorised 
reproduction of fashion photos, Internet, 
margin of appreciation, news reporting 
exception, commercial speech 
Full text 285 
185 Avram & others v. 
Moldova 
41588/05 05/07
/2011 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, undercover 
video, journalism 
Full text 256 
187 Axel Springer AG v. 39954/08 07/02 V Privacy, reputation, receive information, Full text 260 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
Germany /2012 public interest, conflicting human rights 
226 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany (No. 2) 
48311/10 10/07
/2014 
V Protection of reputation, private life, value 
judgment, former Chancellor, public 
figure, degree of tolerance, public 
watchdog 
Full text 327 
271 Axel Springer SE and RTL 
Television GmbH v. 
Germany 
51405/12 21/09
/2017 
NV Restriction on publishing pictures of 
accused, court reporting, non-public 
figure, presumption of innocence  
Full text 418 
118 Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey  50692/99 02/02
/2006 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, positive obligations, religion 
Full text 153 
84 Ayse Öztürk v. Turkey 24914/94 15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, terrorism, incitement 
to violence, public debate, positive 
obligation 
Full text 107 
62 B. & P. v. the United 
Kingdom 
36337/97 
and 
35974/97 
24/04
/2001 
NV Privacy, protection of vulnerable persons, 
necessity 
Full text 84 
70 Bankovic & others v. 
Belgium & others 
52207/99 12/12
/2001 
I NATO-bombing of TV station, 
inadmissible, jurisdiction, treaty 
obligations of State Parties 
Full text 94 
29 Başkaya & Okçuoğlu v. 
Turkey 
23536/94 
and 
24408/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
221 Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey 39690/06, 
40559/06,
48815/06, 
2512/07, 
55197/07, 
55199/07, 
55201/07 
and 
25/03
/2014 
V 10, 
6 
Criminal conviction, publication of 
declarations by illegal armed organisation, 
right to fair trial, fight against terrorism, 
no encouragement of violence, no hate 
speech 
Full text 319 
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55202/07 
272 Becker v. Norway 21272/12 05/10
/2017 
V Journalist ordered to give evidence, 
protection of journalistic sources, bad faith 
of source, chilling effect 
Full text 420 
251 Bédat v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
56925/08 29/03
/2016 
NV 10 Criminal conviction, secrecy of criminal 
investigation, responsible journalism, 
accused’s private life 
Full text 376 
212 Belpietro v. Italy 43612/10 24/09
/2013 
V Freedom of parliamentary speech, 
parliamentary immunity, defamation, 
public officials, conviction, editorial 
control, chilling effect 
Full text 301 
51 Bergens Tidende v. 
Norway 
26132/95 02/05
/2000 
V Defamation, publication of photos, 
reputation, rights of others, good faith, 
public watchdog 
Full text 74 
25 Bladet Tromso & 
Stensaas v. Norway 
21980/93 20/05
/1999 
V Secret information, presumption of 
innocence, critical reporting, defamation, 
honour and reputation, good faith, public 
watchdog 
Full text 63 
231 Bohlen v. Germany 53495/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 337 
16 Bowman v. the United 
Kingdom  
24839/94 19/02
/1998 
V Political expression, monopoly position of 
the media, critical reporting 
Full text 54 
254 Brambilla and Others v. 
Italy 
 
22567/09 23/06
/2016 
NV Criminal conviction, illegal interception of 
police communications, responsible 
journalism, duty to obey ordinary criminal 
law 
Full text 384 
222 Brosa v. Germany 5709/09 17/04
/2014 
V Freedom of political expression, pre-
election, neo-Nazi organisation, private 
individual, public discussion, mayoral 
Full text 320 
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election, acceptable criticism, honour and 
social reputation, sufficient factual basis 
243 Cengiz and Others v. 
Turkey 
48226/10 
and 
14027/11 
01/12
/2015 
V YouTube, blanket blocking order, insulting 
to the memory of Atatürk, citizen 
journalism, not prescribed by law 
Full text 360 
194 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and 
Di Stefano v. Italy 
38433/09 07/06
/2012 
V 10, 
AP-
1(1) 
Dominant position over the audiovisual 
media, allocation of frequencies, media 
pluralism, right to receive information 
Full text 270 
32 Ceylan v. Turkey 23556/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
130 Colaço Mestre & SIC v. 
Portugal 
11182/03 
and 
11319/03 
26/04
/2007 
V Interview, public interest, defamation, 
journalistic ethics 
Full text 172 
79 Colombani & others v. 
France 
51279/99 25/06
/2002 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public watchdog, public 
function of press 
Full text 102 
53 Constantinescu v. 
Romania  
28871/95 27/06
/2000 
NV Criminal defamation, criticism, public 
debate, interview, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 75 
92 Cordova v. Italy (Nos. 1 & 
2) 
40877/98 
and 
45649/99 
30/01
/2003 
V 6 Defamation, insult, duties and 
responsibilities, public interest, reputation 
Full text: 
No. 1 
No. 2 
118 
242 Couderc and Hachette 
Filipacchi Associés v. 
France [Grand Chamber] 
40454/07 10/11
/2015 
V Private life, freedom of expression, fair 
balance, debate of public interest, 
disclosure of the Prince’s fatherhood 
Full text 357 
106 Cumpana & Mazare v. 
Romania [Grand Chamber] 
33348/96 17/12
/2004 
V Defamation, insult, limits of acceptable 
criticism, factual basis or value judgments, 
reputation, privacy, chilling effect, public 
watchdog 
Full text 133 
63 Cyprus v. Turkey 25781/94 10/05 V Conflict between State Parties, censorship Full text 85 
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/2001 of school-books, restricted distribution 
and importation media 
40 Dalban v. Romania 28114/95 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, exaggeration, 
criminal libel, duty of care for journalists, 
public function, privacy, public watchdog 
Full text 67 
117 Dammann v. Switzerland 77551/01 25/04
/2006 
V Confidential information, public 
discussion, vital role of press, public 
watchdog, newsgathering 
Full text 152 
246 De Carolis and France 
Télévisions v. France 
 
29313/10 21/01
/2016 
V Defamation proceedings, protection of 
reputation, Saudi prince, investigative 
journalism, sufficient factual basis 
Full text 366 
75 De Diego Nafría v. Spain 46833/99 14/03
/2002 
NV Defamation, criticism, limits of 
acceptable criticism, public interest, 
employment relation 
Full text 98 
9 De Haes & Gijsels v. 
Belgium 
19983/92 24/02
/1997 
V Defamation, criticism, duties and 
responsibilities, mode of expression, 
exaggeration, provocation, authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, protection of 
journalistic sources, alternative evidence 
Full text 49 
214 Delfi AS v. Estonia 64569/09 10/10
/2013 
NV, 
>GC 
Internet news portal, grossly insulting 
remarks, readers’ comments, ISP liability 
(exemption), filter, notice-and-takedown, 
editorial control, economic interest 
Full text 305 
237 Delfi AS v. Estonia [Grand 
Chamber]  
64569/09 16/06
/2015 
NV Internet news portal, users’comments, 
offensive content, media publisher, duties 
and responsibilities, liability, notice-and-
takedown, E-commerce Directive, Internet 
service providers, economic interest 
Full text 345 
86 Demuth v. Switzerland 38743/97 05/11
/2002 
NV Allocation of broadcasting licence, media 
pluralism, margin of appreciation 
Full text 109 
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252 Diamant Salihu and 
others v. Sweden (dec.)  
33628/15 10/05
/2016 
I Criminal conviction, purchasing illegal 
firearms, newsgathering, duty to obey 
ordinary criminal law 
Full text 379 
73 Dichand & others v. 
Austria 
29271/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, offensive 
information, public interest, value 
judgments 
Full text 96 
88 Dicle on behalf of DEP 
(Democratic Party) v. 
Turkey  
25141/94 10/12
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, positive 
obligation 
Full text 111 
57 Du Roy & Malaurie v. 
France  
34000/96 03/10
/2000 
V Public interest, secrecy during 
investigation and enquiry procedures, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 80 
131 Dupuis & others v. France 1914/02 07/06
/2007 
V Confidential but well-known information, 
public interest, public watchdog, chilling 
effect, newsgathering 
Full text 173 
71 E.K. v. Turkey 28496/95 07/02
/2002 
V Book, political expression, vital role of 
press, receive information 
Full text 95 
104 Editions Plon v. France 56148/00 18/05
/2004 
V Privacy, public interest, medical 
confidentiality, journalistic ethics, rights of 
others 
Full text 131 
65 Ekin Association v. France 39288/98 17/07
/2001 
V Insult of foreigners, discrimination based 
on foreign origin 
Full text 88 
204 Eon v. France 26118/10 14/03
/2013 
V Insult of President, discussion of matters 
of public interest, private life or honour, 
satire, chilling effect 
Full text 289 
119 Erbakan v. Turkey 59405/00 06/07
/2006 
V Political debate, political expression, hate 
speech, intolerance, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, religion 
Full text 154 
31 Erdoğdu and İnce v. 
Turkey 
25067/94 
and 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
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25068/94 
52 Erdogdu v. Turkey 25723/94 15/06
/2000 
V Propaganda against the territorial integrity 
of the State, terrorism, access, receive 
information, prevention of disorder or 
crime 
Full text 75 
236 Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland 
(no. 3)  
54145/10 02/06
/2015 
V Reporting on criminal proceedings, public 
debate, responsible journalism, good faith, 
diligence 
Full text 343 
96 Ernst & others v. Belgium 33400/96 15/07
/2003 
V 10, 
8 
Protection of sources, journalism, 
overriding public interest 
Full text 123 
232 Ernst August von 
Hannover v. Germany  
53649/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 337 
150 Faccio v. Italy 33/04 31/03
/2009 
I Disproportionate measure, right to receive 
information, privacy, licence fee. 
Full text 202 
171 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 40984/07 22/04
/2010 
V Sensitive and offensive information, 
defamation, terrorism, historical truth, 
public watchdog, disproportionate 
sanction, order of immediate release from 
prison 
Full text 231 
66 Feldek v. Slovakia 29032/95 12/07
/2001 
V Facts or value judgments, political speech, 
public interest, common knowledge, limits 
of acceptable criticism 
Full text 89 
154 Féret v. Belgium 15615/07 16/07
/2009 
NV Hate speech, insult of foreigners, political 
expression, election campaign, public 
debate 
Full text 209 
135 Filatenko v. Russia 73219/01 06/12
/2007 
V Defamation, public interest, reputation, 
good faith, journalistic ethics 
Full text 179 
160 Financial Times & others 
v. the United Kingdom 
821/03 15/12
/2009 
V Protection of journalistic sources, a source 
acting in bad faith, public interest 
Full text 220 
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163 Flinkkilä & others v. 
Finland 
25576/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest 
Full text 225 
144 Flux (No. 6) v. Moldova 22824/04 29/07
/2008 
NV Criticism, sensationalism, defamation, 
journalistic ethics, unprofessional 
behaviour, chilling effect, lack of factual 
basis for allegations 
Full text 191 
267 Fouad Belkacem v. 
Belgium (dec.) 
34367/14 27/06
/2017 
NV  Criminal proceedings, incitement to 
discrimination, hatred and violence, public 
figure, YouTube videos, Article 17 
Full text 410 
193 Frasilă and Ciocirlan v. 
Romania 
25329/03 10/05
/2012 
V Positive obligations, access, rights of 
others, public debate, public watchdog, 
pluralism 
Full text 269 
203 Frederik Neij & Peter 
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The 
Pirate Bay) v. Sweden 
(dec.) 
40397/12 19/02
/2013 
I Copyright, The Pirate Bay, Internet file-
sharing service, illegal use of copyright-
protected music, conviction, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 287 
23 Fressoz & Roire v. France  29183/95 21/01
/1999 
V Confidential information, public interest, 
well-known information, privacy, 
journalistic ethics, tax reports, journalists 
committing offence and public interest
  
Full text 61 
48 Fuentes Bobo v. Spain 39293/98 29/02
/2000 
V Offensive information, criticism, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, reputation, rights of others, 
employment relations, dismissal 
Full text 72 
76 Gaweda v. Poland 26229/95 14/03
/2002 
V Lack of clarity, accessible and foreseeable, 
printed media 
Full text 99 
34 Gerger v. Turkey 24919/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
268 Ghiulfer Predescu v. 29751/09 27/06 V Defamation, live television show, mayor, Full text 412 
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Romania /2017 criminal groups, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public interest, sufficient factual 
basis, good faith, chilling effect 
175 Gillberg v. Sweden 41723/06 02/11
/2010 
NV 10, 
8, >GC 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 240 
192 Gillberg v. Sweden [Grand 
Chamber] 
41723/06 03/04
/2012 
NV Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 268 
114 Giniewski v. France 64016/00 31/01
/2006 
V Religion, defamation, religious insult, 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 147 
134 Glas Nadezhda EOOD & 
Elenkov v. Bulgaria 
14134/02 11/10
/2007 
V 10, 
13 
Allocation of radio licence, religion, lack of 
motivation of the judgment, transparency, 
licensing procedure 
Full text 177 
7 Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom 
17488/90 27/03
/1996 
V Protection of sources, public interest, 
responsible journalism, chilling effect, 
whistle-blowing  
Full text 45 
244 Görmüş and Others v. 
Turkey 
 
49085/07 19/01
/2016 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
disclosure of confidential military 
information, whistle-blowers, seizure of 
computer data 
Full text 362 
14 Grigoriades v. Greece 24348/94 25/11
/1997 
V Military discipline, limits of acceptable 
criticism, insult 
Full text 53 
109 Grinberg v. Russia 23472/03 21/07
/2005 
V Defamation, political expression, facts and 
value judgments, public function of press, 
public watchdog, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public function, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 138 
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15 Guerra v. Italy 14967/89 19/02
/1998 
NV10; 
V8 
Right to receive information, positive 
obligations, effective protection, privacy 
Full text 53 
141 Guja v. Moldova 14277/04 12/02
/2008 
V Whistleblowing, public interest, 
journalistic ethics, duties and 
responsibilities, good faith, chilling effect, 
employment relation 
Full text 186 
99 Gündüz v. Turkey 35071/97 04/12
/2003 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, religious intolerance, positive 
obligations, shocking or offensive 
information, live studio debate, hatred or 
hostility, pluralism 
Full text 126 
132 Hachette Filipacchi 
Associés v. France 
71111/01 14/06
/2007 
NV Rights of others, privacy, human dignity, 
very high circulation of information, 
accessibility and foreseeability 
Full text 174 
234 Haldimann and Others v. 
Switzerland  
21830/09 24/02
/2015 
V Hidden cameras, private life, public 
interest, personal reputation, ethics of 
journalism, good faith, accurate factual 
basis 
Full text 339 
270 Halldórsson v. Iceland 44322/13 04/07
/2017 
NV Defamation proceedings, journalist, 
audiovisual media, public figure, accurate 
factual basis, protection of journalistic 
sources  
Full text 416 
44 Hashman & Harrup v. the 
United Kingdom 
25594/94 25/11
/1999 
V Unlawful action, concept of behaviour 
contra bonos mores, foreseeability 
Full text 69 
266 Herbert Haupt v. Austria 
(dec.) 
55537/10 02/05
/ 2017 
NV 8 Private life, positive obligations, 
defamation, television comedy show, 
politician, artistic expression 
Full text 408 
20 Hertel v. Switzerland 25181/94 25/08
/1998 
V Research paper, rights of others, necessity, 
commercial speech, academic freedom 
Full text 58 
265 Huseynova v. Azerbaijan 10653/10 13/04 V 2 Journalist murdered, right to life, positive Full text 406 
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/2017 obligations, failure to carry out an 
effective investigation, chilling effect  
110 IA v. Turkey 42571/98 13/09
/2005 
NV Religious insult, rights of others, 
provocative opinions, abusive and  
offensive information 
Full text 140 
59 Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey  28635/95, 
30171/96 
and 
34535/97 
10/10
/2000 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence 
Full text 81 
165 Iltalehti & Karhuvaara v. 
Finland 
6372/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
18 Incal v. Turkey   09/06
/1998 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, limits of acceptable criticism, 
public interest, hate speech 
Full text 56 
108 Independent News and 
Media v. Ireland 
55120/00 16/06
/2005 
NV Political expression, defamation, libel, 
chilling effect, margin of appreciation 
Full text 136 
253 Instytut Ekonomichnykh 
Reform, TOV v. Ukraine 
61561/08 02/06
/2016 
V Defamation proceedings, public figure, 
political speech, satire, value judgments, 
sufficient factual basis 
Full text 381 
24 Janowski v. Poland  25716/94 21/01
/1999 
NV Journalism, insult, necessity, offensive and 
abusive verbal attacks 
Full text 61 
169 Jean-Marie Le Pen v. 
France 
18788/09 20/04
/2010 
I Offensive information, hate speech,  
political debate, reputation, rights of 
others, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 228 
2 Jersild v. Denmark  15890/89 23/09
/1994 
V News reporting, interviews, anti-racism, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 40 
61 Jerusalem v. Austria 26958/95 27/02
/2001 
V Political expression, public debate, facts 
or value judgments 
Full text 83 
164 Jokitaipale & others v. 
Finland 
43349/05 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
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255 Jon Gaunt v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.) 
26448/12 06/09
/2016 
NV Broadcasting regulation, broadcasting 
regulator, manifestly insulting language, 
public figure 
Full text 386 
245 Kalda v. Estonia 
 
17429/10 19/01
/2016 
V Prisoner, access to Internet, right to 
receive information, role of Internet, 
security and economic considerations 
Full text 364 
257 Kaos GL v. Turkey 4982/07 22/11
/2016 
V Seizure of magazine, protection of minors, 
protection of public morals, LGBT, 
sexually explicit expression 
Full text 390 
85 Karakoç & others v. 
Turkey  
27692/95, 
28138/95 
and 
28498/95 
15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, public watchdog, 
separatist propaganda, positive obligation 
Full text 107 
30 Karataş v. Turkey 23168/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
97 Karkin v. Turkey 43928/98 23/09
/2003 
V Political expression, hate speech, 
discrimination, racism 
Full text 124 
184 Karttunen v. Finland 1685/10 10/05
/2011 
I Internet, possession and reproduction of 
child pornography, illegal content, artistic 
expression 
Full text 254 
153 Kenedi v. Hungary 31475/05 26/05
/2009 
V 10, 
6, 13 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, public watchdog 
Full text 207 
148 Khurshid Mustafa & 
Tarzibachi v. Sweden 
23883/06 16/12
/2008 
V Language of television, freedom to receive 
information, positive obligation, horizontal 
effect, disproportionality of the 
interference      
Full text 198 
98 Kizilyaprak v. Turkey 27528/95 02/10
/2003 
V Receive information, separatist 
propaganda, hate speech based on ethnic 
and regional differences 
Full text 125 
123 Klein v. Slovakia 72208/01 31/10 V Responsible journalism, good name and Full text 161 
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/2006 reputation, religion, critically comment 
74 Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Austria  
34315/96 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, publication of photos, 
vital role of press, public interest, privacy 
Full text 96 
161 Laranjeira Marques da 
Silva v. Portugal 
16983/06 19/01
/2010 
V Political expression, defamation, facts or 
value judgments, reputation, public 
interest 
Full text 222 
124 Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Cine 
Revue v. Belgium 
64772/01 09/11
/2006 
NV Censorship, privacy, strictly confidential 
correspondence, public interest  
Full text 162 
21 Lehideux & Isorni v. 
France 
24662/94 23/09
/1998 
V Advertisement, reputation, rights of 
others, abuse of rights, historical research, 
second world war 
Full text 58 
146 Leroy v. France 36109/03 02/10
/2008 
NV Public interest, artistic expression, 
glorifying terrorism, political expression, 
activism, cartoon 
Full text 194 
218 Lillo-Stenberg and 
Sæther v. Norway 
13258/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 8 Public figures, respect for private life, 
wedding, accessibility to public, image, 
personality, reputation, fair balance 
Full text 313 
133 Lionarakis v. Greece 1131/05 05/07
/2007 
V 10, 
6 
Political expression, radio broadcast, 
defamation, facts or value judgments, 
value judgments with factual basis 
Full text 176 
56 Lopes Gomes da Silva v. 
Portugal 
37698/97 28/09
/2000 
V Vital role of press, political expression, 
limits of acceptable criticism, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 78 
256 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság 
v. Hungary [Grand 
Chamber] 
18030/11 08/11
/2016 
V 
 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, non-governmental 
organisation, public watchdog 
Full text 388 
247 Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete and Index.hu 
Zrt v. Hungary 
22947/13 02/02
/2016 
V Internet news portal, readers’ comments, 
ISP liability, commercial reputation, 
matters of public interest, notice-and-
take-down-system 
Full text 367 
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126 Mamère v. France 12697/03 07/11
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation, libel, public 
interest, political expression, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 166 
156 Manole & others v. 
Moldova 
13936/02 17/09
/2009 
V Broadcasting licences, political 
independence political independence of 
media, pluralism, censorship, public 
service broadcasting 
Full text 213 
69 Marônek v. Slovakia 32686/96 19/04
/2001 
V Well-known information, public interest, 
rule of law, good faith, reputation, rights 
of others 
Full text 93 
120 Matky v. Czech Republic 19101/03 10/07
/2006 
I Receive information, access to public or 
administrative documents, positive 
obligations, rights of others, national 
security, public health, public interest 
Full text 156 
228 Matúz v. Hungary 73571/10 21/10
/2014 
V Whistleblower, journalist, confidential 
information, censorship, public 
broadcasting organisation, public interest, 
severity of sanction 
Full text 331 
78 McVicar v. the United 
Kingdom 
46311/99 02/05
/2002 
NV Defamation, public interest, well-known 
sports figures, factual evidence 
Full text 101 
143 Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop 
Movsesyan v. Armenia 
32283/04 17/06
/2008 
V Non-discriminatory allocation of 
frequencies or broadcasting licences, 
licencing procedure 
Full text 189 
207 Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia 
(dec.) 
45199/09 21/05
/2013 
I Broadcasting licence, licensing body, 
arbitrary interference, procedural 
safeguards, domestic enforcement of 
Court’s judgment, fresh violation of 
freedom of expression 
Full text 295 
177 MGN Ltd. v. United 39401/04 18/01 V Public interest, privacy, chilling effect, Full text 244 
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Kingdom /2011 disproportionality of interference 
264 Milisavljević v. Serbia 50123/06 04/04
/2017 
V Criminal proceedings, insult, public figure, 
human rights activist, journalistic freedom 
of expression 
Full text 404 
121 Monnat v. Switzerland 73604/01 21/09
/2006 
V Broadcasting, critical reporting, public 
interest, positive obligations, anti-
Semitism, politically engaged journalism, 
journalistic ethics, public watchdog 
Full text 158 
235 Morice v. France [Grand 
Chamber] 
29369/10 23/04
/2015 
V Defamation, investigative judges, lawyers, 
sufficient factual basis, public interest, 
value judgments, judicial proceedings, 
authority of judiciary, chilling effect 
Full text 341 
181 Mosley v. the United 
Kingdom 
48009/08 10/05
/2011 
NV 8 Privacy, positive obligation, 
prenotification, public interest, margin of 
appreciation, chilling effect 
Full text 248 
195 Mouvement raëlien suisse 
v. Switzerland 
16354/06 13/07
/2012 
NV Internet, illegal content, poster campaign, 
aliens, proselytising speech, the protection 
of morals, health, rights of others and 
prevention of crime 
Full text 272 
95 Murphy v. Ireland 44179/98 10/07
/2003 
NV Broadcasting prohibition, religious 
advertising, margin of appreciation 
Full text 122 
209 Nagla v. Latvia 73469/10 16/07
/2013 
V Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, chilling effect, safeguards 
against abuse, pressing social need 
Full text 297 
200 Nenkova-Lalova v. 
Bulgaria 
35745/05 11/12
/2012 
NV Dismissal of journalist, disciplinary 
sanction 
Full text 281 
47 News Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria 
31457/96 11/01
/2000 
V Defamation, reputation, rights of others, 
public concern, publication of photos, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 71 
128 Nikowitz & 5266/03 22/02 V Defamation, value judgments, well-known Full text 169 
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Verlagsgruppe News 
GmbH v. Austria 
/2007 information, humorous commentary, 
acceptable satire, public interest 
77 Nikula v. Finland 31611/96 21/03
/2002 
V Defamation, criticism, fair trial, potential 
chilling effect of criminal sanctions, 
lawyer 
Full text 100 
43 Nilsen & Johnsen v. 
Norway 
23118/93 25/11
/1999 
V Police brutality, defamation, receive and 
impart information, exaggeration, public 
debate, limits of acceptable criticism 
Full text 69 
239 Niskasaari and 
Otavamedia Oy v. Finland  
32297/10 23/07
/2015 
V Defamation proceedings, journalist’s 
reputation, scrutiny of journalists, 
comment and criticism 
Full text 351 
113 Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. 
Denmark 
40485/02 08/12
/2005 
NV Protection of sources, vulnerable persons, 
positive obligations, major crime 
Full text 145 
137 Nur Radyo v. Turkey 6587/03 27/11
/2007 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, shocking or 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 182 
176 Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon 
Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
(No. 2) 
42284/05 12/10
/2010 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, rule of law, 
positive obligations  
Full text 243 
10 Oberschlick (No. 2) v. 
Austria 
20834/92 01/07
/1997 
V Political expression, defamation, insult, 
offensive information, limits of acceptable 
criticism 
Full text 50 
33 Okçuoğlu v. Turkey 24246/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
263 Ólafsson v. Iceland 58493/13 18/03
/2017 
V Defamation proceedings, political 
candidate, website liability, dissemination 
of others’ statements, journalistic ethics 
Full text 402 
261 Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia 42911/08 21/02
/2017 
V Electoral law, administrative offence, 
election campaigning, newspaper, normal 
journalistic coverage of a political debate 
Full text 398 
216 Österreichische 39534/07 28/11 V NGO, gathering of information in public Full text 309 
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Vereinigung zur 
Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines 
wirtschaftlich gesunden 
land- und 
forstwirtschaftlichen 
Grundbesitzes v. Austria 
/2013 interest, public debate, right of access to 
information, positive State obligations, 
information monopoly, social watchdog 
127 Österreichischer 
Rundfunk v. Austria 
35841/02 07/12
/2006 
V Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 168 
103 Österreichischer 
Rundfunk v. Austria (dec.) 
57597/00 25/05
/2004 
I Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 130 
179 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 2034/07 15/03
/2011 
V Political expression, insult, value 
judgments, honour, privacy, dignity, public 
debate, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 246 
1 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. 
Austria  
13470/87 20/09
/1994 
NV Cinema, blasphemous film, religion, 
artistic expression, margin of appreciation, 
art house cinema 
Full text 39 
49 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey  23144/93 16/03
/2000 
V Critical media reporting, separatist 
propaganda, racism, political expression, 
positive obligations, horizontal effect of 
human rights 
Full text 72 
115 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 64178/00, 
64179/00, 
64181/00, 
64183/00, 
64184/00 
30/03
/2006 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 148 
138 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey  11369/03 04/12
/2007 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
Full text 182 
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hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
41 Öztürk v. Turkey  22479/93 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, incitement to crime, 
hatred or hostility, public interest, 
prevention of disorder or crime 
Full text 67 
158 Pasko v. Russia 69519/01 22/10
/2009 
NV Confidential information, state secrets, 
national security, military information 
Full text 217 
91 Peck v. the United 
Kingdom 
44647/98 28/01
/2003 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, reasonable 
expectation of privacy, CCTV, media 
reporting 
Full text 116 
94 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark 
49017/99 19/06
/2003 
NV 10, 
6, >GC 
Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 121 
105 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark [Grand 
Chamber] 
49017/99 17/12
/2004 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 132 
220 Pentikäinen v. Finland 11882/10 04/02
/2014 
NV, 
>GC 
Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 317 
241 Pentikäinen v. Finland 
[Grand Chamber] 
11882/10 20/10
/2015 
NV Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 355 
217 Perinçek v. Switzerland 27510/08 17/12
/2013 
V, >GC Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 311 
240 Perinçek v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
27510/08 15/10
/2015 
V Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
Full text 353 
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debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
67 Perna v. Italy 48898/99 25/07
/2001 
V, >GC Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest  
Full text 90 
93 Perna v. Italy [Grand 
Chamber] 
48898/99 06/05
/2003 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation 
Full text 119 
145 Petrina v. Romania 78060/01 14/10
/2008 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, defamation, 
libel, reputation 
Full text 193 
250 Pinto Coelho v. Portugal 
(no. 2) 
 
48718/11 22/03
/2016 
V Criminal conviction, broadcasting 
recordings of court hearing, journalistic 
reporting on matters of public interest 
Full text 374 
28 Polat v. Turkey 23500/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
5 Prager & Oberschlick v. 
Austria  
15974/90 26/04
/1995 
NV Critical reporting, offensive information, 
defamation, criticism, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 43 
227 Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria 8429/05 30/10
/2014 
V 8 Private life, confiscation of computers, 
illegal software, illegal distribution and 
reproduction, search-and-seizure, arbitrary 
interference, sufficient guarantees 
Full text 329 
12 Radio ABC v. Austria 19736/92 20/10
/1997 
V Private broadcasting, monopoly position 
of the media, positive obligations 
Full text 52 
101 Radio France v. France 53984/00 30/03
/2004 
NV Privacy, good name and reputation, 
responsible journalism, exaggeration, 
provocation 
Full text 128 
125 Radio Twist v. Slovakia 62202/00 19/12
/2006 
V Privacy, political information, public 
interest, use of illegally recorded 
telephone conversation 
Full text 164 
26 Rekvényi v. Hungary 25390/94 20/05
/1999 
NV Politically neutral police force, national 
security, prevention of disorder 
Full text 64 
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168 Renaud v. France 13290/07 25/02
/2010 
V Internet, political speech, criticism, 
emotional political debate, tolerance, facts 
or value judgments, chilling effect 
Full text 227 
197 Ressiot & others v. France 15054/07 
and 
15066/07 
28/06
/2012 
V Protection of sources, disproportionality of 
interference, searches of offices of 
newspapers, searches of homes 
Full text 276 
213 Ricci v. Italy 30210/06 08/10
/2013 
V Satirical television programme, disclosure 
of confidential images, suspended prison 
sentence, ethics of journalism, chilling 
effect 
Full text 303 
215 Ristamäki and Korvola v. 
Finland 
66456/09 29/10
/2013 
V Defamation, conviction, protection of 
reputation, public interest, tax inspection 
Full text 307 
90 Roemen & Schmit v. 
Luxembourg 
51772/99 25/02
/2003 
V Protection of sources, search of homes, 
privacy, responsible journalism 
Full text 114 
262 Rolf Anders Daniel Pihl v. 
Sweden (dec.) 
74742/14 09/03
/2017 
NV 8 Private life, positive obligations, website 
liability, anonymous online comment, 
chilling effect 
Full text 400 
225 Roşiianu v. Romania 27329/06 24/06
/2014 
V Right of access to public documents, 
public interest, journalism, efficient 
enforcement mechanisms, arbitrary 
restrictions, indirect censorship 
Full text 325 
180 RTBF v. Belgium 50084/06 29/03
/2011 
V Broadcasting, patients’ rights, impart 
information, prior restraint, censorship, 
foreseeability of law 
Full text 247 
260 Rubio Dosamantes v. 
Spain 
20996/10 21/02
/2017 
V 8 Private life, positive obligations, television 
programme, public figure, disclosure of 
intimate details, sexual orientation 
Full text 396 
205 Saint-Paul Luxembourg 
S.A. v. Luxembourg 
26419/10 18/04
/2013 
V 10, 
8 
Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, identification of author, 
proportionality 
Full text 291 
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223 Salumäki v. Finland 23605/09 29/04
/2014 
NV Newspaper article, insinuation, criminal 
conviction, private life, reputation, fair 
balance, public interest, presumption of 
innocence, margin of appreciation 
Full text 322 
174 Sanoma v. The 
Netherlands 
38224/03 14/09
/2010 
V Protection of journalistic sources, public 
interest, public watchdog 
Full text 238 
238 Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland  
931/13 21/07
/2015 
> GC 
NV 10, 
14; V 
6 
Privacy, personal data, taxation data, 
public interest, data journalism, magazine 
and SMS-service, extent of publication, 
processing of personal data, journalistic 
activities, margin of appreciation, fair 
balance, length of proceedings 
Full text 348 
269 Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland 
[Grand Chamber] 
931/13 27/06
/2017 
NV 10 
V 6 
Privacy, personal data, taxation data, 
public interest, data journalism, magazine 
and SMS-service, extent of publication, 
processing of personal data, journalistic 
activities, margin of appreciation, fair 
balance, length of proceedings 
Full text 414 
17 Schöpfer v. Switzerland 25405/94 20/05
/1998 
NV Limits of acceptable criticism, receive 
information, critical reporting, public 
interest  
Full text 55 
196 Schweizerische Radio- 
und Fernseh gesellschaft 
SRG v. Switzerland  
34124/06 21/06
/2012 
V Television interview, political and 
economic expression, rights of others, 
public interest, privacy, security, margin of 
appreciation, public interest 
Full text 274 
82 Seher Karatas v. Turkey  33179/96 09/07
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
incitement to hatred or hostility, national 
security 
Full text 104 
259 Selmani & Others v. the 
former Yugoslav Republic 
67259/14 09/02
/2017 
V Forcible removal, journalists, press gallery, 
national parliament, protests, legitimate 
Full text 394 
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of Macedonia public concern, behaviour of elected 
representatives, necessary in democratic 
society 
54 Sener v. Turkey 26680/95 18/07
/2000 
V Vital role of press, positive obligations,  
political expression, public interest, 
receive information 
Full text 77 
182 Sigma Radio Television 
Ltd. V. Cyprus 
32181/04 
and 
35122/05 
21/07
/2011 
NV 10, 
14 
Rights of others, decisions by independent 
media regulators, budget neutrality, 
margin of appreciation, discrimination 
Full text 250 
183 Sipoş v. Romania 26125/04 03/05
/2011 
V 8 Journalism, defamation, insult, privacy, 
horizontal effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, chilling effect of criminal 
sanctions 
Full text 252 
166 Soila v. Finland 6806/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
249 Sousa Goucha v. Portugal 
 
70434/12 22/03
/2016 
NV 8, 
14 + 8 
Defamation proceedings, right to 
protection of reputation, sexual 
orientation joke, television host, public 
figure, fair balance 
Full text 372 
83 Stambuk v. Germany 37928/97 17/10
/2002 
V Medical advertising, rights of others, 
protect health, commercial speech, public 
interest 
Full text 105 
186 Standard News Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria (No. 3) 
34702/07 10/01
/2012 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, public figure, 
defamation, libel  
Full text 258 
107 Steel & Morris v. the 
United Kingdom 
68416/01 15/02
/2005 
V 10, 
6 
Defamation, libel, potential chilling effect, 
reputation, public debate 
Full text 135 
22 Steel & others v. the 
United Kingdom  
24838/94 23/09
/1998 
V Necessity, public order, rule of law, 
authority of the judiciary, breach of peace, 
preventing disorder, rights of others 
Full text 59 
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116 Stoll v. Switzerland 69698/01 25/04
/2006 
V, >GC Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 150 
136 Stoll v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
69698/01 10/12
/2007 
NV Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 180 
35 Sürek & Özdemir v. 
Turkey 
23927/94 
and 
24277/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
36 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) 26682/95 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
37 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 2) 24122/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
38 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3) 24735/94 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
39 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4)  24762/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
198 Szima v. Hungary 29723/11 09/10
/2012 
NV Internet, criticism, labour union, 
disciplinary sanction 
Full text 277 
45 T. v. the United Kingdom 24724/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest Full text 70 
60 Tammer v. Estonia 41205/98 06/02
/2001 
NV Privacy, private information, politician, 
public interest, defamation 
Full text 82 
224 Taranenko v. Russia 19554/05 15/05
/2014 
V 10, 
11 
Freedom of assembly and association, 
leaflets, occupation of administrative 
premises, conviction, prison sentence, pre-
trial detention, chilling effect 
Full text 324 
152 TASZ v. Hungary 37374/05 14/04
/2009 
V Access to information, public or official 
documents, open government, indirect 
censorship, personal information of a 
Full text 205 
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politician, social watchdog 
55 Tele 1 
Privatfernsehgesellschaft 
MBH v. Austria 
32240/96 21/09
/2000 
V & 
NV 
Allocation of broadcasting licence, impart 
information, monopoly position of the 
media 
Full text 78 
199 Telegraaf Media 
Nederland Landelijke 
Media B.V. & Others v. the 
Netherlands 
39315/06 22/11
/2012 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
intelligence and security services, 
surveillance, coercive measures, ex ante 
review 
Full text 279 
258 Terentyev v. Russia 25147/09 26/01
/2017 
V Defamation proceedings, blogger, artistic 
criticism, statements of fact and value 
judgments 
Full text 392 
68 Thoma v. Luxembourg 38432/97 29/03
/2001 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, quoting other media sources, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 92 
219 Tierbefreier E.V. v. 
Germany 
45192/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 10, 
14 
Association, animal rights, film, website, 
injunction, personality rights of company, 
debate on matters of public interest, 
unfair means 
Full text 315 
140 Tillack v. Belgium 20477/05 27/11
/2007 
V Protection of sources, searches of homes 
and workplaces, public watchdog 
Full text 184 
149 Times Newspapers Ltd. 
(Nos. 1 & 2) v. the United 
Kingdom 
3002/03 
and 
23676/03 
10/03
/2009 
NV Internet, internet publication rule, 
defamation, libel, education, historical 
research, responsible journalism, news 
archives 
Full text 200 
6 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the 
United Kingdom  
18139/91 13/07
/1995 
V Defamation, libel, crime reporting, 
disproportionate damages 
Full text 44 
129 Tønsberg Blad AS & Marit 
Haukom v. Norway 
510/04 01/03
/2007 
V Criticism, defamation, reputation, right to 
receive information, public interest, good 
faith, journalistic ethics, duty to verify 
factual allegations 
Full text 170 
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112 Tourancheau & July v. 
France 
53886/00 24/11
/2005 
NV Crime reporting, necessity, reputation, 
rights of others, presumption of innocence 
Full text 143 
167 Tuomela & others v. 
Finland  
25711/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
189 Tusalp v. Turkey 32131/08 
and 
41617/08 
21/02
/2012 
V Defamation, journalistic freedom of 
expression, value judgments, Prime 
Minister’s personality rights, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 262 
147 TV Vest SA Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v. Norway 
21132/05 11/12
/2008 
V Television, political advertising, positive 
obligation, margin of appreciation, 
pluralism 
Full text 196 
72 Unabhängige Initiative 
Informationsvielfalt v. 
Austria 
28525/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, political debate, 
public interest, value judgment 
Full text 96 
229 Urechean and Pavlicenco 
v. Moldova  
27756/05 
and 
41219/07 
02/12
/2014 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, President, 
blanket immunity, right of access to courts 
Full text 333 
159 Ürper & others v. Turkey 14526/07, 
14747/07, 
15022/07, 
15737/07, 
36137/07, 
47245/07, 
50371/07, 
50372/07 
and 
54637/07 
20/10
/2009 
V Terrorism, suspension of publication and 
distribution of newspaper, public 
watchdog 
Full text 219 
230 Uzeyir Jafarov v. 
Azerbaijan 
54204/08 29/01
/2015 
V 3 Violent attack, journalist, favourable 
environment, participation in public 
debate, effective investigation, prohibition 
Full text 335 
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of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment 
46 V. v. the United Kingdom  24888/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest 
 
Full text 70 
191 Vejdeland & others v. 
Sweden 
1813/07 09/02
/2012 
NV Hate speech, homophobia, insult 
homosexuals, pamphlets, school  
Full text 266 
3 Vereiniging Weekblad 
Bluf! v. the Netherlands  
16616/90 09/02
/1995 
V National security, sensitive information, 
State secrets, impart information 
Full text 41 
4 Vereinigung 
Demokratischer Soldaten 
Österreichs & Gubi v. 
Austria 
15153/89 19/12
/1994 
V Political expression, critical reporting, 
criticism, rights of others, reputation 
Full text 42 
157 VgT Vereinigung gegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland (No. 2) [Grand 
Chamber] 
32772/02 30/06
/2009 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 215 
64 VgT Vereinigung Tegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland 
24699/94 28/06
/2001 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 86 
102 Von Hannover v. Germany 59320/00 24/06
/2004 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, continual 
harassment, public interest, conflicting 
human rights   
Full text 129 
188 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 2)  
40660/08 
and 
60614/08 
07/02
/2012 
NV 8 Privacy in public areas, public interest, 
entertainment press, conflicting human 
rights 
Full text 260 
211 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 3) 
8772/10 19/09
/2013 
NV 8 Photograph, injunction prohibiting further 
publication, debate of general interest, 
public figure, privacy, freedom of the 
press, positive obligations 
Full text 300 
139 Voskuil v. The 64752/01 22/11 V Confidential information, protection of Full text 184 
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Netherlands /2007 sources, integrity of the police and judicial 
authorities, right to remain silent, public 
watchdog 
210 Węgrzynowski and 
Smolczewski v. Poland 
33846/07 16/07
/2013 
NV 10, 
8 
Personality rights, online news media, 
digital archives, public watchdog, privacy, 
libel, rectification 
Full text 298 
122 White v. Sweden 42435/02 19/09
/2006 
NV 8 Privacy, good name and reputation, 
defamation, exaggeration, provocation, 
journalistic ethics, positive obligation, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 160 
42 Wille v. Liechtenstein 28396/95 28/10
/1999 
V Political expression, insult, critical 
reporting, public debate, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 69 
80 Wilson & NUJ v. the 
United Kingdom 
30668/96, 
30671/96 
and 
30678/96 
02/07
/2002 
V 11 Journalism, freedom of assembly and 
association, necessity  
Full text 103 
8 Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom 
17419/90 25/11
/1996 
NV Blasphemous film, artistic expression, 
rights of others, general verification 
system for videos, political speech, public 
interest, margin of appreciation, morals or 
religion 
Full text 47 
111 Wirtschafts-Trend 
Zeitschriften-Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria 
58547/00 27/10
/2005 
V Limits of acceptable criticism, political 
expression, defamation, high degree of 
tolerance, public interest  
Full text 141 
155 Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland 20436/02 16/07
/2009 
V Public interest, pluralism, facts or value 
judgments, duties and responsibilities, 
good faith, employment relation 
Full text 211 
11 Worm v. Austria 22714/93 29/08
/1997 
NV Authority and impartiality of the judiciary, 
journalism, prejudice, crime reporting, fair 
Full text 51 
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trial 
81 Yagmuredereli v. Turkey 29590/96 04/06
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
separatist propaganda, violence, national 
security 
Full text 104 
87  Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 28493/95 05/12
/2002 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, receive information, positive 
obligation 
Full text 111 
142 Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 
(No. 3) 
71353/01 22/04
/2008 
V Incitement to hatred or hostility, 
separatism, necessity 
Full text 188 
178 Yleisradio Oy & others v. 
Finland 
30881/09 08/02
/2011 
NV Defamation, confidential and sensitive 
information, privacy, private persons,  
Full text 245 
208 Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights v. Serbia 
48135/06 25/06
/2013 
V Access to documents held by public 
authorities, NGO, electronic surveillance 
measures, freedom of information 
legislation, public debate, public interest, 
public watchdog 
Full text 296 
13 Zana v. Turkey 18954/91 25/11
/1997 
NV Political expression, incitement to 
violence, terrorism 
Full text 53 
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          Armenia 
143 Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop 
Movsesyan v. Armenia 
32283/04 17/06
/2008 
V Non-discriminatory allocation of 
frequencies or broadcasting licences, 
licencing procedure 
Full text 189 
207 Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia 
(dec.) 
45199/09 21/05
/2013 
I Broadcasting licence, licensing body, 
arbitrary interference, procedural 
safeguards, domestic enforcement of 
Court’s judgment, fresh violation of 
freedom of expression 
Full text 295 
          Austria 
50 Andreas Wabl v. Austria  24773/94 21/03
/2000 
NV Political expression, defamation, Nazism, 
offensive information 
Full text 73 
73 Dichand & others v. 
Austria 
29271/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, offensive 
information, public interest, value 
judgments 
Full text 96 
266 Herbert Haupt v. Austria 
(dec.) 
55537/10 02/05
/ 2017 
NV 8 Private life, positive obligations, 
defamation, television comedy show, 
politician, artistic expression 
Full text 408 
61 Jerusalem v. Austria 26958/95 27/02
/2001 
V Political expression, public debate,  facts 
or value judgments 
Full text 83 
74 Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Austria  
34315/96 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, publication of photos, 
vital role of press, public interest, privacy 
Full text 96 
128 Nikowitz & 
Verlagsgruppe News 
GmbH v. Austria 
5266/03 22/02
/2007 
V Defamation, value judgments, well-known 
information, humorous commentary, 
acceptable satire, public interest 
Full text 169 
47 News Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria 
31457/96 11/01
/2000 
V Defamation, reputation, rights of others,  
public concern, publication of photos, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 71 
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10 Oberschlick (No. 2) v. 
Austria 
20834/92 01/07
/1997 
V Political expression, defamation, insult, 
offensive information, limits of acceptable 
criticism 
Full text 50 
216 Österreichische 
Vereinigung zur 
Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines 
wirtschaftlich gesunden 
land- und 
forstwirtschaftlichen 
Grundbesitzes v. Austria 
39534/07 28/11
/2013 
V NGO, gathering of information in public 
interest, public debate, right of access to 
information, positive State obligations, 
information monopoly, social watchdog 
Full text 309 
103 Österreichischer 
Rundfunk v. Austria (dec.) 
57597/00 25/05
/2004 
I Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 130 
127 Österreichischer 
Rundfunk v. Austria 
35841/02 07/12
/2006 
V Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 168 
1 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. 
Austria  
13470/87 20/09
/1994 
NV Cinema, blasphemous film, religion, 
artistic expression, margin of appreciation, 
art house cinema 
Full text 39 
5 Prager & Oberschlick v. 
Austria  
15974/90 26/04
/1995 
NV Critical reporting , offensive information, 
defamation, criticism, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 43 
12 Radio ABC v. Austria 19736/92 20/10
/1997 
V Private broadcasting, monopoly position 
of the media, positive obligations 
Full text 452 
186 Standard News Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria (No. 3) 
34702/07 10/01
/2012 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, public figure, 
defamation, libel  
Full text 258 
55 Tele 1 
Privatfernsehgesellschaft 
32240/96 21/09
/2000 
V & 
NV 
Allocation of broadcasting licence, impart 
information, monopoly position of the 
Full text 78 
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MBH v. Austria media 
72 Unabhängige Initiative 
Informationsvielfalt v. 
Austria 
28525/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, political debate, 
public interest, value judgment 
Full text 96 
4 Vereinigung 
Demokratischer Soldaten 
Österreichs & Gubi v. 
Austria 
15153/89 19/12
/1994 
V Political expression, critical reporting, 
criticism, rights of others, reputation 
Full text 42 
111 Wirtschafts-Trend 
Zeitschriften-Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria 
58547/00 27/10
/2005 
V Limits of acceptable criticism, political 
expression, defamation, high degree of 
tolerance, public interest  
Full text 141 
11 Worm v. Austria 22714/93 29/08
/1997 
NV Authority and impartiality of the judiciary, 
journalism, prejudice, crime reporting , fair 
trial 
Full text 51 
          Azerbaijan 
171 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 40984/07 22/04
/2010 
V Sensitive and offensive information, 
defamation, terrorism, historical truth, 
public watchdog, disproportionate 
sanction, order of immediate release from 
prison 
Full text 231 
265 Huseynova v. Azerbaijan 10653/10 13/04
/2017 
V 2 Journalist murdered, right to life, positive 
obligations, failure to carry out an 
effective investigation, chilling effect  
Full text 406 
230 Uzeyir Jafarov v. 
Azerbaijan 
54204/08 29/01
/2015 
V 3 Violent attack, journalist, favourable 
environment, participation in public 
debate, effective investigation, prohibition 
of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment 
Full text 335 
          Belgium 
70 Bankovic & others v. 52207/99 12/12 I NATO-bombing of TV station, Full text 94 
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Belgium & others /2001 inadmissible, jurisdiction, treaty 
obligations of State Parties 
9 De Haes & Gijsels v. 
Belgium 
19983/92 24/02
/1997 
V Defamation, criticism, duties and 
responsibilities, mode of expression, 
exaggeration, provocation, authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, protection of 
journalistic sources, alternative evidence 
Full text 49 
96 Ernst & others v. Belgium 33400/96 15/07
/2003 
V 10, 
8 
Protection of sources, journalism, 
overriding public interest 
Full text 123 
154 Féret v. Belgium 15615/07 16/07
/2009 
NV Hate speech, insult of foreigners, political 
expression, election campaign, public 
debate 
Full text 209 
267 Fouad Belkacem v. 
Belgium (dec.) 
34367/14 27/06
/2017 
NV  Criminal proceedings, incitement to 
discrimination, hatred and violence, public 
figure, YouTube videos, Article 17 
Full text 410 
124 Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Cine 
Revue v. Belgium 
64772/01 09/11
/2006 
NV Censorship, privacy, strictly confidential 
correspondence, public interest  
Full text 162 
180 RTBF v. Belgium 50084/06 29/03
/2011 
V Broadcasting, patients’ rights, impart 
information, prior restraint, censorship, 
foreseeability of law 
Full text 247 
140 Tillack v. Belgium 20477/05 27/11
/2007 
V Protection of sources, searches of homes 
and workplaces, public watchdog 
Full text 184 
          Bulgaria 
134 Glas Nadezhda EOOD & 
Elenkov v. Bulgaria 
14134/02 11/10
/2007 
V 10, 
13 
Allocation of radio licence, religion, lack of 
motivation of the judgment, transparency, 
licensing procedure 
Full text 177 
200 Nenkova-Lalova v. 
Bulgaria 
35745/05 11/12
/2012 
NV Dismissal of journalist, disciplinary 
sanction 
Full text 281 
227 Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria 8429/05 30/10 V 8 Private life, confiscation of computers, Full text 329 
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/2014 illegal software, illegal distribution and 
reproduction, search-and-seizure, arbitrary 
interference, sufficient guarantees 
          Cyprus 
182 Sigma Radio Television 
Ltd. V. Cyprus 
32181/04 
and 
35122/05 
21/07
/2011 
NV 10, 
14 
Rights of others, decisions by independent 
media regulators, budget neutrality, 
margin of appreciation, discrimination 
Full text 250 
          Czech Republic 
120 Matky v. Czech Republic 19101/03 10/07
/2006 
I Receive information,  access to public or 
administrative documents, positive 
obligations, rights of others, national 
security, public health, public interest 
Full text 156 
          Denmark 
2 Jersild v. Denmark  15890/89 23/09
/1994 
V News reporting, interviews, anti-racism, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 40 
113 Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. 
Denmark 
40485/02 08/12
/2005 
NV Protection of sources, vulnerable persons, 
positive obligations, major crime 
Full text 145 
94 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark 
49017/99 19/06
/2003 
NV 10, 
6, >GC 
Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 121 
105 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark [Grand 
Chamber] 
49017/99 17/12
/2004 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 132 
          Estonia 
214 Delfi AS v. Estonia 64569/09 10/10
/2013 
NV, 
>GC 
Internet news portal, grossly insulting 
remarks, readers’ comments, ISP liability 
(exemption), filter, notice-and-takedown, 
editorial control, economic interest 
Full text 305 
237 Delfi AS v. Estonia [Grand 
Chamber]  
64569/09 16/06
/2015 
NV Internet news portal, users’ comments, 
offensive content, media publisher, duties 
Full text 345 
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and responsibilities, liability, notice-and-
takedown, E-commerce Directive, Internet 
service providers, economic interest 
245 Kalda v. Estonia 
 
17429/10 19/01
/2016 
V Prisoner, access to Internet, right to 
receive information, role of Internet, 
security and economic considerations 
Full text 364 
60 Tammer v. Estonia 41205/98 06/02
/2001 
NV Privacy, private information, politician, 
public interest, defamation 
Full text 82 
          Finland 
163 Flinkkilä & others v. 
Finland 
25576/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest 
Full text 225 
165 Iltalehti & Karhuvaara v. 
Finland 
6372/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
164 Jokitaipale & others v. 
Finland 
43349/05 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
184 Karttunen v. Finland 1685/10 10/05
/2011 
I Internet, possession and reproduction of 
child pornography, illegal content, artistic 
expression 
Full text 254 
77 Nikula v. Finland 31611/96 21/03
/2002 
V Defamation, criticism, fair trial, potential 
chilling effect of criminal sanctions, 
lawyer 
Full text 100 
239 Niskasaari and 
Otavamedia Oy v. Finland  
32297/10 23/07
/2015 
V Defamation proceedings, journalist’s 
reputation, scrutiny of journalists, 
comment and criticism 
Full text 351 
220 Pentikäinen v. Finland 11882/10 04/02
/2014 
NV, 
>GC 
Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 317 
241 Pentikäinen v. Finland 
[Grand Chamber] 
11882/10 20/10
/2015 
NV Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
Full text 355 
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equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
215 Ristamäki and Korvola v. 
Finland 
66456/09 29/10
/2013 
V Defamation, conviction, protection of 
reputation, public interest, tax inspection 
Full text 307 
223 Salumäki v. Finland 23605/09 29/04
/2014 
NV Newspaper article, insinuation, criminal 
conviction, private life, reputation, fair 
balance, public interest, presumption of 
innocence, margin of appreciation 
Full text 322 
238 Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland  
931/13 21/07
/2015 
NV 10, 
14; V 
6 
Privacy, personal data, taxation data, 
public interest, data journalism, magazine 
and SMS-service, extent of publication, 
processing of personal data, journalistic 
activities, margin of appreciation, fair 
balance, length of proceedings 
Full text 348 
269 Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland 
[Grand Chamber] 
931/13 27/06
/2017 
NV 10 
V 6 
Privacy, personal data, taxation data, 
public interest, data journalism, magazine 
and SMS-service, extent of publication, 
processing of personal data, journalistic 
activities, margin of appreciation, fair 
balance, length of proceedings 
Full text 414 
166 Soila v. Finland 6806/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
167 Tuomela & others v. 
Finland  
25711/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 225 
178 Yleisradio Oy & others v. 
Finland 
30881/09 08/02
/2011 
NV Defamation, confidential and sensitive 
information, privacy, private persons,  
Full text 245 
          France 
202 Ashby Donald & Others v. 
France 
36769/08 10/01
/2013 
NV Intellectual property, unauthorised 
reproduction of fashion photos, Internet, 
margin of appreciation, news reporting 
Full text 285 
Back to overview of case-law 
482 
 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
exception, commercial speech 
79 Colombani & others v. 
France 
51279/99 25/06
/2002 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public watchdog, public 
function of press 
Full text 102 
242 Couderc and Hachette 
Filipacchi Associés v. 
France [Grand Chamber] 
40454/07 10/11
/2015 
V Private life, freedom of expression, fair 
balance, debate of public interest, 
disclosure of the Prince’s fatherhood 
Full text 357 
246 De Carolis and France 
Télévisions v. France 
 
29313/10 21/01
/2016 
V Defamation proceedings, protection of 
reputation, Saudi prince, investigative 
journalism, sufficient factual basis 
Full text 366 
131 Dupuis & others v. France 1914/02 07/06
/2007 
V Confidential but well-known information, 
public interest, public watchdog, chilling 
effect, newsgathering 
Full text 173 
57 Du Roy & Malaurie  34000/96 03/10
/2000 
V Public interest, secrecy during 
investigation and enquiry procedures, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 80 
104 Editions Plon v. France 56148/00 18/05
/2004 
V Privacy, public interest, medical 
confidentiality, journalistic ethics, rights of 
others 
Full text 131 
65 Ekin Association v. France 39288/98 17/07
/2001 
V Insult of foreigners, discrimination based 
on foreign origin 
Full text 88 
204 Eon v. France 26118/10 14/03
/2013 
V Insult of President, discussion of matters 
of public interest, private life or honour, 
satire, chilling effect 
Full text 289 
23 Fressoz & Roire v. France  29183/95 21/01
/1999 
V Confidential information, public interest, 
well-known information, privacy, 
journalistic ethics, tax reports, journalists 
committing offence and public interest
  
Full text 61 
114 Giniewski v. France 64016/00 31/01 V Religion, defamation, religious insult, Full text 147 
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/2006 offensive information, hate speech 
132 Hachette Filipacchi 
Associés v. France 
71111/01 14/06
/2007 
NV Rights of others, privacy, human dignity, 
very high circulation of information, 
accessibility and foreseeability 
Full text 174 
169 Jean-Marie Le Pen v. 
France 
18788/09 20/04
/2010 
I Offensive information, hate speech,  
political debate, reputation, rights of 
others, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 228 
21 Lehideux & Isorni v. 
France 
24662/94 23/09
/1998 
V Advertisement, reputation, rights of 
others, abuse of rights, historical research, 
second world war 
Full text 58 
146 Leroy v. France 36109/03 02/10
/2008 
NV Public interest, artistic expression, 
glorifying terrorism, political expression, 
activism, cartoon 
Full text 194 
126 Mamère v. France 12697/03 07/11
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation, libel, public 
interest, political expression, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 166 
235 Morice v. France [Grand 
Chamber] 
29369/10 23/04
/2015 
V Defamation, investigative judges, lawyers, 
sufficient factual basis, public interest, 
value judgments, judicial proceedings, 
authority of judiciary, chilling effect 
Full text 341 
101 Radio France v. France 53984/00 30/03
/2004 
NV Privacy, good name and reputation, 
responsible journalism, exaggeration, 
provocation 
Full text 128 
168 Renaud v. France 13290/07 25/02
/2010 
V Internet, political speech, criticism, 
emotional political debate, tolerance, facts 
or value judgments, chilling effect 
Full text 227 
197 Ressiot & others v. France 15054/07 
and 
15066/07 
28/06
/2012 
V Protection of sources, disproportionality of 
interference, searches of offices of 
newspapers,  searches of homes 
Full text 276 
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112 Tourancheau & July v. 
France 
53886/00 24/11
/2005 
NV Crime reporting, necessity, reputation, 
rights of others, presumption of innocence 
Full text 143 
          Germany 
187 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany 
39954/08 07/02
/2012 
V Privacy, reputation, receive information, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 260 
226 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany (No. 2) 
48311/10 10/07
/2014 
V Protection of reputation, private life, value 
judgment, former Chancellor, public 
figure, degree of tolerance, public 
watchdog 
Full text 327 
271 Axel Springer SE and RTL 
Television GmbH v. 
Germany 
51405/12 21/09
/2017 
NV Restriction on publishing pictures of 
accused, court reporting, non-public 
figure, presumption of innocence  
Full text 418 
231 Bohlen v. Germany 53495/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 337 
222 Brosa v. Germany 5709/09 17/04
/2014 
V Freedom of political expression, pre-
election, neo-Nazi organisation, private 
individual, public discussion, mayoral 
election, acceptable criticism, honour and 
social reputation, sufficient factual basis 
Full text 320 
232 Ernst August von 
Hannover v. Germany  
53649/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 337 
83 Stambuk v. Germany 37928/97 17/10
/2002 
V Medical advertising, rights of others, 
protect health, commercial speech, public 
interest 
Full text 105 
219 Tierbefreier E.V. v. 
Germany 
45192/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 10, 
14 
Association, animal rights, film, website, 
injunction, personality rights of company, 
debate on matters of public interest, 
unfair means 
Full text 315 
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102 Von Hannover v. Germany 59320/00 24/06
/2004 
V8 Privacy in public areas, continual 
harassment, public interest, conflicting 
human rights   
Full text 129 
188 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 2)  
40660/08 
and 
60614/08 
07/02
/2012 
NV 8 Privacy in public areas, public interest, 
entertainment press, conflicting human 
rights 
Full text 260 
211 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 3) 
8772/10 19/09
/2013 
NV 8 Photograph, injunction prohibiting further 
publication, debate of general interest, 
public figure, privacy, freedom of the 
press, positive obligations 
Full text 300 
          Greece 
162 Alfantakis v. Greece 49330/0 11/02
/2010 
V Television interview, defamation, insult, 
reputation, live broadcasting, facts or 
value judgments 
Full text 224 
14 Grigoriades v. Greece 24348/94 25/11
/1997 
V Military discipline, limits of acceptable 
criticism, insult 
Full text 53 
133 Lionarakis v. Greece 1131/05 05/07
/2007 
V 10, 
6 
Political expression, radio broadcast, 
defamation, facts or value judgments, 
value judgments with factual basis 
Full text 176 
          Hungary 
153 Kenedi v. Hungary 31475/05 26/05
/2009 
V 10, 
6, 13 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, public watchdog 
Full text 207 
256 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság 
v. Hungary [Grand 
Chamber] 
18030/11 08/11
/2016 
V 
 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, non-governmental 
organisation, public watchdog 
Full text 388 
247 Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete and Index.hu 
Zrt v. Hungary 
22947/13 02/02
/2016 
V Internet news portal, readers’ comments, 
ISP liability, commercial reputation, 
matters of public interest, notice-and-
take-down-system 
Full text 367 
228 Matúz v. Hungary 73571/10 21/10 V Whistleblower, journalist, confidential Full text 331 
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/2014 information,  censorship, public 
broadcasting organisation, public interest, 
severity of sanction 
26 Rekvényi v. Hungary 25390/94 20/05
/1999 
NV Politically neutral police force, national 
security, prevention of disorder 
Full text 64 
198 Szima v. Hungary 29723/11 09/10
/2012 
NV Internet, criticism, labour union, 
disciplinary sanction 
Full text 277 
152 TASZ v. Hungary 37374/05 14/04
/2009 
V Access to information, public or official 
documents, open government, indirect 
censorship, personal information of a 
politician, social watchdog 
Full text 205 
          Iceland 
236 Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland 
(no. 3)  
54145/10 02/06
/2015 
V Reporting on criminal proceedings, public 
debate, responsible journalism, good faith, 
diligence 
Full text 343 
270 Halldórsson v. Iceland 44322/13 04/07
/2017 
NV Defamation proceedings, journalist, 
audiovisual media, public figure, accurate 
factual basis, protection of journalistic 
sources  
Full text 416 
263 Ólafsson v. Iceland 58493/13 18/03
/2017 
V Defamation proceedings, political 
candidate, website liability, dissemination 
of others’ statements, journalistic ethics 
Full text 402 
          Ireland 
108 Independent News and 
Media v. Ireland 
55120/00 16/06
/2005 
NV Political expression, defamation, libel, 
chilling effect, margin of appreciation 
Full text 136 
95 Murphy v. Ireland 44179/98 10/07
/2003 
NV Broadcasting prohibition, religious 
advertising, margin of appreciation 
Full text 122 
          Italy 
212 Belpietro v. Italy 43612/10 24/09
/2013 
V Freedom of parliamentary speech, 
parliamentary immunity, defamation, 
Full text 301 
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public officials, conviction, editorial 
control, chilling effect 
254 Brambilla and Others v. 
Italy 
 
22567/09 23/06
/2016 
NV Criminal conviction, illegal interception of 
police communications, responsible 
journalism, duty to obey ordinary criminal 
law 
Full text 384 
194 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and 
Di Stefano v. Italy 
38433/09 07/06
/2012 
V 10; 
AP-
1(1) 
Dominant position over the audiovisual 
media, allocation of frequencies, media 
pluralism, right to receive information 
Full text 270 
92 Cordova v. Italy (Nos. 1 & 
2) 
40877/98 
and 
45649/99 
30/01
/2003 
V 6 Defamation, insult, duties and 
responsibilities, public interest, reputation 
Full text: 
No. 1 
No. 2 
118 
150 Faccio v. Italy 33/04 31/03
/2009 
IA Disproportionate measure, right to receive 
information, privacy, licence fee. 
Full text 202 
15 Guerra v. Italy 14967/89 19/02
/1998 
NV10; 
V8 
Right to receive information, positive 
obligations, effective protection, privacy 
Full text 53 
67 Perna v. Italy 48898/99 25/07
/2001 
V, >GC Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest  
Full text 90 
93 Perna v. Italy [Grand 
Chamber] 
48898/99 06/05
/2003 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation 
Full text 119 
213 Ricci v. Italy 30210/06 08/10
/2013 
V Satirical television programme, disclosure 
of confidential images, suspended prison 
sentence, ethics of journalism, chilling 
effect 
Full text 303 
          Latvia 
209 Nagla v. Latvia 73469/10 16/07
/2013 
V Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, chilling effect, safeguards 
against abuse, pressing social need 
Full text 297 
          Liechtenstein 
42 Wille v. Liechtenstein 28396/95 28/10 V Political expression, insult, critical Full text 69 
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/1999 reporting, public debate, margin of 
appreciation 
          Luxembourg 
90 Roemen & Schmit v. 
Luxembourg 
51772/99 25/02
/2003 
V Protection of sources, search of homes, 
privacy, responsible journalism 
Full text 114 
205 Saint-Paul Luxembourg 
S.A. v. Luxembourg 
26419/10 18/04
/2013 
V Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, identification of author, 
proportionality 
Full text 291 
68 Thoma v. Luxembourg 38432/97 29/03
/2001 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, quoting other media sources, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 92 
          Moldova 
185 Avram & others v. 
Moldova 
41588/05 05/07
/2011 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, undercover 
video , journalism 
Full text 256 
144 Flux (No. 6) v. Moldova 22824/04 29/07
/2008 
NV Criticism,  sensationalism, defamation, 
journalistic ethics, unprofessional 
behaviour, chilling effect, lack of factual 
basis for allegations 
Full text 191 
141 Guja v. Moldova 14277/04 12/02
/2008 
V Whistleblowing, public interest, 
journalistic ethics, duties and 
responsibilities, good faith, chilling effect, 
employment relation 
Full text 186 
156 Manole & others v. 
Moldova 
13936/02 17/09
/2009 
V Broadcasting licences, political 
independence political independence of 
media, pluralism, censorship, public 
service broadcasting 
Full text 213 
229 Urechean and Pavlicenco 
v. Moldova  
27756/05 
and 
41219/07 
02/12
/2014 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, President, 
blanket immunity, right of access to courts 
Full text 333 
          The Netherlands 
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174 Sanoma v. The 
Netherlands 
38224/03 14/09
/2010 
V Protection of journalistic sources, public 
interest, public watchdog 
Full text 238 
199 Telegraaf Media 
Nederland Landelijke 
Media B.V. & Others v. the 
Netherlands 
39315/06 22/11
/2012 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
intelligence and security services, 
surveillance, coercive measures, ex ante 
review 
Full text 279 
3 Vereiniging Weekblad 
Bluf! v. the Netherlands  
16616/90 09/02
/1995 
V National security, sensitive information, 
State secrets, impart information 
Full text 41 
139 Voskuil v. The 
Netherlands 
64752/01 22/11
/2007 
V Confidential information, protection of 
sources, integrity of the police and judicial 
authorities, right to remain silent, public 
watchdog 
Full text 184 
          Norway 
151 A. v. Norway 28070/06 09/04
/2009 
V 8 Crime reporting, defamation, presumption 
of innocence, privacy, margin of 
appreciation, moral and psychological 
integrity, protection of minors 
Full text 203 
272 Becker v. Norway 21272/12 05/10
/2017 
V Journalist ordered to give evidence, 
protection of journalistic sources, bad faith 
of source, chilling effect 
Full text 420 
51 Bergens Tidende v. 
Norway 
26132/95 02/05
/2000 
V Defamation, publication of photos, 
reputation, rights of others, good faith, 
public watchdog 
Full text 74 
25 Bladet Tromso & 
Stensaas v. Norway 
21980/93 20/05
/1999 
V Secret information, presumption of 
innocence, critical reporting, defamation, 
honour and reputation, good faith, public 
watchdog 
Full text 63 
218 Lillo-Stenberg and 
Sæther v. Norway 
13258/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 8 Public figures, respect for private life, 
wedding, accessibility to public, image, 
personality, reputation, fair balance 
Full text 313 
Back to overview of case-law 
490 
 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
43 Nilsen & Johnsen v. 
Norway 
23118/93 25/11
/1999 
V Police brutality, defamation, receive and 
impart information, exaggeration, public 
debate, limits of acceptable criticism 
Full text 69 
129 Tønsberg Blad AS & Marit 
Haukom v. Norway 
510/04 01/03
/2007 
V Criticism, defamation, reputation, right to 
receive information, public interest, good 
faith, journalistic ethics, duty to verify 
factual allegations 
Full text 170 
147 TV Vest SA Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v. Norway 
21132/05 11/12
/2008 
V Television, political advertising, positive 
obligation, margin of appreciation, 
pluralism 
Full text 196 
          Poland 
76 Gaweda v. Poland 26229/95 14/03
/2002 
V Lack of clarity, accessible and foreseeable, 
printed media 
Full text 99 
24 Janowski v. Poland  25716/94 21/01
/1999 
NV Journalism, insult, necessity, offensive and 
abusive verbal attacks 
Full text 61 
210 Węgrzynowski and 
Smolczewski v. Poland 
33846/07 16/07
/2013 
NV 10, 
8 
Personality rights, online news media, 
digital archives, public watchdog, privacy, 
libel, rectification 
Full text 298 
155 Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland 20436/02 16/07
/2009 
V Public interest, pluralism, facts or value 
judgments, duties and responsibilities, 
good faith, employment relation 
Full text 211 
          Portugal 
130 Colaço Mestre & SIC v. 
Portugal 
11182/03 
and 
11319/03 
26/04
/2007 
V Interview, public interest, defamation, 
journalistic ethics 
Full text 172 
161 Laranjeira Marques da 
Silva v. Portugal 
16983/06 19/01
/2010 
V Political expression, defamation, facts or 
value judgments, reputation, public 
interest 
 
Full text 222 
56 Lopes Gomes da Silva v. 37698/97 28/09 V Vital role of press, political expression, Full text 78 
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Portugal /2000 limits of acceptable criticism, 
exaggeration, provocation 
250 Pinto Coelho v. Portugal 
(no. 2) 
 
48718/11 22/03
/2016 
V Criminal conviction, broadcasting 
recordings of court hearing, journalistic 
reporting on matters of public interest 
Full text 374 
249 Sousa Goucha v. Portugal 
 
70434/12 22/03
/2016 
NV 8, 
14 + 8 
Defamation proceedings, right to 
protection of reputation, sexual 
orientation joke, television host, public 
figure, fair balance 
Full text 372 
          Romania 
172 Andreescu v. Romania 19452/02 08/06
/2010 
V 10, 
6 
Access, defamation, insult, reputation, 
facts or value judgments, public debate, 
good faith 
Full text 234 
53 Constantinescu v. 
Romania  
28871/95 27/06
/2000 
NV Criminal defamation, criticism, public 
debate, interview, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 75 
106 Cumpana & Mazare v. 
Romania [Grand Chamber] 
33348/96 17/12
/2004 
V Defamation, insult, limits of acceptable 
criticism, factual basis or value judgments, 
reputation, privacy, chilling effect, public 
watchdog 
Full text 133 
40 Dalban v. Romania 28114/95 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, exaggeration, 
criminal libel, duty of care for journalists, 
public function, privacy, public watchdog 
Full text 67 
193 Frasilă and Ciocirlan v. 
Romania 
25329/03 10/05
/2012 
V Positive obligations, access, rights of 
others, public debate, public watchdog, 
pluralism 
Full text 269 
268 Ghiulfer Predescu v. 
Romania 
29751/09 27/06
/2017 
V Defamation, live television show, mayor, 
criminal groups, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public interest, sufficient factual 
basis, good faith, chilling effect 
Full text 412 
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145 Petrina v. Romania 78060/01 14/10
/2008 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, defamation, 
libel, reputation 
Full text 193 
225 Roşiianu v. Romania 27329/06 24/06
/2014 
V Right of access to public documents, 
public interest, journalism, efficient 
enforcement mechanisms, arbitrary 
restrictions, indirect censorship 
Full text 325 
183 Sipoş v. Romania 26125/04 03/05
/2011 
V 8 Journalism, defamation, insult, privacy, 
horizontal effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, chilling effect of criminal 
sanctions 
Full text 252 
          Russia 
135 Filatenko v. Russia 73219/01 06/12
/2007 
V Defamation, public interest, reputation, 
good faith, journalistic ethics 
Full text 179 
109 Grinberg v. Russia 23472/03 21/07
/2005 
V Defamation, political expression, facts and 
value judgments, public function of press, 
public watchdog, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public function , margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 138 
261 Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia 42911/08 21/02
/2017 
V Electoral law, administrative offence, 
election campaigning, newspaper, normal 
journalistic coverage of a political debate 
Full text 398 
158 Pasko v. Russia 69519/01 22/10
/2009 
NV Confidential information, state secrets, 
national security, military information 
Full text 217 
224 Taranenko v. Russia 19554/05 15/05
/2014 
V 10, 
11 
Freedom of assembly and association, 
leaflets, occupation of administrative 
premises, conviction, prison sentence, pre-
trial detention, chilling effect 
Full text 324 
258 Terentyev v. Russia 25147/09 26/01
/2017 
V Defamation proceedings, blogger, artistic 
criticism, statements of fact and value 
judgments 
Full text 392 
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          Serbia 
264 Milisavljević v. Serbia 50123/06 04/04
/2017 
V Criminal proceedings, insult, public figure, 
human rights activist, journalistic freedom 
of expression 
Full text 404 
208 Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights v. Serbia 
48135/06 25/06
/2013 
V Access to documents held by public 
authorities, NGO, electronic surveillance 
measures, freedom of information 
legislation, public debate, public interest, 
public watchdog 
Full text 296 
          Slovakia 
66 Feldek v. Slovakia 29032/95 12/07
/2001 
V Facts or value judgments, political speech, 
public interest, common knowledge, limits 
of acceptable criticism 
Full text 89 
123 Klein v. Slovakia 72208/01 31/10
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, religion, critically comment 
Full text 161 
69 Marônek v. Slovakia 32686/96 19/04
/2001 
V Well-known information, public interest, 
rule of law, good faith, reputation, rights 
of others 
Full text 93 
125 Radio Twist v. Slovakia 62202/00 19/12
/2006 
V Privacy, political information, public 
interest, use of illegally recorded 
telephone conversation 
Full text 164 
          Spain 
75 De Diego Nafría v. Spain 46833/99 14/03
/2002 
NV Defamation, criticism, limits of 
acceptable criticism, public interest, 
employment relation 
Full text 98 
48 Fuentes Bobo v. Spain 39293/98 29/02
/2000 
V Offensive information, criticism, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, reputation, rights of others, 
employment relations, dismissal 
Full text 72 
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179 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 2034/07 15/03
/2011 
V Political expression, insult, value 
judgments, honour, privacy, dignity, public 
debate, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 246 
260 Rubio Dosamantes v. 
Spain 
20996/10 21/02
/2017 
V 8 Private life, positive obligations, television 
programme, public figure, disclosure of 
intimate details, sexual orientation 
Full text 396 
          Sweden 
248 Arlewin v. Sweden 
 
22302/10 01/03
/2016 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, transfrontier 
television programme service, jurisdiction, 
EU law, right of access to court 
Full text 370 
252 Diamant Salihu and 
others v. Sweden (dec.)  
33628/15 10/05
/2016 
I Criminal conviction, purchasing illegal 
firearms, newsgathering, duty to obey 
ordinary criminal law 
Full text 379 
203 Frederik Neij & Peter 
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The 
Pirate Bay) v. Sweden 
(dec.) 
40397/12 19/02
/2013 
I Copyright, The Pirate Bay, Internet file-
sharing service, illegal use of copyright-
protected music, conviction, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 287 
175 Gillberg v. Sweden 41723/06 02/11
/2010, 
>GC 
NV 10, 
8 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 240 
192 Gillberg v. Sweden [Grand 
Chamber] 
41723/06 03/04
/2012 
NV Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 268 
148 Khurshid Mustafa & 
Tarzibachi v. Sweden 
23883/06 16/12
/2008 
V Language of television, freedom to receive 
information, positive obligation, horizontal 
effect, disproportionality of the 
interference      
Full text 198 
262 Rolf Anders Daniel Pihl v. 74742/14 09/03 NV 8 Private life, positive obligations, website Full text 400 
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Sweden (dec.) /2017 liability, anonymous online comment, 
chilling effect 
191 Vejdeland & others v. 
Sweden 
1813/07 09/02
/2012 
NV Hate speech, homophobia, insult 
homosexuals, pamphlets, school  
Full text 266 
122 White v. Sweden 42435/02 19/09
/2006 
NV 8 Privacy, good name and reputation, 
defamation, exaggeration, provocation, 
journalistic ethics, positive obligation, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 160 
          Switzerland 
251 Bédat v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
56925/08 29/03
/2016 
NV 10 Criminal conviction, secrecy of criminal 
investigation, responsible journalism, 
accused’s private life 
Full text 376 
117 Dammann v. Switzerland 77551/01 25/04
/2006 
V Confidential information, public 
discussion, vital role of press, public 
watchdog, newsgathering 
Full text 152 
86 Demuth v. Switzerland 38743/97 05/11
/2002 
NV Allocation of broadcasting licence, media 
pluralism, margin of appreciation 
Full text 109 
234 Haldimann and Others v. 
Switzerland  
21830/09 24/02
/2015 
V Hidden cameras, private life, public 
interest, personal reputation, ethics of 
journalism, good faith, accurate factual 
basis 
Full text 339 
20 Hertel v. Switzerland 25181/94 25/08
/1998 
V Research paper, rights of others, necessity, 
commercial speech, academic freedom 
Full text 58 
121 Monnat v. Switzerland 73604/01 21/09
/2006 
V Broadcasting, critical reporting , public 
interest, positive obligations, anti-
Semitism, politically engaged journalism, 
journalistic ethics, public watchdog 
Full text 158 
195 Mouvement raëlien suisse 
v. Switzerland 
16354/06 13/07
/2012 
NV Internet, illegal content, poster campaign, 
aliens, proselytising speech, the protection 
of morals, health, rights of others and 
Full text 272 
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prevention of crime 
217 Perinçek v. Switzerland 27510/08 17/12
/2013 
V, >GC Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 311 
240 Perinçek v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
27510/08 15/10
/2015 
V Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 353 
17 Schöpfer v. Switzerland 25405/94 20/05
/1998 
NV Limits of acceptable criticism, receive 
information, critical reporting , public 
interest  
Full text 55 
196 Schweizerische Radio- 
und Fernseh gesellschaft 
SRG v. Switzerland  
34124/06 21/06
/2012 
V Television interview, political and 
economic expression, rights of others, 
public interest, privacy, security, margin of 
appreciation, public interest 
Full text 274 
116 Stoll v. Switzerland 69698/01 25/04
/2006 
V, >GC Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog,  exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 150 
136 Stoll v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
69698/01 10/12
/2007 
NV Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 180 
64 VgT Vereinigung Tegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland 
24699/94 28/06
/2001 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 86 
157 VgT Vereinigung gegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland (No. 2) [Grand 
Chamber] 
32772/02 30/06
/2009 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 215 
          ”The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” 
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259 Selmani & Others v. the 
former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
67259/14 09/02
/2017 
V Forcible removal, journalists, press gallery, 
national parliament, protests, legitimate 
public concern, behaviour of elected 
representatives, necessary in democratic 
society 
Full text 394 
          Turkey 
100 Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey 42435/98 09/03
/2004 
V Political expression, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, social, ethnic and regional 
differences 
Full text 127 
201 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey 3111/10 18/12
/2012 
V Internet, defamation, blocking of Google 
Sites, disproportionate measure, 
prescribed by law 
Full text 283 
170 Akdas v. Turkey 41056/04 16/02
/2010 
V Artistic expression, obscene or immoral 
information, fiction, 
exaggeration, humorous, duties and 
responsibilities, protection of morals  
Full text 230 
58 Akkoç v. Turkey 22947/93 
and 
22948/93 
10/10
/2000 
NV Interview, disciplinary sanction, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence, armed 
resistance or an uprising 
Full text 86 
173 Aksu v. Turkey 4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
27/07
/2010, 
>GC 
NV 14, 
8 
Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation,  racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy 
Full text 236 
190 Aksu v. Turkey [Grand 
Chamber] 
4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
15/03
/2012 
NV 8 Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation,  racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy  
Full text 264 
27 Arslan v. Turkey 23462/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
Full text 65 
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information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
118 Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey  50692/99 02/02
/2006 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, positive obligations, religion 
Full text 153 
84 Ayse Öztürk v. Turkey 24914/94 15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, terrorism, incitement 
to violence, public debate, positive 
obligation 
Full text 107 
29 Başkaya & Okçuoğlu v. 
Turkey 
23536/94 
and 
24408/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 65 
221 Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey 39690/06, 
40559/06,
48815/06, 
2512/07, 
55197/07, 
55199/07, 
55201/07 
and 
55202/07 
25/03
/2014 
V 10, 
6 
Criminal conviction, publication of 
declarations by illegal armed organisation, 
right to fair trial, fight against terrorism, 
no encouragement of violence, no hate 
speech 
Full text 319 
243 Cengiz and Others v. 
Turkey 
48226/10 
and 
14027/11 
01/12
/2015 
V YouTube, blanket blocking order, insulting 
to the memory of Atatürk, citizen 
journalism, not prescribed by law 
Full text 360 
32 Ceylan v. Turkey 23556/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
Full text 65 
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hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
63 Cyprus v. Turkey 25781/94 10/05
/2001 
V Conflict between State Parties, censorship 
of school-books, restricted distribution 
and importation media 
Full text 785 
88 Dicle on behalf of DEP 
(Democratic Party) v. 
Turkey  
25141/94 10/12
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, positive 
obligation 
Full text 111 
71 E.K. v. Turkey 28496/95 07/02
/2002 
V Book, political expression, vital role of 
press, receive information 
Full text 95 
119 Erbakan v. Turkey 59405/00 06/07
/2006 
V Political debate, political expression, hate 
speech, intolerance, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, religion 
Full text 154 
31 Erdoğdu and İnce v. 
Turkey 
25067/94 
and 
25068/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 65 
52 Erdogdu v. Turkey 25723/94 15/06
/2000 
V Propaganda against the territorial integrity 
of the State, terrorism, access, receive 
information, prevention of disorder or 
crime 
Full text 75 
34 Gerger v. Turkey 24919/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 65 
244 Görmüş and Others v. 49085/07 19/01 V Protection of journalistic sources, Full text 362 
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Turkey 
 
/2016 disclosure of confidential military 
information, whistle-blowers, seizure of 
computer data 
99 Gündüz v. Turkey 35071/97 04/12
/2003 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, religious intolerance, positive 
obligations, shocking or offensive 
information, live studio debate, hatred or 
hostility, pluralism 
Full text 126 
110 IA v. Turkey 42571/98 13/09
/2005 
NV Religious insult, rights of others, 
provocative opinions, abusive and  
offensive information 
Full text 140 
59 Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey  28635/95, 
30171/96 
and 
34535/97 
10/10
/2000 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence 
Full text 81 
18 Incal v. Turkey   09/06
/1998 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, limits of acceptable criticism, 
public interest, hate speech 
Full text 56 
257 Kaos GL v. Turkey 4982/07 22/11
/2016 
V Seizure of magazine, protection of minors, 
protection of public morals, LGBT, 
sexually explicit expression 
Full text 390 
85 Karakoç & others v. 
Turkey  
27692/95, 
28138/95 
and 
28498/95 
15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, public watchdog, 
separatist propaganda, positive obligation 
Full text 107 
30 Karataş v. Turkey 23168/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
Full text 65 
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pluralism 
97 Karkin v. Turkey 43928/98 23/09
/2003 
V Political expression, hate speech, 
discrimination, racism 
Full text 124 
98 Kizilyaprak v. Turkey 27528/95 02/10
/2003 
V Receive information, separatist 
propaganda, hate speech based on ethnic 
ad regional differences 
Full text 125 
137 Nur Radyo v. Turkey 6587/03 27/11
/2007 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, shocking or 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 182 
176 Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon 
Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
(No. 2) 
42284/05 12/10
/2010 
V Broadcasting licence, religion,  rule of law, 
positive obligations,  
Full text 243 
33 Okçuoğlu v. Turkey 24246/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 65 
49 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey  23144/93 16/03
/2000 
V Critical media reporting, separatist 
propaganda, racism, political expression, 
positive obligations , horizontal effect of 
human rights 
Full text 672 
115 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 64178/00, 
64179/00, 
64181/00, 
64183/00, 
64184/00 
30/03
/2006 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 148 
138 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey  11369/03 04/12
/2007 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 182 
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41 Öztürk v. Turkey  22479/93 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, incitement to crime, 
hatred or hostility, public interest, 
prevention of disorder or crime 
Full text 67 
28 Polat v. Turkey 23500/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 65 
82 Seher Karatas v. Turkey  33179/96 09/07
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
incitement to hatred or hostility, national 
security 
Full text 104 
54 Sener v. Turkey 26680/95 18/07
/2000 
V Vital role of press, positive obligations,  
political expression, public interest, 
receive information 
Full text 77 
35 Sürek & Özdemir v. 
Turkey 
23927/94 
and 
24277/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 65 
36 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) 26682/95 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
37 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 2) 24122/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
38 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3) 24735/94 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
39 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4)  24762/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 65 
189 Tusalp v. Turkey 32131/08 21/02 V Defamation, journalistic freedom of Full text 2562 
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and 
41617/08 
/2012 expression, value judgments, Prime 
Minister’s personality rights, margin of 
appreciation 
159 Ürper & others v. Turkey 14526/07, 
14747/07, 
15022/07, 
15737/07, 
36137/07, 
47245/07, 
50371/07, 
50372/07 
and 
54637/07 
20/10
/2009 
V Terrorism, suspension of publication and 
distribution of newspaper, public 
watchdog 
Full text 219 
81 Yagmuredereli v. Turkey 29590/96 04/06
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
separatist propaganda, violence, national 
security 
Full text 104 
87  Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 28493/95 05/12
/2002 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, receive information, positive 
obligation 
Full text 111 
142 Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 
(No. 3) 
71353/01 22/04
/2008 
V Incitement to hatred or hostility, 
separatism, necessity 
Full text 188 
13 Zana v. Turkey 18954/91 25/11
/1997 
NV Political expression, incitement to 
violence, terrorism 
Full text 53 
           Ukraine 
253 Instytut Ekonomichnykh 
Reform, TOV v. Ukraine 
61561/08 02/06
/2016 
V Defamation proceedings, public figure, 
political speech, satire, value judgments, 
sufficient factual basis 
Full text 381 
          The United Kingdom 
89 A. v. the United Kingdom 35373/97 17/12
/2002 
NV 6, 
8, 13, 
Political expression, right of access, 
defamation, discrimination, privacy 
Full text 114 
Back to overview of case-law 
504 
 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
14  
19 Ahmed & others v. the 
United Kingdom 
22954/93 02/09
/1998 
NV Impart information, political expression, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 57 
206 Animal Defenders 
International v. the 
United Kingdom [Grand 
Chamber] 
48876/08 22/04
/2013 
NV Public debate, ban on political advertising, 
NGO, powerful financial groups, access, 
influential media, alternative media, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 293 
62 B. & P. v. the United 
Kingdom 
36337/97 
and 
35974/97 
24/04
/2001 
NV Privacy, protection of vulnerable persons, 
necessity 
Full text 84 
16 Bowman v. the United 
Kingdom  
24839/94 19/02
/1998 
V Political expression, monopoly position of 
the media, critical reporting 
Full text 54 
160 Financial Times & others 
v. the United Kingdom 
821/03 15/12
/2009 
V Protection of journalistic sources, a source 
acting in bad faith, public interest 
Full text 220 
7 Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom 
17488/90 27/03
/1996 
V Protection of sources, public interest, 
responsible journalism, chilling effect, 
whistle-blowing  
Full text 45 
44 Hashman & Harrup v. the 
United Kingdom 
25594/94 25/11
/1999 
V Unlawful action, concept of behaviour 
contra bonos mores, foreseeability 
Full text 69 
255 Jon Gaunt v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.) 
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/2016 
NV Broadcasting regulation, broadcasting 
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public figure 
Full text 386 
78 McVicar v. the United 
Kingdom 
46311/99 02/05
/2002 
NV Defamation, public interest, well-known 
sports figures, factual evidence 
Full text 101 
177 MGN Ltd. v. United 
Kingdom 
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/2011 
V Public interest, privacy, chilling effect, 
disproportionality of interference 
Full text 244 
181 Mosley v. the United 
Kingdom 
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/2005 
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24838/94 23/09
/1998 
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45 T. v. the United Kingdom 24724/94 16/12
/1999 
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Kingdom 
3002/03 
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/2009 
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Full text 200 
6 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the 
United Kingdom  
18139/91 13/07
/1995 
V Defamation, libel, crime reporting, 
disproportionate damages 
Full text 44 
46 V. v. the United Kingdom   16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest 
 
Full text 70 
80 Wilson & NUJ v. the 
United Kingdom 
30668/96, 
30671/96 
and 
30678/96 
02/07
/2002 
V 11 Journalism, freedom of assembly and 
association, necessity  
Full text 103 
8 Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom 
17419/90 25/11
/1996 
NV Blasphemous film, artistic expression, 
rights of others, general verification 
system for videos, political speech, public 
interest, margin of appreciation, morals or 
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Full text 47 
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Appendix IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Treaty Series - No. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rome, 4.XI.1950 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Text amended by the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194) as from the date of its 
entry into force on 1 June 2010.  
The text of the Convention had been previously amended according to the provisions of 
Protocol No. 3 (ETS No. 45), which entered into force on 21 September 1970, of 
Protocol No. 5 (ETS No. 55), which entered into force on 20 December 1971 and of 
Protocol No. 8 (ETS No. 118), which entered into force on 1 January 1990, and comprised 
also the text of Protocol No. 2 (ETS No. 44) which, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 3 
thereof, had been an integral part of the Convention since its entry into force on 
21 September 1970. All provisions which had been amended or added by these Protocols 
were replaced by Protocol No. 11 (ETS No. 155), as from the date of its entry into force on 
1 November 1998. As from that date, Protocol No. 9 (ETS No. 140), which entered into force 
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on 1 October 1994, was repealed and Protocol No. 10 (ETS no. 146) had lost its purpose.  
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  The governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe, 
 
  Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948; 
 
  Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective 
recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared; 
 
  Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater 
unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be 
pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; 
 
  Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the 
foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one 
hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common 
understanding and observance of the human rights upon which they depend; 
 
  Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded 
and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of 
law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights 
stated in the Universal Declaration, 
 
  Have agreed as follows: 
 
  Article 1 – Obligation to respect human rights 
 
  The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention. 
 
 Section I – Rights and freedoms 
 
  Article 2 – Right to life 
 
 1 Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
 
 2 Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
 
  a in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
 
  b in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
 
  c in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
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  Article 3 – Prohibition of torture 
 
  No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
 
  Article 4 – Prohibition of slavery and forced labour 
 
 1 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
 
 2 No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
 
 3 For the purpose of this article the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not 
include: 
 
  a any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed 
according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during 
conditional release from such detention; 
 
  b any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in 
countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory 
military service; 
 
  c any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life 
or well-being of the community; 
 
  d any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. 
 
  Article 5 – Right to liberty and security 
 
 1 Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived 
of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law: 
 
  a the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
 
  b the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation 
prescribed by law; 
 
  c the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to 
prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
 
  d the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
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competent legal authority; 
 
  e the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of 
infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or 
vagrants; 
 
  f the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is 
being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
 
 2 Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
 
 3 Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.c 
of this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised 
by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to 
appear for trial. 
 
 4 Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided 
speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
 
 5 Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
 
  Article 6 – Right to a fair trial 
 
 1 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall 
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part 
of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private 
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of 
the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice. 
 
 2 Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 
 
 3 Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
 
  a to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
 
  b to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
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  c to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing 
or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free 
when the interests of justice so require; 
 
  d to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; 
 
  e to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court. 
 
  Article 7 – No punishment without law 
 
 1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty 
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was 
committed. 
 
 2 This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act 
or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to 
the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. 
 
  Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
 
 1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
 
 2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. 
 
  Article 9 – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion  
 
 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, 
in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
 
 2 Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
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  Article 10 – Freedom of expression 
 
 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom 
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
 
 2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
  Article 11 – Freedom of assembly and association 
 
 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
 
 2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the 
administration of the State. 
 
  Article 12 – Right to marry 
 
  Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a 
family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
 
  Article 13 – Right to an effective remedy 
 
  Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
 
  Article 14 – Prohibition of discrimination 
 
  The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
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national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
  Article 15 – Derogation in time of emergency 
 
 1 In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any 
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under 
this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law. 
 
 2 No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful 
acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this 
provision. 
 
 3 Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it 
has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the 
provisions of the Convention are again being fully executed. 
 
  Article 16 – Restrictions on political activity of aliens 
 
  Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High 
Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens. 
 
  Article 17 – Prohibition of abuse of rights 
 
  Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention. 
 
  Article 18 – Limitation on use of restrictions on rights 
 
  The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms 
shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been 
prescribed. 
   
 
 Section II – European Court of Human Rights 
 
  Article 19 – Establishment of the Court 
 
  To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting 
Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a 
European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as "the Court".  It shall 
function on a permanent basis. 
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  Article 20 – Number of judges 
 
  The Court shall consist of a number of judges equal to that of the High 
Contracting Parties.   
 
  Article 21 – Criteria for office 
 
 1 The judges shall be of high moral character and must either possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of 
recognised competence. 
 
 2 The judges shall sit on the Court in their individual capacity. 
 
 3 During their term of office the judges shall not engage in any activity which is 
incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-
time office; all questions arising from the application of this paragraph shall be 
decided by the Court. 
 
  Article 22 – Election of judges 2 
 
  The judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly with respect to each 
High Contracting Party by a majority of votes cast from a list of three candidates 
nominated by the High Contracting Party.   
 
  Article 23 – Terms of office and dismissal 3 
 
 1 The judges shall be elected for a period of nine years.  They may not be re-elected.  
 
 2 The terms of office of judges shall expire when they reach the age of 70. 
 
 3 The judges shall hold office until replaced.  They shall, however, continue to deal 
with such cases as they already have under consideration. 
 
 4 No judge may be dismissed from office unless the other judges decide by a 
majority of two-thirds that that judge has ceased to fulfil the required conditions. 
 
  Article 24 – Registry and rapporteurs 2 
 
 1 The Court shall have a registry, the functions and organisation of which shall be 
laid down in the rules of the Court.  
 
 2 When sitting in a single-judge formation, the Court shall be assisted by 
rapporteurs who shall function under the authority of the President of the Court. 
                                                          
2
 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
3
 Article renumbered, heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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They shall form part of the Court’s registry. 
 
  Article 25 – Plenary Court 4 
 
  The plenary Court shall 
 
  a elect its President and one or two Vice-Presidents for a period of three years; 
they may be re-elected; 
 
  b set up Chambers, constituted for a fixed period of time; 
 
  c elect the Presidents of the Chambers of the Court;  they may be re-elected; 
 
  d adopt the rules of the Court; 
 
  e elect the Registrar and one or more Deputy Registrars; 
 
  f make any request under Article 26, paragraph 2. 
 
  Article 26 – Single-judge formation, committees, Chambers and Grand Chamber 1 
 
 1 To consider cases brought before it, the Court shall sit in a single-judge formation, 
in committees of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand 
Chamber of seventeen judges. The Court’s Chambers shall set up committees for a 
fixed period of time. 
 
 2 At the request of the plenary Court, the Committee of Ministers may, by a 
unanimous decision and for a fixed period, reduce to five the number of judges of 
the Chambers. 
 
 3 When sitting as a single judge, a judge shall not examine any application against 
the High Contracting Party in respect of which that judge has been elected. 
 
 4 There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber the 
judge elected in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned. If there is none 
or if that judge is unable to sit, a person chosen by the President of the Court from 
a list submitted in advance by that Party shall sit in the capacity of judge. 
 
 5 The Grand Chamber shall also include the President of the Court, the Vice-
Presidents, the Presidents of the Chambers and other judges chosen in accordance 
with the rules of the Court. When a case is referred to the Grand Chamber under 
Article 43, no judge from the Chamber which rendered the judgment shall sit in 
the Grand Chamber, with the exception of the President of the Chamber and the 
judge who sat in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned. 
 
                                                          
4 Article renumbered, heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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  Article 27 – Competence of single judges 5 
 
 1 A single judge may declare inadmissible or strike out of the Court’s list of cases an 
application submitted under Article 34, where such a decision can be taken 
without further examination. 
 
 2 The decision shall be final. 
 
 3 If the single judge does not declare an application inadmissible or strike it out, 
that judge shall forward it to a committee or to a Chamber for further 
examination. 
 
  Article 28 – Competence of committees 6 
 
 1 In respect of an application submitted under Article 34, a committee may, by a 
unanimous vote, 
 
  a declare it inadmissible or strike it out of its list of cases, where such decision 
can be taken without further examination; or 
 
  b declare it admissible and render at the same time a judgment on the merits, if 
the underlying question in the case, concerning the interpretation or the 
application of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, is already the subject 
of well-established case-law of the Court. 
 
 2 Decisions and judgments under paragraph 1 shall be final. 
 
 3 If the judge elected in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned is not a 
member of the committee, the committee may at any stage of the proceedings 
invite that judge to take the place of one of the members of the committee, having 
regard to all relevant factors, including whether that Party has contested the 
application of the procedure under paragraph 1.b. 
 
  Article 29 – Decisions by Chambers on admissibility and merits 7 
 
 1 If no decision is taken under Article 27 or 28, or no judgment rendered under 
Article 28, a Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of individual 
applications submitted under Article 34. The decision on admissibility may be 
taken separately. 
 
 2 A Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of inter-State applications 
submitted under Article 33. The decision on admissibility shall be taken separately 
unless the Court, in exceptional cases, decides otherwise.  
                                                          
5 New article according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
6 Heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
7 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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  Article 30 – Relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber 
 
  Where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the 
interpretation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or where the resolution 
of a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a 
judgment previously delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, at any time before 
it has rendered its judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand 
Chamber, unless one of the parties to the case objects. 
 
  Article 31 – Powers of the Grand Chamber 8 
 
  The Grand Chamber shall 
 
  a determine applications submitted either under Article 33 or Article 34 when a 
Chamber has relinquished jurisdiction under Article 30 or when the case has 
been referred to it under Article 43;  
 
  b decide on issues referred to the Court by the Committee of Ministers in 
accordance with Article 46, paragraph 4; and 
 
  c consider requests for advisory opinions submitted under Article 47. 
 
  Article 32 – Jurisdiction of the Court 1 
  
 1 The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which 
are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47. 
 
 2 In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall 
decide. 
 
  Article 33 – Inter-State cases 
 
  Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the 
provisions of the Convention and the protocols thereto by another High 
Contracting Party.   
 
  Article 34 – Individual applications 
 
  The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one 
of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the 
protocols thereto.  The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any 
way the effective exercise of this right. 
                                                          
8 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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  Article 35 – Admissibility criteria 1 
 
 1 The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and 
within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.   
 
 2 The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that 
 
  a is anonymous; or 
 
  b is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the 
Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information. 
 
 3 The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under 
Article 34 if it considers that : 
 
  a the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the 
Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of 
individual application; or 
 
  b the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires 
an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case 
may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a 
domestic tribunal. 
 
 4 The Court shall reject any application which it considers inadmissible under this 
Article.  It may do so at any stage of the proceedings.   
 
  Article 36 – Third party intervention 9 
 
 1 In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, a High Contracting Party one 
of whose nationals is an applicant shall have the right to submit written 
comments and to take part in hearings. 
 
 2 The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of 
justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings 
or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written comments or 
take part in hearings. 
 
 3 In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights may submit written comments and take part in 
hearings. 
                                                          
9 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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  Article 37 – Striking out applications 
 
 1 The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out 
of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that 
 
  a the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or  
 
  b the matter has been resolved; or  
 
  c for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to 
continue the examination of the application. 
 
  However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the protocols thereto so requires. 
 
 2 The Court may decide to restore an application to its list of cases if it considers 
that the circumstances justify such a course.  
 
  Article 38 – Examination of the case 10 
 
  The Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties 
and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the 
High Contracting Parties concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities.  
 
  Article 39 – Friendly settlements 11 
 
 1 At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may place itself at the disposal of the 
parties concerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on 
the basis of respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the 
Protocols thereto. 
 
 2 Proceedings conducted under paragraph 1 shall be confidential. 
 
 3 If a friendly settlement is effected, the Court shall strike the case out of its list by 
means of a decision which shall be confined to a brief statement of the facts and 
of the solution reached. 
 
 4 This decision shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall 
supervise the execution of the terms of the friendly settlement as set out in the 
decision. 
 
  Article 40 – Public hearings and access to documents 
 
                                                          
10 Heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
11 Heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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 1 Hearings shall be in public unless the Court in exceptional circumstances decides 
otherwise. 
 
 2 Documents deposited with the Registrar shall be accessible to the public unless 
the President of the Court decides otherwise. 
 
  Article 41 – Just satisfaction 
 
  If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the 
protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned 
allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just 
satisfaction to the injured party. 
 
  Article 42 – Judgments of Chambers 
 
  Judgments of Chambers shall become final in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 44, paragraph 2. 
 
  Article 43 – Referral to the Grand Chamber 
 
 1 Within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, 
any party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred 
to the Grand Chamber. 
 
 2 A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber shall accept the request if the case 
raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the 
Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance. 
 
 3 If the panel accepts the request, the Grand Chamber shall decide the case by 
means of a judgment. 
 
  Article 44 – Final judgments 
 
 1 The judgment of the Grand Chamber shall be final. 
 
 2 The judgment of a Chamber shall become final  
 
  a when the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred 
to the Grand Chamber; or 
 
  b three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the 
Grand Chamber has not been requested; or  
 
  c when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer under 
Article 43. 
 
 3 The final judgment shall be published. 
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  Article 45 – Reasons for judgments and decisions 
 
 1 Reasons shall be given for judgments as well as for decisions declaring 
applications admissible or inadmissible. 
 
 2 If a judgment does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of 
the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. 
 
  Article 46 – Binding force and execution of judgments 12 
 
 1 The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court 
in any case to which they are parties.   
 
 2 The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of 
Ministers, which shall supervise its execution. 
 
 3 If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision of the execution of a 
final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may 
refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A 
referral decision shall require a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives 
entitled to sit on the Committee. 
 
 4 If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to 
abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving 
formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two 
thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, refer to the Court 
the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation under paragraph 
1. 
 
 5 If the Court finds a violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the 
Committee of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken. If the 
Court finds no violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee 
of Ministers, which shall close its examination of the case. 
 
  Article 47 – Advisory opinions 
 
 1 The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, give advisory 
opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and 
the protocols thereto. 
 
 2 Such opinions shall not deal with any question relating to the content or scope of 
the rights or freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention and the protocols 
thereto, or with any other question which the Court or the Committee of Ministers 
might have to consider in consequence of any such proceedings as could be 
                                                          
12 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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instituted in accordance with the Convention. 
 
 3 Decisions of the Committee of Ministers to request an advisory opinion of the 
Court shall require a majority vote of the representatives entitled to sit on the 
Committee. 
 
  Article 48 – Advisory jurisdiction of the Court 
 
  The Court shall decide whether a request for an advisory opinion submitted by the 
Committee of Ministers is within its competence as defined in Article 47. 
 
  Article 49 – Reasons for advisory opinions 
 
 1 Reasons shall be given for advisory opinions of the Court. 
 
 2 If the advisory opinion does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous 
opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. 
 
 3 Advisory opinions of the Court shall be communicated to the Committee of 
Ministers. 
 
  Article 50 – Expenditure on the Court 
 
  The expenditure on the Court shall be borne by the Council of Europe. 
 
  Article 51 – Privileges and immunities of judges 
 
  The judges shall be entitled, during the exercise of their functions, to the 
privileges and immunities provided for in Article 40 of the Statute of the Council 
of Europe and in the agreements made thereunder. 
 
 Section III  – Miscellaneous provisions 
 
  Article 52 – Inquiries by the Secretary General 
 
  On receipt of a request from the Secretary General of the Council of Europe any 
High Contracting Party shall furnish an explanation of the manner in which its 
internal law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the 
Convention. 
 
  Article 53 – Safeguard for existing human rights 
 
  Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any 
of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the 
laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a 
Party.  
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  Article 54 – Powers of the Committee of Ministers 
 
  Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the powers conferred on the Committee 
of Ministers by the Statute of the Council of Europe. 
 
  Article 55 – Exclusion of other means of dispute settlement 
 
  The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they will 
not avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force between 
them for the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a dispute arising out of the 
interpretation or application of this Convention to a means of settlement other 
than those provided for in this Convention. 
 
  Article 56 – Territorial application  
 
 1 Any State may at the time of its ratification or at any time thereafter declare by 
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that the 
present Convention shall, subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, extend to all or 
any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible. 
 
 2 The Convention shall extend to the territory or territories named in the 
notification as from the thirtieth day after the receipt of this notification by the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 
 
 3 The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such territories with due 
regard, however, to local requirements. 
 
 4 Any State which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this 
article may at any time thereafter declare on behalf of one or more of the 
territories to which the declaration relates that it accepts the competence of the 
Court to receive applications from individuals, non-governmental organisations or 
groups of individuals as provided by Article 34 of the Convention. 
 
  Article 57 – Reservations  
 
 1 Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of 
ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the 
Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in 
conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be 
permitted under this article. 
 
 2 Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the law 
concerned. 
 
  Article 58 – Denunciation  
 
 1 A High Contracting Party may denounce the present Convention only after the 
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expiry of five years from the date on which it became a party to it and after six 
months' notice contained in a notification addressed to the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe, who shall inform the other High Contracting Parties. 
 
 2 Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the High Contracting 
Party concerned from its obligations under this Convention in respect of any act 
which, being capable of constituting a violation of such obligations, may have 
been performed by it before the date at which the denunciation became effective. 
 
 3 Any High Contracting Party which shall cease to be a member of the Council of 
Europe shall cease to be a Party to this Convention under the same conditions. 
 
 4 The Convention may be denounced in accordance with the provisions of the 
preceding paragraphs in respect of any territory to which it has been declared to 
extend under the terms of Article 56. 
 
  Article 59 – Signature and ratification 13 
 
 1 This Convention shall be open to the signature of the members of the Council of 
Europe. It shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited with the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe. 
 
 2 The European Union may accede to this Convention. 
 
 3 The present Convention shall come into force after the deposit of ten instruments 
of ratification. 
 
 4 As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the Convention shall come into 
force at the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. 
 
 5 The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify all the members of the 
Council of Europe of the entry into force of the Convention, the names of the High 
Contracting Parties who have ratified it, and the deposit of all instruments of 
ratification which may be effected subsequently. 
 
 
  Done at Rome this 4th day of November 1950, in English and French, both texts 
being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the 
archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary General shall transmit certified 
copies to each of the signatories. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
